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Editorial

Back in March 2008 I was elected Carnival Editor 2008-2009 at the General Assembly in Delft. At first I had no intention to stand as a candidate, but in a split of a second I decided to do so and afterwards I didn't regret that decision at all.

When the 2007-2008 edition of Carnival was presented at the annual conference in Zagreb, I started to collect new articles for this edition. At first I was afraid there might not be enough good spirit to publish articles, but as you can see further on that was not quite the case. There were many new members present in Zagreb and many people were interested in writing an article for this Carnival. Furthermore Volker, one of the council members 2008-2009 and my assistant in the Editorial Board, and I discussed about the *dos* and *dons* for this Carnival and we concluded we want to modify it a bit. For example we decided to add statistical information from past seminars and conferences. Of course this edition is modelled after previous issues and contains: a word from the president and the articles on the topic 'Turning points in History.' We are very happy to present you a variety of articles covering very different themes.

At the beginning of July everything seemed to be on schedule and during the summer months I planned to edit and print the 2009 edition, so it would be ready right before the autumn seminar in Pisa. Unfortunately I couldn't keep up with that schedule due to some health problems. Together with the International Board I decided to postpone the publishing of Carnival. As well due to the financial situation this edition is published a bit later than expected. But thanks to the support of the International Board
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and especially Volker, we managed to get this thing done.

I want to thank everybody who helped me with this edition of Carnival and everybody else who made an effort to keep the ISHA spirit alive. Also special thanks to the people who helped me proofreading the texts, and of course a big thank you to the authors of all the articles I received.

In order to make it easier for future editors in chief I am willing to share my experiences and to set up a scenario in co-operation with other Carnival editors. I think it will be a good thing to standardise Carnival a bit further and to give it a more permanent character, so it will be recognisable in the future. I wish you all lots of great experiences with ISHA and I hope you will enjoy what we have done with the 2009 edition of Carnival. Let us continue with this wonderful tradition after 20 years of ISHA. The only thing left to say, like many editors did before me: all good things come to an end.

Yours faithfully,

Lia Hamminga
Carnival Editor 2008-2009
A Word from the President

Dear ISHA,

This past year has been a good one for ISHA for several reasons. First of all, there have been four events: three seminars (Ljubljana, Belgrade, Utrecht) and the conference in Zagreb. With four events, anyone who has been willing has been able to take part in at least one of the events. On the other hand, the President (me) has been compelled to fly to four events, but that’s my problem (or my wallet’s). All of these four events have been successful both in terms of academic contribution and the social side. We have clearly been able to raise the academic level of our workshops and hopefully this will be possible in the future as well. In Zagreb, for example, we had a most interesting round table talk at the end of the conference about “turning points” and the role of history as a science. This kind of debating will open our minds for different views and trains us for future international conferences.

ISHA has also been expanding quite a bit in terms of both sections and countries. A clear demonstration of this is that in 2008, at Delft’s conference, we had participants from 9 sections and 5 countries whereas in 2009, at Zagreb’s conference, we had participants from 20 sections and 14 countries. This is a fantastic development and we should all hope for more growth and getting more countries and sections involved. Promoting ISHA should be a continuous, never-ending project.
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In addition, we have had a considerable amount of cooperation with other organisations this year. ISHA attended both UNESCO’s World Conference on Higher Education in Paris and CLIOH-World’s conference in Salzburg. Euro-CLIO is also starting a new project, “Connecting Europe through History”, to which ISHA has also been invited to take part. There has been an interesting proposal for cooperation from European Student Union (ESU) as well. Our status as an international student organisation has clearly been recognised by many.

All in all, ISHA seems to be going strong, but we have to bear in mind that nothing comes for free and we must all remain active with our organisation. I want to thank everyone who has been working for ISHA, including both officials and all of you who have been taking part in our events this year. YOU make ISHA what it is!

Yours sincerely,

Marko Halonen
ISHA President 2008-2009
Turning Points
Interview with Prof. Dr. Christoph Kampmann

Interview by Sven Mörsdorf, ISHA Marburg, on June 10 2009

Christoph Kampmann is professor for early modern history in Marburg, Germany, since 2003. After studying in Bonn, Cologne, and Oxford, Kampmann specialised in the fields of criminal justice in the Thirty Years’ War, as well as international relations and politics. His major works include an extensive study on the concept of *arbiter*, or conciliator between the European powers, and most recently an account of the Thirty Years’ War in an international perspective. Currently, Professor Kampmann is researching aspects of religious pluralism and confessional minorities in the early modern period, that is, examining the politics behind the “protection of foreign subjects”, which today may have a parallel in humanitarian interventionism.

ISHA: Professor Kampmann, your work focuses on the early modern era. With regard to the topic of this edition of Carnival, “Turning Points in History”, one might at first ask how practicable the notion of epoch actually is, and how epochs are being defined.

KAMPMANN: This whole discussion can be illustrated by the example of the early modern period. The idea of a “modern” epoch was originally coined by Humanism, in the 15th and 16th century, to distinguish the “backward” Middle Ages and a rediscovered classical Antiquity, in the tradition of which the Humanists wanted to put their own time. In the course of the following centuries, this division became broadly accepted. It was not until the 20th century that a discussion about the existence and duration of an *early* modernity was sparked. Especially constitutional and
social historians argued that for the majority of the population no significant differences existed between the medieval and early modern periods. Thus, to draw a sharp line would have been justified only for the lives of tiny minorities. One proposal was to abandon the notion of an early modernity, and instead introduce a wider “Ancien Régime” epoch beginning in the high medieval period and ranging well into the 18th century.

It was a counter-movement to this idea that helped shape the notion of the early modern period as we use it today. In response to the social approach, it was argued that many of the historical developments of that time were far too complex to be incorporated into such a long interval, and since the Second World War, the early modern period is being recognised as an epoch characterising more than just the conditions of small elites. Therefore, the question whether or not there is a modern or early modern period is in a fundamental way related to the assessment and classification of history and chronology itself. Although, of course, it is a historiographical necessity to structure developments, there is more behind it than simple pragmatism.

Which characteristics make of the early modern times a distinct historical period?

There are plenty of opinions in favour of a distinct early modern period. Although it is acknowledged that Europe basically remained an agrarian society, many fundamental processes of development occurred. The first to be named is the confessional split of the Western world. By the way, one should bear in mind that the terminology only fits the European point
of view. From a global perspective it might easily be questioned. In the European context, however, the break-up of medieval universalism into different churches meant the first experience of change that penetrated more than the elites. Since the late 16th century, people became more and more aware of the establishment of multiple creeds and churches. This affected the daily lives of the common people in a fundamental way, and initiated the process of “confessionalisation”.

The second point is the *educational and communicational revolution* which took place especially after the spread of letterpress printing in the 15th century. This development is connected to the reformation – and thereby, to the first point mentioned here – as well. For the first time, mass media evolved that were able to reach large parts of the population. Research shows that the new public discourse incorporated all parts of society, including those unable to read or write.

The third major point is the *formation of statehood* which, though rooted in medieval dynastic structures, only in the early modern period created a complex system of administration. This found its expression in ever-growing loads of files and records, but also in the extension of fiscal organisation. Financial resources for the new state were accrued, allowing for a better infrastructure, and on the other hand, for waging war much more efficiently. War indeed is an important point, as now money started to play the central role in military campaigns. Money was needed to finance mercenary armies that were very much larger than ever before, directly involving tens of thousands of men, compared to only hundreds in medieval times. Hence, since the medieval period the method of warfare was not just continued, but transformed into a more destructive tool. All these aspects – religious diversity, education and communication,
formation of statehood, extended warfare – were of lasting importance, and are the main arguments for an independent early modern era that is more than a sequel to the medieval epoch.

Apart from the processes you mentioned, is it possible to define the early modern period by means of concrete dates, years, or events?

Didactically speaking, concrete dates are of course very useful. But to name certain dates at which something begins and something ends is pure convention, and thus always debatable.

For my own part, I am involved in a project for an “Encyclopaedia of the Modern Era” (Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit) which is meant to cover the timeframe between ca. 1450 and 1850. My colleagues and I resolved to use these dates because most of the developments described above begin in the middle of the 15th century, and around 1850, at least in continental Europe, the pre-industrial period ends. But with equal justification we could have drawn the temporal borderline, for instance, at the Reformation or the discovery of America, the former due to its heavy impact on society, and the latter because of the beginning of globalisation and the spread of European civilisation into the world.

The conventional character of these dates lies in the fact that, taken on its own, none of them can be called an event that shook the foundations of the whole of Europe. While many broader processes were affecting large parts of the population, to say the same for individual events would mean to overemphasise their impact. Yet, I think it is necessary to name certain dates in order to structure complex historical developments. But in contrast to the discussion about epochs, which at its core is related to one’s
fundamental assessment of history, the discussion about dates is merely a matter of convention, even more due to the strong influence of historiographical traditions. I would be reluctant to say that in the moment it happened, a single event would have changed the world in an extraordinarily fundamental way.

**Could one still speak of turning points, if only concrete dates or events which were signalling or symbolising epoch-making changes are meant?**

I really think we need such dates. They are important to structure historical developments. But one has to be very cautious in order to neither over- nor underrate them. Take a look at the example of 1648. About eleven years ago, this date has been subject to an immense jubilee, celebrating the Peace of Westphalia 350 years before. While the event itself undoubtedly was of great importance, much of its historical value has been exaggerated. It is true that 1648 installed a new order in central Europe, ended the Thirty Years’ War, and caused many important territorial stipulations – but it did not bring peace to Europe, contrary to what many people think. War continued outside Germany, and for many people, in spite of the treaties of Westphalia, nothing changed. To name 1648 an epoch-making turning point would be to neglect the European dimension. However, I would not say that 1648 cannot be used as such a turning point. I think it is a good date to set a turning point, as long as we always pay attention to the context.

If we make a turning point absolute, we overstress it, and forget about other important events. Doing so, it is also very easy to inherit
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nationalistic historiographical traditions, or at least disregard other nations’ perspectives. 1648 is an essentially central European event which cannot be called a turning point for England, Spain, Russia, or Poland, and so forth. Only if we look at the symbolic value of certain dates it is legitimate to call an event a turning point in an absolute way. We thereby do not judge the event itself, but its symbolic implication for processes and shifts taking place at a specific time. The event’s assessment is only related to historiography itself. This is what I mean by critical distance: Turning points need to be questioned and critical knowledge needs to be employed when using them. 1648 is a suitable date for a turning point, but only if we see it in a differentiated way. This is what sometimes was forgotten in 1998. Some argued that “the” European peace had come. To say this means to treat history a little bit too uncritical.

If we speak of turning points from the historiographical perspective, it must seem that it is all a matter of convention and construction.

As a principle, almost everything is a construct. Still, strong historical dynamics may exist within these constructs. If we take, for example, the French Revolution of 1789, we can see an event that, without doubt, has changed the European world in a fundamental way. Its transformational impact was already understood by contemporaries, but later employed in a more exclusive, often gallocentric manner to form a European or even global turning point. Here we see, again, the tendency to overrate the influence of an event. In England, for example, 1789 did not lead to important changes at all. The same applies to broader international politics, where, according to some solid theses, only few things changed. It
was argued that the European development of the 18th century was inevitably leading towards certain results: The expansion of warfare (*Kriegsverdichtung*, literally “compression of war”) and an increase in efficiency of the state. 1789 would only mean a new level of escalation as a result of the preceding developments — but no turning point, as the old system of politics would carry on under slightly different circumstances.

Here, the symbolic character of the event is questioned by a perspective of international relations. For all turning points it is important to remember that if we consider certain historical processes, in the end our own perspective decides. If one examines the development of the inner structure of the state and its estates, 1789 indeed plays a pivotal role. But if one looks at international state policy, the turning point-character will be qualified or, more literally, put into perspective again.

It might be interesting to note that in the historical science, international state policy has been rather neglected in former decades, and only recently found more attention. Turning points reveal much about a particular time’s perspective on history, and they may in a way even symbolise epochs of historiography itself.

**What about turning points in the historical science, then? After methodology changes, or new perspectives on old topics evolve, often a turning point will be declared, for example the various “cultural turns” of the last decades. To what extend are these turning points legitimate?**

I think that the same applies to historical science as to history itself. Who defines the turning points defines the perspective on history. And who
Carnival XI (2009) defines historical science, defines its politics as well. If I say, for instance, a “cultural turn” has happened and now everything is different than before – by this, I draw a line. Of course, many would rightly disagree with this, because it is doubtful that everything after a turning point will be new and unprecedented.

This is not meant to question all the valuable contributions of cultural history, but to point out that the older tradition of historiography (if well-crafted) already had considered important cultural aspects before any turning point occurred. To assert that a “cultural turn” were the only starting point for a better understanding of historical developments, and thereby to imply that everything before the turn were wrong, is nothing more than overrating. Moreover, it is equally wrong for the opponents of this concept to say that everything appearing after this turn is wrong. Personally, I think that such debates are much too focused on the politics of science.

It is positive if modern historiography pays attention to a bigger picture and perspective, but I strongly doubt that a simple “turn” is everything behind this process. All too often, otherwise innovative approaches are being overstressed, for example as turning points, and after enthusiasm faded, in a quick yet equally wrong they are neglected and forgotten again. Because of all this, I am very sceptical about such “turns” in historical science. What lurks behind the whole discussion about turning points is: Whoever tries to control the definition and interpretation of turning points tries to control the view on historical developments and the evolution of historical science, as well. This, however, is a step too far across the border between history and politics.
The title of this conference is ‘Turning Points in History’ and it is this very use of turning points as a useful concept in the study of our past that I will examine. As an economic history student I will make use of my expertise in this area to provide case studies in support of my arguments. In addition, I will use examples from the field of military history. Military history cannot be divorced from technological developments and these in turn are intrinsically linked to economic history. A further reason for using military history is that major military related events are often cited as turning points in history by both lay and academic historians.

Let us first turn to the definition of turning points as a concept. How big is a turning point? Is a one degree alteration in direction a turning point? Is a 180 degree change of direction a turning point, or something else? What of a 0.00001 degree change in direction? In history we have an infinite number of examples of potential turning points. Was Hitler’s decision to become a vegetarian a turning point in modern history? How about the decision by Stalin to join the communist movement led by Lenin? Continuing this militaristic theme, when the Mongols swept across Europe and the Middle East, the destruction they wrought was awe-inspiring in its scale and impact. Was their destruction of an individual city a turning point and even if so, on what level? Can it be
of bills of exchange, the advances made in European naval capabilities from the late mediaeval period into the early modern period, and the movement in land ownership from a feudal system to a market-focused farmer model. The sixteenth century witnessed a prolonged period of price inflation right across Europe, something much noted by contemporaries and much debated then and since. An early identified cause was the influx of precious metals from European expansion along the African coast and throughout the Americas. Among the results attributed to this ‘great inflationary period’ are the expansion of trade, the concentration of capital and creation of better social support for the poor and needy. An associated development was the invention of bills of exchange to allow those of good credit to spend bullion without the need to present it immediately at the point of sale. Such bills could be used to withdraw the bullion on the account of those whose name they were drafted from their bankers when convenient. This system quickly evolved to allow the circulation of the bills through many hands before they would be cashed and their exchange between bankers allowed for the settling of accounts without the need to move all the bullion involved. Such a paper-based system reduced the need to transport bullion, facilitated long distance trade, helped overcome currency exchange issues and allowed a far greater liquidity to emerge through the multiplier effect. In short, this development is a necessary precursor to our modern fiat money. Yet whether this was the result of a single individual’s decision or how it spread is not known. Even if it could be proven that an individual banker was responsible for this innovation could it be argued that it would not have happened during this period in any case? Given the fall in the relative value of bullion and the increase in long distance cross-border trade, an instrument as obvious as bills of
argued that the sacking of a regionally important fortified settlement was less a turning point than their near total destruction of the key learned centre of Bagdad in 1258? Jumping back to the twentieth century – what is a more significant historic event, a greater turning point, for humanity: the invention of the jet engine or the birth control pill for women? Surely the production of the pill is a key moment in the liberation of over half of humanity and thus a far better candidate for being a turning point. Indeed, could it be argued that this event is in the longer term a more significant event than World War II as a whole?

Leaving aside the difficulties in defining turning points by the perceived scale of any change in the direction of events – how else can they be identified or categorised? Are they to be defined on the importance of the key actors or on the overall importance of the events themselves? Does the involvement of a major figure of the period have any bearing on the designation of a turning point, or should such a designation solely rely on the events that occurred? Should greater weight be given to actions that resulted from the decisions of individuals rather than to those that took place due to the reactions of key actors to events outside their control? Even where these reactions have massive significance, is it not the events that spurred these reactions that should be the central focus of any designated turning point? These few questions serve to underline the complexities involved in formulating a clear approach to defining turning points in history. Moving on from this theoretical debate, the usefulness of reaching such a definition can be examined in the context of case studies from economic and military history.

I have chosen three key developments in European history that have been much examined within economic history. These are the creation
exchange was a natural development. Where is the turning point, or indeed is there any ‘turning’ evident in this key development?

Naval warfare superiority was the bedrock on which European worldwide domination was built. Long before European powers had the military capacities to dominate colonial populations through a combination of limited manpower armed with advanced weaponry they had achieved this at sea. Within years of the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, their ships had driven all local rivals from the major shipping routes linking Asia. Not only did the development of larger sail powered ships allow naval expansion around the world, but it also allowed for the trade of grain and other bulk goods between different regions of Europe. Resulting from this regional increased specialisation, hunger and famine was countered to a far greater degree. Capital investment needs drove the creation of trading companies and great social changes occurred, such as the rise in serfdom among many Baltic populations. Even more than with the previous example of financial advancement, this example of technological-scientific advancement cannot be said to be the result of a single actor or event. For over one hundred years Europeans advanced their capabilities in naval construction and navigation from the relatively stagnant Mediterranean model centred on the galley to the wind-power ocean capable model that was to endure until the steam age. Again, even if this process could be accepted as a ‘point’, would it in any case qualify as a turning point?

Today’s ample food production could not have been achieved within a feudal system where peasants produced little beyond their own needs and land ownership on a larger scale was seen as a prerequisite to social status rather than as part of an agricultural business. The shift in
ownership patterns facilitated surplus food production, crop specialisation, capital investment in new technologies, and encouraged labour specialisation and urbanisation. As part of a complex web of developments, the changes in land ownership and use contributed to the fermentation of European colonisation of the Americas, industrialisation, capitalism, and democracy. These vital agricultural based developments in the social sphere of European history can be said to have occurred over an even longer period of time than the previous two case studies and involved an even larger cast of actors deciding on, and reacting to, a vast array of individual events. From Canada to South Africa to Australia the changes wrought in the European countryside shaped not just our own agricultural sectors but whole societies around the planet. Yet even on a global scale – is this a turning point? Are we to argue that these changes would not have happened elsewhere in any case and that but for thousands of Europeans acting over hundreds of years the world would be locked in feudal and tribal food production systems?

Military history has always been one of the most popular fields of historical studies for both academics and the broader public. We are often attracted to the apparent simplicity of key actors and dramatic events, such as major battles, which are often described as ‘turning points’ of wars, leaderships, and even whole civilisations. Linking back to my highlighting of the importance of naval developments in the history of Europe, I will now turn to the contribution made by advances in the production of cannon to European expansion. As with so many major advances in history there is no clear evidence on when, where, or by whom, cannon were first invented. Indeed, our current best knowledge suggests that many of the advances in the history of cannon technology arrived in different
locations independently. That said, Europe has the earliest records of cannon being used with a Florentine document dated 1326, being the first to use the word cannon, deriving from the Latin ‘canna’, meaning ‘reed’, an obvious reference to its tubular construction (Cipolla 1970: 35). Even earlier references from the late 13th century are generally not considered reliable in meaning or date; but from the 1320s references to guns proliferate. From Europe the concept and technology rapidly spread to the Ottoman Empire. That gunpowder was invented in Asia seems beyond doubt, although there is no clear evidence favouring China over India as the home of the discovery. These two regions have records of cannon use from shortly later than the earliest European records and are most likely to have developed early cannon independent of European technology. The rapid advances in cannon design resulted in the efficient, mass produced firearms with which Europeans could defeat numerically superior foes. Even before the technology to do so on land was perfected, the combination of reliable cannon, larger ships, and controlled wind power allowed small numbers of Europeans to clear the high seas of all opposition around the globe. The advances made in iron cannon production by the English, Swedish, and other North European powers helped magnify their military power at the expense of their rivals. Yet, where would one position a turning point in this history of technological and scientific advances? Even leaving aside this question, could it truly be argued that had not a particular advance been made in one location at a certain time, it would not have occurred elsewhere at a similar or somewhat later time?

Moving closer to our own time, World War II is often portrayed as a turning point in itself and as the catalyst for a variety of other turning
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points from political institutions to nuclear power. Yet the war itself could be argued to be little more than the continuation of the earlier World War and perhaps even the final chapter in the readjustments caused by the unification of Germany at the heart of a militaristic industrial Europe. That war didn’t end wars and didn’t mark some new type of war, simply being a bigger, more destructive version of earlier human bouts of insanity. The Treaty of Versailles was a contributing factor to the causes of the war but is no more a turning point leading to war than the 1929 stock market crash or the ongoing appeal of populist nationalist chauvinism. As it would be hard to argue that any one event, or person, caused the return to war in 1939, can it be argued that the war was anything but a natural continuation of the flow of history, and not some turn away from it? Likewise can it seriously be argued that the Nazi death camps are some major new development that were not part of a continuum from the English concentration camps of the Boer War up to more recent examples such as those of the Bosnian War? The successful splitting of the atom opened the so-called Atomic Age, but to describe the abuse of this power in the bombing of Japan as a turning point would be to imply that this marked a change of direction, a radical alteration in the flow of events up to that point. If Einstein had not been born, science would still have arrived at that point and the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons did not need to be tested on Japanese civilians for governments to refrain from their use. Many of the countries of Europe fell under the yoke of Communist dictatorships after the war and lost years of development through mismanagement and abuse. Yet to visit countries like Croatia and Hungary today is not to step back in time decades and in the last few years the countries of the former Communist zone have made great strides to regain
their rightful places in the European family. Within a short time these countries will have returned to the economic ranking they occupied before being overrun by Russia and her allies. Even Ireland, a colony for nearly 800 years, has finally begun to overcome the economic handicaps created by such a sad history of exploitation and mismanagement.

To conclude, the use of the term ‘turning point’ can only be justified in historical debate if it can be clearly defined and aids our ability to understand the past. There is always a danger in adopting theories as a way of analysing the past. Historiography clearly shows that too much academic time has been wasted on trying to explain the past through the lens of highly structured theories. Whether historians spent time attempting to explain an event from a purely Marxist approach or arguing with each other through the pages of historical journals on the need to revisit history from a Feminist perspective there is the danger of squandering time, resources, and goodwill. As historians we should focus our academic energies on the study of the past and not become bogged-down in attempting to use the past to support large overly structured theories, that ironically may not stand the test of time themselves. When studying a small patriarchal community of the distant past one approach may work best and when looking at a large scale movement of the nineteenth century in Europe a different approach is almost certainly needed. What is clear in both these extremely different cases is that attempting to identify turning points is nearly as useless as speculating on alternative outcomes to the events examined. History on both the micro and macro levels continued and it cannot be said with certainty that any event caused either the village or the continent to reach a different point than would otherwise have occurred. Rather like examining
the black box of a flight from Ireland to Boston we can review the changes in direction, altitude, and speed, but we could not pick out any event as being a turning point that implies the plane did not arrive at the correct airport in the US. This is not a deterministic approach to history. I am not one who believes there is a pilot guiding our journey, and I do believe that certain events could have resulted in history producing different outcomes. Whether that is our plane diverting to New York or a present day in which the Irish rule the world is neither here nor there. It is simply that it is not within our abilities to definitively identify these causal events and their resulting shift of the flow of history. Let us leave these fantasy alternative histories to the novelists, failed dictators, and late night banter of history students in the conference pub!
When it comes to identifying turning points in history, we usually turn to politics. As a result, we inevitably come up with a more or less predictable list of events, containing, for example, the battle of Gaugamela, the fall of Rome, the Reconquista of Spain, the French and American Revolutions, the Holocaust, the failed plot to kill Hitler, the Cuban missile crisis, and so on. These are the battles, deeds, and crimes which are often believed to have played the greatest part in shaping today’s world. As such they are likely to be prominent in the historical awareness of people and, more importantly, in historical debates about turning points in history. Another rather popular genre concerning turning points is the history of inventions. In this type of history we often have in mind admiring portraits of great engineers who single-handedly change the world with their genius. Common themes are the steam engine, the first aircraft, Apollo 11, or even Archimedes’ unusual weapons used against the invading Romans in 213 B.C.

Undoubtedly these all deserve to be remembered as turning points of singular importance. Nevertheless, as a student of history I cannot help thinking that in emphasising political, military, and scientific events like those mentioned above, we are focusing on no more than a small part of a much greater story. In this essay then, my goal will be to expand the
standardised list of historical turning points by presenting insightful perspectives from cultural and intellectual history which are often unjustly ignored. The second part of the essay is dedicated to this point. First of all, though, I will have a look at the concept of a turning point itself. That is, I will reflect upon the advantages and dangers of identifying such crucial moments in history and consider the conventional criteria that are used in the selection of important events for history textbooks. All of this will hopefully stimulate the reader to rethink his own ideas on which turning points in history are most important and why. Lastly, I will briefly touch on what I believe are important elements of cultural history that can enrich the story of turning points in human history.

1. What is a Turning Point?

Any discussion about turning points in history must be based on a well-defined idea of what a turning point actually is. After all, a blunt or imprudent definition at this stage will have consequences for the discussion itself. Let us therefore have a look at the most common notion of a historical turning point available today and carefully examine the main criteria used, so that we can spot its flaws.

The first criterion that one is likely to encounter is the criterion of *time*: a historical turning point is ideally an event which, although it may have been long in the making, takes only a short time – often a day or less – to unfold. For instance, the atom bomb, which took years to develop, changed the world only as it was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. As this happened so quickly, no one failed to notice it. A turning point, as is clear from the terminology I have used so far, must be an *event*, which means that it takes place within a time frame short enough for contemporary witnesses to perceive it as single moment.
This leads us to the second criterion, namely, the belief implicit in many political histories that the actors involved need to be *aware* of the great historical event as it unfolds. How else could it count as a great event? Admittedly, events which pass without notice in their own time are usually not neglected in any account by political historians. Still, and oddly enough, these events are only rarely awarded the status of a true turning point in history simply because at the time they happened they went unnoticed.

The third criterion is *influence*. Historical events, if they are to have any importance, need to have an irreversible impact on the actors and their worlds. Ideally, these singular moments lead to new political landscapes, new world orders, or a significantly new way of life for the societies in which they take place. Their influence must extend across large, (inter) nationally significant groups or countries. In short, they ought to change the world, or at least a large part of it.

I believe that the first and second criteria are the most problematic. The first is essentially the reason why the majority of turning points historians identify are of a political or military nature. After all, politics and war consist mainly of short events that follow in quick succession. It is relatively easy to isolate a single happening from the chain of events and designate it as the main event in these fields of history. For other types of history this is much more difficult, if not impossible. Social and cultural history, for example, are usually concerned with long-term developments, mentalities, and ‘texts’. These cannot properly be called events, and are often neglected as a result.
The second criterion makes it even more difficult for cultural and social history to add their own turning points to the list. Mentalities, for example, are very difficult to notice for the people who live with or within them. Long-term developments in culture, which often extend across generations, are similarly difficult to recognise for contemporaries.

The third criterion, however, is more acceptable. In my view it is the single most important criterion by which we can decide which parts of the past are turning points. After all, the very concept of an historical turning point necessarily implies that it must have been an important element of the past, which brought great changes, but did not necessarily take place within a day, or with the full awareness of people living at the time. Also, the third criterion allows students and professors from all fields of history to contribute to a discussion on pivotal past developments. Therefore, the main question we should ask ourselves is: did the event or ‘text’ change the world?

2. The Problem With Lists
In 2006 the Dutch historical community was stirred by a great controversy. A commission headed by professor Van Oostrom had finished work on the *Historische canon van Nederland* (the Dutch Canon of History). The canon consisted of a list of important events and personalities from the history of the Netherlands. Its goal was to provide guidance for history courses in primary and secondary schools. Immediately upon publication, the canon was severely criticised. Various ethnic groups in Dutch society felt excluded. The presented turning points in history were evidently not theirs. Several historians emphasised that the commission’s selection of events was extremely limited, or even that this was an attempt by the government to impose an officially sanctioned
The affair of the *Historische canon* illuminates the political significance of a canon defining crucial moments of the past in generating controversies. It shows us that in selecting turning points in our history, we must always be aware of what and who we exclude. Also, such a mainstream attempt at framing (national) history in single events might blind us to perspectives on that differ from our own. That is why, as historians, we have the duty to present our lists of turning points as provisional and keep them open to change and divergent perspectives. At the same time, we must never shy away from publishing our work, even if it is controversial. The historian, no matter how balanced his account of the past, will never be able to please everyone, nor should he wish to.

3. Two Turning Points in Cultural History
Within the limitations of this essay it is impossible to draw a complete picture of all turning points that can be identified in cultural history. Therefore, I have selected two cases which show what a turning point in cultural history would look like. The first is the rise of the Christian world view through the Christianisation of the Roman Empire, and the second is the development of modernity through the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries.

*The Rise of the Christian World View*
At the time Jesus of Nazareth died, he had only a limited number of followers, most prominent among whom were of course the Apostles. Christianity had not yet been established, and at this stage the great religion consisted of no more than a tiny group of believers who were still
more or less part of the Jewish community and religion. Very soon, however, this group started to propagate its beliefs, which were gradually starting to differ from Jewish theology. The Apostle Paul had an essential role in the formation of a separate Christian theology and the conversion of a considerable number of Jews and gentiles in the eastern part of the Roman Empire (Frend 1984: 86-110). Throughout the first and second centuries A.D. the new sect continued to grow, despite persecution by the Romans. Inevitably, the early Christians developed differing visions of their religion. The Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. established orthodoxy while the church fathers, among whom St. Augustine, supplied further religious and philosophical guidance, some of which derived from Greek philosophy.

What is most important in terms of culture was that by the year 380, when Christianity became the sole and obligatory Roman state religion, it had spread across the entire Roman Empire and changed its culture significantly. Christianity is described as a mixture of Greek philosophy, Jewish theology, and Roman culture. It included a new view on the creation of the world, the significance of human life, ethics, law, and the duties of statesmen. Even more significantly, invading barbarians who eventually sacked Rome also converted to Christianity. Through them and through the efforts of proselytising priests the whole of what is now Europe came to embrace Christianity.

The Development of Modernity
In the 17th and 18th century large elements of the Christian world view started to crumble and change radically. The discovery of new worlds and the advances of science (Rietbergen 2006: 187-271) called into question
the validity of an uncritical reading of the Bible, which until then had served as the main explanation of all essential questions, such as the creation of man and the world. Soon there appeared radical philosophies which reduced God to the totality of existing things, or even denied his existence altogether (Israel 2001: 62). New discourses on the human nature surfaced: in his highly controversial book *L’homme machine* (1748) the French philosopher Julien Offray de la Mettrie reduced humans to machines. Theologically less controversial, yet more widely believed were deistic philosophies like those of Voltaire, who favoured the idea of a universe created, but not directly controlled by God. According to Voltaire and many of his contemporaries, man himself, and not God, was responsible for his fate.

Admittedly, the Western world did not instantly convert to atheism and secularised science, and some Enlightenment thinkers even tried to reconcile biblical stories with science and the new philosophical doctrines. Many others stuck by the Bible. Nevertheless, a great change had occurred: Christianity was no longer the only world view, and it was losing ground to the new science and philosophy – a process still at work today.

**Conclusion**

Unless we change the criteria by which we judge which parts of the past should count as turning points, cultural history and a number of other perspectives, including social, intellectual, and gender history will continue to be neglected in this matter. Some criteria, like the first and second that I mentioned, will have to be abandoned to allow room for turning points that are not reducible to the political events of a single day. Cultural history can make a useful contribution to a new, dynamic, and
open view on history’s turning points, offering fresh insights about the forces that have shaped the world as we know it today. Finally, as historians, we should be aware of the political significance of our work. When we decide what is important in history, we should pay attention to what we are excluding, and how this will affect society.

References


“I Will Never be Hungry Again”

Classical Hollywood and the American Dream

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From the invention of cinematographic devices in 1895 on, cinema obtained the central role in mass entertainment of the 20th century. Having evolved a new system of film production and distribution the film studios near Los Angeles, commonly referred to as “Hollywood”, began to reach the pinnacle of the film industry in the 1st decade of the century. During the Second World War the Hollywood Studios developed their style and dominated the film industry in almost every country in Europe, Central and South America, and parts of Asia.

The so-called era of Classical Hollywood does not only mark a turning point in the world’s film industry, but also in cultural history. The idea of the American Dream as a major part of American ideology had and still has a great impact on other countries’ consumption of Hollywood movies. Not only did Hollywood become a synonym for a place where people are rich, beautiful and happy, but the “American way of life” as shown in the movies is often taken to represent reality.

I want to give an overview of the development of cinema from its beginning through the 1930s, when the Hollywood system reached its peak. Finally, I want to explore the ways in which the products of
Hollywood contributed to the spread of American ideology in the countries consuming them.

1. The development of Cinema and Hollywood

Early Cinema
In 1895 devices for the recording and playing of film were invented almost simultaneously in France, Germany, and the USA (see Vasey 1997: 51-52). During the following, so-called “Primitive Period” until 1906 or 1908, most movies were very short and non-fictional (see Thompson 1985: 157-173). Apparently, audiences were satisfied with simple actions, such as a couple feeding a baby (Le repas de bébé, Louis Lumièrè, F 1895, 41 sec.) and delighted in the sheer innovation of moving pictures. The action was usually played out in a single long shot, photographed with a static camera on a stand or a moving vehicle, thus providing a theater-like perspective. From 1903 on, the narrative film gained popularity and the movies became longer; also, trick effects and editing were evolved. But still both characters and action were explained by intertitles and “the narration seldom attempted to guide the spectator actively” (Thompson 1985: 163).

At this time, movies were shown in common entertainment locations, usually vaudeville theaters, but also in outdoor tents or small-town opera houses (see Waller 2007: 239), until the so-called nickelodeons (see Merrit 1995: 83-102, Waller 2007a: 239-241), specialized in showing movies, gained more and more popularity. Theater owners did no longer need to buy movies anymore, but could rent them. This allowed changing programs at least three times a week, whereas movies were screened the whole day in a loop. By 1910, the peak of
nickelodeons was reached with approximately 10,000 movie theaters in the USA (see Bowser 1990: 121-128, Waller 2007a: 239-241).

**The Studio System**

At the same time (see Gomery 1997: 43), independent film companies left New York, where the American film industry was then located, and during the next five years established studios in a suburb of Los Angeles (see Schatz 1997a: 170). Here, the production of movies was shifted into huge factory-like buildings, called “studios” (see Gomery 1997: 43-44. Schatz 1997a: 170-172). Furthermore, a system of mass production (geared to Henry Ford’s methods, see Staiger 1985: 87-90) was developed, including division of labor, a centralized management, a standardized film style, and a focus on feature films (see Jewell 2007: 65-70, Keil 2007a: 77-78, Schatz 1997a: 170-174), which enabled “products in the most efficient way, at the lowest cost” (Jewell 2007: 65). Thus emerged the “Big Five” and the “Little Three” \(^1\) as the most successful studios, establishing an oligopoly in the 1920s. It is important to point out, that prior to 1938, studios controlled all three sectors of the business: the production, distribution, and exhibition of movies (see Gomery 1997: 49). Their power and ability to adapt to different eras and times is evidenced by the fact that, although the production system changed drastically after 1948 (see Schatz 1997a: 174-176), seven of those studios are still dominant today.

**The Movie Palace**

Adolph Zukor (*Paramount*) was the first person to gain supervision over a closed system by buying several movie theatres (see Gomery 1997: 49-51). By 1945, a fifth of all movie theaters in the USA were property of the “Big Five”, and almost half of these were owned by *Paramount* (Keil
Carnival XI (2009) 2007a: 86). To attract the well off middle-class, movie theaters were turned into luxurious palaces providing every kind of comfort, such as carpeted floors and plush draperies, elaborate decoration (statues, fountains, electric light), air conditioning and numerous staff, including doormen, ushers, projectionists and often a complete orchestra (see Hall 1961: 30-91, Keil 2007a: 81, Waller 2007a: 241). After the nickelodeons had helped the movies to obtain the central role in mass entertainment (see Keil 2007a: 80, Rosenberg 131999: 100), the movie palaces raised their reputation and became an “icon signifying a spectacular and glamorous Hollywood” (Waller 2007a: 243).

The Star System
Another crucial element of Hollywood’s image to the outside world were stars. Although they existed previously- for example at the theater, like Sarah Bernhardt (see Bowser 1990: 106-107, McDonald 2007b: 150-152, Walker 1970: 43), there was no such thing as a star system until it was developed in Hollywood.

Until 1909, names of movie actors or actresses were not advertised to the public for a variety of reasons. The heads of the studios were afraid the actors would demand more money with their rising popularity, but also artists did not want to be named, because motion pictures were rather unpopular at the beginning of the 20th century and movie appearances might put their theater careers at a risk (see McDonald 2007b: 148, Powdermaker 1951: 228).

However, when movies became more respectable around 1912 and studios started realizing the value of promoting stars, movie actors and actresses received increasing and steady wages (see Bowser 1990: 107, DeCordova 1998: 17-29, Powdermaker 1951: 228-253, McDonald 2007b:...
Most studios began to invest in star development, which means the actors and actresses got voice and dance training, as well as acting and elocution lessons. After being “tested” in several supporting roles, the star played a leading role that leveraged his or her career (see Jewell 2007: 258-259, McDonald 2007b: 148-150). Apart from the movies, publicity and promotion were arranged in cooperation with other media, such as Photoplay, the first fan magazine in 1912 (see DeCordova 1998: 17-28, Dyer 1979: 2-5, Keil 2007a: 78). Different stars represented different types of people (see Dyer 1979: 38-68) which were often connected to specific genres, for example Fred Astaire starred in musicals and Humphrey Bogart in film noirs (see Jewell 2007: 261). All this was arranged by the studios, to which the actors and actresses were bound by long-term contracts up to 7 years (see Jewell 2007: 255-257, McDonald 2007b: 148-150), defining the star as the studio’s exclusive property. Although that guaranteed regular employment and income for the artist, he or she lost any control over his or her roles and public image.

The star system as described above hit its peak in the 1930s and 1940s during the so-called Golden Age of Cinema and “to a large extent, the popularity of cinema results from the production, distribution, and consumption of film stars” (McDonald 2007a: 155).

II. The American Dream
The basic idea behind what is called the “American Dream” is implied in the Declaration of Independence (1776), where the “pursuit of happiness” is listed among the “unalienable rights” of all men. The notion of the “American Dream” emerged during the economic boom at the beginning of the 20th century (see Kamp 2009), simultaneously with the feature film (see Vasey 1997: 51). James Truslow Adams was the first one to use the
term “American Dream” in *The Epic of America* in 1931, where he defined it as “that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement“ (Adams 1993: 404). Although the idea changed over the years, there are four major features of the “American Dream”, pointed out by Richard Dyer: “dignity of the common individual”, “democracy as the guarantee of freedom and quality”, “gospel of hard-work”, and the “belief in material progress” (Dyer 1979: 28). It is the belief in one nation under God, with each man and woman forging his or her own destiny, according to individual wishes and abilities.

When in *Gone with the Wind* (Victor Fleming, USA 1939), the highest-grossing movie of all time (adjusted for inflation) and an example for Classical Hollywood style par excellence, Scarlett O’Hara (Vivien Leigh) walks out on the fallow field after her family lost its fortune during the American Civil War, collapses crying, but then rises again with strength and swears “I will never be hungry again”, this is what the “American Dream” is about.

**III. Conclusion**

After national European film industries collapsed during the First World War (see Keil 2007a: 75), the USA took advantage of this situation and flooded foreign (and domestic) markets with their movies (see Gomery 1997: 46-49). Indeed, American movies seem to appeal to a mass audience (see Vasey 1997: 56), in contrast to elitist European art movies. In the mid 1920s, Hollywood controlled the market in Great Britain, Canada, Australia and Europe (except Germany and the Soviet Union, see Gomery
1997: 48) and drew 33% of its sales from foreign markets (see Jewell 2007: 81). Also, the rise of Hollywood thwarted other national film industries, because European artists, such as Marlene Dietrich, Maurice Chevalier, or Charles Chaplin, emigrated to Hollywood. In response to Hollywood’s immense success, some of the remaining national film industries aspired to imitate its style and aesthetics. According to one of the ideals of the “American Dream”, that the USA (and especially its democracy) should serve as a model for other countries, this was all the more a justification for Hollywood.

In addition to people watching the staged version of the US-citizens’ everyday life on screen, mass-produced goods from the USA, such as cars, telephones, or cameras, were touted all over the world. The rich and famous stars were presented by media as common, but extraordinarily gifted people, who were working hard and managed to stay down to earth despite their success (see Dyer 1979: 28-68, McDonald 2007a: 157-164). According to the “gospel of hard-work” and the “belief in material progress”, the US film industry appeared both a marvelous technical achievement and the result of the hard and collaborative work of common people. Simultaneously, the idea of the “Dream Factory” emerged, depicting Hollywood as a paradisiacal place, where “a fortune is just around the corner” (Powdermaker 1951: 24).

In conclusion, the so-called “Classical Hollywood”-era not only marks a turning point in the world’s film history, but also in cultural history. At that time Hollywood movies were formed to the style we are used to today and also rose to their dominant position on the world’s movie market. In doing so, Hollywood movies (only in part intentionally)
Carnival XI (2009)

contributed to the spread of American ideology and American goods all over the world.

References


Carnival XI (2009)


Endnotes

I want to thank Shana Ryan and Frank Cifarelli for their help.

As the “Big Five“ are considered: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM), Paramount, Warner Bros., Twentieth Century Fox and Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO). The “Little Three” are Universal, Columbia and United Artists. For further information see Jewell 2007: 51-65.


For further details on Gone with the Wind see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0031381 (last checked on 9.6.2009).
Ideological Stances in Dystopian Fiction

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Ever since the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God had exiled Adam and Eve from his pre-historic utopia, men and women of the Abrahamic tradition have either tried to return to paradise or to build one of their own, both in fiction and in real life. The Islamic conquest of the Mediterranean, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the discovery of the New World, the settlement of Christian pilgrims in Northern America, the return of the Jews to Zion – all these historical events have an unmistakable religious and utopian dimension, as they mirror human longing for a perfect society, an earthly paradise. Real utopian undertakings were usually followed and often preceded by works of fiction reflecting the experiences in (mostly) religious visions of such a ‘good place’.

However, since the 18th century a new kind of utopia appeared in the minds of enlightened men and women, a utopia without God. Freed of a transcendental entity and devoted to reason, the fictional utopias were now populated by enlightened individuals weary of tyranny and engaging with each other on a voluntary basis. Yet, this libertarian ideal was of short breath. The advent of industrialisation in the late 18th and early 19th centuries marked the beginning of an era of utopian visionaries who believed that human happiness could be calculated in mathematical formulae and implemented on a large scale. If reason was the deity of
Jacobin revolutionaries, then technology became the new divinity of the proletariat and its intellectual avant-garde. The old god who had sent his son to shepherd the flock of believers back into the sheepfold was replaced by the almighty machine that needed fitting screws and bolts and couldn’t tolerate any loose ends.

The climax of this development was reached in the first quarter of the 20th century with the establishment of the Soviet Union. The October Revolution had a twofold meaning for the history of utopia: first, it ushered into reality a modern utopia foretold by H.G. Wells and Edward Bellamy; second, it spawned a new kind of literary genre that was to haunt communism – the genre of dystopia.

**The Outsider-Hero**
The classic dystopian novel evolves around a central figure, an outsider-hero, who moves away from utopian conformity towards anti-utopian non-conformism. He is a sort of romantic anarchist whose deep-rooted doubts about the ruling system are confirmed, usually by the encounter with a like-minded woman. Their passionate relationship releases a rebellious energy which devours their last inhibitions and fears, making them partners in crime. The female character then usually fades away, having performed the duty of triggering the mutiny – a scenario reminiscent of the Book of Genesis.

The hero rarely gets involved in organised massive opposition to the regime, what emphasises the solitary (and egoist) character of his insurrection. After a short interval of free thought and sex, the transgressor is detected and brought to justice. At this point the narratives take different roads, and the level of violence inflicted upon the outlaw varies greatly. Huxley’s Bernard Marx, for instance, is expelled to a remote island where
his retrograde ideas of privacy and individuality cannot contaminate the minds of the citizens of the Brave New World. Zamyatin’s D-503 receives a lobotomy which once again makes him happy and unfree. The fate of Orwell’s Winston Smith is by far the gloomiest – he is tortured and finally executed with a bullet shot in the back of his head.

These tragic heroes stem from three novels deemed as classics of the dystopian genre: *We* (1921), *Brave New World* (1932), and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949). These books have received great attention, especially in the second half of the 20th century, when they were used by a number of Western governments as literary anti-communist propaganda in the Cold War context. In turn, left-wing theoreticians have attacked Zamyatin, Huxley, and especially Orwell as petty bourgeois hack writers whose works were no more than third rate reactionary reading. Studying the lives and works of the writers, it becomes evident that the issue at stake is a bit more complex than that.

**Zamyatin**

Yevgeny Zamyatin had been a Bolshevik long before the October Revolution. Not surprisingly, he greeted the violent dismissal of the Russian czar with great enthusiasm. During the ensuing civil war, Zamyatin worked as journalist and editor of several socialist newspapers and lectured on writing-techniques in the *House of Arts* which had been established by Maxim Gorky in Petrograd. In the late 1920s he broke with the Communist party, not because he was a supporter of the ancien régime, but rather because he could not bear to have his critical spirit censored and muzzled by the new authorities. In 1931 he and his wife were allowed to go into exile, and they spent the rest of their lives in France.
In *We*, which wouldn’t be published in Russia until the *Perestroika* of the late 1980s, Zamyatin described a future totalitarian system headed by an omnipotent ‘Benefactor’ ruling over a shapeless mass of people in uniforms and with shaved heads, wearing numbers. The image of working drones, who had been forbidden the use of the word “I” (re-used for the design of the *Borg* in the TV-show *Star Trek*), was intended to depict the *uravnilovka* – the forced levelling of the population. This levelling was only an idea at the time Zamyatin wrote his novel and would only be introduced as official Soviet doctrine with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The Benefactor himself was interpreted by many to portrait Stalin, but in 1921 Zamyatin couldn’t possibly have known that the Georgian commissar for nationalities would one day assume unrestrained power. These facts only emphasise the importance of Zamyatin’s novel since it prophesied the collectivisation of economy as well as a dictatorship which was to end the practice of democratic centralism put in place by Lenin, and to subsequently turn his country into one big penal labour camp.

**Huxley**

Aldous Huxley was a very different personality. Politically unaffiliated, he was free to criticise his native Victorian Britain, capitalist America, and communist Russia. A sceptical agnostic during his youth, he developed into a mystic who studied Eastern philosophies and the rites of Native Americans while experimenting with various psychedelic drugs in his little house in the Californian part of the Mojave Desert. Huxley’s most famous novel, *Brave New World*, written while still in Britain, was a dystopian warning of a possible future in which a world government controls the minds of its citizens by the means of a dream-inducing drug called ‘soma’ and a perfected form of propaganda called ‘hypnopaedia’, teaching people...
how happy they are during sleep. Many Western readers immediately ‘discovered’ the link between Huxley’s one-world government and Soviet Russia, but this was not what the author had had in mind. In a famous interview given to Mike Wallace on ABC Television in 1958, Huxley clearly stated that all democratic countries of the world, including the United States, were at great risk of becoming dictatorial states in the future. His fears were based on four elements: over-population, over-organisation, and the advancements in psycho-pharmacology and media propaganda. Asked about his repeated attacks on the advertisement moguls in New York’s Madison Avenue, Huxley answered:

I think that advertisement plays a very necessary role, but the danger it seems to me in a democracy is this... I mean what does a democracy depend on? A democracy depends on the individual voter making an intelligent and rational choice for what he regards as his enlightened self-interest, in any given circumstance. But what these people are doing, I mean what both, for their particular purposes, for selling goods and the dictatorial propagandists are for doing, is to try to bypass the rational side of man and to appeal directly to these unconscious forces below the surfaces so that you are, in a way, making nonsense of the whole democratic procedure, which is based on conscious choice on rational ground.

Speaking about the effect of commercials on children Huxley gave the following statement:

This whole question of children, I think, is a terribly important one because children are quite clearly much more suggestible than the average grownup; and again, suppose that... for one reason or another all the propaganda was in the hands of one or very few agencies, you would have an extraordinarily powerful force
playing on these children, who after all are going to grow up and be adults quite soon. I do think that this is not an immediate threat, but it remains a possible threat, and... Well, after all, you can read in the trade journals the most lyrical accounts of how necessary it is, to get hold of the children because then they will be loyal brand buyers later on. But I mean, again you just translate this into political terms, the dictator says they all will be ideology buyers when they are grown up. (ibid.)

One must underline that Huxley made these harsh comments about the American political and economic system in 1958, still under the influence of the anti-communist witch-hunt in the heyday of McCarthyism. This not only proved that he was far from being a petty bourgeois regime scribbler, but that he was a brave intellectual ready to put his career and possibly his life at risk in order to defend his personal ideals.

**Orwell**

The case of George Orwell is by far the most interesting and complex, and it prompted one of the most heated debates in literary history. Compared to Zamyatin’s novel, Orwell’s account of a fictitious land called Oceania, governed by the principles of ‘Ingsoc’ (‘Newspeak’ for English Socialism) and watched over by Big Brother’s ever-present eye, was an even more apparent satire of the Soviet Union, by now in the firm grip of Joseph Stalin. The sheer amount of terror inflicted upon the people of Oceania in general, and, as the story unfolds, upon the main character in particular, sets this work off from the other two novels. The level of contempt that Winston Smith, an outer-party employee at the ‘Ministry of Truth’, breeds for the system and the vivid descriptions of him being tortured by O’Brien, an inner-party bureaucrat, once again led many to believe that this book was the writer’s personal crusade against Communism. This might have been quite right, after all.
Orwell was indeed a great ideological enemy of the Soviet Union and its dictatorial leader. Even before *1984* he had written the satire *Animal Farm*, in which he mocked the leadership of the USSR in depicting them as pigs with great hunger for power. Yet, the roots of his burning anti-Stalinism are to be found even earlier, in *Homage to Catalonia*, his lesser known personal account of experiences and observations made in 1936 and 1937 during the Spanish Civil War. Orwell had participated in the war as a foreign volunteer for the Trotskyite POUM-militia which eventually came into conflict with the more Soviet-oriented communists for refusing to partake in the Popular Front – a motley coalition of antifascist parties under Moscow’s control. Severely wounded in the neck during a battle with General Franco’s Falangists, Orwell closely escaped the communists, who had just arrested, tortured, and murdered Andreu Nin, a leading member of the POUM. Leon Trotsky himself suffered a similar fate only three years later when he was murdered with an ice axe by an NKVD agent in Mexico.

The abandonment of the revolutionary struggle by Moscow-loyal communists in favour of a coalition with moderate republican parties in 1937, the shocking Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, as well as the gruesome murder of Trotsky in 1940 persuaded Orwell that the USSR under Stalin had forsaken the proletarian revolution and was slowly turning into a bureaucratic collectivist state that looked for an arrangement with Western powers – a speculation that proved true in 1943 when Stalin dissolved the Comintern and carved up the world between himself, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at the Teheran Conference. In the light of these facts, Orwell’s last books (he died in 1950) can be regarded as a
personal literary revenge of a Trotskyite revolutionary against the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin.

**A Very Western Genre**
The classic dystopian novel, as we have seen, is about the hero (white male, to be sure) refusing integration (or ‘assimilation’ in the vocabulary of the Borg) into a greater collective that will by definition diminish or completely dismantle his individuality. In this sense it can be described as a very Western genre, since it has nothing in common with Eastern (Asian) ethics calling for self-subordination of the individual to the greater good, even if the collective has proven itself as imperfect and faulty.

The clash of a singular will against the hive mind is a theme that keeps wriggling through dystopian and other forms of science fiction until this day and has reached its popular peak in the unforgettable dialogs between ex-Borg Seven of Nine and Kathryn Janeway, the first female captain of star ship ‘USS Voyager’ from the *Star Trek* series. In their discussions, Captain Janeway tries to re-teach Seven of Nine the very meaning of humanity and individuality, which proves to be a difficult task since the ex-drone, who had been abducted and ‘assimilated’ by the Borg at the age of 6, has a hard time leaving the cold and emotionless logic of the Borg collective behind. In the seventh and last season of *Star Trek: Voyager*, Seven is finally ‘saved’ after falling in love with first officer Chakotay.

However, there are opposite examples of dystopian fiction in which the futuristic system is one of complete privacy and individuality, while the hero is battling for an old-fashioned and long forgotten union of man, woman, and child. Such is the storyline of Walter Tevis’ *Mockingbird* (1980). Then there are novels in which the main character eventually
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comes to understand that his very existence represents an obstacle to the
new order of things. This is the case in Richard Matheson’s famous horror-
his days by roaming the streets of Los Angeles and killing dormant
vampires which belong to one of two different species that have come to
fight over the world, after a global pandemic apocalypse had caused the
end of humanity as we know it. In the end Neville is captured by the
victorious side and awaits his execution. Realising that a new society had
been born with him being the only hindrance to its progress, Neville
chooses to end his life and become a ‘legend’:

They all stood looking up at him with their white faces. He stared back. And
suddenly he thought, I’m the abnormal one now. Normalcy was a majority
concept, the standard of many and not the standard of just one man. Abruptly that
realization joined with what he saw on their faces – awe, fear, shrinking horror –
and he knew that they were afraid of him. To them he was some terrible scourge
they had never seen, a scourge even worse than the disease they had come to live
with. He was an invisible spectre who had left for evidence of his existence the
bloodless bodies of their loved ones. And he understood what they felt and did not
hate them. His right hand tightened on the tiny envelope of pills... Robert Neville
looked out over the new people of the earth. He knew he did not belong to them;
he knew that, like the vampires, he was anathema and black terror to be destroyed.
And, abruptly, the concept came, amusing to him even in his pain. A coughing
chuckle filled his throat. He turned and leaned against the wall while he swallowed
the pills. Full circle, he thought while the final lethargy crept into his limbs. Full
circle. A new terror born in death, a new superstition entering the unassailable
fortress of forever. I am legend.
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Kartini: Marking the Beginning of a New Era

Liang de Beer

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The subject of the Zagreb conference was ‘Turning points in history’. At that time I was asked to write an article about such a turning point. Immediately I thought of the paper I am writing about First-wave feminism and one of its pioneers. Amongst the readers of ISHA’s magazine Carnival the name of Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879-1904) is probably unknown. She was a woman who longed for change more than anyone. Without knowing it, she herself contributed to such change. This article will explore the way in which she influenced the course of history. Therefore the first part will look at her unusual life, and the second part will focus on the influence Kartini had on both European and Indonesian women.

Kartini was born in 1879, when Indonesia was still a colony of the Netherlands Indies. Her father was a ‘native’ colonial official and still lived according to adat tradition. Towards the turn of the century Java was experiencing a process of social and cultural upheaval. Progressive (ethical) politicians were gaining power in the colonial administration. Educational facilities were established in the Dutch East Indies, mostly on Java. The regent allowed Kartini and her sister Kardina and half-sister Roekmini to go to a European elementary school. It was revolutionary for Indonesian girls to go to a public school, at a time in which in the whole
archipelago only about 3000 boys were attending elementary school. The sisters learnt about Dutch culture and began to speak fluently Dutch. However, tradition was still very strong and at the age of twelve Kartini was ‘caged’. According to adat law a girl had to stay at home until she was married off. In those years Kartini was able to familiarize herself with feminist thought because her father allowed her to read Dutch books and magazines. She began to fear the future when she wrote in a letter: “But we must marry, we must, we must. Not getting married is the greatest sin a muslim girl can commit.”

However times were already changing. At the age of sixteen Kartini returned to society, not as a married but as a confident single woman. She and her sisters were allowed to travel. She became acquainted with Dutch feminist Marie Ovink-Soer, who told her about Dutch feminism. And in 1898 she was ready to make her first public statement by writing an article for the Dutch Women’s Exhibition. This introduced her to an elite circle of Dutch feminists and ethical politicians.

In 1899, after placing an advertisement in the women’s magazine *The Dutch Lily*, Kartini started a correspondence with a Jewish feminist from Amsterdam: Stella Zeehendelaar. At the same time she also began corresponding with Rosa Abendanon and her husband Henri who was a colonial bureaucrat in the Dutch East Indies. It was certainly unusual for a ‘native’ girl to become friends on equal terms with Europeans.

Kartini withstood the pressure of her family and *adat* law to get married as long as she possibly could. She and her sisters wanted to receive education in the Netherlands. They would be the first ‘native’ girls to do so. After their education they wanted to open a school for girls and thus improve the lives of the Javanese. But in 1902 her sister Kardinah
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was married off to a first cousin. Kartini and Roekmini were left alone but they stuck to their plans of going to Holland. In 1903 Henri Abendanon spoke to Kartini and discouraged her to go to the Netherlands, suggesting she could pursue education in Batavia. For if she would go to Holland, she would be alienated from the Javanese people. Abendanon feared that they wouldn’t accept a westernized Kartini.

But even for studying in Batavia it was already too late. In 1903 Kartini couldn’t resist the pressure of her family anymore, partly because of her fathers being severely ill. She consented to marry the regent of Rembang. He was also a progressive ‘native’ official and by way of exception they corresponded with each other before the marriage. “What we are doing is so new. Never before have Javanese men and women corresponded”, Kartini said. But her fiancé wasn’t that progressive about marriage. The regent was only a widower according to adat law. His Raden Ajoe had died but his three concubines and their six little children were still very alive. Kartini had to consent to the marriage. She said to herself that even though she had to give up her own plans she could now educate the six little children. Soon after the marriage she was pregnant herself. She rejoiced at the thought of having a girl. The child would be a better version of herself. It would have more choice in life than its mother and could pursue education. But she died, at the age of twenty-five, a few days after giving birth to a son. And there her dreams would have ended, if not Henri Abendanon had kept them alive.

In 1911 Henri Abendanon decided to publish the wide range of letters Kartini wrote during her lifetime. The book was called: *Through darkness to light*. It became an instant bestseller and the profit was used to establish schools in the Indies.
In her letters she described what life was like for a Javanese upper class girl. The long years of confinement, coping with tradition and the struggle to avoid marriage: “Nothing will change; one day it will happen, it must happen, I will follow a husband I do not know. Love is a fairytale in Java. How can a man and a woman love each other if they see each other for the first time when they are already bound in matrimony?” But Abendanon and Stella Zeehandelaar edited the letters in which Kartini referred to her own polygamous marriage, Islam, and superstitious practices. Kartini had to be pure in order to be an example.

The letters about improving the life of the Javanese were not edited. Kartini was convinced that through education the Javanese people could lead better lives. Teaching women would not only lead to more equal marriages but would also improve family life. Indonesian people should to this themselves. The colonial government should only provide the framework: education.

Kartini actively worked on creating more opportunities for Javanese upper class women. But she was alone. There were other women with feminist ideas, but they were scattered all over the archipelago. After the death of Kartini more Indonesian women, inspired by her letters, became involved in achieving the many goals of Kartini for example education for girls and marriage reform.

Her sisters were amongst those early feminists. Especially Roekmini, who was alone after Kartini had died, saw the great responsibilities ahead of her. Her possibilities of getting an education in Holland were equally out of reach when Abendanon talked Kartini out of their plans. The lifetime of Roekmini reflects the transitional period in
Indonesia. She struggled with adat law in her youth, but eventually she married a man of her own choice and had a monogamous marriage. Roekmini and the other sisters were part of an urban elite who saw itself as ‘modern’. They experienced the final days of Dutch colonialism. But they also saw the rise of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Roekmini was one of the first to join the nationalist organization *Budi Utomo* in 1909.

In the meantime feminist organizations were developing all over the archipelago. In 1928 the *First Indonesian Women’s Congress* was held in Yogyakarta. Educated women from Java attended. There were secular groups like *Isteri Indonesia* who made modest demands. The women of *Isteri Sedar* were more radical in their secularism. But religious organizations were also flourishing: *Aisjiah* wanted reform within the boundaries of the Islamic faith. Women from the outer islands only sent letters and congratulations, travelling to Java was still too expensive for them. The congress saw the birth of one feminist organization. The participants all spoke Malay, the new national language, avoiding the aristocratic High Javanese.

Around the turn of the century Kartini had still depended on the favour of colonial officials. But the colonial context was getting weaker. During the 1920s and 1930s feminist organizations moved away from Kartini’s western ideals about marriage and family life. They formulated a new strong Indonesian identity, infused with religious connotations. Feminist connected with nationalist organizations and aimed at reforming society from within.
Kartini was one of the first ‘native women’ who became widely known among Europeans. During her lifetime Kartini struggled with the image of being an ‘exotic curiosity’. Her father even said to her: “Ni, don’t think that there are a lot of Europeans who really love you. They are very few.” Luckily Kartini had the Abendanons and Stella Zeehandelaar among her most faithful friends.

After her death in 1904 and the publication of the letters in 1911 she became the darling of progressive Europeans. They praised her for her highly original and enlightened visions. Around the turn of the century the ethical approach was gaining strength in Dutch politics. Ethical politicians advocated education for ‘uplifting the native’. Around the same time First-wave feminism was at its culmination point. Those progressive men and women recognized their own ideals in Kartini’s letters. Kartini was both an example for Indonesian feminists and a mirror to European progressives.

Kartini had experienced Dutch education and was influenced by modern values. For the ‘ethicals’ Kartini was an encouragement to continue with their ‘civilizing mission’. ‘Kartini schools’ were established to educate priyayi girls. They didn’t know that educating the ‘native’ would be one of the many reasons for the loss of the Dutch East Indies within fifty years.

Kartini lived in a transitional period: Between tradition and modernity, between colonialism and nationalism. Her letters reflect the changes in that colonial society. She had an active and interesting life that was popularized after her death by the publication of Through Darkness to Light. She became an example for her sisters and other Indonesian
feminists. They developed a more national stance. For the Dutch she became an example in which they recognized their successful colonial policy. Kartini herself was fully aware that she was initiating new things, although it was too early for her to know that she was changing the world around her. But her letters influenced others and inspired them to change traditions. Today she is venerated as a national hero in Indonesia. Her portrait is placed on the 10,000 Rupiah banknote, her birthday is a national holiday and every city has a street named after her.

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Endnotes

1 All quotations are translated by the author from the 1912 edition of Through Darkness to Light: J.H. Abendanon (ed.), Door duisternis tot licht, gedachten van Raden Adjeng Kartini (Den Haag 1912)
Notes on Terms

Adat Law The traditional Javanese law infused with Islamic elements. It was the official law for the Indonesian part of the population. The Europeans, Chinese, and Arabic citizens had their own laws.

Batavia The capital of the Dutch East Indies, now Jakarta.

Ethical policy A progressive wing in Dutch politics emerging around 1900.

Priyayi Aristocratic class. Daughters of regents are called for example: Priyayi girls.

Raden Ajeng Denomination for an aristocratic unmarried girl.

Raden Ajoe The chief wife of an Indonesian regent. Roekmini was the daughter of the Raden Ajoe.

Selir The concubine of a regent. Kartini and Kardinah were the daughters of the selir.
There has always been broad interest in events that marked the history of mankind. In this, many have occupied their minds with the history of the Late Roman Empire. How was it that the capital of the ancient world fell into the hands of “barbarians”? How come the eternal city lost its glamour and aura of an imperial capital? What caused the end of the western part of the Empire? All these questions were met with more or less satisfactory answers. Still, it seems to us that one very important aspect of the Late Roman Empire remains not fully understood and explained. Great changes of the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D., strongly influencing every aspect of Roman society, marked the end of “the old Roman way” and set a strong basis for a new concept of life in the Empire. In relation to that a religion which offered salvation, redemption, and forgiveness sprang out into the epicentre of political events of the 4th century and found its supporter in no less than the Emperor of Rome, Constantine the Great. It is the goal of this paper not to speculate about Constantine’s either true Christian or mere pragmatic nature, but rather to give an overview of the occurrences that led to the rise of Christianity to the very top of Roman society, as well as to show the impact of Constantine’s rule on Christianity.

Before we begin our exposition we must pay some attention to the sources
of the time. We must note first, that not many of them have survived to the present day. Second, being of pagan as well as of Christian origin, they do not give us a very objective picture of Constantine’s realm. This is all the more understandable if we keep in mind the great 3rd century crisis which questioned the existence of the Empire in every possible way. Triumphant over his co-rulers, Constantine put a stop, though not for a long time,¹ to tumults and civil wars, and was thus perceived as saviour both by pagans and his protégées. He brought back faith in victory among the soldiers of the Empire, put an end to the persecutions, brought back peace and, for some time, stability. The popular adjectives of the Late Empire were thus bestowed upon him: Constantine was acclaimed *restitutor, reformator, restaurator, reintegrator, redonator patriae, reditor lucis aeternae.*

Christian sources, mainly Eusebius of Caesarea and Lactantius, present us a realm of a very pious emperor, a true Christian, who was chosen to rule by the hand of God.² Thus, historians face great difficulty in getting a clear picture of the reign of an apparently not so pious, but rather pragmatic, not at all mild-tempered but ambitious emperor, a true politician, rather than Christian, who fought his way to the throne.

The reign of Constantine the Great (306-337 A.D.) can be seen as a turning point in the history of Christianity. As Harold A. Drake (2006: 111) put it: “It is during the thirty years of his reign, that more changes in status, structure and beliefs of the Christian Church took place, than during any previous period of its history.” When Constantine was first elevated as *augustus* by his father’s troops in 306, Christians were facing the great persecution and fighting for their mere existence. At the time the Emperor lied on his deathbed Christian leaders had assumed the rank, dress, and,
increasingly, the duties of the old civic elite. They started playing a crucial role in Roman society. Christians were granted churches, freedom of worshiping and honouring their God, a Divinity that brought victory and prosperity. Whether or not Constantine truly believed it, he made his subordinates believe it.

The central question arising from this remarkable development is why Constantine chose to turn to a minority of believers instead of supporting his co-religionists. Did he recognise some kind of power in the organisation of Christians as a future ruling elite – a power that was essential to the stability of the state? Christians, even though just a minority in the Empire, were the apparently best organised religion in comparison to all other religions, groups, and cults flourishing in the Empire. Their God offered salvation, protection, and hope, a chance to question previous believes, and redemption. Constantine, who did not fully understand the essence of Christianity, used its teaching to fight his opponents and gain followers. We may be free to say that it worked and served its purpose.

In order to get a better grasp of the rise of Christianity in Constantine’s time, we propose to split his reign into two parts. The first is related to the beginning of his reign as one of the tetrarchs and ends with the Edict of Milan. The second part comprises the period from 313 to the end of his reign.

1. From the beginning of Constantine’s reign to the Edict of Milan, 306-313

When Constantine succeeded his father in the western half of the Empire, he took over the task of defending its frontiers and protecting its people. His father, Constantius Chlorus, was remembered as just ruler and
successful warrior, the only one of the tetrarchs who did not take part in the great persecution. His provinces, namely Gaul and Britain, were said to be one of the strongholds of Christianity in the West. However, stories about him being a Christian as written by Eusebius in *The Life of Constantine* (see chapters XIII and XIV), are not confirmed by other sources of his time. It is more likely that Constantius, like his son after him, realised the persecution would bring instability to his provinces, which were already under attack by German tribes. Toleration was the only possible and reasonable solution. The Roman Empire, large as it was, was comprised of many different peoples and home to various cults (see MacMullen 1984). The most important of them were the cult of Isis, the cult of goddess Roma, but still more the ‘Cult of the Unconquered Son’, *Sol Invictus*, and other cults worshipped through Mithras or Apollo (see ibid.). Constantine thus followed the policy of his father.

Shortly before his death, Gaius Galerius, according to Lactantius the most ardent of all the persecutors, issued an edict of toleration in 311 ending the persecution. From this edict, preserved in Lactantius’ *The Death of the Persecutors*, we learn that the Christians were perceived as a threat to the Empire, a punishment sent from the gods, outcasts who had turned their back to Roman tradition. According to Lactantius, persecution induced mass hysteria among the people of Rome, pagans as well as Christians, turning them into enemies of their friends and neighbours (see Lactantius). When it stopped people were relieved, and Christians were soon to be protected by the famous Edict of Milan. Preceding the issuance of this document was the outbreak of the great civil war. Why did it occur and who invoked it? We are not inclined to discuss the political events or the course of the war itself. What is important for us is to note, that it was this
civil war that prepared the breakthrough of the Christian faith into the political scene of the Empire.

Not much is known of the famous episode just before the Battle of Milvian Bridge. Two separate accounts of Constantine’s vision of a cross survived in works written by Christian contemporaries. The earliest, written by Lactantius in 315, states that: “Constantine was advised in a dream to mark the heavenly sign of God on the shields of his soldiers and then engage in battle” (Lactantius, XLIV). This sign was the slanted letter X, the first letter of Christ’s name. A more famous account of Constantine’s vision is contained in *The Life of Constantine* written by Eusebius in 337. Eusebius informs us that Constantine told him “a long while after” that “he saw with his own eyes, up in the sky and resting over the sun, a cross-shaped trophy formed from light and a text attached to it which said, ‘By this conquer’” (Eusebius, XXVIII: 80).

Whether the Emperor really had a vision, or a dream, or neither – he used this story to increase the moral in his army, which now could believe in divine intervention. Constantine was victorious and that was all that was needed. But why did Constantine choose the Christian sign instead of some other? It is not inappropriate to think of this episode as pure invention of Christian writers who sought to justify and show the might of their God. However, maybe the answer lies in the fact that his opponents, involved in the persecution, were hated by the Christians and thus the latter were suitable allies of Constantine. On the other hand, since the Christians were still a minority, it is most likely that Constantine used the sign in an open manner, leaving its exact significance to the interpretation of his soldiers and followers. They needed to believe that gods, or God, was with them, that some kind of Divinity would provide
them with help and victory, no matter what its true nature was. It is likely that Constantine did make up a story of this kind in order to encourage his troops before a decisive battle.

After the Battle of Milvian Bridge, Constantine and his ally, Licinius, began with the establishment of peace and order throughout the Empire. The first thing to do was to secure the freedom of worship to each and every one of their subordinates. This was achieved through the Edict of Milan in 313 (see MacMullen 1987: 93). Constantine and Licinius thus guaranteed legal protection to Christians as well as to the other religions. The Edict of Milan was followed by numerous laws issued by Constantine which regulated and protected the Christians and their ritual.5

2. From the Donatist Schism to the end of Constantine’s reign, 311/3-337

While Constantine was busy consolidating the Empire and planning to take over the throne completely to himself, religious unrest broke out in the large and influential North African Christian community. This dispute, known as the Donatist Schism, as well as the Arian controversy that followed, showed that Christianity was comprised of many fractions and teachings that needed to be consolidated. Which side would prevail was to be seen, and as we now know, it was Constantine who decided its faith.

The subject of the Donatist controversy was the clergy, which had become tainted during the persecution by surrendering sacred books and objects to imperial officials. This made them traditores, unworthy of their offices. The problem was however, that the hierarchy in Carthage considered valid the sacraments these traditores performed. But a rigourist
group, the Donatists, named after their most zealous leader, the priest Donatus, insisted on the invalidity of the sacraments, especially baptism, ordering that they had to be administered anew. The following dispute soon came to the knowledge of Constantine as the Donatists appealed to him for help. First assigning the settling of their dispute to the bishop of Rome and, because the Donatists were not satisfied with the verdict and appealed to him again, Constantine resolved to take the matter into his own hands (see Smith 1997, Lensky 2006). Thus, he decided to summon a council of all bishops of the western provinces to assemble in Arles in 314. This was the first time that a Roman Emperor took the initiative to convene a council of bishops. What was even more important, this was the first time that the Roman Emperor decided not to use force as a mean to achieve religious conformity. The council of Arles decided against the Donatists, but it did not end the dispute.

The second controversy which shook the Empire was the famous Arian controversy. We cannot discuss the theology, the nature of the Holy Trinity, and the course of the dispute at length here (for this, see MacMullen 1987 and Popović 2007). What is crucial is that the settling of the dispute took place at the first ecumenical council in Nicea in 325 when Constantine was the sole ruler of the Empire. He convened the council and presided over its sessions. He directed the course of the dispute, and it was he who approved of the creed, which was to become the only valid credo in the Christian world. Although the council did not put an end to the quarrels between the fractions, it created a firm basis for the endurance of Christianity and its establishment as state religion of the Empire at the end of the 4th century. After Nicea it became clear that Christianity had won the support of the ruler and that Constantine, although not interested in the
theology of things, had a strong influence on directions taken by the Church. Why was religion so important to him?

Constantine tried to establish a concord, the so called *homonoia*, after the war with Licinius. This term is attested in almost all of his letters preserved in Eusebius' work (see MacMullen 1987: 165). Pagans as well as Christians believed that the celestial order had its reflection in the terrestrial state and that the Empire represented, or rather embodied, this celestial order. In this view, harmony was best achieved by obeying to one head of the State and thus one Divinity only. The old Roman religion, with its gods constantly at dispute and busy leading their own immoral lives, was not suitable for the Roman world of the 4th century. This did not mean that the Empire became Christian right away. There was still a long way to go. However, the strongest and the best organised religion prevailed, and it was Constantine who understood that Christianity was powerful enough to endure. He was only to turn it into the right direction.

**Conclusion**

Whether Constantine himself believed in the Christian God remains unknown to us. We know that he did not break off with paganism for he kept the title of *pontifex maximus* throughout his reign, renewed some of the old temples, and we know that some of the learned pagans of his time, such as the Greek rhetorician and Neoplatonist Sopater, enjoyed a privileged position in the palace. Still, the fact that he did not, according to the tradition, fully accomplish his famous *adventus* in Rome after defeating Licinius at the Capitoline hill, reveals that the old ways were left behind, even if only for the Emperor.
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It can be concluded that there was something of a monotheism in that strong, and not so handsome man. Constantine was attached to the cult of the *Sol Invictus*. The coins he issued provide us with that testimony. Thus, he, as well as his father before him, began as a solar monotheist, and then let himself be guided by that Divinity, regardless of its name and nature. Constantine’s eldest son, Priscus, was tutored by Lactantius. Constantine’s mother, Helena, was said to have found a True Cross, and we know that it was Constantine who started building basilicas and churches throughout the Empire. By this Constantine set a milestone to a new empire, a new ideology, a new time. It is astonishing how a strictly speaking non-Christian emperor founded one of the greatest Christian empires of the upcoming Middle Ages.

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1 Before he died Constantine divided his empire between his sons who continued fighting their opponents. Apart from that, the religious disputes provoked conflicts between Constantine’s sons and marked the beginning of a long period of unrest in the Empire.


4 This edict was issued in Nicomedia.

5 Many of these laws have been preserved in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History.

6 This title was used by Emperors until 379 A.D.
The reforms accomplished in the Late Roman Empire were caused by a large crisis during the 3rd century that found its origins in the public as well as the state sphere. Toward the weakening of the Roman state led two things: external threat and, related to this, economic difficulties. The external threat was twofold: on the one hand, the strong Persian state put pressure on the eastern border, while borders in Britain, the Rhine, and Danube were threatened by the attacks of unorganised tribes. Permanent wars caused a demographic disaster, and the Roman Empire, that throughout the 1st century counted 70 million inhabitants, diminished now, in the 3rd century, to a population of 50 millions. Wars at the borders brought insecurity to roads and reduced the volume of trade. State expenditures increased, because support for the military required increasingly huge resources. Rebellions occurred and the frequent changes on the throne lead the land to a state of anarchy. However, this crisis was surpassed more easily in the eastern part of the Roman Empire as it was more densely inhabited and had a greater number of large cities. In general, the East was richer and culturally more developed. The best answer to this challenging turning point of the Roman Empire gave the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine.

After the victory over Licinius in 323 AD Constantine was the sole surviving caesar of the Roman Empire. Committed to prevent further
collapse of his state Constantine decided to build a new capital, a new Rome. From the time of Diocletian it had become clear that Rome would not be suitable as capital any more. It was Rome where the conspiracies took place, north and west of Rome lay the lands of ‘barbarians’, and at the same time the necessity for division of the Empire was seen, so that it was not expected that Constantine would rule from Rome. Diocletian on the other hand, as the focus of his government was in the East, lived in Nicomedia. Constantine needed a residence and a population that would be grateful only to him (see Burkhart 2006: 333). The obvious choice was in the East, which was the centre of trade and were Christianity, the religion that Constantine accepted, was in the ascent. The decision fell to the old colony of Megara, Byzantium, which was located in one of the most beautiful spots on the then known earth.

The establishment of a new capital was preceded by many decisions and challenges, and at first place Byzantium was not considered as such. Beside Serdica (Sofia), the Emperor had in mind also Thessaloniki, and then Chalcedon on the Asian coast of the Bosphorus. The first serious plans were concerned with Troy in the outmost west of the Hellespont. As Constantine wanted to build a new Rome, Troy seemed an ideal place for him: according to Roman legend, Rome was founded by Aeneas who with the help of God avoided the terrible fate of the city, carrying with him palladium, which was the incarnation of the success of Troy, to Latium. So Ilium (Troy) was the sacred and ancient homeland of the Romans, and an ancient prophecy tells us that the Romans would once transfer the centre of their empire to their homeland (see Burkhart 2006: 409). Constantine began drawing the outlines of a future city were once had been the camps of the Greeks, as well as the grave of Ajax, and he
built a gate that could still be seen even after hundreds of years. Then, one night God told him to choose another place. This event is described in Sozomen’s *Ecclesiastical History* (II.3) that also tells us what happened after that:

“[...] God appeared to him by night and bade him seek another site for his city. Led by the divine hand, he came to Byzantium in Thrace, beyond Chalcedon in Bithynia, and here he desired to build his city, and render it worthy of the name of Constantine. In obedience to the command of God, he therefore enlarged the city formerly called Byzantium, and surrounded it with high walls; [...]” (Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History*, II.3).

Thus, the decision fell to Byzantium on the Bosphorus, and not without reason. The city had a strategically unique position, located at the juncture of two continents, Europe and Asia. On its western side, the city is connected by land with the rest of the Balkans, while the rest is surrounded by water. In the south lays the Aegean sea, linked by the Dardanelles with Propontis, itself being connected to the Black Sea by the Bosphorus. The only weak point of the city was a natural gulf of the Golden Horn. Here, an iron chain was installed, lifting up and down and preventing the entrance to it. Byzantium was closer to Persians and Goths, who put the Empire in danger. Still, it controlled the maritime trade. Two large land roads went off from Byzantium: the western, the *Via Egnatia*, ran to Thessaloniki and continued through northern Greece to Dyrrachium and Brindisi; the northern, the *Via Militaris*, which was much more important in the 4th century, led to Hadrianopolis, Serdica, Naissus, and the Danube provinces, and from there to north Italy, Gaul, and Britain.
One may say that for superstitious people Byzantium was the safer choice than Chalcedon or Troy. Its founding prediction, told to his founder Byzas from Megara by the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi in the 7th century BC, indicated that the city would be established twice and that the second establishment would have a glorious outcome (see Smith 1971: 223). Herodotus writes about the good position of the city, referring to Persian military leader Megabas who, entering the city, ought to have said that the inhabitants of Chalcedon were blind because they did not see the advantage of territory across the sea. Byzantium already had a turbulent history, which now interested the world. For instance, the city had suffered serious destruction by Septimius Severus, who afterwards renewed it, realising the importance of its strategic position.

Constantine was superstitious and consequently consulted with augurs and astrologists about a favourable day for the ritual of marking the line of the new city walls. Then, he personally flagged an area on which to build the city. This area was five times larger than the preceding. On this a legend was created: for when the Emperor’s escort saw that he went too far in the line marking the walls, one with courage asked him: “How far my lord?” to which the Emperor replied: “When he who goes in front of me stops!” It seemed that he saw in front of him some kind of supernatural being (Sherrard 1965: 8).

Constantine’s city was supposed to have the official look of another Rome. According to the model of the ancient Rome, Constantinople also was built on seven hills, of which one was called Capitol, and as Rome, it was divided into fourteen areas. As it was not possible to fill the entire area with buildings in a period of only four years – as would pass according to the emperor’s plans – the building efforts were concentrated
in certain areas: the main port, the western wall, etc. Since the beginning, Constantine planned that his New Rome should be a treasury of all the best from antiquity. For that purpose he sent people all over the world to collect artefacts in order to adorn the new capital. For the sake of beautification of the New Rome, Constantine plundered the art treasures of the Greco-Roman world. The capital was decorated with artefacts such as the Artemision from Ephesus, the Athenaion at Lindos from Rhodes, the temples of Zeus from Dodona, Castor, and Pollux, the Delphic Apollo, the Muses of Helicon, etc (see ibid.).

As the new capital was literally considered as equal to Rome, it received the same institutions, services, and privileges. Therefore, it had to have a Senate. Constantine called the old senatorial family to move to the shores of the Bosphorus. For those who accepted that, attracted by privileges, he built faithful copies of Roman palaces. The Senate acted only as an advisory body. To senatores was awarded the title of clarī (clear, shining, glorious). They were rich landholders, which was the source of their actual power. The city was made equal to Rome in that Constantine assigned to the senatores the old Italian privilege, the ius italicum, that granted them tax immunity.

The city should have a sufficient number of people. Constantine used various ways to persuade inhabitants of the Roman Empire to move to the new capital. At first, he used the general breakdown, that took place in the East after the defeat of Licinius, to force people to move. He promised them land in Asia and the Pontus if they built a house in the new capital. To attract people even more, Constantine proclaimed on May 18\textsuperscript{th} 332 the constant distribution of bread, according to the model of Rome.
In effect, he redirected products from Egypt, destined to the ‘Old’ Rome, to the ‘New’ Rome (see Jones 1964, vol. I: 84).

Central places in the new city built by Constantine were the Hippodrome, the Sacred Palace, and the Hagia Sophia. They were the most important places for the capital’s public life. Among them was the main square, the Augusteum, where Constantine, on his way to the Hagia Sophia, was carried on the shield by his nobles and proclaimed Emperor by the people (Sherrard 1965: 17). South of the Augusteum was located the Hippodrome, which had been built for the first time during the rule of Septimius Severus. The Hippodrome was the equivalent of the Circus Maximus in Rome. The caesar’s lodge on the Hippodrome was directly connected with the Palace, while the Empress, separated from the Emperor with her escort, watched the events in the Hippodrome from the balcony of St. Stephan’s church. Originally it was intended for chariot races, which indeed was his main function. However, it was also here that Emperors were proclaimed and cast off, justice was delivered and offenders punished, triumphs celebrated and art admired. The Hippodrome was the place where the people expressed their current mood and feelings. Here the population met face to face with the Emperor, sitting among his subjects. In the centre of the arena were exposed some of the most important works of ancient art. One of them was an Egyptian porphyry column, which still rests on its original base, showing how the Emperor presided over the games. Another was a bronze pillar which represented the body of three interwoven snakes, whose heads carried, in the original version, a golden tripod dedicated to Apollo after the Greek victory over the Persians at Plataea. The tripod was lost during the transportation of the column to the new city.
To the east of the Hippodrome was the Sacred Palace, the residence of the emperors, that was the site of ceremonial life. The Sacred Palace comprised a whole complex of buildings: gardens, terraces, summer pavilions, churches, receiving halls, baths, fountains, etc. It was richly decorated, each room featured a different style and different motifs on the walls. Splendour was visible in every step. Here the Emperor appeared as victor, conqueror, and protector of the faith.

The third most important building beside the Imperial Palace and the Hippodrome was the church of Hagia Sophia, dedicated to God’s Wisdom and the former heart of the Byzantine world. It is located on the north-eastern part of the Augusteum, and its construction had begun in Constantine’s time, but was completed only during the rule of his son Constantius II. At his own time, Constantine built the church of Saint Irene, on the foundations of Aphrodite’s temple and located behind the Hagia Sophia. The church of St. Irene was the most important place for the service of God, the liturgy, before the construction of the Hagia Sophia was accomplished. During the most important days of the year, including Christmas, Epiphany, Good Friday, Easter Monday, The Sunday after Easter, Pentecost, The Exaltation of the Cross, the Emperor and Empress were present with their escort (see Sherrard 1965: 72). Later, in the time of Justinian, the churches experienced great damage, but Justinian renewed and beautifully decorated them.

Near the Augusteum large baths were founded, dating back to the time of Septimius Severus, known as the baths of Zeus. Like the Hippodrome they were very popular. Their walls were covered with marble, and in the niches there were over sixty bronze statues.
Constantine’s religious ideas were expressed in the statue that was set up in the heart of the new city. It was placed on the highest porphyry column brought from Heliopolis, which was set onto the new ‘Constantine forum’. The statue, made by the sculptor Phidias, presented a bronze Apollo whose head was replaced by that of Constantine, around which was a metal crown or Halo with sunrays. The right hand held a sceptre, while in the left hand lay an orb pierced with The Cross. This ambiguous symbol could be interpreted both as representing the God of the Sun and Christ. Inside the orb was placed a part of The Cross (see Smith 1971: 226) which had been discovered in Jerusalem by Constantine’s mother, empress Helena. The holy relics were stored at the foot of the pillars: among others the crumbs used by Christ to feed the people in the desert; parts of the crosses on which were crucified the two thieves together with Christ; part of the rock from which the water flowed when it was touched by Moses’ staff. The *palladium* was also put here after having been transferred by Constantine from Rome to the new city on the banks of the Bosphorus. In this way he wanted to give to his new city the role of the world leader, which was in earlier times inherited by Rome from Troy (see Sherrard 1965: 11). It appears that with this statue Constantine claimed that he united in himself all the religions. Consequently, the inscription on the column read: “O Christ, Ruler and Master of the World, to You now I dedicate this subject City, and these Sceptres, and the Might of Rome. Protector, save her from all harm” (ibid: 11). Constantine’s column glorified his victory over all enemies and it was dedicated to the founder of a new Christian Empire (see Odahl 2004: 241).

In addition to Christian churches, Constantine founded also pagan temples. One was dedicated to Dioscures, Castor and Pollux, and another
to the goddess of Tyche, protector of the city. Similar to the *Miliarum Aureum* in Rome, a *Milion* was placed in the central square, the Augusteum, which marked the beginning of all roads in the empire. It was placed on the road that led to Hadrianapolis, which then formed the main city street, the *Mese*. Setting the *Milion* on this site confirmed that this point had become the centre of the world, and so the New Rome took the place of its ‘old’ predecessor.

One of the strongest feelings of powerful rulers, the passion for construction, also possessed Constantine, because it entailed a lasting symbol of power. Splendour in the use of colours, the dome, round porticos, and gilded mosaics were the essential elements of that rich architectural complex and the main insignia of the buildings constructed during that time. Even though it cannot be assessed how much was spent for the construction of the city, the population still suffered due to the various fees that had to be introduced in order to finish construction works. Mostly because of the speed with which the buildings were erected, it became necessary to renovate many of them after only a few years.

For the date of the dedication of the city, Constantine selected May 11 330, consulting again augurs and astrologists. On that day a large procession led by priests started on the Hippodrome. The priests carried a large statue portraying the emperor holding in his right hand a small statue of goddess Tyche. The soldiers marched in long white tunics with white candles in their hands, representing an honorary guard of the emperor’s statue. During the ceremony Constantine sat in the imperial lodge, and those who had the space, when the statue was carried in front of them, paid their respect to it. After having made a circle on the Hippodrome, the statue was carried back to the forum where both a pagan and a Christian
prayer were held to the glory of the emperor. The city was named *Constantinopolis*. Above all, Constantine dedicated the city to himself and to his glory. Every year on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of May games were held in the Hippodrome to celebrate the foundation day of the city. To the city was given, by the emperor’s words, the eternal name *Flora* or *Anthousa*, the sacred name of Rome, previously given to Rome by pagan priests (see Burkhart 2006: 410).

In the 4\textsuperscript{th} century, in contrast to Rome, Constantinople was a growing city that saw intensive construction. Its growth and development was owed primarily to the fact that it was the residence of the emperor and his court (see Jones 1964, vol. II: 688). For its founder the new city was a symbol of a new world. It was meant to become a city with a long and glorious future. The foundation of Constantinople finally showed the public that Rome was not the capital of the state any more. As did its predecessor the new capital possessed the *Milion*, a *Forum*, the Senate, a Hippodrome, etc. In so many ways Constantinople sought to be, as its founder Constantine the Great said, *ALTERA ROMA* – another, a *New Rome*.

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Migrations in Byzantine Istria in the 6th Century

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Byzantine Istria had a homogeneous population, but its origins were very diverse. One part descended from the Romanised native people – the Histrians and Roman colonists from the time of the late Roman Republic and early Empire (Matijašić 1998: 21-52). A new population joined them in late Antiquity, in the 5th and 6th centuries. They were Roman and Romanised people who were withdrawing from Noricum and Pannonia towards Istria which had a more secure position in that time (Marušić 1960: 21).

1. Immigration from Byzantine territory
The consolidation of Byzantine rule after the Gothic war in 552 also brought to Istria an increased number of immigrants of eastern origin, joining those who had, by duty, been there already during the war. These were chiefly state functionaries and officials, as well as soldiers and officers who were not displaced after the war (Carile 1978: 188, Guillou 1980: 253-254).
Perhaps because the decrease of population in Istria during the war was lower than in other Italic regions, and because Istria was distant from the great centres, the migration from the east was smaller and limited mainly
to members of the imperial army and bureaucracy. The civil newcomers consisted, just like outside Istria, of craftsmen, ecclesiastics, merchants, money-changers, and sailors. Their ethnic origin did not differ much from the migrants elsewhere in northern Italy. Most came from Syria, Thracia, Bythinia, Cylicia, Armenia, Helada, and there were also Jews (Guillou 1980: 254) and Greeks (Rižanski: 82). From Tergeste (modern Triest) it is known that two Syrians lived there (Sticotti : 298-299). Greek names among the inscriptions in the Euphrasian Basilic in Poreč could indirectly confirm the presence of newcomers from the Greek-speaking east (see Iscriptiones Italiae X, nr. 135, 174, 185 and 229; Kos 1902: nr. 125). However, this explanation is not entirely reliable as we know that Greek names were frequent among Roman natives, too. Some military staff must have come to Istria after the foundation of the exarchate in Ravenna and after the unification of civil and military power in the hands of local commanders. A certain number of people probably came from Ravenna because of the connection with the local archbishopric (which held property in the region), and especially archbishop Maximian’s activity (Cuscito 1977: 287).

The migrants from east settled down mainly in towns and fortified places (castela). Soldiers, officers and state officials were present in every town and castelum, in particular after the foundation of Ravenna’s exarchate when the officers were taking over leadership in the administration of the region (Štih 2001: 7). Most immigrants lived in Pola (modern Pula), the capital of the Istrian province. State functionaries and important officers were related to the seat of magister militum and other state offices of this kind. Newcomers from Ravenna were linked to the possessions of Ravenna’s church in the territory of Pola’s ager and in the
town itself. There they executed the archbishop’s authority over his possessions and the adherent part of the local population and functionaries (Cuscito 1977: 287). They also administrated Ravenna’s possessions in the whole province of Istria (Marušić 1967: 22).

If we take into account that the majority of migrants (exceptions were soldiers and part of the clergy) arrived with their families, and that at least rich newcomers, among them the more important clerics from Ravenna, key functionaries, and a great part of officers, all brought their own household personnel (ostlers, maids, and slaves), we have to estimate their total number at some hundred or even a thousand persons. The numerical growth of people coming from the east was highly significant in regard to former years when almost no population with eastern origins existed.1

Apart from this, however, economic reasons caused the retreat and even flight of single persons and small groups of the Istrian population. Of course, the number of those who left Istria for such reasons was zero in comparison to the number of newcomers. In the great majority of cases, just like everywhere else in Italy, members of the upper classes (senators, important officials) left their homes in Istria and went to Constantinople (Lukman 1980: 5). There are sources suggesting the existence of the senatorial order even in the second half of the 6th century (Bratož 2001: 44). At least in the beginning senatorial emigration was smaller than elsewhere in Italy, because Istria had not been affected as badly during the Gothic war. Most members of the wealthy classes probably left Istria in the time of combined Lombard, Avar, and Slavic pressure on Istria during the turn of the 6th and 7th centuries.
2. Federates

Already at that time, Lombards and Slavs could be found in Istria. Lombards were present in Istria, above all, as soldiers of federate units belonging to Gisulfus II, Lombard duke in Friuli. They were stationed in the Buzet area around 600 AD (Štih 2001: 14). Later in the 7th century, single Lombards served at the *limes* (Grafenauer 1988: 193). Their presence has been confirmed by archaeological remains from the necropolis of Brežac near Buzet, where a grave of a Lombard horseman was discovered (Marušić 1987: 81-83, Matijašić 1998: 9, Štih 2001: 14). Female jewellery could indicate that Lombard soldiers lived there with their families (Margetić 1992: 157).

3. Refugees from Pannonia and Noricum

The majority of new inhabitants came to Istria as refugees from Noricum and the Pannonian area, especially after the end of the Gothic war (Markušić 1967: 21). Their arrival was influenced by the events that took place between Danube and the Adriatic Sea, and probably happened in several waves depending on the political situation and the Avar and Slavic advance in this area. The Lombard settling in Pannonia in 546/7 and the end of the Gothic war, when the way to Italy was opened once again, probably started the first wave (Grafenauer 1988: 310). The second wave was going on during the Lombard migration to Italy, when the last Pannonian Romans withdrew to Italy with the Lombards (Grafenauer 1988: c.26). A part of them may have come to Istria instead. Furthermore, the Lombard invasion probably forced a certain number of people from Venetia to escape to Istria. Some possibly fled from Aquileia, while others retreated to Grado (Grafenauer 1988: c.10).
A further flow of refugees was more closely linked to the Avarian- Slavic pressure towards the end of the 6th century. The stages of retreat and indications for the origin of the refugees can be found in accounts of the contemporary destruction of bishoprics in modern Slovenian territory, the transfer of place names, names of church patrons (Bratož 1984: 66-67), and some papal letters (Kos 1902: nr. 124, 126 and 127). Some refugees perhaps came from the territory of the extinct Petovian bishopric, up until about 580, when the Slavs occupied Pannonia. The Romans of Celje and the Ljubljana basin were retreating from this area before the Slavic occupation around 587 (Grafenauer 1964, 1978: 306-307). Without a doubt, even some Istrians must have left the more dangerous parts of the province. In the initial waves of refugees people from all social classes were present (Grafenauer 1988: c.26). Among those who came later the upper classes prevailed (Grafenauer 1964, 1978: 320).

It seems that the refugees settled in all parts of the Istrian territory, which was still under Byzantine rule. Near Pula, it is known that they settled in the localities of Brioni, Rogatica, Guran, Barbariga, Muzibel near Štinjan, Banjole, Medulin, Ušićevi Dvori, and Magornjak near Peroj (Marušić 1967: 21). But they came to the Tergestine ager, too, as it was the Istrian territory nearest to Noricum and Pannonia. This is indirectly shown in the events connected with religious struggles between Catholics and followers of the Three Chapters in Carpis (moder Koper), Neapolis (modern Novigrad), and Tergeste itself.

The arrival of these refugees and their settling in this part of Istria have been directly mentioned and confirmed by the bishop John who had come from Pannonia himself (episcopus quidam Iohannes nomine de Pannoniis veniens) (Kos 1902: nr. 127). But there are more things
indirectly confirming it. The arrival of catholic refugees at the turn of the 6th and 7th centuries intensified the religious conflicts in the towns of the area (Kos 1902: nr. 121-131, 135, 136, 139, Bratož 1984: 67-68). The transmission of the name of modern Ljubljana from Emona to Neapolis (see Bratož 1984: 66, Rus 1939: 161), and the transmission of the cult of the "Emonian" martyrs Saint Pelagius and Saint Maximus from Emona to Neapolis indicate the arrival of a large number of refugees from the Emonian area. Other people probably came from the area of Celea (modern Celje) in Noricum, as indicated by a cult of the “Celean” martyr Saint Maximilian which appeared in Piran and Koper (Štih 2001: 10).

Besides John from Pannonia there are two other potential refugee-bishops: Patricius from Emona and John from Celea. It is possible that Patricius and John lived in Istria already in 590 (Bratož; Peršić 1989: 58). In the case that they fled to Istria with at least a part of their own adherents (there are examples from Venetia for this), it is highly probable that they settled together to preserve their own community. Hence, the Emonian community can be located in Neapolis and the Celean community in Piran (modern Piran). The number of Emonian newcomers can be estimated at one-hundred or even a few hundred persons (Bratož 1984: 66-68, Rus 1939: 161-164).

4. Migrations in Istria because of religious reasons
Istria was also a final destination for those who were escaping from Catholic regions because they remained faithful to the Three Chapters. Examples for this are Aquileian patriarchs like Paulinus (557-569), who was at first a monk in his native city of Rome (Kos 1902: nr. 61) Probinus (569-571), who was born in Benevento (Kos 1902: nr. 77), Elias (571-586), who was of Greek origin (Kos 1902: nr. 78), and Severus (586-607).
who came from Ravenna (Kos 1902: nr. 96). It is obvious that Istria, which remained with the Three Chapters, became very attractive for clergy adhering to this part of the schism.

The schism of Three Chapters caused new refugees in the times of Pope Gregory the Great. The refugees were not coming to Istria anymore, but left it. This time, the schism began to lose its power and some of its followers began to defect to the Catholic side. In the beginning, the converts were retreating from Istria voluntarily\(^3\), later they had to leave because of pressure and violence emanating from persistent members of the schismatic side.\(^4\) About these converts, whom Gregory the Great in his letters named followers of the Istrian schism, it cannot be said with certainty that they only came from Istria, because the term “Istrian schism” indicated the entire schismatic area of the Three Chapters controversy on the territory of Aquileian patriarchate and not only Istria (Bratož 2001: 40). Nonetheless, it tells us that there were single persons who were retreating from Istria because of their conversion to Catholicism. Pope Gregory the Great mentioned four such persons: a deacon Felix (Kos 1902: nr. 109), two Johns (Kos 1902: nr. 114,115), and one unnamed Istrian bishop (Kos 1902: nr. 123). All four found their refuge in Sicily. Felix dwelt in the area of Syracuse, one of the Johns in the area of Catania. The exact places where the other two converts stayed are unknown (Kos 1902: 109, 114; Lukman 1980: 217-218). Although the persons named in Gregory’s letters were only higher clerics, it is not impossible that converted laymen or lesser-ranking clerics were retreating from Istria for the same reasons.
The next wave of refugees for religious reasons began after the intensification of the Three Chapters controversy in 607. John probably attracted some adherents from Istria. The flight was stimulated by the hard methods employed by Byzantine authorities during the recatholisation of Istria (Kos 1902: nr. 144). The last wave of such refugees perhaps left Istria in 628 when the attempt of Fortunatus, patriarch in Grado, to restore schismatic rule in this region once again failed. Fortunatus himself had to flee to Lombardy, where he became patriarch in Aquileia (Kos 1902: nr. 156).

5. Conclusion
In only half a century, Istria experienced considerable shifts in populations. New people came to Istria for various reasons. From the Byzantine East came those who saw new economic opportunities or who came by duty because they were serving in the imperial bureaucracy or the army. Another background for migrants was Ravenna with its exarchate and bishopric as a connection to Istria. Most of the newcomers were refugees from Noricum and Pannonia. Religious reasons (the Controversy of the Three Chapters) made people come and leave. In the beginning, Istria attracted adherents to the schism, some of which later left after re-conversion into Catholicism, and finally, those who kept on as ‘schismatics’ of the Three Chapters had to flee.

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Endnotes

1 For comparison: in Ravenna region the share of people originating from East grew from 16% to 43% of population in some years (A. GUILLOU, L’Italia bizantina dall’invasione longobarda alla caduta di Ravenna, page 253).

2 The Three Chapters controversy was the result of long controversies about the nature of Christ. Its roots lie in the Council of Efes (431), where writings of Theodor of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyprus and Ibas of Edessa had been condemned as Nestorian. For more information on the Three Chapters, see F. KOS, Gradivo I, number 142.

3 There was a deacon Felix who went in Rome to the pope Gregorius the Great in 593. The pope in the letter to the bishop of Siracusa did not mentioned any schismatic persecution again Felix (F. KOS, Gradivo I, number 109).

4 Three years later, in 596 (see the previous note), pope Gregorius the Great had to provide for safety for a new convert named John (F. KOS, Gradivo I, number 114).

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Abbreviations

Arh. vest. – Arheološki vestnik (Archeological review)
HL – Historia Langobardorum
AAAd – Antrachita' Altoadriatiche
Transferring Borders

The Paris Peace Conference as a Turning Point in History

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You see these little holes? We call them here ‘Wilson’s Points.’ They have been made with machine guns; the big gaps have been made with hand grenades. We are now engaged in self-determination, and God knows what and when the end will be.¹

Turning points are essential for any historian who wants to make sense of the past. Carefully analysing them we aim at understanding the inner workings of historical processes, that is the often twisted linkage of underlying structures and contingencies, historical agents, and unforeseen events over time. At a first, rather postmodern sight, historical junctions seem to be a mere matter of scale, depending on the interpretative judgment of the historian. Following this lead, a closer look at presumably big events such as the French Revolution will tend to blur them to a maze of endless single moments, all in some way contributing to the epochal occurrence of ‘1789’. Contrarily, the same incident may be of great importance for a certain period or aspect of modern European history, but thinking in larger time intervals of thousands of years or considering the
importance of the French Revolution in other parts of the world or aspects of life, this significance will equally diminish. However useful for critical reflection of simplistic terms and concepts, this is a view on history that may itself fall short of past complexities. It runs the double risk of relativist ignorance, denying the existence of any meaningful event in history, and, on the other hand and maybe even worse, of a renewed version of structural determinism, according to which events do not matter anyway, because they all give way to structural dispositions in the longer run. Yet, if we want to make sense of historical processes, structures and ex-post accounts are not enough. We must also reveal the moments of bifurcation in which contingencies are reduced to specific events and ensuing processes. This is, to put it bluntly, when history happens, and it is up to the historian’s scrutiny to examine the mechanisms that interweave structures and agents in non-determined settings.

Contingency, that is, the realm of possibilities within a historical setting, is of course not dissolved by such developments. Structural dispositions, it is true, remain a strong factor in the history to follow a revolution, a war, the emergence of a powerful new idea or method of production. It is just that the very structure is not the same as it was before, it has changed, and so has the realm of possibilities: Turning points, in this sense, are the directors of historical structures.

As a case in point, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 stands at the intersection between the so-called ‘long’ 19th and the commencing ‘short’ 20th centuries. In this paper, I will examine this impressively huge meeting of international politicians and experts regarding concepts of territorial borders. Following an introduction to the major problems the delegates
faced at the conference, I will draw on two case studies of violent border conflicts which unfolded in the direct aftermath of war: Alsace and Lorraine on the one and the Turko-Greek population exchange on the other hand. I will then outline the general problem of complex realities in the young and to be established states. To sum up, I will conclude my main ideas and briefly return to the matter of turning points in history.

1. Paris 1919
As “the world’s government, its court of appeal and its parliament, the focus of its fears and hopes” (Macmillan 2001: xxv), the Paris Peace Conference, unprecedented in size and scope, was supposed to find answers to the disasters and upheavals of World War I.\(^4\) Besides urgent economic and diplomatic issues, the task was nothing less than to find and impose a new common political order in Europe.\(^5\) The Habsburg, Ottoman, and Tsarist Empires had disappeared, while German imperial fantasies of ‘Mitteleuropa’ had not only failed but had plunged the entire continent into war.

Although this collective degression to violence dealt a sensible blow to a perceived European or Western moral supremacy, the new world order was still being conceived of in terms of Western civilisation. Imposing a common political order thus started as a project of transferring seemingly universal Western concepts to the reorganising eastern and south-eastern regions of the continent. The fundament of Western concepts was the model of the emancipatory nation-state, a political community formed by common experience and political will. The appealing catchword of ‘national self-determination’, as the American president Woodrow Wilson put it, was but a reformulation of Ernest
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Renan’s vision of the nation as a “plébiscite de tous les jours” (Renan 1992: 55).

The central instrument of installing a European-wide national order was the drawing or redrawing of territorial borders. In that borders were to follow ‘national’ lines, they should impose the new principle by dividing and uniting diverse local populations according to national principles. In the attempt to apply the Western model of national borders all over Europe, the Allied Forces sought to pacify the troublesome political patchwork left behind by the fallen empires. Yet, they also sought to export specific political principles and thus extend their power as centres of the new, national order. Soon enough, these simplistic ideas of a one-way transfer of Western concepts resulted in endless complications, modifications, and contradictions with mutual and widely unforeseen consequences.

2. Re-establishing borders: Alsace and Lorraine

Although conflicting claims go back to early modern times (see Erbe 2002), quarrels in the sense of national rivalry about the German-French border regions of Alsace and Lorraine set in with their German annexation in 1871. Ever since, nationalist discourse in both countries revolved around and gained momentum by the ‘question’ of Alsace-Lorraine. Whereas in France writers such as Fustel de Coulanges and Ernest Renan ardently defended a voluntarist model of the nation, German thinkers like Theodor Mommsen stressed cultural similarities. However, in the aftermath of First World War the French did not resort to their proclaimed principles, but rather used a classification system based largely on
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hereditary grounds to cope with the complex situation in the regained provinces.

First of all, there would be no plebiscite, as the leading figure of French victory against the German attack, Georges Clemenceau, had made clear even before the fighting came to an end (see Harvey 1999: 540). Clemenceau argued that the annexation of 1871 had been illegal, and that furthermore massive immigration from the German heartland would present a major flaw in any kind of local vote. Indeed, the result of a plebiscite would have most probably been narrow, and it was not foreseeable in favour to which state people would vote in their majority. Similar to what the Germans had done some forty years earlier, the French took advantage of their stronger position, bending their initial ideals of political identity and quieting an ambivalent situation with the metaphor of “les enfants perdus”.

But not every resident of Alsace and Lorraine was considered a ‘lost child’. Confronted with a border society “ridden with fissures, feuds and latent conflicts” (Harvey 1999: 544), the French authorities applied a presumably objective and easy to handle passport classification system: A-Cards were issued to people born in France or Alsace-Lorraine, whose parents were both French or old-established residents of one of the provinces. They presented the largest group with 1,082,650 persons (59% of the total population). B-Card holders were children of one French / Alsace-Lorrainian and one German parent, even if the child was born in Alsace-Lorraine. They numbered 183,500 individuals (10%). C-Card holders were foreigners, e.g. Poles or Italians, a tiny minority of 55,050 persons (3%). Finally, D-Cards were handed to all persons who had two German parents. Those made up 28% (513,800) of the total population.
and were principally suspect to voluntary or forced expatriation as well as to a number of economic and social disadvantages.

The aim behind the classification system was the re-establishment of public order and the re-integration of the ‘lost provinces’ to the French heartland, drawing a clear national line of distinction through the population. The term for this was ‘épuration’, which would roughly translate as ‘purification’ (for a more detailed discussion see Grohmann 2005). Purification, at least in theory, stood in stark contrast to former French concepts of assimilation in that it did not allow for changes of national adhesion and ultimately aimed at an expatriation of an important part of the population.⁹

In practice, however, the ideal of an Alsace-Lorraine purified from German influence experienced a variety of difficulties (see Harvey 1999: 547). For instance, radical trade unionists and revolutionaries were more likely to be expelled than local industrialists. Also, unemployed people or prostitutes ran a higher risk of expulsion due to ‘moral’ reasons. Furthermore, local residents tried to settle personal disputes by denouncing the other to the authorities, accusing him of being a German sympathiser.

Approximately 150,000 supposedly German people left Alsace and Lorraine until 1921 (see Harvey 1999: 551). It was clear that the French government was trying to impose a clear-cut line of national division between the two countries which excluded the complex and intermingled heritage of these regions. In order to arrive at a sharp line of division through such a complex area, the French authorities made use of a hereditary model of national classification that was closer to German
concepts of the time than to classical French voluntarist principles. It will be the task of further research to assess this hereditary twist in its origins, unfolding, and consequences in greater detail.

3. Constructing borders and moving peoples: the Greco-Turkish case

The Greco-Turkish case has to be seen in the wider context of the attempted Westernisation of central, eastern, and south eastern Europe after World War I by establishing national borders in formerly imperial regions. It is also a remarkable example of opportunist Western policy, guided more by momentary strategic interests than solid international principles.

Thus, in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), the Allied Powers supported the Greek advance to realise their ‘megali idea’ and expand the Greek state to Anatolia. As the young Turkish state successfully fought back and by 1922 drove the Greek army off the Anatolian shores, the Allies gave up their support of Greece and through the newly formed League of Nations initiated a peace conference acknowledging the new situation as fait accompli.

The Lausanne negotiations, led by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, introduced a striking novelty to international political practise: the massive compulsory exchange of populations based on ethnic principles. Although the treaty rather sanctioned what was already happening, namely the exodus of the ancient Greek orthodox population from Anatolia, it should not be underestimated in its serving as a model for international politics (see Mazower 1997: 47-48). In sum, an estimated two million people was exchanged, provoking not only personal hardships but also tremendous difficulties in the respective societies. As most people
migrated from Turkey to Greece, the population exchange proved a heavy burden especially for the latter. Greece had enormous difficulties in integrating almost two million new inhabitants whose habits, language, qualifications, and regional affiliations were strongly shaped by their Anatolian homeland and largely foreign to Greeks in Greece.

The Greco-Turkish conflict, in consequence, was less a well prepared and wise exchange of culturally distinct populations in order to pacify and homogenise a region in turmoil. Rather, both nascent nations sought to create and shape a common cause, a common experience, a common identity by violently linking religious affiliation to territory and ‘nationality’. This was the background to the Greek military campaign in Anatolia as well as the atrocities committed by the Turkish army on the local orthodox population. In the longer run, the violent construction of an ethnic border disrupted century old contacts across the Aegean and led to ever latent hostility between the two nations in the course of the 20th century.

4. Complex realities
The transfer of Western principles to formerly imperial grounds met a number of structural difficulties. In most of the areas there was a relatively weak relation between people and the state. Furthermore, one could often find a mixture and shading of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic communities in the same region. National ideas penetrating these realms since the early 19th century led to first civic strife and uprisings mainly on the basis of religious affiliation.11 There was, it seems, neither the necessary integrative political or economic forces nor the time to engage in a process of forging a modern nation according to the Western paradigm. As a result, many societies attempted to compensate for their
relative political and economic backwardness by overleaping a step in national development. This meant that nationalism in these environments lost its originally emancipatory character of a people forming a conscious political body fighting against feudal rule. Instead, in many cases local elites used modern Western concepts and arguments to mobilise parts of the local population for violent conflict, while they presented this towards bewildered and ill-informed Western leaders as local national upheavals of suppressed peoples.¹²

One major problem for the Western delegations around the big three, Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, and David Lloyd George, was the sheer number of self-claimed nations and the complexity of the situations in the eastern and south eastern regions of Europe. The Americans, disposing of virtually no knowledge on these affaires before 1917, tackled these complexities by generating huge numbers of statistics, maps, and expert committees (see Crampton 2006). Asking local populations and conducting plebiscites proved too laborious and would most certainly not have yielded clear results, as many people did not care or even know which nation they belonged to and even then territorial claims in most cases overlapped. Thus, people were not asked but measured. Ethnicity traits, that is, presumably objective and superficial attributes of a person, was what national awakening had been coming down to.

As the example of Alsace and Lorraine has shown, the application of national principles in complex and disputed settings experienced significant modifications also in Western Europe itself. Nationalism as a unifying and liberating force apparently had exhausted its powers and became a means of exclusion and mobilisation for conflict. The major
effect was an ethnification of formerly inclusive, political border concepts. While this was a general European phenomenon, the integration of the entire European continent into a national order proved unequal. Not only had the newly formed states to observe, in their eyes, humiliating protection of minorities, which reduced their sovereignty and rendered them in some sense second class nations. Above all, local structures and inequalities were often transformed and deepened to ‘national’ or ethnic division lines in the respective society. As there were neither strong peaceful mechanisms, e.g. provided by the League of Nations, to alter inequalities between old and new states and within the latter, nor a foreseeable depart from the ideal of homogeneous nation states, solutions by force to many seemed the only possible way.  

5. Conclusions

The central problem of the new European order to be installed by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 resided in the interplay of a diffuse but strong Western ideal with complex realities in the eastern and south eastern regions of the continent, but also back home. Borders had to be clear lines along ‘national’ divides, while the homogenous, territorial nation-state figured as unquestionable ideal. In the same time, key terms such as ‘nation’, ‘self-determination’, and race remained diffuse and, confronting complex and highly contested areas, tended towards an ethnic and violent meaning. As peaceful means to solve arising conflicts and a powerful supranational idea or organisation were missing, violent redrawing of borders, expulsion, and extinction of ethnic groups became largely applied policy instruments with disastrous consequences in the 1930s and 40s.
In this sense, the Paris Peace Conference indicates an *ambivalent* turning point. Although it imposed a modern, national order on the whole of Europe, based on mass politics and active peoples, it still stuck to the older notion of a balance of powers and fully sovereign states. As it turned out, this old concept proved too rigid to handle the new national order, while it hindered the establishment of an effective supranational body. But the Paris Peace Conference is also an *open* turning point in that it introduced an entirely new mode of European politics. Minority rights, supranational cooperation, questions of outside intervention in domestic affairs were entirely new elements, and despite all shortcomings it was in no way determined that war would be the necessary outcome. However, the observed ethnification of border concepts and quarrels, in which conflicting strategic interests and political principles found a common ground, hints at the contradictions and shortcomings of the new order.

The question of Paris being a turning point is obviously also a matter of scale. Its importance even seems to increase in the longer run, as some of the unsolved and troubling problems it dealt with resurfaced in the aftermath of the Cold War. Ethnic cleansing, national self-determination, but also issues concerning supranational order and global inequality are crucial contemporary problems. The historical study of an impressive first attempt to come to terms with such challenges thus has a high relevance for the present.

Nevertheless, even if the situations of today and that of the 1920s bear some resemblances, they are separated by a world war, the competition of two ideologically opposed blocks, and a process of pluralisation that, at least in some parts of the world, has led to a relativisation of national borders and identities. Turning points, then, have
unforeseeable consequences in the future in that they change the direction of historical development. It is because of this path dependence that we cannot separate structures and events in a simple dichotomy, as if they existed independently from each other. Choices select certain possibilities in a certain time and by this eliminate others and generate new ones. This does not mean that the structure is changed in its entirety, or that it looses its significance. But it means that we must depart from deterministic and structuralist accounts. On the other hand, some choices do make a greater difference than others and there are decisive moments in historical processes. Of course, this is a matter of interpretation (see Gaddis 2004: 91-110), but this is exactly the task of historians: making sense of the past.

References


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Endnotes

1 Such was the description of the situation in L’viv 1919 by a resident towards an American visitor, as quoted in Mazower 1997: 50.

2 For a stimulating, most recent discussion of turning points in history see Collins 2007, arguing from the position of sociological determinism. For another sociologically inspired, but more balanced approach to ‘events’ and ‘structures’ in history see the edited volume by Suter et al. 2001.
3 This quite arbitrary enumeration is to indicate that turning points are not restricted to political and military events alone, but can equally be found in cultural and economic history. Apart from a general bias in traditional historiography towards a stress on military and political events or ‘great men’, there is no reason *prima facie* to follow a dichotomy between a ‘structural’ economic or cultural and an ‘eventful’ political and military history. Consider a picture, a new style of painting, the transition to a different kind of economy (think only of the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe) in contrast to the emergence of the modern state in Western Europe or even lengthy battles in the trenches of the First World War. The distinction between a turning ‘point’ and a longer process of change should be a gradual and pragmatic one, justified by the context and the analytical model the historian uses.


5 The colonial context, important as it is, cannot be dealt with at this point. The same goes for the incipient rivalry between the USA and the young Soviet Union. As these points indicate, however, the situation right after the end of the war witnessed the naissance of major key structures and problems shaping much of 20th century’s history.

6 The study of borders and border regions is a relatively young and vibrant field of transdisciplinary research, see only Sahlin 1989, Baud / van Schendel 1997, Struck et al. 2007. Borders are an excellent analytical tool and provide a promising perspective especially for studies on political order and nationhood, because they figure in the centre of questions regarding collective identity and territoriality. There are, however, no works on transnational political concepts and their application in the wider European context. This articles intends to do a first step in this direction.

7 All figures are from Harvey 1999: 548.
8 ‘German’ here means people either originating from the German heartland or being born in Alsace-Lorraine after 1871. The fact that children of two ‘Germans’ were born in Alsace-Lorraine did not make a difference.

9 Still, according to article 79 of the Versailles Treaty, it was possible for ‘German’ residents of Alsace-Lorraine to make a request for French citizenship. From a number of 95,893 inquiries to naturalisation, 77,064 were granted (see Grohmann 2005: 583). In addition, authorities proved to be relatively generous in dealing with similar requests of people who wanted to change their passport from B to A or from D to B (see Harvey 1999: 549).

10 There are several recent publications on the Turko-Greek population exchange. See, among others, the excellent volumes by Yildirim 2006 and Hirschon 2008.

11 On the prominent example of the Balkans in the 19th century see Sundhaussen 2001.

12 The example of Serbian delegate Jovan Cvijic at the Paris Peace Conference is a good case in point. Presenting them dubious ethnographic maps and exploiting his good education and contacts to Western leaders, Cvijic managed to strengthen Serbian leadership in the new Kingdom of the Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs, and even to enlarge Yugoslav territory. See Crampton 2006: 741.

13 In recent historiography the role of the League of Nations has been examined in a more detailed and positive perspective, see e.g. Clavin / Wessels 2005 and Cowan 2003. A survey of the current debate can be found in Pedersen 2007.

14 The Anglo-Irish conflict between 1916 and 1922, ending with the separation of Ireland, is another example.

15 For a more critical and pessimistic view of the Paris arrangements see Fink 2004, who examines the ‘half-hearted’ minority rights system. For a very recent provocative essay on the tendency toward national homogenisation in the ‘Paris system’, leading to minority protection as well as forced population transfers as “two sides of the same coin”, see Weitz 2008, quote on p. 1313.
Becoming a Metropolis: Urban Development of Moscow 1870-1914

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The last third of the nineteenth century was the era of modernization and tremendous growth for many cities in Europe and Northern America. Russia was no exception. Among its cities Moscow is a remarkable example of this process. Within decades the city covered the long distance between a ‘big village’ and a metropolis and became the outpost of capitalism and modernity in Eastern Europe.

In this paper I will argue that the profound and rapid transformation that Moscow underwent placed unprecedented burdens on the majority of its inhabitants. Firstly, I will locate Moscow in the context of early 19th century Europe and Russia. Then, I will identify and weigh the most important aspects of economic and demographic transformation. In the last part of the paper, I will emphasise the interaction between the new patterns of the social sphere and the uses of the urban space.

However, one should not overestimate the ‘big village’ character of pre-industrial Moscow. This expression, introduced to the Western reader by Joseph Bradley (see Bradley 1983, Hamm 1986), reflects the provincial nature of Moscow and its inferior position to St. Petersburg rather than the true place of the city in the urban hierarchy. In 1750 Moscow was the seventh biggest European city (Hohenberg and Lees 1985: 227) and still
one hundred years later, when industrialization brought many new actors to the historical scene, it ranked among the top ten cities in the world (Hamm 1986: 2). It was also the second largest city in the country and an important centre of the national manufacturing. Yet to keep this position, Moscow needed to meet the challenge of the developing cities both inside and outside the country and keep the pace of an accelerating growth and transformation.

Nevertheless, mid-nineteenth century Moscow certainly did look quite differently from what was considered to be a modern European city. The major part of it, apart from the limited central districts and mansions of the nobility, indeed resembled a swelled village or provincial town, with its darkness and dust, never-ending fences, humble wooden houses, barrens overgrown with grass, kitchen gardens, and streets so dirty that “pedestrians were losing their galoshes in the mud” (Vasilich 1915: 105). Moscow social life was dominated by the gentry, living “in the magnificent idleness” on the expense of their numerous souls, so to say serfs, somewhere in the remote Russian provinces. Moscow stayed in the memory of the contemporaries as the “refuge for those who have nothing to do except for squandering their riches, playing cards and paying visits” (Levshin 1915: 95); the whole organization of city life was presented as traditional and patriarchal while its rhythm was measured and slow.

In the development of Moscow the turning point came in the beginning of the 1870s. It was the time when many European and American cities started their rapid growth unprecedented in the past – so did Berlin, Budapest, New York, Chicago, and many other cities. This process was global, but in the case of Moscow it had a strong connection
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to one single event in the national history – the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Located in the middle of the agricultural provinces, Moscow immediately felt the impact of the liberation.

Between 1830 and 1864 the population increased by 30,000 whereas after 1864 – by this time the majority of the liberation contracts (ustavnye gramoty) were settled – in only seven years it grew by 238,000 to 601,969 in 1871. The coming decades continued in this pattern and in 1897 Moscow had already 1,043,000 residents followed by 1,346,000 in 1907 and 1,612,000 in 1912 (Zvyagintsev 1915: 112).

To some extent this population growth was caused by the natural increase of natality that doubled between 1878 and 1908 and a certain decrease of the death rate due to the development of medical facilities. However, to a much larger degree this growth was the result of constant immigration. The provinces of Central Russia, that is Riazan, Tula, Kaluga, Smolensk, Tver, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, etc. in the late 19th century suffered from the catastrophic over-population as peasant allotments, redistributed according to the number of family members at regular intervals, were becoming too small to feed the family. Consequently, peasants were forced to look for other sources of income and rushed to Moscow in search of work. For example, Ruza, the western county of the Moscow province, sent to the metropolis 27.5% of its entire population between 1897 and 1902 (Bradley 1983: 106). This case was certainly not unique.

Moscow became the city of immigrants, as almost three-fourth of its population was non-native. The proportion of the immigrants remained remarkably constant at 74% in 1882, 72% in 1902, and 71% in 1912. In other words, in 1902 only 12.2% of the entire active male population were born in Moscow, or, in other words, seven out of every eight working men
in the city could not call it their native town (Bradley 1983: 103). These immigrants constituted an inexhaustible source of cheap labour-force and thus provided the necessary basis for the developing urban economy.

The main trend of the modernizing city economy was industrialization. Moscow experienced dramatic growth of industry, facilitated by a developing infrastructure and concentration of the labour-force. Between 1871 and 1912 the number of the industrial enterprises doubled while the number of workers employed increased threefold (Nifontov 1954: 73). The city’s nickname at that time, ‘Calico Moscow’, is a good indication of its industrial profile. The textile industry held a key position. In the mid-19th century it employed 80% of all the city’s workers and kept this first place until the revolution, though the proportion of the employees was constantly decreasing. It was metallurgy and machinery, food and printing industry that challenged the textile’s leading position in the urban economy. In 1912 35% of the 165,000 factory workers were employed in the textile industry, followed by metal working and machine building (16%), food processing (11%), printing (7%), and chemicals (3%) (Colton 1995: 37).

Although the growth of industry was tremendous, one should not overestimate its role as a driving force in the urban economy. First of all, manufacturing was not necessarily factory-bound. The traditional small forms of production in artisanal workshops were still prevalent in many sectors of the manufacturing sector. Although in the textile industry, chemicals, machinery, the vast majority of the employees were factory workers. In wood, leather, and paper manufacturing the proportion of the latter did not exceed 40%, while in clothing amounted to less than 4%.
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On the other hand, the period under examination saw the dramatic growth of Moscow as a commercial centre. In 1902 156,000 Muscovites were engaged in commerce (as compared to 72,000 thirty years earlier), constituting 21% of the entire labor-force, a larger proportion than in St. Petersburg or Odessa; indeed, among the major European capitals it was only Paris that exceeded Moscow in this indicator (Bradley 1982: 74-75, Bradley 1986: 18). Retailing flourished and was supported by the continuous increase of population, but it was wholesale that built the basis of the city’s economic power.

Ten railroads, constructed in the second half of the nineteenth century, connected Moscow to the coal of Donetsk, the oil of Baku, to cotton plantations of Central Asia, to iron ore of the Urals, or grain of the southern Russian provinces. The volume of freight of the Moscow railway junction tripled between 1882 and 1905. In 1910 it reached the volume of 12 millions tons with roughly 40% of it falling on the transit traffic that was greatly facilitated by the Moscow Circuit Railroad, built in 1908 (Zvyagintsev 1915: 213). Located on the cross-road of this highly centralized railway network, Moscow controlled the wholesale on the vast territory of the empire, and this brought the city the leading position in the country’s external and internal trade.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the value of annual trade and industrial production combined reached 1,2 billion rubles (11.5% of the total in European Russia), with 73% of it falling on commerce while only 27% on the industry. The value of goods produced in Moscow’s industrial zone was three and a half times more than the country’s average and twice as high as in the north-western zone with St. Petersburg on a per-capita basis (303 rubles, 84 rubles and 130 rubles respectively)
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(Buryshkin 1954: 53). These numbers explain why contemporaries compared Moscow to the business heart of Russia, “whose pulse could be felt from Perm to Crimea and even to the distant Chinese Walls” (Zvyagintsev 1915: 215).

The developing industry and commerce required an appropriate financial infrastructure. However, in Moscow this sector emerged much later than in other European capitals. It was not until the 1860s that the first network of private banking establishments came into being and only around turn-of-the-century did they reach real economic power, securing the financial stability of Moscow’s industry and commerce against outside competitors (Petrov 1998: 48).

Social life underwent also significant restructuring accompanying the economic growth. As was already said, industrialization triggered rapid growth of the working population. On the other hand, it resulted in the emergence of the bourgeois middle-class that, at least in such form, was unknown to Russian society before. Though its part in the city population was still rather small – no more than a fifth of Muscovites could be considered middle-class – the tempo of its growth was impressive (Bradley 1986: 362-366). The fastest growing group of the middle class were white-collar employees of the commercial and industrial enterprises: managers, accountants, secretaries, salesmen, bank clerks, etc. On the eve of the war their number exceeded 80,000 (Bradley 1986: 362-366).

The highest strata also had its share in the general reorganization. The traditional nobility of Moscow, deprived of their source of income because of the peasant reform, was removed from its top place in the city hierarchy and replaced by the new elite, whose supremacy built upon success in the capitalist economy. “Merchant Moscow” – this expression
used by Pavel Buryshkin in his famous memoirs truly depicts the shift of the dominant aspect in the social life of the city. As E. Sinegub wrote in 1915 in his overview of the turn-of-the-century Moscow,

The Moscow of mansions, living at the expense of the ‘souls’ from Tambov and Penza, rapidly transforms into capitalist Moscow. A new powerful class enters the stage that managed to accumulate enormous strength in the silence of the patriarchal flour shops. Once they get access to civil rights and democratized education, the ‘dark kingdom’ will turn into the urban industrial bourgeoisie in the European meaning of the word (Zvyagintsev 1915: 214).

It is worth mentioning that the majority of the members of the elite of Merchant Moscow were of peasant origin. The founders of the entrepreneurial dynasties, brought to the city by need and hunger, were distinguished from the peasants only by their activities, their energy, and, possibly, their luck, while their lifestyle, manners, dress, and vernacular speech remained the same. It was only in the second generation when the external transformation took place, although peasant ancestry continued to determine identity and group psychology (Shatsillo 1998: 87). Not accidentally Alexander Guchkov, a prominent Moscow entrepreneur and leader of the Octobrist party, when accused of being a “merchant patriot”, replied proudly from the Duma tribune: “I am not only the son of a merchant but also the grandson of a peasant, a peasant who had made his way to the world by his diligence and persistence starting his life as a serf” (Shatsillo 1998: 89).

The municipal reform of the 1870s granted Russian cities self-governance and thus opened the new bourgeoisie the way to the
summit of the power pyramid, at least on the city level. Many of the city mayors like S.M. Tretyakov, N.A. Alekseev, K.V. Rukavishnikov, or N.I. Guchkov belonged to the bourgeoisie. The new municipal statute gave the Moscow city council control over several important branches of urban life like the improvement and beautification of the city, development of the local welfare, medicine and education, and many reformative projects in these spheres were the products of bourgeois activity.

In the first place, one can speak about large-scale improvements of the infrastructure provoked by the challenges of urban growth. The growing capitalist economy required a new approach to time-management and thus demanded the rapid transportation of goods, people, resources, or by-products. Therefore, new streets and roads were constructed and existing ones were widened and paved. The freight traffic within the city was greatly facilitated by the Moscow Circuit Railroad, completed in 1908. The public transportation system was also transformed by the electrical trams that started to operate in 1897. It immediately gained popularity and in 15 years its network, including thirty six lines, was already suffering from overload (Kirichenko 1977: 110). In 1897 Moscow also received its first sewage system. At the eve of the First World War it was connected to the upgraded 500-km-long plumbing system and covered more than a third of the city territory, supplying it with 100,000 m$^3$ of fresh water and removing 75,000 m$^3$ of waste products every day (Zvyagintsev 1915: 251-253).

The whole image of Moscow was changing rapidly. The developing industry and commerce needed new space and this caused the expansion and densification of the urban space, consuming the green areas. The city was constantly under construction and being filled with the
increasing number of dwellers. Since the land value, especially in the central districts, was ceaselessly rising, traditional houses were replaced by multi-storey block buildings. In Moscow, this type of housing, unlike in many European and American cities, was a completely new phenomenon. For example, as late as in 1911 Moscow poetess Marina Tsvetaeva called a six-storey building a “bulky monster” (Tsvetaeva 1994: 171-172) while the ten-storey apartment house of Nirnze, built in 1913, was perceived as a true sky-scaper (Kirichenko 1977: 272).

Commerce also changed its face. The turn of the century was the period of competition between the traditional and modern forms of trade (Potkina 1998: 38). Traditional forms such as street vending, peddling, open markets, although still present in the city commerce, were persistently pushed out from the urban centre by the luxurious European-like shops with colourful advertising, shining glass-windows, and trained stuff, aiming at the wealthy bourgeois clientele. Such were the new arcades built in 1880s on the Red Square, Tverskaya, Lubyanka, and Petrovka streets. However, the most impressive example, where all these new tendencies came together, was the largest department store in Russia, *Muir and Mirrielees*, located in a superb neo-Gothic edifice designed and realised by the architect R. Klein in 1908. Apart from the wide range of high-quality goods and excellent services it offered a restaurant, a reading hall, telephones, information desks, a medical centre and even two elevators (Potkina 2006: 78). It was a true symbol of modernity: a new form of public space as the expression of new social structures.

Apart from department stores and arcades, the modern public space was presented by impressive railway stations, museums, galleries, theatres, restaurants, luxurious hotels, banks, institutions, hospitals,
office-centres, and factories as well as newly created squares and public gardens. Breaking the monotony of the residential buildings, these new forms of public space became the dominant character of the transformed urban environment.

If one had visited Moscow on the eve of the First World War, it would have been difficult to recognize in this booming city its pendant that existed on the same territory forty years earlier. Instead of the slow, traditional town, one would have found a truly modern metropolis, with multi-storey buildings, complex infrastructure, seething streets, and sparkling lights of new attractions. However, this was only one side of the coin. As any other big city, Moscow accumulated both the best and the worst of industrialization. It was not only the modern paradise but also the modern hell, and the first could not exist without the latter.

Increase in scale and heightened density affected the social as well as the physical shape of the city. Concentration of people, technology, money, and flows of goods in the limited space required more natural resources than ever before, thus setting a challenging task of providing proper living conditions for the numerous residents and enterprises. The newly equipped factories produced enormous profits, paid taxes for the government and translated into positive figures in statistical books, but they also exerted tremendous pressure on the human resources and polluted the air.

In the social realm the negative ‘by-products’ of modernization were even more obvious. Although the booming city opened wide perspectives and unprecedented chances to vertical mobility for those with initiative and luck, it was the path of only a few. The rest was doomed to labour for twelve hours per day monotonously. Large numbers of them
were seriously ill and, in addition to this, were totally underpaid. Having run away from hunger and overpopulation in the village, the migrants were plunged into poverty in the crowded city.

And Moscow was indeed overcrowded. Even though overall population density per unit of territory was quite low for contemporary European standards – it was just half of Paris or Berlin – the density per housing unit was extremely high. In 1912 Moscow had 8.5 persons per housing unit as compared to 4.5 in London, 4.2 in Vienna and 3.9 in Berlin (Bradley 198?: 196). Extreme poverty led many workers to minimize their demands to a roof over the head in the literal sense of these words. Thus, the average number of residents per one-room apartment reached 6.5 persons. In addition to this, almost 70,000 workers lived in the barracks where they could claim only a cot, and even this was shared with the others (Bradley 198?: 200-201, Rouble 2001: 266).

These horrible housing conditions were marked not only by insufficient space and complete lack of intimacy, but also by very poor sanitary standards. For thirty years between 1881 and 1910 Moscow remained the deadliest metropolis in Europe, being topped only by St. Petersburg. Overcrowded houses were a fertile ground for infectious diseases like typhus, diphtheria, and cholera. Moscow’s tuberculosis rates were by far the highest in Europe – 45.6 for 100.000 people as compared to 17.6 in London and 20.0 in Berlin (Thurston 1987: 19).

As Blair Ruble puts it, “to be a poor European anywhere was dreadful during this era, but nowhere on the continent was poverty more destructive than in Russia’s great industrial towns and cities” (Ruble 2001: 265). This terrible situation did not escape the attention of the contemporaries and this alone can explain why socialist ideas were so
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popular among the Russian intellectuals and why they were finally implemented.

Modernization transformed Moscow into an urban giant, providing the basis for it to soon regain the capital status that it had lost two centuries earlier. However, the price of this apparent success was very high.

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Endnotes

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Two Examples of Regional Emancipation in the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century Baltics

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At some point in the early modern period, individuals began to identify with extended groups of people they believed to share common attributes with. The development was fuelled, amongst others, by the ideas of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. The spread of national consciousness and, eventually, nationalism led to enormous changes in all aspects of human life, and can therefore easily be called a “turning point” in history.

This article, however, will neither focus on the emergence of these phenomena, nor on facets of their impact, but introduce two representatives of the ideas of the Enlightenment and their contribution to the formation of a broader Baltic and a distinct Estonian identity. This may serve as an example of the Enlightenment’s role in the development of social identities and emancipation long before the rise of nationalism occurred. But in a first step, it is necessary to outline some historical specificities of this lesser-known region.

\textit{The Baltics in the Era of Enlightenment}

While today the Baltic region is composed of the three states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, in the eighteenth century only the northern half, Latvia and Estonia, was considered part of it. After the end of the Nordic Wars in 1721 the region, back then called Livonia, was incorporated into
The victorious Russian Empire. Most of present-day Lithuania, named Courland, remained part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth as long as 1795, the year in which Poland was partitioned for the third time. Though the formerly independent states were transformed into Russian provinces, the local estates managed to retain most of their privileges. It was only in the late nineteenth century that their autonomy was lost. But Tsarist rule also proved a gain to the Baltic lands. Especially throughout the era of Enlightenment, important reforms helped to modernise the largely backward and (as viewed from Western Europe) remote region. Begun by Tsar Peter the Great, the reforms were intensified under Catherine the Great in the second half of the eighteenth century. The advent of the Enlightenment in the Baltics approximately coincided with the Russian takeover. In the course of the eighteenth century progressive ideas acquired more and more significance. But as most of the Baltic population lived as poor and uneducated peasants in the plain country, the key group for the spread of enlightened ideas happened to be mainly the German elite.

**The Role of the German Elite**

Livonia had been conquered and ruled by German settlers since the late Middle Ages. Missionaries, knights, craftsmen, and traders had poured into the Baltic lands and subjugated the autochthonous population. Most of the newcomers settled in the cities or became feudal lords in the countryside. However, the huge majority of inhabitants of the region remained of Baltic ethnicity, even more so because no attempts towards forced assimilation were made. Still, becoming part of the ruling class automatically required embracing German culture and language. For hundreds of years, the Baltic ruling class thus consisted only of
'Germans’, while all other groups held no power at all. Of course, many enlightened thinkers, whose ideals included improving the situation of peasants, grew dissatisfied with the persisting inequality. In the Baltics almost all of these thinkers came from a clerical background and were consequently able not only to discuss what needed reform, but to put their thoughts into practice in their own parish.

As concerns theoretical debate, the enlightened minds of the Baltic region stayed in touch with their cultural centre, the German-speaking countries. But their sense of belonging to the German ‘scholarly republic’, as it was called, was not mere nostalgia: The eighteenth century saw a constant inflow of academics emigrating from Germany in search of jobs. Most of them were clerics, and in the majority of cases they would soon find a decent income as private teachers (Hofmeister) and later, if possible, as priests. The newcomers maintained a connection to the German ‘heartland’, and once able to subsist, only few did not stay for the rest of their lives. This also means that the Baltic region, in which for most of the eighteenth century no proper university was situated, always had access to recent developments in the emerging philosophy of Enlightenment.

The agrarian, sparsely populated structure of the region made it necessary to rely on personal contacts and scientific “networks” in and between the big cities, where many scholarly and enlightened circles were established. The interconnection was held up by means of written correspondence, either through letters or in academic journals. A lively academic culture emerged, and despite their comparative remoteness, many Baltic scholars took part in debates throughout the German motherland.
Apart from their scientific achievements, most Baltic thinkers of
the Enlightenment – as has been said before – were actively promoting
their ideals. The following two representatives of their time may serve as
interesting examples for the diversity of the Baltic enlightened culture, and
its impact on later developments.

**Gadebusch’s Concept of Baltic Identity**
Friedrich Konrad Gadebusch was arguably one of the most important
personalities of the Baltic Enlightenment. He was born in 1719 in the
island of Rügen (or Rugia) in northern Germany and went to school in
Hamburg and Greifswald. In 1738, still in Greifswald, he began to study
history and law, which he concluded at the University of Königsberg
(today’s Kaliningrad) in East Prussia. Gadebusch had come there as a
private teacher for two young nobles, and in 1748 he finally settled over to
Livonia where he had obtained a position as Hofmeister. Seven years later,
Gadebusch took on a more promising career. He enlisted in the political
administration of the city of Dorpat (today’s Tartu, Estonia), one of the
most important intellectual centres of Livonia. Over the years, Gadebusch
became councillor, city syndic, and finally mayor. His administration was
marked by his efforts to rebuild the city after a devastating fire. He
resigned from office due to bad health in 1783, and died five years later,
highly esteemed, in Dorpat.

Gadebusch’s works all display his interest in the history of his new
Baltic homeland. In an encyclopaedical endeavour, he collected and
reproduced every piece of information he found useful to understand how
the Baltic region came into being. Even Gadebusch’s own correspondence
was incorporated into his vast collection of texts, sources, and other
materials. Far from than progressive, he tried to justify the given order of
the dominating German lords and the exclusion of the autochthonous inhabitants. Still, his concept of history, in particular of Baltic history, deserves attention. Gadebusch was the first Baltic historian who argued that historiography is the key to understand one’s community as a whole. This paradigm should then make it possible to identify oneself with a ‘fatherland’, in Gadebusch’s case not only Livonia, but the whole of the Baltic region. This idea evidently countered empress Catherine’s efforts to unify her provinces by forced russification. Gadebusch even tried to draw the reader into history by deliberately resorting to a terminology of a “we” and an “our”. Major historical events are meant to constitute a “social memory” in order to build the foundation of a community.

The next step, according to Gadebusch, foresees the active participation of all members with their respective talents and possibilities. Such commitment would further intensify identification with the community, and be the very essence of what Gadebusch calls “patriotism”. Since the nobility already identified sufficiently with their home country by holding titles and manors, and traditionally served in state functions, the concept was rather directed towards the emerging middle-class or bourgeoisie, to which Gadebusch belonged himself. His effort to create such a Baltic identity and community ultimately failed, but proves a significant example for a pre-nationalist conception grounded in common, ‘social’ history.

**Hupel and Estonian Emancipation**

August Wilhelm Hupel’s life can be seen as the typical career of a German-Baltic clergyman at the time. He was born in 1737 in Saxony, and took on his studies in 1754 in Jena. In the beginning Hupel took courses in natural sciences and foreign languages, but later changed to theology, which
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promised a more secure career. As soon as he had obtained his degree Hupel settled over to Livonia and became Hofmeister. He stayed in this position for several years, until in 1763 he finally became priest in Oberpahlen (today’s Põltsamaa, Estonia).

Hupel stayed in Oberpahlen until his death almost 60 years later, and these were the years when he was most active as a priest, scholar, and reformer within his parochial community. Hupel’s time in Oberpahlen coincided with the rule of a progressive-minded landlord who tried to raise the economy of his lands and the living standard of its inhabitants, that is, to not only increase his revenue, but to put enlightened ideas into practice. In Hupel this landlord found a valuable ally, as he fulfilled his pastoral duties with vigour, and in his spare time (of which, however, he said he had none) wrote important works on a huge variety of subjects, including his Topographic Notes on Livonia and Estonia (1774-1789), an encyclopaedic account of nearly everything there was to say about the region’s geography, culture, history, and inhabitants. Apart from that, one of Hupel’s most important achievements was the establishment of a small yet influential enlightened circle around him, which was peculiar in its aim – to share and comment on literature and recent publications although living on the flat land – and its longevity (1773-1798). Hupel ceased to publish and distribute books when censorship in Imperial Russia was tightened. His open-minded and progressive thoughts had already led to several disputes, including many quarrels with Gadebusch and his followers, but within the enlightened society of the Baltics, Hupel always enjoyed an honourable reputation.

Most naturally, the core of Hupel’s work, both in terms of theory and practise, focussed on his parochial community, which by a great
majority was composed of Estonian peasants. As a protestant pastor, Hupel’s duty was to learn enough Estonian to be able to communicate with the local people and preach to them in church services. Unlike most of his colleagues he acquired a profound knowledge of the entire language within only a few years. This made it possible for Hupel to translate a short medical treatise into Estonian, meant as advice for the peasants. It was published in several volumes and thus became the first Estonian periodical. Of even more importance would be his publication of an improved Estonian grammar and dictionary with 17,000 words during the 1780s. This book, although in many instances still faulty, remained for almost a century a fundamental work for the study of the Estonian language. Apart from words and expressions, Hupel was an ardent collector of Estonian proverbs and folksongs, many of which he sent to enrich Johann Gottfried Herder’s growing collection.

One could argue that this was also meant to help correct Herder’s and most of his contemporaries’ opinion about (or rather prejudice against) the Baltic peoples. Herder, for example, once referred to the Estonians as the “last savages of Europe“. Hupel, out of his own experience, tried to show that it was quite the contrary. His vivid portrait of the culture and living conditions of the Estonians, published in the second volume of his Topography, acquired some prominence, and made a substantial contribution to a more balanced public perception. It even included a slight critique of the prevailing system of serfdom, which Hupel compared to north American slavery, and which he rejected as harmful to the Estonian people’s development towards equality.

It is true that Hupel did not regard the Estonians as a fully-developed nation in its own right. Yet, his positive and unprejudiced
approach, combined with his efforts for the Estonian language, helped pave the way towards a better understanding between the cultures, and also made possible what developed later in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century: First, the movement of ‘Estophilia’, which aimed at emancipating the Estonian people, and in the second half of the century, the Estonian national movement itself.

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Note: Most works on the history of the Baltics in the era of Enlightenment, among them those on Gadebusch and Hupel, are available only in German or one of the Baltic languages. For this article, only German publications were considered, including the following:


History and Digital Sources

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Today, the internet and new technologies influence the historian’s work and his studies. Which are the possibilities and the limits imposed by these new instruments? The internet is the youngest mass medium, guarding and conveying memory into the society. Is it possible to consider it as 1) a new way of communication of history, 2) a new historical research tool and 3) a new “place of sources”?

1. A New Way of Communicating History
The internet is considered the last, but not the least, mass medium of the past century. It is not just a simple medium, rather can we consider it a medium of media or a meta-medium (Criscione 2006a). Within the internet it is possible to mix all the other media, from which it gathers and absorbs numerous peculiarities and elements. Thus, in a single “place” it is possible to use and enjoy all the contents normally broadcasted by the other media.

In an early, enthusiastic embrace of the new medium at their disposal, historians believed it now was feasible to build a virtual copy of the ancient library of Alexandria of Egypt, a place to preserve all human history and culture (de Luna 2004). Whereas the internet indeed allows to distribute digital documents worldwide, these pieces of information are
also subject to volatility and reproducibility. Being edited, deleted, moved, or copied, such digital files risk to become indistinguishable.

Regarding these peculiarities of digital papers, historians have to approach them carefully. When quoting from a digital source, historians must take pains to verify the truthfulness of contents, specify where and when they look it up. The authors of digital papers almost never indicate the character and date of alterations, even if those changes fundamentally modify the content. Frequently, for instance, there is considerable confusion whether the editing had been done by the authors of the website or by users, adding comments, notes, and links, and posting new information.

On the internet, the communication flow does not follow the traditional pattern of broadcasting, a one-to-all, but works in a sort of “narrowcasting”, or an all-to-all (Criscone 2006a: 81-82). Therefore, some social behaviours are modified and there seems to be a levelling of hierarchies: instead of a pyramidal scale of users, one encounters ‘horizontal crowds’ of authors and users. This situation allows the web surfer to build up his own popularity regardless of academic schemes. Moreover, the new technology raises an important question about the relationship between older, established historians and their young students. Though the former are able to use traditional historical tools, they often struggle to apply new technologies and are mostly not interested in the internet as a tool of scientific work. Hence, the web suffers a lack of interest by older, experienced historians (Bandini / Bianchini 2007). On the other hand, students of history are so embedded in the virtual culture that they risk to disregard and not learn the use of basic instruments of historical research.
This generational tension could be solved if both parts entered a dialogue and older historians accepted the internet as the present and not saw in it a distant future. In Italy, for instance, digital papers are not considered as scientific publications. Yet, in the academic world, younger professors start to be interested in relations between history and digital sources, and some serials on these topics are published online. These publications are not innovative. In fact, they are just analogous texts published online and no hyper-texts wrote specifically for the web.

Writing for the web is not the same as writing on paper. Only in understanding the potentials offered by the internet can we make history ready to compete with the other social sciences in the third millennium. Writing history online is so easy and fast that it has positive, but also negative effects. On one hand, it becomes possible to release documents, contents, that is, information otherwise not available. On the other hand, these documents risk to lose their truthfulness and scientific value. The fear of historians, in consequence, is the incapacity to recognise which digital publication respects scientific paradigms and which rather intends a mystification of historical events. In fact, there are a lot of “history” web sites published by users that present historiographical questions at complete odds with state of the art research.

Today, we are observing the democratisation of the public sphere, through which the relationship between history, historians, students, and society is being reconfigured, leading towards a new way of the public use of history (Criscione 2006b). Historians can benefit from digital sources passively, just as web surfers, or they can have an active role, as authors or editors of web contents. In each case, they must have the ability to
recognise a historical document created with valid scientific instruments and reject everything proposed by questionable authors.

2. A New Historical Research Tool

Until not long ago, in order to do historical research historians went to libraries and archives, spending many hours or days to find books, references, and documents. The development of communication technologies and the computerisation of several customer services now allow historians to perform a large part of their work in remote distance using their personal computer.

Regarding historiographical and bibliographical research, being able to perform these activities faster, historians can save time that can be spent on other things. The common use of word processors, for instance, permits to write texts faster, edit, and finally send them by e-mail to the publisher or to other historians. Not surprisingly, the use of e-mail has spread early in the academic world. With this tool, historians can communicate with each other over long distances without ever meeting. This possibility has been extended by the introduction of instant messaging, that allows to write and ‘chat’ to others in real time and to share files and documents. With the use of online catalogues of libraries, historians can find books and articles from their own home. Newer online services such as Google Books even permit to turn over the pages of a book without holding it in the hands. In a similar vein, other web-based search engines allow us to find any kind of document required. For example, we can use YouTube to find videos, Google Images to find pictures and so on.
3. A New “Place of Sources”

The peculiarities of the ‘net’ are the apparent absence of censorship, the widespread diffusion, the ease of use, and the possibility of being both author and user of contents. Do these characteristics make its content non-verifiable and devoid of scientific validity? All traces left by men, including a movie on *YouTube* or a blog entry, inevitably become a potential source. Remembering the innovations in the criticism of historical sources brought by the school of *Annales*, the historian has to approach digital documents with particular attention. He must understand the peculiarities distinguishing them from traditional sources: digital documents are of a virtual, a non-material nature. A paper, to be recognised as source by traditional historical criticism, needs to respect specific characteristics: the stability of the physical device, the durability of the information, the inseparable unity between physical and logical structure. A digital document does not respect any of these, to the contrary, it is *immaterial, fluid* (or *plastic*) and *fragile* (Vitali 2004).

*Immateriality*. As has been said, digital documents are immaterial. We cannot read or even see them until we use a suitable device, as e.g. a personal computer, an e-book reader, and so on. When we ourselves create digital files we use a certain software that will translate every part of the information in sequences of ‘0’ and ‘1’. When we store and re-open it the software will read this sequence and translate it to a form readable by humans. Sometimes, we create a digital document, but the software will translate it into two or more files. For example, a web page consists of separate files, each being a composing part of the document. We could have one file for the picture, one for the text, one for the music, and so on. Only with the suitable software can we read the web page correctly and perceive it as one document.
Fluidity. The fluidity of a digital document is the feature of web contents of being altered and modified without any chance for the user to notice the change. This happens frequently without any mystificatory intention by authors or users. For example, think of picture-editing with a common software such as Photoshop. Making any kind of alteration means to change the authenticity of the original picture. The same goes for text: certain online software allows users to collaborate in the creation of digital documents. Anyone can join the work without meeting the others and will be able to add, modify, or delete parts of information. The documents remain work in progress without a definite completion, but they can always be downloaded and saved as (apparently definite) text files.

Fragility. Over time, digital documents become fragile and risk to disappear. This is a disquieting situation for anyone who wants to maintain ‘old’ digital papers. Every storage device is subject to natural deterioration and after some years we couldn’t access those documents any more. Moreover, there is a huge diversity of storage devices that are different from each other and often not mutually compatible. There is no single way to store files and it isn’t always possible to easily access and share stored data. Technological development allows to produce ever more capacious storage devices, but it does not resolve the problem of data loss. Finally, the easy production of digital contents and its online publication add up to such a vast amount of information, that most of it can never be taken into consideration by the virtual society, left alone by the historians.

Conclusion
The internet imposes itself on our lives and activities as it does on the works of historians. As has been said, the web is not only a new way of
communicating history, a research tool, or a new source for history. The internet and the virtual society present a new way of human relations, a new world that you may endorse or not, that may include or reject you. But it is impossible to be completely excluded or fully enclosed. Similarly, the internet is fundamental in the various stages of the historian’s work. The new technologies are there today, not just in a distant future, and we cannot dismiss everything produced and published online as non-academic document. In the future, we will consider contemporary digital documents as historical sources and study the second millennium through the lens of these virtual papers.

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“Thank you for the great week! I had a blast”

A Statistical Report on the Annual Conference 2009 in Zagreb

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On the statistical level, the 54 filled-in evaluation forms clearly express the satisfaction of participants (see figure 1). More than 57% of respondents stated they “very much” liked the event, and around 35% said it was “good”. Only around 2% responded “more or less”, while a bit less than 6% thought the conference was “not so good”. In average (statistical mean), this is a very good value of 1.56. Furthermore, a majority of participants “totally” (35%) or “rather agreed” (50%) that the topic of the conference, “Turning Points in History”, was interesting. 15% at least “partly agreed” on this, whereas no one ticked the “rather disagree” or “disagree totally” boxes. Also, the topic was considered “just right” by almost 57%. Still, some 26% thought it had been “a little too broad”.

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Altogether, the surveys underline the majoritarian satisfaction with the conference, its organisation, cultural, as well as academic parts. Some critical remarks concern the non-central location of the accommodation, meals, long journeys by tram, and information flows between organisers and participants.

1. Organisation

The key variable on organisation certainly is the question whether the seminar or conference was, “in general”, well organised. Almost two thirds (64%) answered this with “yes”, while 28% considered the organisation to be “not so good”. Roughly 7% stated “no”, adding up to a mean of 1.43 (see figure 2). Especially content were people with the help of organisers during the event. Almost three fourths (74%) “totally agreed” that ISHA Zagreb was “open for requests” and “ready to help participants”, and another 17% “rather agreed”.

Information provided beforehand and during the seminar, including local customs and laws, workshops, and schedule, was generally appreciated by the majority of participants. However, the information provided on the conference schedule scored lowest and shows some dissatisfaction (see figure 3).

Although almost half still ticked the “totally” (19%) or “rather agree” (28%) boxes, a significant minority expressed its discontent by “rather” (18%) or even “totally” (9%) disagreeing. 26% agreed
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“partly”, that information on schedule and conference planning was sufficient. One respondent missed a “better communication with participants”, whereas another encouraged organisers to “give people information!!”

![Figure 3](chart.png)

**Figure 3**

2. *Free time, accommodation, and meals*

Concerning free time, participants were particularly happy with the organisation of parties and the cultural programme. Most people liked the city of Zagreb “very” (47%) much or “rather well” (38%). Furthermore, a majority of 49% thought the price-performance ratio of the participation fee and the meals and accommodation was satisfactory. Yet, roughly a third (34%) were “more or less” content with this, while 17% were dissatisfied.
Indeed, location of the hostel and meals prove to be the main points of discontent for participants. Although the hostel itself received good ratings (see figure 4), not less than 17 of 54 respondents complained about its peripheral location. An associated problem in the eyes of several participants were the long journeys to be taken throughout the city, or as one respondent put it: “Our hostel was situated really far away from the center, and transport was quite difficult.” Others complained that “locations were spread around town (too) much” and that “there was too much time lost on travel / public transport”. Meals were another critical point (see figure 5). Whereas some 41% considered them to be “acceptable” and 20% stated they were “quite good”, 26% said meals were “not so good”, and 13% even rated them as “awful”. Nobody chose the option “excellent”.

3. Workshops and the academic part

Regarding the statistical results of the surveys, workshops and academic progress clearly were a success. The overall academic level was
judged “perfect” by 65% of respondents, whereas 27% found it “a bit too low”. A tiny rest saw the academic level either as “a bit too high” (6%) or “far too low” (2%) (see figure 6).

Remarkable, in comparison to previous seminars, are the results for the academic profit gained through the event. 15% said they had profited “very much” from the conference, 31% opted for “much”. 46% still profited “a bit”, whilst only 4% ticked the “not so much” or “not at all” boxes respectively. Workshops were generally rated positively, especially discussions were considered interesting and moderators complimented for their good preparation. Also, presentations and workshop discussions contributed strongly to academic gain, even though discussions in free time were valuated even higher (see figure 7).
4. (Final) Conclusions

Clearly, the most important motivation for people to come to Zagreb was to “meet interesting people from other countries” with a mean of 2.04. This is followed by the “cultural” (3.04) and “academic” (3.25) parts. Meeting old ISHA friends was not so important (3.85), even less so “parties and fun” (4.19) and a “cheap opportunity to travel” (4.33). Although not everyone returned the evaluation forms, respondents come from an outstanding number of 12 countries, 50% of whom participated for the first time in an ISHA event. For 27% it was the second or third time, while for 23% respectively it was at least the fourth event.

Regarding the Final Conclusions, participants are slightly in favour of the more serious version (56 against 44%). Still, 13 people left this question unanswered, some of whom explicitly stated they wished a combination of both. As this result is similar for previous seminars, it could be read as a vote for mixed, “humorous” and “academic” Final Conclusions.

In sum, statistical data underlines that the Zagreb Conference of 2009 was a very successful event. Some criticism is expressed concerning meals, location of the hostel, and communication flows between organisers and participants. Yet, while these critical remarks remain in minority in every case, respondents express a large overall satisfaction, especially concerning the academic part and the help of organisers during the conference. In my view, regarding the immense and unexpected number of participants and major organisational challenges faced in last minute, these results reflect the extraordinarily good work done by the team of ISHA Zagreb.
Endnotes

1 Although data is available for the Belgrade autumn seminar 2008, we decided not to write a separate report on it. First, the number of valid evaluation forms (16) is comparably small. Second, as this is the first time of such a statistical report, we did not want to push it too hard and thus only included an article on the main event, which was the Annual Conference in Zagreb. However, at some points comparisons will be drawn to the Belgrade results as well as to previous seminars for which data is available.

2 If not stated otherwise, all figures are rounded.


5 Adding up to an average of 2.25 (1=“very much” up to 5=”not at all”), this is a higher score than in the previous seminars of Berlin 2007 (2.51), Osijek 2007/08 (3.16), and Belgrade 2008 (2.75).

6 The scale goes from 1 for “very important” to 6 for “not important at all”.

7 This is an average of 1.88 (1=“first time”, 2=”second or third”, 3=”fourth or fifth”, 4=”sixth time or more”), relatively low in comparison to “older” seminars in Berlin 2007 (2.20), Osijek 2007/08 (2.52), and Belgrade (2.13).