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Editorial: The More Things Change, the More Things Stay the Same

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Have you ever wondered where the name *Carnival* originates from? Sakari Saaritsa solves this mystery in the editorial of vol. 1: " . . . a colleague came up with *Carnival* on the following grounds: when students publish an international journal of their own, the moment is carnivalistic, since the "commoners become kings", implying a revolution of the existing hierarchy; and each issue will also be a recurring cause for celebration!" I would love to get a comment from Mr. Saaritsa on this quote 20 years later, especially now that he is an associate professor of history at the University of Helsinki. Saaritsa manages two pinpoint two problems which have staid with *Carnival* since the beginning: Uniting all published articles of a given edition under a common theme, and the question of academic standards and 'quality control'.

The first problem requires, in my mind, a pragmatic approach. If enough papers are submitted under a certain theme the better, but this is never a given. The second problem is slightly trickier: Whose academic standards? Who decides what passes as a 'quality paper'? We tend to forget that ISHA is made up of students from all over the world, but currently mostly from Europe. And even inside of Europe alone, *Carnival* highlights the disparate academic backgrounds and traditions that cover the catch-all term "the field of historical studies". As an editor, it is easy to fall into the trap of "my way or the highway", and it helps to periodically remind oneself of one's own fallibility and limited perspective of the historic discipline.

The biggest change between 1999 and 2020 is digital. The days of sending in your submitted papers on diskette via 'snail-mail' seem quaint compared to the possibilities of Google docs, "Track Changes", email attachments and slack channels. To close with a historical cliché: The human element, no matter the circumstances, remains ever important. I could not have finished this edition of Carnival without the help of my fellow Editor in Chief Moriah, as well as the Editorial Board. Thank you for lasting support and expertise over the course of 2019 and 2020.

Viva ISHA!

Eric Jeswein,

Berlin, 03.10. 2020.

Conflicts in Symbolic Space: The Bombardment of Nijmegen

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Abstract

Conception of spaces plays an important role in connecting communities to their past and in forming their collective identity. Spaces may carry symbolic meanings with which a group has endowed them and by which the group can represent their collective memory. A symbolic space can carry different meanings which may oppose each other. Such space is the city of Nijmegen as the symbolic space of liberation and destruction. In 1944, two horrendous military operations swept through Nijmegen. The first was Operation Argument, which led to the bombardment of 22 February 1944 and caused the death of almost 800 citizens. The second was Operation Market Garden which resulted in great losses – both military and civilian – and in the liberation of Nijmegen from the German occupation. These events led to two different interpretations of Nijmegen as a symbolic space, which conflict with each other. The opposing interpretations of space cause frustration and conflict in the collective memory. My paper is an attempt to explore how the conflict provoked by the opposing interpretations of a symbolic space, affects the collective identity and how this conflict is being resolved and visualized in physical, public spaces by monuments and commemorations of the events.

Introduction

To establish connections with events of the past, a community needs a medium which serves as a link between past and present. This medium can be oral traditions, written or visual sources, actions and rituals, but space itself can also serve as a medium.[1] In the process of remembering, one needs space where those images can be placed which construct the memory. Space can be endowed with symbolic meanings, since spaces where significant events took place are storages of memory.[2] These spaces can become symbolic if the symbolic content is understood and accepted by the community.[3] However, a physical place can be endowed with different symbolic meanings which are, though present in the same community, oppositional in their meanings. Thus, conflicting symbolic interpretations can emerge within a community which transform physical space into a battlefield of the power struggle over collective memory.

The aim of this paper is to explore how conflicting interpretations of a symbolic space affect the identity of a community. The subject of the research is the Dutch city of Nijmegen, where after the events of the Second World War, two opposing interpretations of the happenings were materialized. On the one hand, Nijmegen can be interpreted as the symbolic space of destruction, which meaning emphasizes the German invasion of the Netherlands and the horrors of the liberation. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as a symbolic space of liberation, these understandings put emphasis on the victory of the Allied forces and the liberation of the

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[1] Peter Burke, "A történelem mint társadalmi emlékezet" [History as Social Memory], *Regio* 12, no. 1 (2013): 7-8.

[2] Cheryl Natzmer, "Remembering and Forgetting: Creative Expression in Post-Pinochet Chile," *in Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives*, eds. Jacob J. Climo and Maria G. Catell (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002), 169.

[3] Jérome Monnet, "The symbolism of Place: A Geography of Relationships Between Space, Power and Identity," *European Journal of Geography: Political, Cultural and Cognitive Geography* 10 (2011), http://cybergeo.revues.org/24747?lang=en.

Netherlands. The city, as a symbolic space, represents the identity of its community, but as the symbolic meanings clash on several levels, the identity of the community bears this conflict as well.

The effects of the conflicting interpretations on the collective identity of the community of Nijmegen are presented in this paper. These effects can be examined through various forms of remembrance, such as memorials, exhibitions and commemorating events. Exploring the liberation of the Netherlands by the Allied forces and the memory of the Nijmegen bombardment through the perspective of symbolic spaces reveals the problematic construction of memory.

Remembrance, representation and identity

The theoretical foundations of the social interactions of memory were developed by Maurice Halbwachs and are summarized in his concept of 'collective memory.' According to his theory, memory is an individual state of consciousness, which exists independently, without social interactions. However, remembrance is not merely an image, because it cannot be acted out without *a* language, but language requires a community, therefore, the act of remembering can only take place within a community or a society.[4] The community creates the social framework of remembrance, develops the media of memory, determines the time of ritual practices, and the community selects the symbolic spaces of collective memory. According to the anthropologist Albert Zsolt Jakab, as a result of the social aspect of remembering, the process of remembrance has its spaces, objects and actors, it is not permanent but is constantly changing, as it is created by

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[4] Gyáni Gábor, *Emlékezés, emlékezet és a történelem elbeszélése* [Remembering, Memory and the Narration of History] (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2000), 129-130.

the social context that is influenced by the memory.[5] Thus, as Aleida Assmann argues, remembrance is dynamic and its shifts and changes depend on the community that integrates it into the collective memory, therefore, it becomes affected by the needs of the present.[6]

Halbwachs' collective memory theory was influenced by the work of sociologist Émile Durkheim, who summarized the set of ideas and behaviors that are commonly realized within a society in the concept of collective representations. As social psychologist János László argues, Durkheim considered these collective representations as parts of language and customs and understood them as the essence of social activity.[7] Representations provide a scheme for the individual to reach the past, but these schemes of the individual remembrance gain their meaning in the community. Thus, individual and collective forms of knowledge appear here that Durkheim differentiates as the inner subjective identity and the objective, external collective identity that serves the interpretation of social interactions.[8]

As this paper argues, individuals can be members of multiple communities simultaneously, so they can have multiple identities at the same time. Analyzing the identity-forming processes of memory, Jan Assmann noted that a common memory requires spatial and temporal shape that also provides the symbols of remembrance. The community is bound to the spaces created by the act of remembrance, and if these spaces are not reachable for the community, they are able to recreate it

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[5] Jakab Albert Zsolt, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat: a kulturális emlékezet reprezentációi Kolozsváron* [Commemoration and Practices of Memory: Representations of Cultural Memory in Kolozsvár] (Kolozsvár: Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2012), 17.

[6] Aleida Assmann, "Az emlékezés átalakító ereje" [The Transformative Power of Memory], trans. Máté Gyöngy. *Studia Litteraria*, no. 1-2 (2012): 21.

[7] László János, "A szociális reprezentációról" [On Social Representation], in *Társadalmi kommunikáció*, eds. Béres István, Horányi Özséb (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1999), 129-138.

[8] Blága Ágnes, "Szimbolikus helyek, cselekvések szerepe a székelyföldi Felcsík kistérségben" [The Role of Symbolic Places and Actions in the Subregion of Felcsík in Székelyföld], *Metszetek*, no.4 (2015): 56.

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through symbolic means.[9] The community's interpretation and acceptance of the symbols offered by spatial and temporal constraints allow the formation of a common identity.[10]

According to the theory of collective memory, individual remembrance always functions within a society and this social framework regulates the act of remembering. The individual is the one who has memories and remembers, but memory itself is the product of a society, so individual memory is not independent.[11] Halbwachs argues that individuals cannot remember in any other way than by finding, within the framework of collective memory, those events of the past that interest the individual.[12] The social nature of individual memory was also studied by psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett, who said that individual remembrance is influenced by how other members of the community remember the certain event.[13] Thus, as we can see, memories gain their meaning in social interactions, which are, hence, the link between the members of the community.

As the sociologists Marcel and Mucchielli argue following Halbwachs, as members of the community change, so does collective memory, which is constantly being reinterpreted to fit the demands of the present.[14] According to Jan Assmann, collective memory affects the interpretation

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[9] Jan Assmann, *A kulturális emlékezet. Írás, emlékezés és politikai identitás a korai magaskultúrákban* [Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance and Political Imagination], trans. Zoltán Hidas (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999), 39-40.

[10] Ibid. 39-40.

[11] Maurice Halbwachs, "Kollektív emlékezet" [Collective Memory], in *Szociológiai irányzatok a XX. század elejéig*, eds. Felkai Gábor, Némedi Dénes, Somlai Péter (Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2000), 403-432.

[12] Ibid. 403-432.

[13] Paolo Jedlowski, "Az emlékezet szociológiája" [Memory and Sociology], *Információs Társadalom* 8, no.4 (2008): 101.

[14] Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli, "Maurice Halbwachs' Mémoire Collective," in *Media and Cultural Memory*, eds. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 148.

of the past, but also organizes the experience of the present.[15] Halbwachs explains a special form

of memory formation which is forgetting. He claims that forgetting can be explained by the changes

in the social framework of memory.[16] Thus, as we can see, forgetting is also a mechanism of the

social processes of memory. This process has been approached by Peter Burke with the notion of

social amnesia, according to his theory, the elimination and censorship of certain events are

important elements in the development of memory and thus social amnesia has the same

community-forming function as collective memory.[17]

Regarding the types of distortion and forgetting of collective memory, Michael Schudson

distinguishes four categories: removal, instrumentalization, narrativization and

conventionalization.[18] Removal is activated by the passing of time, as the attachment to emotional

related memories decreases. Instrumentalization means the usage of memories of the past in the

interests of the present, for example the political instrumentalization of history. Narrativization, as

distortion of collective memory takes place when different narratives appear on certain past events.

Conventionalization can also distort collective memory since the interpretation of the past through

cultural conventions is indispensably associated with the public consensus.[19]

As we can see, individuals connect to the events of the past through the representations of

collective memory that have an impact on the identity of individuals and of communities. However,

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15 Jan Assmann, *A kulturális emlékezet. Írás, emlékezés és politikai identitás a korai magaskultúrákban* [Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance and Political Imagination], trans. Zoltán Hidas (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999), 42-43.

16 Maurice Halbwachs, "Az emlékezés társadalmi keretei" [The Social Framework of Memory], in *Francia szociológia*, ed. Ferge Zsuzsa (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1971), 131.

17 Jakab Albert Zsolt, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat: a kulturális emlékezet reprezentációi Kolozsváron* [Commemoration and Practices of Memory: Representations of Cultural Memory in Kolozsvár] (Kolozsvár: Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2012), 42.

18 Jakab, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat*, 41-42.

19 Ibid. 41-42.

due to the instability of memory, these processes are not closed, and the community is forced to reinterpret events of the past from time to time. Meanwhile, distortions in memory also give rise to changes in society.

Symbolic spaces

Space itself represents the collective memory, but as a symbolic one, different meanings can be associated with space in the consciousness of a community.[20] Henri Lefebvre described space as a social product, which is affected by social interactions, but also produces these interactions.[21] Thus, the physical representation of memory, the visualization of the past emerges from the relationship between society and space, which is an argument that also appears in Jan Assmann's work, who argues that memory requires places and spaces.[22]

As it has been argued, the function of symbolic spaces is that the community can establish a physical relationship with the events of the past, or the actors of the past. Symbolic spaces provide a space for constructing, deconstructing and transforming memory, but at the same time they are becoming the space of community through having a symbolic meaning understood and accepted by all members of the community. Through the means of symbolisms, space becomes the medium of values, in which the common identity and the common past are represented. A symbolic meaning does not always correspond to the original meaning of the space, therefore, symbolic spaces have the function of identity formation, since members of the community can accept the symbolic

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20 Jakab, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat*, 33.

21 Jakab, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat*, 34.

22 Assmann, *A kulturális emlékezet*, 40.

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meaning over the original meaning.[23] As the sociologist Margit Feischmidt argues, symbolic representations legitimize and strengthen the identity formation.[24] Since an individual can interact with multiple communities at the same time, one can connect with different symbolic interpretations which may contradict each other.

Through the process of selecting and defining the symbolic meaning, the needs of the present may cause conflicts, as these processes have two-way effects: firstly, they reinforce the already accepted symbolic meaning and secondly, they try to weaken those symbolic meanings which are contradicting the new one.[25] If symbolic meanings are not contradicting each other, a hierarchy can arise between them. At the top of the hierarchy, there is the symbolic meaning that has been accepted by the widest range of the society.[26] As this paper argues, the collective identity manifested in symbolic space points out that the change, manipulation, and distortion of meanings have a profound impact on the process of identification in the society as well. This influence may be aimed at suppressing memories and meanings that make memories uncomfortable, such as suppressing the meaning of symbolic spaces that is different from the meaning accepted at the top of the hierarchy.

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[23] Blága, "Szimbolikus helyek," 59.

[24] Feischmidt Margit, "A magyar nacionalizmus autenticitás-diskurzusainak szimbolikus térfoglalása Erdélyben" [The Symbolic Occupation of the Authenticity Discourses of Hungarian Nationalism in Transylvania], in *Erdély de-konstrukciók*, ed. Feischmidt Margit (Budapest: Néprajzi Múzeum, 2005), 7.

[25] Jakab, *Emlékállítás és emlékezési gyakorlat*, 50.

[26] Jérome Monnet, "The Symbolism of Place: A Geography of Relationships between Space, Power and Identity," *European Journal of Geography: Political, Cultural and Cognitive Geography* 10 (2011), http://cybergeo.revues.org/24747?lang=en.

The bombardment of Nijmegen

For the city of Nijmegen, 1944 represents the most devastating year of World War II. The city was bombed by the Allied forces in February, and half a year later in September, the German army set fire to the city in order to hold back the advancement of the Allied forces. Although the Allied forces captured the city during the fall of 1944, the German army continued to bomb Nijmegen until March 1945. As we will see, all these events were deeply embedded in the memory of the community of Nijmegen. Considering Nijmegen as a symbolic space, it is important to review these events so that we can interpret the symbolic meanings of the space.

Nijmegen is located near to the German border; therefore, it was occupied by the German forces early during the invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940. However, after the invasion, during the years of the war, the city was relatively peaceful up until February 1944. In November 1943, the Allied forces developed a military operation code named Operation Argument, which aimed at destroying the German air force and providing safe airspace for the upcoming military operations.[27] According to the plan, for a week, every single day Allied air force troops would have bombed the German military industry, including Gotha, Leipzig and Tutow.[28] The primary targets of the strategic bombing were bridges, airports, railway stations and industrial sites. Weather conditions proved to be favorable on 19 February 1944, so the operation started, however, during the first two days the British Air Force suffered great losses.

On 22 February, the US Air Force targeted the Messerschmitt factories in Gotha, but due to bad weather conditions, the bomber squadrons were ordered to return to avoid further losses.

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[27] Joost Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen, 1944: American Bombs and German Fire* (Nijmegen: Van Tilt, 2014), 41-57.

[28] Pim Kooij, "The Destruction of Dutch Cities during the Second World War," in *Stadtzerstörung und Wiederaufbau*, ed. Martin Körner (Vienna: Verlag Paul Haupt, 2000), 289-301.

Due to the bad communication conditions, fourteen bombers received the message half an hour later, when they were already flying deep in the German airspace. Therefore, they were ordered to bomb targets of opportunity on the way of their retreat. When the bombers reached Nijmegen, they targeted the railway station in order to destroy the German supply lines, but because of navigational errors and erroneous calculations, they mistakenly bombed not the railway lines but the city center.[29] On the same day under similar circumstances, Allied bombings caused great damage to the towns of Arnhem and Enschede as well.

On 22 February 1944, the air raid sirens of Nijmegen first went off at quarter past one in the afternoon. Since it was a false alarm, the citizens of Nijmegen continued their everyday routine and work. Almost ten minutes later the sirens went off again, and at half past one in the afternoon, the first bomb hit the city center followed by 143 other.[30] As a result of the bombardment, one-third of the historic downtown, nearly 1250 buildings were destroyed, including churches, public buildings, residential homes and a school with twenty-four students.[31] The circumstances were aggravated by the fact that the communication channels were also damaged, so rescue operations were delayed. Nearly 800 people lost their lives during the attack, many of whom could not be identified.[32]

The Dutch government-in-exile, based in London, learned about the events on 24 February, however, in the absence of reliable information and because they did not intend to confront the US

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[29] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 41-57.

[30] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 23.

[31] William Hitchcock, *The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 101.

[32] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 17-41.

forces, the exile government did not react to the events.[33] British minister of foreign affairs, Anthony Eden responded to the events saying that all of these terrible consequences are the price of the liberation.[34] By contrast, the German propaganda machine immediately launched propaganda bulletins in the city and surrounding settlements, as well as newsreels were made about the ruined city to reach out to the Dutch resistance.[35] By April, posters and newsreels were replaced by the distribution of photographs of the ruined city, as too open propaganda was found to be unsuccessful.[36] Allied forces, meanwhile, had been planning their next operation.

Following the successful operations in Normandy, both the BBC and the Dutch Radio Orange tried to spread the news of the upcoming liberation in the occupied territories. The re-occupation of the Western part of the Netherlands was strategically important, since any operations aimed at occupying the Ruhr area should be launched from the Netherlands. The purpose of Operation Market Garden was to liberate the Western part of the Netherlands, and it included two separate sub-operations. During Operation Market, British, Polish and American parachute divisions were supposed to occupy Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, and they were responsible for ensuring the integrity of bridges, and for the liquidation of enemy troops and the protection of supply lines. Operation Garden aimed at liberating the Dutch cities one-by-one.[37]

On 17 September 1944 in Nijmegen, air raid sirens went off again. Realizing that the Allied troops were advancing, the German troops set fire to the city, burning down hundreds of houses,

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[33] Ibid., 17-41.

[34] "I fear loss of life and damage to property and cultural monuments are inevitable. It is part of the price of liberation." qtd: Hitchcock, *The Bitter Road to Freedom*, 102.

[35] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 79-101.

[36] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 79-101.

[37] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 101-103.

by which they tried to slow down the enemy and gain time to prepare for defense. However, in many cases, residents of the city who sought shelter in the cellars and basements of their houses upon hearing the air raid sirens, were killed in the fire since they could not escape their houses.[38] During the several-day-long fights on the streets of Nijmegen, Allied troops managed to liberate the city in September, despite the fact that operation Market Garden was ultimately unsuccessful.

Although the city was liberated in September 1944, the continuous German air raids were devastating until 17 March 1945. Nijmegen was one of the starting points of Operation Veritable launched on 8 February 1945, during which 470,000 British and Canadian soldiers were deployed to control the area between the Rhine and Maas rivers. The operation was successful, and by 24 March the entire Rhineland was under Allied occupation.[39] Meanwhile, Nijmegen was kept under constant fire, resulting in the complete destruction of 1400 houses, and an additional 13,000 buildings were damaged.[40]

In February 1944, American bombs destroyed one-third of Nijmegen, and half a year later, German soldiers burned down the city. The tragic events of 1944, however, were just one episode of the events in which Nijmegen and the Netherlands were liberated from the German occupation. This paper argues that the city has a significant place in the Dutch memory of the war and of the liberation of the Netherlands, by representing both liberation and destruction. These two symbolic meanings are present in the memory of the community, therefore, Nijmegen as a symbolic space carries great tension.

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[38] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 105-129.

[39] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 129-131.

[40] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 132.

The memory of the bombardment

Nijmegen played an important role in the liberation of the Netherlands, and this role cost a lot to the city. Therefore, Nijmegen has been endowed with two opposing symbolic meanings. This paper argues that on the first hand, the city represents the symbolic space of destruction in the collective memory of the locals. As it can be seen, this interpretation focuses on the devastating events of the bombardment in February 1944 and on the massive damages caused to the city during Operation Market Garden and Operation Veritable. On the other hand, the city also represents the symbolic space of liberation, this interpretation focuses on the liberation by the Allied forces. These two interpretations oppose each other, and this opposition causes conflicts in the collective memory.

The three most devastating tragedies of the Netherlands in the 20th century were the German bombing of Rotterdam in 1940, the bombardment of Nijmegen in 1944 and the great floods in 1953, however, while the Rotterdam bombing and the great floods are present in the Dutch collective memory, however, the bombardment of Nijmegen is not.[41] It was not until in 1984, 40 years after the bombardment, when the first study of the events was written and published. The first monument of the bombardment was created in 2000. From the 1960's, there were only a few commemorations of the bombardment in the city, and finally, it was only in 2000 when an annual commemoration of the victims was established locally. These facts raise the questions why it took so long before the first official monument was erected to the victims of the bombing, and what caused this social amnesia that prevented the living memory of the bombardment to become a part of the collective memory?

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[41] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 9.

Firstly, the locals could not come to terms with the events, as they did not understand why the Allied forces bombed the city. Secondly, the German propaganda made it even more difficult to process the bombardment, because it evoked a feeling that those who would raise their voices against the Allied bombing, were viewed as collaborators with the German occupiers. Thirdly, since even the exile government remained silent over the events, locals had no understanding of the political and military motives of the air raid.[42] These facts led to the development of an unpleasant and frustrating memory of the bombardment, which was ultimately censored by the collective memory, as it will be illustrated further below.

As it is argued by the Dutch historian Rosendaal, in the Dutch collective memory, Allied forces (the United States Air Force included) are represented as liberators, however, the local collective memory offers another interpretation which is not compatible with the nation's collective memory. Since if the local victims of the bombardment are in the focus of the memory, then it would be necessary to name those who caused the disaster. Thus, only the local collective memory integrated the memory of the bombardment, but the nation's collective memory could not do that.[43]

The two opposing symbolic meanings of Nijmegen are represented in the city, through two monuments. The first was erected in 2000 at the site of the school which was bombed in February 1944. The monument is called "Swing" and it commemorates the 24 pupils and their 8 teachers who died during the bombardment.[44] The second monument was established in 2005 at the site of

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[42] Joris A. C. van Esch, "Nijmegen Bombardment on February 22 1944: a Faux Pas or the Price of Liberation?," (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis. Kansas: Fort Leavenworth, 2010), 5-7.

[43] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 141.

[44] For further information, Wesley Dankers and Jimmy Hilgen, "Monument the Swing Nijmegen," Traces of War, last accessed October 03, 2020, https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/28689/Memorial-The-Swing-Nijmegen.htm.

the mass grave of the victims.[45] If we consider the placement of these memorials in the physical space, we can find that these monuments carry the conflict of the symbolic space as well.

Though the "Swing" is located in the city centre, at the site of the former Montessori school, which was bombed, the memorial is under a chestnut tree which blocks the sight of the "Swing" from the pedestrians. Since the other monument is located at the mass grave of the victims, it is outside of the city centre, in a park which is mostly visited only by the locals. After visiting these monuments, we can say that although the memorials are present in the physical space, there are so hidden that if you are not local, or you do not know where to look for them, you can hardly find them. It is clear, that though the bombardment is represented in the local memory and in the city as well, it is argued that the memory of the bombardment is still being oppressed and censored. These two monuments present a counter-space; thus, the conflict of the symbolic space insert itself into spatial reality.

In Nijmegen, one of the most emblematic representations of the symbolic space of liberation is the National Liberation Museum, which depicts the history of the country from the start of the German invasion of the Netherlands to the liberation and reconstruction era.[46] The exhibition focuses specifically on the liberation, the presentation of Allied forces and the display of military operations dominate the exhibition. Visiting the exhibition reveals the tension between the symbolic interpretations of the city. The bombardment of Nijmegen is represented through the model of the old railway station. In spite of the fact that during the bombing, the train station was

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[45][40] For further information, TracesOfWar.nl, "Mistake Bombing Memorial Nijmegen," Traces of War, last accessed October 03, 2020, https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/28690/Mistake-Bombing-Memorial-Nijmegen.htm.

[46] For further information, "Nationaal Bevrijdingsmuseum 1944-1945" [National Liberation Museum 1944-1945], Freedom Museum, captured September 02, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200903043241/https://freiheitsmuseum.com/.

the primary target, but only a minor damage was done to the building or to the railroad.[47] Real damages to the city are not displayed, and although there is a huge amount of archival footage available to represent the bombing, the exhibition does not use them in any way, which is also controversial considering that the exhibition is specifically aimed at representing the realities of the war and of the liberation.

As we can see, the tragedies of 1944-1945 appear in the collective memory of the community in Nijmegen. The symbolic space of the city has a dual meaning, but these meanings are only interpreted and accepted at the local level and are not present in the collective memory of the nation. Due to the circumstances of the bombing and the subsequent events, the collective memory of the bombardment was not articulated, and thus it became conflicting, so that the community tried to suppress commemorations by social amnesia. Since the turn of the millennium, a need of the community has appeared to create and to incorporate the memory of the bombing into the collective memory, but this interpretation of the events contradicts the memory of the liberation in the collective memory of the nation, so only local changes have taken place.

As it was discussed in the theoretical introduction, a social framework regulates remembrance, and by the passing of time, as the individuals of the society change, the demands of the present reinterpret the symbolic meaning of physical spaces. Both Halbwachs and Schudson argue that forgetting and removal of events from the memory take place as time passes, however, what one can witness in the case of Nijmegen is a process in the opposite direction in time. In other words, forgetting is not happening by the passing of time, but it happened immediately after the events took place. Owing to the traumatic consequences of the war, the community-forming function of social amnesia overwrote the memory of the victims of the bombardment. The political

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[47] Rosendaal, *The Destruction of Nijmegen*, 21.

and ideological tensions evoked by the Nazi propaganda after the bombing made it impossible to have a consistent collective memory of the events, including both narratives of the bombardment and of the liberation. After this tension was dissolved, a new space of remembrance opened for the community.

By erecting monuments in the physical space, the traumatic narrative of the bombardment was legitimized, and as Feischmidt points out, symbolic representations strengthen the identity formation,[48] therefore, the opposing interpretation could find its place in the hierarchy of the collective memory. Hence, though this paper discusses a conflict in symbolic space, we can argue that what we realize as a conflict is in fact the process of vocalization of identity and of community formation. The opposing interpretations revealed here, are strengthening each other by their mere existence, therefore, they offer an excellent insight into the mechanisms of the social processes of memory.

In conclusion, Nijmegen represents two opposing symbolic spaces, however, only one of them, the symbolic space of liberation is understood and accepted on a national level, only this interpretation is in the nation's collective memory. However, the bombardment of Nijmegen is an integral part of the local collective memory, and this can be illustrated most powerfully by the fact that despite it is not part of the nation's collective memory, this interpretation is still represented in the city. Thus, the memory of the bombardment is so strongly present in the collective memory of the local community that it can define itself even against the nation's collective memory.

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[48] Feischmidt, "A magyar nacionalizmus," 7.

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Contributions to the History of Sport: Sport in the Grip of Ideology and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1941)

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Abstract

Sports and sports facilities have the power to bring together large masses of people. They give the population an opportunity to watch a sporting event live in great numbers. However, politicians use this in a way to present and impose their ideas and ideology and try to gather as many people as possible around them. Through sports, historians follow the influence of ideology and politics, and the use of sport for the agitation of the wider masses. Politically and geographically, Bosnia and Herzegovina are a specific area found between Croatia and Serbia, whose policies are directed towards predisposing the Bosnian population for its own political and ideological goals. We will deal with two periods in the paper. These are the period of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [1875-1918] and the period of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, respectively the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [1918-1941]. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the Berlin Congress had pledged to modernize Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the aspects of the implementation of its policy is the process of spreading sport among the Bosnian population. During this period, the first sports societies were established, and the first sports competitions were organized. However, realizing the importance of national agitation through sport, various sport societies were soon established with an ethno-national character. In this part of the paper, we will present nationalist-oriented sports societies, and how their activities manifested themselves through various political struggles. Yugoslavism is the identity that was

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imposed on all the states that made up the Kingdom at the time. In this section we will seek to answer two questions - what is the role of sport in promoting national and religious values and how much had the idea of Yugoslavia been promoted through sport? In this regard, this area was of great importance for the Serbian and Croatian political elites of the time, and through their approach, they sought to gather as many residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina as possible around their political parties. In resistance to these ideas, the Muslim political elite formed. We will try to show how these three components function through sport, and how they sought to implement their ideas through sport. The Communist Party also emerged as the fourth political element in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we will cover their activities through sport, and how politics and nationalism have influenced their work. In Bosnia and Herzegovina's historiography, this topic has not been extensively explored, so through this work, we seek to contribute to the research of the topic. For the Austria-Hungary period, we will present the beginning of organized sport, the role of the country in modernization, and nationalism through certain sports; while in the period of the Kingdom of SHS and Yugoslavia, we will touch upon football solely, because of the availability of written sources. The period from 1914 to 1941 will not be dealt with mainly because of the scarcity of the sources available.

The period of Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy claimed the right[1] to Bosnia and Herzegovina in section 25 of the Berlin Peace Treaty.[2] By doing so, Austria-Hungary committed itself to the modernization

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[1] "Berlinski ugovor" July 13, 1878, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 1876-1996* [Contractual relations in the Balkans 1876-1996], 1 (1998): 123.

[2] In the Berlin Congress, which was held between June 13th to July 13th, 1878, Austria-Hungary claimed the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the compliance of the great European states. Šarlota Đuranović,

of the region. By strengthening its position in the former Ottoman province, Austria-Hungary hoped to establish a better position on the Adriatic coast and thus form a firm stronghold upon the newly formed Slavic nations. In fulfilling its intentions, Austria-Hungary used all available means: diplomacy, bureaucracy, military, gendarmerie, religion, scholastic and other cultural foundations and institutions.[3] The development of sport in this period can be observed from different perspectives. Firstly, we must keep in mind that in this period of Bosnian history, the first sport clubs and organizations were formed. Furthermore, we can establish that sport has a specific role in the modernization of a society. Secondly, the administration greatly profited from such organizations, in which, for example, young generations had the chance to regularly implement firearm practice, a practice which provided the state with well-educated military personnel, later to be recruited to war by the Monarchy. The final aspect we will touch upon is the use of sports for the purpose of national agitation.

The first years of sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Some ten years after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first shooting organizations were formed. The first was established in 1896. Bogdan Maksimović makes mention of an article in the weekly paper *Bošnjak* (Bosnian), which states that the founders assembly of the first shooting organization was organized in the Bosnian Landstag (Parliament), where a significant

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Opća povijest: od Pariške komune do kraja Prvog svjetskog rata, (1870-1918) [General History: From the Paris Commune Until the End of World War I (1870-1918)] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1960), 147.

[3] Todor Kruševac, "Austrougarska uprava 1878-1918" [Austro-Hungarian Administration 1878-1918], in *Socijalistička republika Bosna i Hercegovina,* ed. Ivo Cecić et al. (Zagreb: Jugoslovenski leksikografski zavod, 1983), 101.

number of *Muhammedaners*[4] was present.[5] However, most of the present citizens were in fact military officers. In organizations such as these, the population was made capable of using pistols and rifles. At the same time, by attending these trainings, the citizens were prepared for military actions. One piece of information from *Sarajevski list* [Sarajevo Journal][6] tells information about a public falconers meeting held on the military grounds[7] .Likewise, we find that "*the shooting session was attended by the head of the state, Mr. Baron Appel, Gardl and Gustas, Colonel Winzor… Many of the significant citizens of the local community were invited without the difference of religion*".[8] With this example, it becomes greatly clear as to why shooting specifically becomes among the first organized sports in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Moreover, in this context we can observe one more event of great importance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and those are horse races organized in Butmir since 1893. The first prize of the race was called *Državna Nagrada* [the State Prize], with the reward of 1000 crowns.[9] The races were of an international character. They were organized by the *Landtag* or by a specially established

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[4] In the news article, this term was used to describe the member of the Islamic religion.

[5] In his article, Bogdan Maksimović made a printing error by claiming that the mentioned organization was established on April 2nd 1898, whereas the actual founding date was April 2nd, 1896, which can be clearly seen in the issue of the Bošnjak paper from the same date regarding its foundation date. For comparison: Bogdan Maksimović, "Streljaštvo u Bosni i Hercegovini" [Archery in Bosnia and Herzegovina], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 5 (1975): 35; "Streljačko društvo," *Bošnjak*, April 2, 1896, 2.

[6] *Sarajevski list* were the official papers of the Bosnian Landstag. The printing of the paper started in 1881. It was written in both Latin and Cyrillic script. Đorđe Pejanović, *Bibliografija štampe Bosne i Hercegovine 1850-1941* [The Bibliography of the Press of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1850-1941] (Sarajevo: Veselin Maleša, 1961), 20.

[7] "Sokolski slet," *Sarajevski list*, August 24, 1912, 3.

[8] …bijaše na ovdašnjoj vojničkoj streljani pucanje časnika, i to iz vojničke puške i revolvera. Pucanju je prisustvovao poglavar zemlje preuzvišeni gospodin baron Appel, Gardl i Gustas, pukovnik Winzor… Bili su pozvani i mnogi ovdašnji odlični građani bez razlike na vjeroispovijest in: Editorial Board "Pucanje na vojničkoj streljani," *Bošnjak*, September 10, 1896, 2.

[9] "Konjska trka na Ilidži," *Bošnjak*, August 10, 1893, 2.

race committee.[10] The official government papers had not missed the chance to contribute to the popularization of the sport among the masses and Bosnian statesmen by using adulate texts. A news article from 1900 tells us about the favorable conditions of the weather on the day of the race and even more favorable state of the hippodrome: *The hippodrome and its surroundings were so rich in green scenery, that one's eyes could not get enough of the complacent sense of freshness.*[11] The authorities used this opportunity, as any other, to propound themselves, gain a positive reputation and strengthen their position among the Bosnian population. We cannot call coincidental the fact that the peasants were mentioned alongside the notable statesmen who participated in the event, among them *His Excellency, the head of the state, baron Appel and deputy baron Kutschera. At three o'clock the spouse of the Joint Minister of Finances Vilma Kalay arrived*, accompanied by her children.[12] One of the prizes of the tournament was the *Carska nagrada* [the Emperor's Award].

Besides these, there were other sports, as well as competitions on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian soil, before the end of World War I. One of the most notable to mention is cycling. Until 1902, most of the competitions held in cycling took place in the garden of Ilidža. The starting line and the finish line were in front of *Hotel Bosna*, which still stands today. In the year mentioned, a cycling lane was built, for the purposes of the competitions. It was of great importance for the Monarchy to prove to the Bosnian public that it is indeed possible to achieve the goal that the country committed itself to in 1878 — the modernization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This model of administrative activism was visible in all spheres of the social life of the time – a multitude of buildings, theaters, museums and alike were constructed. Such policy was then transferred onto

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[10] Bogomir Ružička, "Konjički sport u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1914. Godine" [Equestrian sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1914], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 5 (1972): 56.

[11] "Konjska trka. Prvi dan 24. juna," *Sarajevski list,* June 27, 1900, 4.

[12] Ibid., 4.

sports as well, as it can be seen from the examples given above, especially in the case of cycling, since it was a profoundly popular sport at the end of the 19th century. We consider that it was a colossal gain for the government to incorporate local competitors into the competitions, who would serve as an example to the wider public. One of the most significant competitors of this time was Vincenc Lise, born in Sarajevo in 1881. He started competing when he was nineteen years old, in 1900. In his career, which lasted three years, he won fifteen medals.[13] One more significant competitor was Mahmut Žiga. He was quite popular among the Muslim population. In the following period, he became the mayor of Ilidža.[14] In 1904, the Muslim youth of Sarajevo organized themselves and decided to establish *Muslimanski biciklistički klub* [Muslim cycling club]. In *Bošnjak,*[15] we came upon an information about the founding of this society,[16] whose official name was *El-Kamer.*[17]

Gymnastics and Nationalism

After a certain period, the first locals who decided to establish sport societies emerged. It became clear quickly that sport associations and collectives can play a great role in the process of

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[13] Bogomir Ružička, "U posjeti starom takmičaru" [Visiting an old competitor], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 2 (1969): 120-121.

[14] "Razvoj biciklizma u Bosni i Hercegovini – Mahmut Žiga, pionir ovog sporta na našim prostorima," Bosnae.info, May 13, 2017, http://bosnae.info/index.php/razvoj-biciklizma-u-bosni-hercegovini-mahmut-ziga-pionir-ovog-sporta-na-nasim-prostorima.

[15] The founder of the paper *Bošnjak* was Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak, the government councilor of the time. He gained the concession to publish the paper from Landstag. In this paper, the ideas of Bosniaks were promoted. Todor Kruševac, *Bosanskohercegovački listovi u XIX veku* [Bosnian-Herzegovinian newspapers in the 19th century] (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1978), 238-244.

[16] "Muslimanski biciklistički klub u Sarajevu," *Bošnjak,* April 28, 1904, 3.

[17] *El-Kamer* translated from Arabic means "moon." *Arapsko-bosanski rječnik* [Arabic-Bosnian Dictionary], 3rd ed. S.V. "El-Kamer." Our explanation as to why the word moon was used in the name of the society is because of the moon's role in Islam, which can be found on Islamic flags.

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national agitation. One example of this took place in Mostar, in 1903, where the Serb gymnastic society *Obilić*[18] was established and soon after, in 1905, *Dušan Silni*[19] in Sarajevo as well.[20] In the very names of the sport associations it is possible to see which part of the population the associations tend to attract. After the *Landtag* confirmed the regulations under which the Serb gymnastic society *Dušan Silni* was to operate, the administration of the society decided to invite all Serbs without the difference of class to the founding assembly.[21] It is important to note that these Serb gymnastic clubs were only formed after the administration of Benjamin Kallay ended, in 1903. In the very beginning of his administration over Bosnia and Herzegovina, he argued that the Serb national movement was the most developed and that its national-political tendencies had to be rendered to naught.[22] The Serbs first attempted to acquire religious and educational autonomy. This struggle was ended in 1905, when the autonomy was established in accordance with the state law. This was an upheaval in the political activity of Serb citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[23] An example of such a change is a merriment of sorts organized by the Serb gymnastic society

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[18] Miloš Obilić was a member of the Christian coalition which fought against the Ottoman Empire in Kosovo, in 1389. In the battle of Kosovo, he is accredited to have killed Sultan Murad I. Joseph Von Hammer, *Historija Turskog/Osmanskog Carstva* [History of the Turkish/Ottoman Empire] (Zagreb: Ognjen Prica, 1979), 74. This battle, as well as Miloš Obilić have a significant role in the forming of the national identity of the Serb people.

[19] Stefan Uroš IV Dušan Nemanjić, more frequently mentioned as Dušan Silni [Dušan the Mighty], was one of the most important rulers of the medieval Serbian state. In the time of his rule, Serbia experienced the peak of its territorial expansion. Miloš Blagojević, *Srbija u doba Nemanjića od kneževine do carstva: 1168-1371* [Serbia in the Time of the Nemanjić Dynasty from Duchy to Empire: 1168-1371] (Beograd: TRZ Vajat, 1989), 161.

[20] Bogdan Maksimović, "Sokolski slet u Trebinju 1911. Godine" [The Falcon Rally in Trebinje in 1911], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 2 (1969): 25.

[21] "Srpsko gimnastičko društvo 'Dušan Silni' u Sarajevu," *Sarajevski list,* February 14, 1906, 2.

[22] Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* [History of the Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998), 374.

[23] Mustafa Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnji politički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine od 1878. do 1914* [The Legal Status and the Development of Internal Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1878 to 1914] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1976), 95.

Obilić in 1907, where traditional Serb folk dances were performed.[24] A similar event was organized the next year, on the second day of the Orthodox Easter, with a slightly more informative invitation compared to the previous one. From a certain news article we see that the *Obilićev marš* [The Obilich march] will be performed, alongside the performance of the song *Srpkinja* [Serb woman], as well as the Serb folk dances.[25] Furthermore, in the same place, it can be seen that the society of that time noticed the power that sport held when it comes to the propagation of different ideas and ideologies. In the example of two previously mentioned gymnastic clubs, the goal is to attract the Serb population, especially the Serb youth, and thus direct them towards the Serb national ideology of the time.

Football in Bosnia and Herzegovina within Austria-Hungary

When it comes to football in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it first emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. The way this game made its way to Bosnian soil is not completely clear. Milorad Bajić suggests that football first emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina at different locations at the same time, since this region was under external influence in this period.[26] The first official football club – *Đački sportski klub* [Student's football club] was founded in 1905.[27] They played their

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[24] "Srpsko gimnastičko društvo 'Obilić' u Mostaru," *Sarajevski list*, June 9, 1907, 3. – Despite this not being in the sources, we can imagine that folk dances and generally speaking, various elements of culture and tradition, such as folk and epic singing [especially in the Balkans] are involved in the processes of ethnic and national agitation and hence self-identification. Furthermore, these are social events which homogenizes the sense of the individual's collective self. In this case, these involve the praising of traditional Serb historical figures, expressed greatly though popular heroes who fights the oppression of the occupational forces.

[25] Ibid., 2.

[26] Milorad Bajić, "Počeci fudbalskog sporta u Bosni i Hercegovini" [The Beginnings of Football in Bosnia and Herzegovina], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 5 (1972): 48.

[27] Šefik Pašić, "Šezdeset i pet godina fudbala u Mostaru" [Sixty-five years of football in Mostar], *Prilozi za historiju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 1 (1968): 42–43.

matches mostly against military teams, which is the main reason why the first official match with a professional football team took place in 1911 against *Osman*, a football club from Sarajevo. After a few months, the authorities discontinued the activities of the club because of national propaganda and activism noticed inside the club.[28] However, after sending multiple petitions and appeals, the activities of the club were once more legalized in 1910. The nature of the nationalist activism mentioned and the concrete reason why the activities of the *Đački sportski klub* were shut down and forbidden can themselves be a subject of further research.

Football arrived in Sarajevo due to high school students who observed matches being played in Zagreb, after which they decided to establish their own football club. They held their matches and training on an Austrian polygon, where today's settlement of *Čengić-Vila* is in the city of Sarajevo.[29] The way in which this club gained its name is quite interesting. Namely, the high school students were to play an away game in Split, against *Hajduk*[30] in 1911. The team from Split was not familiar with the name of the club from Sarajevo, which was why they wrote *Hajduk kontra Osman* [Hajduk against Osman][31] on the poster, with an intention to attract the masses, through an insinuation of the historical background behind the alleged name of the Sarajevo club.[32] The footballers of the Sarajevo club fancied the name, which is why they decided to officially adopt

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[28] Ibid, 43.

[29] Bajić, "Počeci fudbalskog sporta," 48.

[30] In 1911, a football club from Split was formed by four students. Dag Baldasar, "History, 1911-1920," official site of HNK Hajduk Split, accessed October 03, 2020, https://hajduk.hr/eng/history.

[31] Bajić, "Počeci fudbalskog sporta," 49.

[32] Osman is a frequent name among the Muslim population. One other possibility is that the name is derived from the word Ottomans [Osmanli].

it. The upcoming Balkan Wars were the reason for an internal national division in the club, which caused it to fall apart.[33]

Interesting to mention is an event tied to *Hajduk* from Sarajevo which took place on the day of the notorious assassination of the crown prince Franz Ferdinand. Namely, in the middle of a match with Slavonian *Marsonija* an announcement was made regarding the prince's death. Upon hearing the news, the present authorities had stopped the match, banishing the players and the fans from the field. These events occurred in the tenth minute of the match.[34] The assassination itself was a political act. The mentioned match was a sporting event of non-political nature. However, after the announcement of the assassination, this event became political in the sense that it was interrupted based on a political event, especially after the banishment of the players from the field. Although the motive of such a behavior remains unknown, we can assume that there was a certain dose of fear among the authorities that such gatherings can instigate mass disturbances in the country. Since the act of assassination was in fact, an act of nationalism, we can interpret these actions of the authorities as a prevention of the spreading of nationalistic ideology and the acts that follow. This portrays in an interesting manner the way politics influenced sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period and history.

The Role of Falconry

In the time of great political, national, cultural, economic and social turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, falconry played a significant role. With the initiative of *Srpski sokol* [the Serb falcon] in 1909, *Srpska*

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[33] Dževad Kajan, "Prva lopta 1903. u Mostaru," *Sport*, June 11, 2007, 13.

[34] Dževad Kajan, "Atentat na Ferdinanda prekinuo meč," *Sport,* June 25, 2007, 13.

sokolska župa bosansko-hercegovačka [Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serb falconry municipality] was founded, with its seat in Sarajevo.[35] We see that it was founded during the Annexation crisis,[36] which is why it can be claimed that the idea of the falconry establishment was itself conscious of the weight of its mission to spread the Serb national idea on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to note that the falconry forums maintained amicable relations towards the Muslim and Croatian falconry associations, as well as with other Serb associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[37] During this period there were around twenty Croat falconry associations which were divided into two groups. The first one was *Tvrtkovo*, encompassing such associations in Bosnia, and the other – *Viševićevo*, which encompassed the ones located in Herzegovina.[38] *Hrvatski sokol* [the Croat falcon] organized a merriment accompanied by the imperial and royal military ensemble in Sarajevo, in 1908.[39] The Muslim struggle for religious and educational autonomy brought about the need for the formation of Muslim falconry associations, which would direct the Muslim youth towards a straight Muslim national orientation.[40] The witness of these struggles and intentions of the Muslims is the establishment of the *Muslimanski sokol* [the Muslim Falcon] in the small town of Nevesinje. The town's youth emphasized the difficulties in the realization of their

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[35] Hajrudin Ćurić, "Srpska sokolska župa bosansko-hercegovačka" [The Serb falcon municipality of Bosnia and Herzegovina], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 1 (1968): 3.

[36] This period represents the time in which Austria-Hungary decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, which caused an international crisis. Ilijas Hadžibegović and Mustafa Imamović, "Bosna i Hercegovina u vrijeme austorugarske vladavine (1878-1918)" [Bosnia and Herzegovina in the time of the Austro-Hungarian rule (1878-1918)], in *Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarijih vremena do kraja Drugog svjetskog rata,* ed. Safet Halilović et al. (Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni centar, 1998), 278-279.

[37] Ćurić, "Srpska sokolska župa," 5.

[38] Hajrudin Ćurić, "Nekoliko podataka o hrvatskim sokolskim društvima u Bosni i Hercegovini prije Prvog svjetskog rata" [A few information on the Croat falconry associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina before World War I], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 2 (1969): 4.

[39] "Hrvatski sokol u Sarajevu," *Sarajevski list,* September 4, 1908, 3.

[40] Hajrudin Ćurić, "Iz istorije muslimanskog sokolstva" [From the history of Muslim falconry], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 2 (1969): 37.

idea in terms of the idea's acceptance. Nevertheless, in the end, the plan came to be realized and Abas-efendija Salahović, the director of the national elementary school, was designated as the head of the association.[41] Ćurić points out that the relations of the Serb falconry association with other associations of the same character with different national names were fraternal in nature. According to him, the prime example of such a relation is an event which took place in 1912, in a falconers' meeting in Prague, when Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian falconry association representatives discussed the possibility of cooperation. As a result of the meeting, a joint meeting was set up in Ljubljana the following year, when the mentioned associations acted conjointly, under one flag. To Ćurić, this indicated a sense of brotherhood and unity.[42] This interpretation must be understood through the concept of the age in which Ćurić wrote his article. The year was 1968, when Socialist Yugoslavia was fully established as an administrative power in the area under the slogan of "brotherhood and unity".[43]

The falconers of the *Srpska sokolska župa bosansko-hercegovačka* took part in the Balkan Wars.[44] The Balkan Wars aroused revolutionary movements among the youth, especially among the Yugoslav oriented one. In a letter, general Potiorek illustrates to minister Bilinsky how many volunteers from Bosnia and Herzegovina are crossing over to Serbia. The message was about the First Balkan War and the clash between the Muslim and the Serb population. The Muslims sided with the Turks, which were set off by the population of Sarajevo with public manifestations in

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[41] "Muslimanski soko u Nevesinju," *Sarajevski list*, July 14, 1911.

[42] Ćurić, "Srpska sokolska župa," 6.

[43] Vera Katz, "Bratstvo i jedinstvo na primjeru Bosne i Hercegovine – ideal, realnost, iluzija," yuhistorija.com, http://yuhistorija.com/serbian/drustvo_txt01c1.html.

[44] After the annexation, Austria-Hungary retreated, which caused the Balkan crisis in 1912-1913. The result of the Annexation crisis accelerated the intentions of the Balkan states to clash with the Ottoman Empire. Zijad Šehić, *U smrt za cara i domovinu! Bosanci i Hercegovci u vojnoj organizaciji Habsburške Monarhije 1878-1918* [To Death for the Emperor and Homeland! The Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Military Organization of the Habsburg Monarchy 1878-1918] (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 2007), 68.

1912.[45] In the meantime, the Serbs assisted Serbia with volunteers, as well as the Serbian Red Cross and in many ways more. Likewise, the Croatian population aided the Balkan allies.[46] The crossovers from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia posed a great threat to Austria-Hungary. This is why the government decided to take a new step – general Potiorek abolished all existing Serb economic, educational, gymnastic and other cultural institutions and foundations.[47] This meant that forty Serb falconry associations, along with its administrative units were abrogated, and their assets confiscated.[48] However, many did not give this much credit. On the day of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, on the 28th of June 1914, a regional falconers meeting was held in Banja Luka. When the word of the event got to Banja Luka, the falconers were asked that they depart from the location of the meeting.[49]

With the outbreak of the Great War, all Serb schools were abolished and on 12th of September, 1914, students were enjoined from taking part in the falconry associations.[50] Similarly as with football, the influence of contemporary politics and political events left a great mark on the falconry associations. Considerably more impactful, however, was the influence of the national

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[45] Dževad Juzbašić, *Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod Austrougarskom upravom: Uticaj Balkanskih ratova 1912/1913. na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i na tretman agrarnog pitanja* [Politics and Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarian Rule: The Influence of the Balkan Wars 1912/1913. on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the Treatment of the Agrarian Question] (Sarajevo: ANUBIH, 2002), 461.

[46] Hamdija Kapidžić, *Previranja u Austro-ugarskoj politici u Bosni i Hercegovini 1912. godine* [Turmoil in the Austro-Hungarian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1912] (Sarajevo: Glasnik arhiva i društva arhivista Bosne i Hercegovine, 1961)*,* 236.

[47] "O društvima i o pravu sakupljača," *Sarajevski list*, May 13, 1913, 3.

[48] Hajrudin Ćurić, "Nekoliko detalja o 'iznimnim mjerama' u Bosni i Hercegovini 1913. godine" [A few details regarding the "exceptional measures" in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1913], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 16 (1982): 14-15.

[49] Ćurić, "Srpska sokolska župa," 7-8.

[50] Jelena Dopuđa, "Fizička kultura u školama Bosne i Hercegovine od prvih početaka do 1918. godine" [The physical culture in the schools of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginnings until 1918], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 1 (1968): 14.

currents on the development of national falconry associations, which is evident through them. Moreover, certain tendencies of the unification of Yugoslav nations into a single entity can be traced through these examples, a matter which posed a great threat to the authorities, which as a result, continuously tried to ban such activities. Nonetheless, such a stance provided falconry with two attributes. The first one is its development with a national name, and the second one being their public reputation as the bearers of unity.

We can conclude that in this period a great deal of interest can be seen from the local population for sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we mention these sports individually, as presented above, fragmentary data is to be found in the media of the time. However, there is also one other group of sports which was much more developed, and which gathered a multitude of people on the sport fields. Furthermore, such manifestations were of a great importance to the local authorities, which made them promote these kinds of events in every way possible. Politicians used such sporting events for self-promotion among the locals. What can be traced through sport manifestations such as these in the period is the policy of modernization Austria-Hungary pledged to accomplish at the Berlin Congress, which made them strive to emphasize every new innovation they brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The very award names such as *Državna nagrada* [State award] and *Carska nagrada* [Imperial award] tell us about the endeavor of the authorities to establish a firm connection with the locals, which made the competitions and the awards tools for the state's propaganda. From a political point of view this period can be tied to the development of the national associations, which at the same time, dealt with sports, thus greatly influencing sport development in the given time period. Furthermore, the Balkan Wars negatively impacted these associations and societies, largely because some of them took active participation, which made the government often ban the activities and gatherings of the Serb associations. We deem that as important to mention that the available literature on the topic at hand leaves space for a further and more thorough elaboration of the relation of sports and politics of the period. Important to

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emphasize is that World War I greatly hindered the further development of sports in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The period between 1914 and 1918 will not be elaborated, since it is extremely difficult to obtain any data regarding sports in the given time frame, which is understandable given the circumstances in which it is to be researched and elaborated. After the war itself, there was a tendency of revival of sports in the region – some attempts were successful, some, on the other hand, were not.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the time of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia

In 1918, Bosnia and Herzegovina entered the newly founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Development of football at this time was greatly influenced by political, social and economic circumstances. After the Great War, football went through a phase of renewal and new clubs and associations were established. With the passage of time, new clubs emerged with noted results in the new state championship. The playing fields in the period were of a very poor standard. In this period, football life was greatly concentrated around Serbs and Croats. Two centers in this respect were formed – Belgrade and Zagreb. The clubs of the two cities regularly won championship titles, except for Split. Bosnia and Herzegovina itself had a center – Sarajevo, which provided its representatives to the state championship. Besides Sarajevo, important centers were Mostar and Banja Luka, both of which had not achieved notable success on the state level but managed to provide a competition to the Sarajevo teams.

The organization of football competitions under the influence of political turbulences

When it comes to the development of football, the system of organizing and managing it is of crucial importance, be it on a global level, the level of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is why the roof organization under the name of *Federation International de Football Association* [FIFA] was established in 1904, in Switzerland.[51] The first forms of the football organizational system as a sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen after World War I. A few months after the emergence of the new state, the first football forum was formed which supervised football activities in the Kingdom. At the time, the center of the sport was concentrated in Zagreb, in which competitions were organized even before the war. Same clubs adhered to the renewal of the football section at the *Hrvatski športski savez* [Croatian Sport Federation]. In various available monographs and literature related to the founding of the *Jugoslavenski nogometni savez* [Yugoslav Football Federation], the date April 14th, 1919 can be seen as the date of the establishment of the institution.[52] However, the correct date would be April 13th, in *Medulić* coffee shop, in Zagreb, on a meeting attended by two delegates from each of the eight clubs from Zagreb. This error was noticed by Nebojša Jakovljević in his work *Fudbalska takmičenja južnih Slovena 1873-1941* [Football competitions of South Slavs 1873-1941]. Namely, the date April 13th, 1919 is clearly visible in the facsimile of the original record of the founder's assembly of the Yugoslav Football Federation [YFF], located in the Archive of Croatia.[53] Today's territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Federation as well. The YFF split the clubs

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[51] Dževad Kajan, "SAŠK i Slavija najuspješniji," *Sport*, July 9, 2007, 13.

[52] Mića Bajić, *Fudbal u Bosni i Hercegovini 1908-1992* [Football in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1908-1992] (Sarajevo: ABC – Sport, 2006), 23.

[53] Nebojša Jakovljević, *Fudbalska takmičenja južnih Slovena 1873-1941* [Football Competitions of South Slavs 1873-1941] (Subotica: Visoka škola strukovnih studija za obrazovanje vaspitača i trenera Subotica, 2018), 25-26.

according to ten regions. Included in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Brod region, to which Derventa, Doboj and Požega belonged and the Karlovac region, to which Banja Luka belonged and finally, the Sarajevo region with Sarajevo and Mostar.[54] Soon afterwards, sub-federations were founded according to the administrative structure of the various regions. In this manner, the Sarajevski podsavez [Sarajevo sub-federation] somewhat influenced the development of football in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whilst other clubs belonged to sub-federations whose centers were outside of the territory of Bosnia. For this period, a three-level system of organization was present – the first, *Nogometni savez Jugoslavije* [Football Federation of Yugoslavia], later to be renamed to *Fudbalski savez* [Football Federation], the second one being *Fudbalski podsavez* [Football sub-federation][55] and finally, the football clubs. However, this system did not provide the expected results, mostly because of its organizational vagueness, poor staff capacity and external influences.[56] Football managed to maintain some degree of development thanks to the tenacity of the football clubs. Two dates are of crucial importance for this development. These are 1921, when the Yugoslav Football Federation was accepted as a temporary member of the FIFA, and 1924, when it was granted permanent membership.[57] The founder's assembly of Sarajevo sub-federation was founded on 22nd of June, 1920 in the premises of the *Jugoslovenski muslimanski športski klub* [Yugoslav Muslim Sport Club]. This federation encompassed most of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as clubs from Čačak and Užice from 1930-1933, whereas the clubs from Derventa were integrated only in 1936. The number of the clubs in the federation significantly

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[54] Ibid, 25.

[55] The word for football more often used in the Croatian language and hence more often affiliated with Croatians is *nogomet*, whilst the same stands for the word *fudbal* in the Serbian language. In this manner, Croats struggled to keep the Federation headquarters in Zagreb, while the Serbs maintained the view of the centralization of the country, which meant that the headquarters should be transferred to Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia.

[56] Bajić, *Fudbal u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 24.

[57] Ibid., 23.

decreased when the clubs from Mostar, Travnik and Western Herzegovina were transferred to the Split sub-federation in 1939. The next year, *Sarajevski podsavez* changes its name to *Sarajevski loptački podsavez* [Sarajevo football sub-federation].

Beside the Sarajevo sub-federation on the Bosnian territory, it operated the Banja Luka football sub-federation, which was founded in 1933. The founder's assembly was attended by the delegates of all the football clubs from the territory of the Vrbas banate. The sub-federation encompassed most of the area of the banate, to which clubs from Derventa region joined in 1936.

Soon, a clash emerged in the Federation between the Serb and Croat side. At the time, *SAŠK*, as a Croatian club, gave its support to the *Hrvatska športska sloga* [Croatian Sport Coalition].[58] Furthermore, *SAŠK* took part in the founder's assembly, which took place on May 14th, 1939. After ten days, the club was officially relegated from the Yugoslav Football Federation.[59] Moreover, clubs from Travnik and Mostar took part in the newly formed Croatian Football Federation in 1940. In this moment of divergence between the Yugoslav and Croatian Football Federation, a new federation was formed on October 1st, 1939 – *Srpski loptački savez* [Serb Football Federation], with two sub-federations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, more precisely Sarajevo and Banja Luka.[60] It is interesting to observe the fact that clubs from Sarajevo could be found in both of the new Federations – while *SAŠK* participated in the Croatian league, *Slavija* participated in the Serbian one.

In the time of the first Yugoslav state, various cup competitions were organized. The largest number of such competitions arose for the affirmation of smaller clubs. The Cup of King Alexander

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[58] This was an organizational unit on the level of a federation. *Hrvatska športska sloga* encompassed all Croatian football clubs and as such is the precursor of *Hrvatski nogometni savez* [Croatian Football Federation].

[59] Jakovljević, *Fudbalska takmičenja*, 33.

[60] Milorad Sijić, *Fudbal u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji* [Football in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia] (Aleksandrovac: Zavičajni muzej župe Aleksandrovac, 2014), 126.

was a national competition played on Yugoslav soil, in the period between 1924 and 1927, and thus it was the first cup competition. Varsity teams of sub-federations participated in the cup, which meant that Sarajevo sub-federation also took part in such an event, however, without major successes.[61] The name of the competition is interesting when we keep in mind that it was of the highest, national level. Through this fact we can track the connotation put on the personality of the king as the first man of the country and perhaps establish this as an attempt to form a cult of personality. The attribute of this competition was that the varsity team who won the competition three times in a row, permanently won the national trophy. This was the varsity team of the Zagreb sub-federation. We can pose the questions as to whether this was coincidental in the context of the political factors of the time.

Ideology, politics and football

Under the influence of the political and national struggle, football as a sport absorbed various ideologies. Clubs were formed according to the national basis. In this manner, Muslim, Croat, Serb and Jewish clubs were formed, in addition to the, at the time, newly established sport collectives under the influence of the Communist Party, as well as the worker's sport collectives with a multinational structure of membership.[62] The authorities had not looked benevolently at the clubs of the Party, which is why mostly repressive measures were taken against them, all the way to the abolition of their activities. In this part of the article arguably most interesting clubs formed according to the national and ideological key will be presented.

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[61] Ibid, 130-132.

[62] Bajić, *Fudbal u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 12.

Immediately after the war's conclusion a group of footballers founded *Fudbalski klub "JŠK - Jugoslovenski športski klub"* [Football Club – "YSC - Yugoslav Sport Club"]. The aim of the club was primarily to aid sport development in general, with a special focus on football[63], to assemble the youth all in one place and to spread the idea of Yugoslavism. However, the club was after a while taken over by the Serbs, under whose management chauvinism and the Great Serbian ideology prevailed, which is the reason why Muslims and Croats had left the club.[64] Soon afterwards, the Croats decided to establish their own national club. The result was *HŠK Zrinjski* from Mostar which became the center for the Croats. Through these two teams, nationalism and chauvinism were spread in an open manner. These circumstances can be used to explain the founding year of the club. Namely, today, *Zrinjski* is one of the greatest sport collectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The club came forth with the club crest on which the year 1905 stands as the year of the foundation of the club, in its attempt to provide a sense of the club's continuity. In this respect, they interpret *Đački športski klub* which was mentioned above, as the starting point of *Zrinjski*. The latter persists in trying to prove that it came to be from *Đački športski klub*. However, there is no evidence that in 1912 *Đački športski klub* changed its name to *Gimnazijalni nogometni klub Zrinjski* [Gymnasium Football Club Zrinjski], regardless of the statement of Ivo Ćorić, the club's activist, who makes mention of *Zrinjski* in his memoirs, with regards to the former. Even if the statement was correct, the year 1905 cannot be taken as the year of founding for the club, since the monograph in which this issue is mentioned, elaborates that *Zrinjski* in 1917 merged with *HROSK*, which was mentioned above as well. Out of this fusion a club named *Hercegovac* [Herzegovinian] was formed, out of which *Jugoslovenski športski klub*'s founding board was

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[63] Draga Mastilović, *Hercegovina u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1918-1929)* [Herzegovina in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1929)] (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 2009), 441.

[64] Pašić, "Šezdeset i pet godina fudbala u Mostaru," 43.

formed.[65] When observed logically, this sequence of events points clearly to the fact that today's *Zrinjski* could not have been established from *Đački športski klub*, nor could it have been established in 1905, nor is there any direct link between the two. The founding of Zrinjski in 1922 can be looked as a counterweight to the hegemony of the Great Serbian ideology, as a need to gather the Croats of Mostar and Herzegovina in one place. When we investigate the political accounts of the time, we can see that it was the time in which the Croatian struggle against the centralized structure of the state was proclaimed with the *Vidovdan* constitution of 1921. At this time, *Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka* [Croatian Republican Peasant Party – HRSS] formed the Croatian block, obtaining success on the 1923 elections, thanks to the party's breakthrough on Bosnian-Herzegovinian soil.[66] Naturally, it is unknown whether the Croatian parties influenced the founding and the activities of the club, however, it can be seen that this period represents a turning point in the gathering and political counter-activism of the Croats against the Great Serbian ideology, which reflected sports, as presented. Additionally, the time frame in which the monograph of the history of *Zrinjski* was written should be kept in mind. This is a period of the club's renewal, which made the contemporary board of the club impose a sense of legitimacy and continuity regarding the renewal of *Hrvatski športski klub* [Croatian Sports Club] i.e. the club with a Croat national name.

After World War I, a national club started operating in Sarajevo as well. We do not possess much knowledge about them. However, based on their titles we can track an influence of national

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[65] *HŠK Zrinjski 1905-1993* (Grude: HŠK "ZRINJSKI", 1993), 11.

[66] Hrvoje Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije (1918-1991) Hrvatski pogled* [History of Yugoslavia (1918-1991), The Croatian View] (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1998), 154-155; Nusret Šehić, *Bosna i Hercegovina 1918-1924. Privredni i politički razvitak* [Bosnia and Herzegovina 1918-1924. Economic and Political Development] (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1991), 221-222; Tomislav Išek, *Djelatnost Hrvatske seljačke stranke u BiH do zavođenja diktature* [The Activities of the Croat Peasants' Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the Establishment of Dictatorship] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1981), 201.

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ideology and religious identity. These are *Hrvatski športski klub*, *Srpski športski klub* [Serbian Sport Club]*, and the *Jugoslovenski muslimanski športski klub* [Yugoslavian Muslim Sports Club]. Not long after the war, they changed their names and became the most well-known clubs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first adopted the name *SAŠK*, the latter *Slavija*. Despite different names, they remained national in character and nonetheless most developed in the country. Their affiliation was particularly visible after the *Cvetković-Maček* agreement. It is known that with this agreement of August 1939, the Banate of Croatia was formed.[67] Just how much the political turmoil had on football shows the fact that a clash emerged in the Football Federation, which split the competitions into two parts: the Serbian League and the Croat-Slovene league. *SAŠK* and *Slavija* were clubs from Sarajevo, yet they participated in two different leagues. The first one took part in the Croat-Slovene League, while the latter attended the Serbian League. The *Jugoslavenski Muslimanski športski klub* changed its name to *Sarajevski* at the same time when *SAŠK* and *Slavija* came to be.[68]

In Tuzla, Muslim, Croat, Serb and Jewish clubs were active. Here we can point out the Muslim club *Zmaj od Bosne* [Dragon of Bosnia][69] among whose players Pašaga Mandžić could be found, a well-known Tuzla communist of the time.[70] One more Muslim club worth mentioning is *Đerzelez*. The club operated even before World War I, but the more interesting fact to be addressed here is the support it got from *JMO - Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija* [Yugoslav Muslim

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[67] See: Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988* [History of Yugoslavia 1918-1988] (Beograd: Nolit, 1980), 145.

[68] Anđelić Dragoljub, *Željezničar 1921-1981* (Koper: F.K. "Željezničar," 1981), 9.

[69] Dragon of Bosnia was a nickname of *Husein-kapetan* Gradaščević, a very important figure for Bosniaks and Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether. In 1831, he launched a military action against the Ottomans with the goal to make Bosnia and Herzegovina autonomous. He is a very important figure in the creation of the identity of the Bosniaks. See: Ahmed Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine* [The Autonomy Movement of Bosnia from 1831 to 1832] (Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu, 1996)

[70] Halid Čokić, *Uspomene na fudbalski klub "Zmaj od Bosne" i Tuzlu između dva svjetska rata* [Reminiscing the "Dragon of Bosnia" Football Club and Tuzla between two world wars] (Tuzla: Kulturno društvo Bošnjaka "Preporod", 1996), 33.

Organization].[71] Namely, in the newspaper *Pravda* [Justice], medium of JMO, we can notice a letter of support to the club, as well as notifications of their successes. Unfortunately, we cannot safely establish whether JMO had any direct influence on the activities of *Đerzelez*. Besides the football team, the club had its mountaineer, skiing and boxing section.[72]

At the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, an idea of creating a worker's club emerged. This was supposed to be the second of the kind in Sarajevo. The first one was *Hajduk*, which was a reaction and an opposition to the establishment of national clubs. To this idea came a railwayman Dimitrije Dimitrijević and in the next period he and his colleagues founded *Željezničar* [Railwayman]. Despite it being a worker's club, it was not under the influence of the Communist Party. In July 1921, an appeal was submitted for *Željezničar* to be accepted as a legitimate member of the local sub-federation. However, since the successful assassination on Milorad Drašković, the author of the declaration against the activities of the Communist Party in this period, the police steadily checked up on the members of the future club.[73]

In 1921, the activities of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were forbidden, which is why they started operating illegally. It was in this period that the Party decided to establish their own football club. The Communists were in the need of an organization, association or a collective to further spread their ideas. On the initiative of Gojko Vuković, the member of CK KPJ - Centralni

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[71] JMO was a political party founded in 1919. It was the political party of the Bosniaks in Yugoslavia. In its activities, it limited itself to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on gathering only the Bosniak Muslim population. Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* [Yugoslav Muslim Organization in the Political Life of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] (Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni centar, 1999), 54.

[72] "Zabava 'Đezeleza'," *Pravda*, February 20, 1937, 6; "'Uspjesi sarajevskog Đezeleza': Klub je okupio veliki broj mladih sportista i simpatizera," *Pravda*, March 26, 1937, 6; "Sportski klub Đerzelez Hrasničar 4:0," *Pravda*, March 26, 1937, 7; "Đerzelez (Sarajevo) – Građanski (Zenica) 5:1," *Pravda*, April 2, 1937, 7; "Đerzelez drugi na tabeli," *Pravda*, June 4, 1937, 7.

[73] Adnan Velagić, *Historija Monarhističke Jugoslavije 1918-1941* [History of the Monarchist Yugoslavia 1918-1841] (Mostar: Fakultet humanističkih nauka Univerziteta "Džemal Bijedić" u Mostaru, 2015), 135.

komitet Komunističke partije Jugoslavije [Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia], *Radnički sportski klub Velež* [Worker's sport club Velež] was founded. The aim of the club was to gather workers and the youth around it. For the symbol of the club, a five-pointed star was chosen.[74] It was exactly this "communist origin" of the club that hindered the development and the advancement of the club in the upcoming period. Working regulations were produced by the members of the Party, however in such a manner that its content and plan of action would not be deemed as suspicious, which convinced the authorities to permit the club's activities,[75] and eventually it was a means of survival after 1929, when many worker's clubs were shut down.[76] Certainly, this did not mean that the club itself was granted permission to be fully operational. There are multiple cases recorded in which players were arrested moments before matches and essentially, everything was done to obstruct the club's work and activities. This matter was particularly brought out after the Sixth-January Dictatorship of king Aleksandar, when the police regularly invaded the club's headquarters, arresting the players and fans of the club. With the king's dictatorship all political parties and organizations were prohibited. Sadly, we do not have any knowledge of what the consequences were for the other national teams, what we do know, however, is that those of *Velež* were severe. The most massive arrests took place in 1929, 1930, 1932, 1937, 1939, finally leading up to the ban of the club's activities in 1940.[77] Some fans and football players were sentenced to long periods of time in servitudes. This naturally obstructed the club's development, which is why despite their quality as a collective, they had not managed to qualify

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[74] Pašić, "Šezdeset i pet godina fudbala u Mostaru," 45.

[75] Šefik Pašić, "Radnička sportska društva i organizacije u Hercegovini do 1941. godine" [Worker's sport associations and organizations in Herzegovina until 1941], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 8 (1974): 9.

[76] Because of the Sixth-January Dictatorship of king Aleksandar, announced on 6th of January 1926. Velagić, *Historija Monarhističke Jugoslavije,* 226.

[77] Pašić, "Šezdeset i pet godina fudbala u Mostaru," 45.

for the Federal League. Before the club was banned, a football match was played on September 1st, 1940 – exactly one year after Hitler's invasion of Poland. Namely, on this date a match was played between *Velež* and *Crna Gora* from Podgorica. After the match, the players of both teams headed towards the streets of Mostar and protested the regime. The police replied to the protest with force, which led to a bloodshed. Two days after the event, on September 3rd, 1940, the club's activities were officially banned.[78]

In 1937, the Muslims of Mostar founded a club with a national name – *Muslimanski sportski omladinski klub Jedinstvo* [Muslim Sport Youth Club Unity]. However, after the ban of *Velež*, the Communist Party took hold of the club with the aim of gathering youth around it. Somewhat older than *Velež* was the club established in 1919, in Tuzla, under the name of *Gorki*. The club was named after a well-known Russian author Maksim Gorki.[79] In 1927, after the mentioned declaration and the ban of the activities, the club was reinstated and adopted the name *Sloboda* [Freedom]. The club's reformation went hand to hand with the renewal of the Party's activities in the Tuzla area. After 1932, *Sloboda* yet again ceased its activities.[80]

In the period until 1927, a Jewish club *Bar Kohba* was active.[81] After its demise, Jews could not establish a new club because of the dictatorship of king Aleksandar. It was only after his death that they managed to establish the mentioned *Makabi,* founded in 1936. Ružička Bogomir in his

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[78] "Prije II svjetskog rata," [History before WWII], FK Velež Mostar, accessed October 03, 2020, https://fkvelez.ba/historija/prije-ii-svjetskog-rata/.

[79] Maksim Gorki was a Russian writer who, through his work, agitated against tsarism and as such, he was widely known to personify the communist ideals. The founders of the given club were influenced by the communist ideology and sought to gather individuals of the same ideological background through sport activities.

[80] Husref Muharemagić, "Radničko sportsko društvo 'Sloboda' Tuzla" [Worker's sport association "Sloboda" Tuzla], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 14 (1980): 10.

[81] Bar Kohba was a Jew who in the year 132 AD led an uprising against Rome. See: Salmedin Mesihović, *Orbis romanvs* [The World of Romans] (Sarajevo, author edition, 2015), 1715.

article states that *Makabi* accepted players of all nationalities.[82] Regardless of this, when the list of players is analyzed, only Jewish names and surnames can be found, most of them merchants and craftsmen. The club made profit from organizing merriments and tea parties. *Makabi* was a standard member of the Sub-federation League. They ceased their activities in April of 1941.[83]

It can be concluded that football clubs were used for certain agendas and propaganda. Sport collectives were a very fertile ground for such activities. Namely, the matches, manifestations, meetings, and merriments gathered multitudes of people. On such occasions, ideas were more easily propagated and spread among the masses. It was of great importance to recruit the youth. This kind of approach was present in every known sport collective, without any regard to the national, religious or additional characteristics of a club. Unfortunately, the direct influence of political parties remains unknown to us. However, the way king Aleksandar dealt with the Communist clubs as presented, gives us the needed space to contemplate the influence of the parties on the clubs themselves. This thesis gains weight so much more when we take into consideration the potency of propagandistic action of the sport collectives on the masses. The goal was not only to gather like-minded individuals, but to allure the ones who were not as such. This was done most easily through football clubs and various competitions we mentioned. The clubs founded in this period mostly had a national or religious predisposition. Furthermore, one can conclude that a football team who, through its activities propagated the idea of Yugoslavism, cannot be found. Even if there were such clubs, their activities were limited and mostly taken over by nationalists.

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[82] Bogomir Ružička, "Sportski klub 'Makabi'" ["Makabi" Sport Club], *Prilozi za istoriju fizičke kulture u Bosni i Hercegovini* 1 (1968): 59.

[83] Ibid, 61.

Conclusion

What can be concluded from the very beginning of this paper is that the foundation of sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina was laid before 1918, and that World War I hindered the development of sport in the country. What is important to mention is that this period laid the basis to the development of national clubs and societies, which could not stand out, because of the official politics of Austria-Hungary. The exact opposite stands for the period of the Kingdom of SHS and respectively, Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Football was the most developed sport in this period. This allows the conclusion that politics exerted an important influence on sports. One can get an impression that football could not avoid politics whatsoever. Why football? Certainly, football was more represented when compared to other sports of the time. One of its prime characteristics is its ability to gather a great amount of masses into one place, for which a bigger stadium is needed, to be filled with people and to whom a certain set of ideas though the sport will be presented. As much as propaganda was important for sport, sport also made it possible for the propaganda of political parties to spread certain political ideas onto the population. Moreover, the Declaration and the Sixth-January Dictatorship impacted gravely the Communist clubs, whose activities were completely banned. In the time of the dictatorship, Jewish clubs were not active at all.

In the introductory part of this work we asked what role does sport have in the promotion of national and religious values and how promoted through it was the idea of Yugoslavism? We reckon that the idea of Yugoslavism was promoted either slightly or not at all. Under the influence of Serb-Croat political clashes, it can be said that the idea of Yugoslavism could not be developed, especially on Bosnian-Herzegovinian soil. On the other hand, we have a promotion of national values, however not in the context of Yugoslavism, but more so in the context of every group's own promotion of their own religious and national values. From this tendency emerged national clubs, national societies, and clubs with national or religious names, through which they spread their ideas. Worker's clubs were utterly unnoticeable, despite their evident activities in this field,

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which were most of the time obstructed by the authorities, mostly because of their fear of the potential Communist activism which was to be made through such clubs.

Furthermore, in this period we have an evident differentiation of the center from the periphery. Here we imply the urban space in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as opposed to the rural areas. Bigger cities had many more opportunities regarding the advancement of sport, whilst other smaller places and settlements were omitted. This can be deduced based on the results achieved when two teams met with the given contrast in mind – teams from the big cities were far more successful.

We conclude that every sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina had its own path of development, dependent, however, upon the politics of a certain period. For a certain sport collective or society to be successful, a national or religious background behind it was necessary. Worker's clubs had not the opportunity to stand out exactly thanks to the fact that they were worker's clubs in addition to some of them having strong ties with the Communist Party, which aggravated their development. Besides this, sport as a phenomenon quickly spread thanks to its fans, hard-working enthusiasts, who invested themselves both personally and collectively into it. World War II ceased the activities of sport societies, however, not sports itself. The period dealt with in this paper paved the way to the further development of sports after World War II. It is important to mention that this article does not make a complete review of the history of sport in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1878 to 1941, be it out of the lack of primary sources and literature, or be it because of the limited space given to present the topic. However, having in mind that this topic is not whatsoever elaborated in the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we hope that this paper will serve as a foundation for further research and elaboration.

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The Legitimacy of the Common Currency – Justification of the Supranational Monetary Regime in the European Periphery

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Abstract

This article analyzes the legitimacy of the common currency Euro and the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU). The legitimacy of the EMU and the Euro are discussed through a constructivist framework that understands legitimacy as a contestation between competing beliefs in legitimacy. The article conducts a critical review of the ideas, norms, and myths that have guided the formation of European economic governance. Furthermore, these cognitive entities are discussed in a case study of the legitimacy of Finland's EMU membership. This article concludes that the issues that came up during the discussions of the Finnish membership are the very same as the frame of the contestation of the legitimacy of the EMU in today's Europe.

Introduction

The year 2019 marks the 20th birthday of the common currency Euro. During the European integration, the Euro symbolizes the utmost point for the project that is supposed to bring Europeans together. To this year, 19 states have abandoned their national currencies and have given up their monetary sovereignty to a supranational central bank. In a world where nation-states are still considered as the main building blocks of the international order and the concept of nationality

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makes up the lion's share of people's identities, this is an unusual transfer of power from the national to the supranational level. This is also an issue that brings forth the question of the legitimacy of the Euro and the European Central Bank (ECB), as legitimacy has traditionally been considered as the relationship between the state and its citizens. In the research literature in the fields of political science, law, and economics, the legitimacy of the ECB is generally approached as a question of normative democratic legitimacy or rational choice institutionalism. However, despite the democratic deficit the Euro was welcomed into the European political community and during the first ten years of its existence, there were no strong feelings about the currency.[1] In contrast, the following ten years have been an era of constant controversies.

Approaches to legitimacy are traditionally normative, and to discuss how governance ought to be arranged or if a certain political regime fulfills the requirements to be considered legitimate.[2] However, the question of what makes the ECB legitimate is more complex. This requires a discussion of the principles that led to the creation of the common currency in the first place and which factors weighed the most as the project was being legitimized by the member states.

This paper seeks to map out the ideas, norms, and myths that have shaped the creation and justification of the common currency Euro. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, the paper reviews a wide literature on ideas, norms, and myths that have guided the development of European economic governance. The purpose of the review is to present how ideas, norms, and myths come to define people's beliefs in its legitimacy. Second, this paper examines a case study of the contestation of the legitimacy of the Finnish EMU membership in Finland. This case study attempts to illustrate how the dominant discourse around the European integration spread to the periphery

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[1] Jean Pisani-Ferry, *The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1.

[2] Hans Agné, "Legitimacy in Global Governance Research," in *Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences*, ed. Jonas Tallberg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 20–34.

and on which principles it was challenged. By applying a constructivist framework of legitimacy with a two-stage thematic qualitative content analysis, the case illustrates how the composition of myth, memory and world views thrives to define the moral framework for governance and where different discourses on legitimacy collide. Third, by reflecting on the case study the paper argues that very little has changed in the contestation over the legitimacy of the ECB. More precisely, the same problems of democratic deficit, sovereignty and equality that shadowed the European project in the early years of the 1990s keep on disturbing the European project today.

This paper proceeds as follows: the second chapter reviews theoretical literature on legitimacy as a concept and introduces the theoretical framework of this study. The third chapter consists of a critical review of the ideas of European integration and economic governance. The fourth chapter briefly introduces the data and method of analysis. The fifth chapter presents the case study and the sixth chapter offers up possible conclusions drawn from the case study.

Legitimacy as a social phenomenon build around ideas, norms, and myths

This chapter introduces the constructivist understanding of legitimacy as a theoretical framework for the analysis that follows. To place this approach into the wider field of study, legitimacy as a concept is briefly discussed.

Legitimacy in political science

Legitimacy can be approached as a normative or as an empirical issue. A normative approach is common among political philosophers, who seek to reason how power ought to be organized. The empirical approach on its part focuses on the existing power relations and their legitimacy. This study is interested in legitimacy from an empirical point of view.

Conceptualizations of empirical legitimacy traditionally depart from Max Weber's notion of legitimacy as a belief in legitimacy.[3] However, Jürgen Habermas has criticized that Weber's notion reduces legitimacy to pure legality.[4] Habermas further argues that legitimacy is always related to normative validity claims.[5] Furthermore, many of those scholars who approach legitimacy as an empirical question argue that in order to prevent legitimacy from considering all sorts of power to be legitimate (e.g. coercion) and to prevent legitimacy beliefs from being reduced to individual self-interest, there is a need for a prior criterion for power to be legitimate.[6] These approaches consider legitimacy beliefs as a sort of consensus among people. However, the theoretical framework that is developed in this paper relates and builds on the constructivist tradition where legitimacy is a contest of competing legitimacy beliefs. Therefore, legitimacy is not seen as a consensus, but domination. The purpose is not to diminish the importance of these approaches, but to introduce an approach that allows the dismantling of the current structures of thought which underline the justification of political regimes. Thus, what is meant by empirical legitimacy in this paper, refers to mapping out the different legitimacy beliefs that political actors promote. The general point is to argue that in a society there are several competing beliefs on how power ought to be organized. However, even though legitimacy is approached from an empirical point of view in this paper, legitimacy is still a normative concept, in the sense that it refers to the political actors' normative standpoints on what is justifiable governance.

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[3] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 212-215.

[4] Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 97.

[5] Ibid.

[6] e.g. Agné, "Legitimacy in Global Governance Research," 34; David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 20-28; Fritz Scharpf, "Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis," *MPIfG Discussion Paper* 12, no. 6 (2012).

A constructivist approach towards legitimacy

Constructivist scholars of legitimacy emphasize the role of the process of legitimation.[7] Thus, their focus lies mostly on legitimacy as a process, meaning, how legitimacy is built. The product of a successful legitimation is a state where it is considered as justifiable that a given political regime is vested with its power.[8] However, the process of legitimation also works the other way, as political actors' justifiability can be challenged through delegitimation.[9] Thus, constructivist scholars consider legitimacy as a contestation between parties that seek to validate or invalidate a given political regime.

As legitimacy is based on what is considered as good and justifiable governance, constructivist scholars pay attention to the norms and ideas that the actors use to legitimize or delegitimize power.[10] Furthermore, as these scholars pay attention to communicative acts, legitimacy is also considered as a discursive phenomenon, where political actors legitimize their actions and social status through legitimacy discourses.[11] Hence, the legitimacy discourses seek to define the normative framework that guides actors' understanding of what ought to be considered justifiable governance.

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[7] Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2–3 (2007): 157; Vivien Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 303; Leonard Seabrooke, *The Social Sources of Financial Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 50-53.

[8] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20-21.

[9] Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Contestation in Global Governance: Revisiting the Folk Theory of International Institutions," *Review of International Organizations* 14, no. 4 (2019).

[10] Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy."; Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism."

[11] Michael Strange, "The Discursive (De)Legitimisation of Global Governance: Political Contestation and the Emergence of New Actors in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body," *Global Discourse* 6, no. 3 (2016): 352; Eero Vaara, "Struggles over Legitimacy in the Eurozone Crisis: Discursive Legitimation Strategies and Their Ideological Underpinnings," *Discourse & Society* 25, no. 4 (2014): 500; Theo Van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication," *Discourse & Communication* 1, no. 1 (2007): 91.

Thus, for constructivist scholars, legitimacy is constructed through the contestation of legitimacy discourses that are constituted by norms and ideas. However, the use of these concepts is very broad, and it is rarely defined what the difference between norms and ideas is, as well as the difference between various ideas. Furthermore, ideas and norms are often treated as fixed units that can be removed from their context and are thus researched as objects which are independent of the rest of the cognitive environment in which they exist. In addition, constructivist scholars bypass the role of memory, myths and understanding of history as catalysts of peoples' legitimacy beliefs. The rest of this subchapter draws back on the literature on ideas, norms, and myths to conceptualize their role as constitutive for legitimacy beliefs and discourses.

Ideas

There is a wide literature on the role of ideas as constitutive for actors' behavior. The most advanced account to conceptualize the different understandings of "ideas" is perhaps the one offered by Vivien Schmidt.[12] Based on a wide review of scholarly literature Schmidt has identified three different levels of ideas that create a hierarchy among themselves. The highest level refers to large philosophical ideas, such as economic liberalism or democracy. The middle level is occupied by s programmatic or paradigmatic ideas that derive from the larger philosophical ones, such as German ordoliberalism or collectivist democracy. The lowest level refers to policy ideas that are derived from the programmatic/paradigmatic ideas, such as economic constitutionalism or deliberative decision making. The benefit of this categorization is that it enables us to identify on which level the contestation between legitimacy discourses takes place. The drawback is that this

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[12] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism."

categorization does not take the role of norms or the difference between norms and ideas into consideration.

Norms

Social norms in society are considered as signs of proper behavior.[13] Norms are used by actors to legitimize their actions.[14] However, norms do not exist on their own but are always part of a larger framework of thinking.[15] Thus, as norms are always promoted by a larger set of ideas, they can be placed at the same level as policy ideas in Schmidt's categorization. Norms and policy ideas do overlap. The difference is that norms can refer to moral norms as equality or liberty. In addition, it can be argued that policy ideas on their part are not necessarily norms, but they seek to become norms. Defining the role of norms in the hierarchy of ideas makes it more convenient to identify the ideational factors that guides actors' legitimacy beliefs and further legitimacy discourses. However, as mentioned, norms and ideas alone cannot explain how legitimacy is constructed. Thus, the roles of myths and memory need to be discovered also.

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[13] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

[14] Seabrooke, *The Social Sources of Financial Power*, 36.

[15] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

Myths and memory

History is always a narrative that is constructed through the concepts that are relevant in the present.[16] This implies that history is not the past as such but, about the past.[17] Thus, one's understanding of history is inevitably political. If we talk about history as a narrative, it means that we explain the past to ourselves through the same concepts that are fundamental for our understanding of our place in the world. Thus, our memory is biased by our present cognitive condition. This makes the understanding of history also a question of identity.,[18] meaning that if we talk about the history of nations, there exists a socially constructed idea of nationality. In addition, as history is narrated through the present, it implies that history is not only about what has taken place in the past but also what can be expected from the future.[19] Thus, it is important to take into consideration the myths and the understandings of the linearity of time that frame the construction of actors' legitimacy beliefs together with norms and ideas.

Ideas, norms and, myths as constitutive of actors' legitimacy discourses

This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework that guides the analysis of the legitimacy of the common currency Euro in this paper. To conclude, legitimacy as a concept refers to the justification of a given power. In this paper, the justification of the common currency Euro and its administrative institutions will be analyzed. Furthermore, legitimacy as an overarching

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[16] Bo Stråth, "Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of a European Community," *German Law Journal* 6, no. 2 (2015): 255-271.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand, *Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5.

[19] Ibid.

term, is divided into the process of legitimation and exercise of legitimacy. In this paper, the focus is on the process of legitimation. The purpose is to analyze the contestation around the justification of the common currency in order to research how the legitimacy of the Euro is constructed as a social phenomenon. Thus, legitimacy is also considered as a discursive phenomenon that is guided by actors' legitimacy beliefs. These beliefs are constituted by norms, ideas, and myths. The beliefs further guide actors' legitimacy discourses that seek to legitimize and delegitimize a given power. The following chapter reviews scholarly literature on ideas, norms, and political myths that have shaped the development of European economic governance.

Ideas, norms, and myths of the European economic governance

The core tenets of the European model of governance are the nation-state, democracy, economic liberalism, and since the 1950s the European integration. This chapter critically analyses the development of these concepts through the framework introduced in the previous chapter.

Nation-state and democracy

The nation-state is undeniably the main building block that has dominated the European understanding of political reality during the last two to three centuries. Furthermore, nationalism is still the most central ideology that guides our understanding of state and political organization today.[20] Thus, nationality is a large source of identity for political actors and their understanding of governance is the relation between the state and citizens. After WWII, the dominant method of organizing governance within the European nation-states has been democracy. As democracy

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[20] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1992), 3.

refs to the power of the people, together these two concepts, nationalism and democracy, place sovereignty in the hands of members of a given nation-state.

There are two main traditions among democratic theories, collectivist and individualist.[21] The collectivist tradition can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his philosophy.[22] The individualist notion of democracy is often considered to be a product of Anglo-American political thinking.[23] The main difference between these branches is located at the two core democratic values liberty and equality.[24] Liberty in the collectivist tradition refers to the freedom to participate in societal decision making.[25] In the individualist tradition, liberty is understood as the right to live free from the constraints of the state and other people.[26] These different notions of liberty are crucial, as they influence the definition of the other core value, equality.

In the collectivist philosophy, equality means equality of condition. This requires a strong distributive role of the state to make sure that all people may live under equally good conditions.[27] However, in the individualist tradition, the strong role of the state violates the individualist notion of freedom. Thus, equality for an individualist means equality of opportunity, which emphasizes non-discrimination and individual rights[28]. This kind of individualism as a core value of governance has been used to argue in favor of a strong constitution, especially among the so-called

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[21] Jacques Thomassen, "Democratic Values," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. Russel Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 242-244.

[22] Thomassen, "Democratic Values," 424.

[23] Scharpf, "Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis."

[24] Thomassen, "Democratic Values," 424-429.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

"neoliberal" thinkers such as F.A. Hayek[29]. In the collectivist tradition, the constitutionalist notion is less important, as it emphasizes the creation of laws through the deliberative process. As presented above, the differences between these two democratic philosophies provide an example of how different philosophical ideas lead to different world views and promote different kinds of norms.

Liberal economic philosophy and European integration

The ideal model of the democratic nation-state as the source of legitimacy is however obscured with the emergence of European integration and power transfer to supranational institutions. Alongside the development of liberal economic philosophy during the 20th century, this has affected which democratic school of thought dominated the public sphere.

Firstly, the ideas of European integration violate the notion of sovereignty of nation-states. Two grand visions guided the early process of European integration, namely federalism and functionalism.[30] According to these notions, the collective governance and material interdependence between states develop an internal dynamic which benefits prosperity and leads to peace.[31] The difference lies in the establishment of the two ideas. Federalism leans on a strong common constitution while functionalism departs from a process that slowly leads into a strong union through various unifying tasks.[32] Secondly, as the early phase of European integration

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[29] Richard Bellamy, "'Dethroning Politics': Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Thought of F. A. Hayek," *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 4 (1994): 419–441.

[30] Craig Parsons, "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union," *International Organization* 56, no. 1 (2002): 47-84.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

embodied by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) shows, the functionalist and federalist ideas were accompanied by the French economic doctrine of *dirigisme* *['Directionism']*. *Dirigisme* emphasizes the role of the state of intervening into and planning the economy by leaning on Keynesian macroeconomic policies[33]. Keynesian economic doctrine suggests that capitalist economic governance should be under state control, which will enhance the production of wealth and social stability.[34] Thus, the Keynesian model reflects collectivist democratic values, as it emphasizes the role of the state which gives a platform for the planning of social welfare. The French elites, with the foreign minister Robert Schuman as their public face, considered that this dirigist-model of integration could act as a guide for the rest of Europe.[35] However, the existential problems faced by the global economy during the 1970s led to a setting aside of Keynesian macroeconomics and made space for a neoliberal turn.

During the 1970s, the rapid hikes of inflation in industrial countries together with the sudden capital flows caused turbulence in the global economy.[36] Keynesian doctrine, which emphasized the importance of full employment and considered inflation to be a minor issue, was unable to find answers to the crisis.[37] Thus, Keynesianism made way for neoclassical economics and monetarism.[38] The new dominant paradigm promoted economic policies that departed from the Keynesian track of a strong state and moved towards models that emphasized the role of free

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[33] Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau, *The Euro and the Battle of Ideas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 67-74.

[34] Martin O'Brien and Sue Penna, *Theorising Welfare: Enlightenment and Modern Society* (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 16-44.

[35] Parsons, "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union."

[36] Erik Helleiner, *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 123-145.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

markets and low regulation.[39] These policies were in line with the thoughts of so-called neoliberal thinkers. Neoliberalism is a problematic term due to the popularity of its use. However, in this paper neoliberalism refers to a school of thought with various branches, which has redefined liberal philosophy during the 20th century.[40] Neoliberalism emerged as a countermovement to socialism and authoritarianism, to protect the core idea of capitalism, private ownership.[41] In addition, "neoliberals" in the first decades of the 20th century considered the emerging democratic governance as a threat as it could be used to implement collectivist policies.[42] In order to overcome these threats, neoliberals argued that a strong constitution was necessary to protect private ownership and market economy.[43] Neoliberal thought has primarily considered the global economy, and the international constitutionalism as a possibility to set the economic sphere apart from the political sphere.[44] In this sense, neoliberalism promotes the individualist notion of liberty and the small role of the state through a strong constitution. At the same time, it considers that even though the free market may produce social inequality, intervening in the market would hurt the individualist notion of liberty.[45] This has led to fierce criticism of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has been portrayed as a political project which extends to all aspects of society and promotes the

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Timo Miettinen "Kolme myyttiä uusliberalismista" [Three myths about neoliberalism], *Politiikasta.fi*, October 15, 2018, https://politiikasta.fi/kolme-myyttia-uusliberalismista/.

[41] Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 16-17.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 267.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Scharpf, "Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis."

restoring of capitalist class power.[46] However, the bottom line is that the shift in the global

economy with the turbulence of the 1970s created the space for neoliberalism to spread. This is a

development that is evident in the design of the common currency Euro.

The Euro was designed to bind member states into further integration and to provide

monetary stability in the single market area.[47] Even though the beginning of the European

integration was shaped by the ideas of the French *dirigisme*, the neoliberal turn brought German

economic traditions to the fore when the Euro was designed. The principles that framed the creation

of the common currency area and Maastricht treaty were derived from German ordoliberalism.[48]

Ordoliberalism can be considered a branch of neoliberalism.[49] As a political doctrine, it emphasizes

a strong economic constitution that removes economic issues from the sphere of democratic

political decision making.[50] The main point is to create an optimal framework for economic

competition.[51] Another important notion is moral hazard, which promotes the norms of

conditionality and budget discipline.[52] Moral hazard refers to a situation where economic actors

believe that in case of a bankruptcy they will be bailed out. Thus, economic actors (states in this

context) have an incentive to take risks or run unsustainable economic policies. Hence, there is

need for an external regulation for budget management. In addition, the assistance for a state which

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[46] Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Laura Horn and Jan Drahokopouil, *Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1-4.

[47] Harold James, *Making the European Monetary Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 163.

[48] Peter Nedergaard, "The Influence of Ordoliberalism in European Integration Processes - A Framework for Ideational Influence with Competition Policy and the Economic and Monetary Policy as Examples," *MPRA Paper* No. 52331 (2013).

[49] Miettinen, "Kolme myyttiä uusliberalismista."

[50] Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, 267.

[51] Nedergaard, "The Influence of Ordoliberalism in European Integration Processes."

[52] Ibid.

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faces a possible bankruptcy, should be happen under certain conditions. Conditions here refer to a given set of structural reforms that must be taken by a state to assure a more sustainable economic governance in the future. The idea of the encasement of the economy is to create a competitive space, and the concept moral hazard is also in the o Maastricht treaty. he Maastricht treaty establishes the ECB as an independent central bank. Thus, the ECB represents the authoritarian economic governance that has been granted safety from political decision making. Second, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), rules that member states must follow its rigid budgetary frames. In this sense, the Maastricht treaty symbolizes the economic constitution that ordoliberalism promotes.

This chapter has so far discussed the ideas and norms that have shaped the development of European economic governance. Those ideas, ways of thinking and world views are often combined with certain stories, narratives, which exist in our social life as political myths that we tend to reproduce in our discourses.

The myth of the triumph of the liberal democratic governance

Tales of European integration are often told as success stories where after the WWII, the western European nations came together, so there would be no more wars. Through the values of equality and liberty, Europe could rise again to a prosperous democratic society. This narrative is further strengthened through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratic revolutions of the Eastern bloc. Francis Fukuyama called this the "End of History" and suggested that the "liberal democracy" had triumphed[53]. However, from today's point of view, it does not seem that it was democracy that triumphed, but rather capitalism. If we consider how in the present China is

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[53] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 11.

becoming a serious challenger to U.S. economic power, it is evident that the reforms that have boosted China's rapid growth have been towards a market economy rather than democracy. However, the myth of "Democracy through market"[54] is often used to legitimize the economic integration of Europe which has mostly been done according to the neoliberal principles[55]. In this sense, the myth of European economic integration has strengthened the individualist definition of democracy. The story of European economic integration is told in a teleological fashion, meaning that history has a certain track that it is bound to follow.[56] In the context of European integration, this track is closely related to the notion of globalization as liberalization. Liberalization refers to a development where boundaries between nation-states are coming down and making it easier for goods, capital, people and ideas to flow freely around the globe. The implication of this process is decline of the role of the nation-state[57]. The underlying argument is that removing the barriers from economic activity promotes peace and prosperity among human populations.[58] In addition, this movement towards liberalization is inevitable and the only possibility for states is to adjust to it.[59] Hence, the teleological understanding of history does not only define the past and the present but also the expectations of the future.[60]

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[54] Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth, *The Political History of European Integration: The Hypocrisy of Democracy-Through-Market* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1-18.

[55] Apeldoorn, Horn and Drahokopouil, *Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance*, 4.

[56] Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, *The Political History of European Integration*, 1-18.

[57] Darren O'Byrne and Alexander Hensby, *Theorizing Global Studies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 37-38.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Stråth, "Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of a European Community."

Legitimacy beliefs and their crossroads

The dominant narrative of European integration has been intertwined with the belief in the progressive power of the market, democracy and the inevitable development that follows.[61] However, as we can see in the brief review above, the principles that derive from the concepts that have defined the nature of the European economic governance are often contradictory to this narrative. The most obvious tension is between nationalism and federalism. However, a more hidden tradeoff is made between different understandings of democratic liberty. Norms and ideas are often used to explain actors' behavior and decisions. However, norms and ideas that guide actors' actions also guide those actors' understanding of ethics. Furthermore, as all the statements made about the nature of governance include normative validity claims[62], the logic, reason, rationality, etc. that guide actors' actions are also a statement of these actors' legitimacy beliefs. Thus, as the empirical part of this paper analyses the debate around the Finnish EMU-membership, it surveys the contestation of the legitimacy of the EMU. However, before this paper moves further on to the analysis, the following chapter briefly introduces the data and the method of analysis.

Method of analysis and data collection

This paper analyzes the debate around the EMU membership of Finland before the parliamentary vote over the decision to join. This case is chosen to illustrate how the cognitive entities surrounding the European economic governance guide the legitimacy and delegitimacy discourses of groups of actors. The case also shows how the ordoliberal ideas and norms, together

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Heikki Patomäki, "The Problems of Legitimation and Potential Conflicts in a World Political Community," *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no. 2 (2012): 239–259.

with the historical myths of the development of the European integration spread and were conceived in the European periphery.

The data collection consists of two sets of speeches given in the Finnish parliament. The first set consists of speeches held during the parliamentary discussion on the official report considering the possible EMU membership. The second set consists of speeches held during the parliamentary discussion before the parliamentary vote over the membership. Both sets consist of speeches held by each parliamentary group during their allocated speaking time which represent the official opinion of the whole party. In addition, the opening speech by the representative of the executive cabinet is also part of the data set. Since there were seven parliamentary groups at the time the total amount is 14 speeches.

This textual data is analyzed by a two-stage thematic content analysis. The first stage identifies the norms, myths, and ideas that construct different legitimacy discourses. The unit of analysis and themes are drawn from the review of the previous chapter. The second stage identifies the legitimation strategies that are used in these discourses. Here the unit of analysis is drawn from the work of Theo Van Leeuwen.[63] Van Leeuwen identifies four strategies of legitimation in discourse and communication: (1). authorization, which is legitimation with reference to authority, (2). tradition, custom or law; moral evaluation, which means legitimation by reference to moral norms; (3). rationalization, which includes a reference to the institutionalized system of knowledge; (4). Mythopoesis, that is, legitimation built through narratives.

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[63] Theo Van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication."

The remainder of this paper is deals with empirical analysis of the contestation of the legitimacy of the Finnish EMU membership and the discussion around the dynamics of the ideas of the European economic governance.

The contestation of the legitimacy of the EMU membership of Finland

During the electoral term April 1995 – April 1999, Finland decided to join the EMU and to take part in the third phase of the EMU, the implementation of the common currency Euro. The government was led by a Social Democratic Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, who formed the executive cabinet together with the National Coalition Party, Swedish People's Party, Left Alliance, and the Green League. The largest opposition party was the Centre Party that was accompanied by three smaller parties, the Christian Democrats, the Finnish Rural Party, and the Young Finnish Party. During the previous electoral term, the Centre Party had led Finland's decision to join the EU. The decision was made after a consulting referendum where the Finns showed their willingness to become part of the Union. However, the EMU membership was not brought to a referendum, but it was prepared by the executive cabinet and decided by parliamentary vote in April 1998. The result of the vote was 135 for and 61 against for the membership. This chapter introduces the debate that took place during the parliamentary discussion that preceded the vote.

The contestation of the legitimacy of the EMU membership of Finland is discussed in three sub-chapters. First, the contestation between national sovereignty and federalism in different discourses is discussed. The second subchapter considers how different discourses sought to define democracy. The third phase of contestation discussed in this paper focusses on the control of future expectations. Throughout these sections, the data is both described and presented as straight quotations to increase the transparency of the research. All the translations from Finnish and

Swedish into English were undertaken by the author of this paper who takes the sole responsibility of their consistency and accuracy with regards to the original transcripts.

Sovereignty, federalism, and integration

When decision making is transferred from national bodies to supranational ones, as in the case of the ECB, the most obvious crisis of identity is between the national and supranational spaces. In a world where nationalism is the dominant state ideology, it sounds counterintuitive to give up national sovereignty. In the parliamentary discussions of the Finnish EMU membership, national sovereignty was a norm that was referred to in all the speeches. However, the debate between national sovereignty and federalism in Finland before the EMU decision was a mild one. The contestation was rather on how the EMU would affect the future integration of the EU, and if it would be a stepping board to federalism or not. All the parties denied their desire for European federalism.

The most severe attitude came from the Centre Party that posited itself as the opponent of EMU membership at an early stage. Their main argument for the delegitimacy of the membership was indeed the question of national sovereignty. The Centre Party representative Mauri Pekkarinen said this out loud: "EMU will eat a piece of the national sovereignty".[64] As Pekkarinen proceeded, he made a clear reference to national identity by referring to the European common currency as something foreign: "The ability of households to get used to foreign money should not be taken for granted".[65] Pekkarinen also brought out the question over the future development " [on] how

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[64] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1997 3, p. 1991, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/eduskunta-asiakirja-original-documents-prod/suomi/1997/PTK_1997_3.pdf.

[65] Ibid.

quickly the common currency will lead to federalism and does Finland want to move along that track".[66] In a similar manner to Pekkarinen, the Centre party leader Esko Aho brought up the question of sovereignty: " [as] the right to decide on its own monetary policy is the core of national sovereignty".[67] However in April 1998 right before the parliamentary vote for the EMU membership, Aho emphasized that the Centre Party was only interested in the "rational" aspects of a possible membership: ". . . the consideration of the favorability of the EMU membership in the Central Party is based on a dispassionate pondering between the pros and cons of the EMU for Finland".[68]

Apart from the Centre Party, the statements of the rest of the parliamentary groups were rather positive and unified on the issues of national sovereignty. Other parties emphasized the importance that as a member of the EMU, Finland would be taking part in future decision making concerning European integration. The main argument was that the future development of European integration was inevitable and that there were no other options. Here we see how actors referred to the teleological course of history that will lead to a certain result. The argument was accompanied by the notion of 'globalization as liberalization', which also has a teleological character. The financial minister Sauli Niinistö, member of the National Coalition Party, phrased the issue as follows:

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[66] Ibid., 1993.

[67] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1699, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/eduskunta-asiakirja-original-documents-prod/suomi/1998/PTK_1998_2.pdf.

[68] Ibid.

"The decision to establish a common market is a strategic issue. By establishing a wide market area Europe seeks to be on the same level of global competition as the US and the economic giants of Asia. The common currency is a key tool in achieving this goal".[69]

In a similar vein, the representative of the Left Alliance Esko Helle stated: "Integration will continue despite anything and international financial markets and capital movement with its implications have been the reality for years".[70] The representative of the Swedish People's Party Magrit Pietikäinen also added: " [The] EMU can be considered as a step towards economic globalization".[71]

However, an issue that did cause controversy and is also related to the problem between federalism and national sovereignty was legislation. As was discussed in the reviews of ideas, federalism means a transformation of the constitution from the national level to the supranational. This was an issue that created contestations inside the executive cabinet. The EU legislation was viewed as both a source of legitimacy and delegitimacy for the Finnish EMU membership. The National Coalition Party had the most "federalist" stance on the issue as can be seen from the statement of the Financial Minister Niinistö: "The constitution of the European Community requires that the states that fulfill the criteria for EMU will join the common currency".[72] The other viewpoint was to see the EU legislation as undemocratic and subordinate to the national legislation. This is something that comes up in the speech of the representative of the Swedish People's Party,

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[69] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1985.

[70] Ibid., 1997.

[71] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1710.

[72] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes PTK 1997 3, p. 1987.

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Eva Biaudet: "There is a tension between national and international legislation…this will be a question of the whole legitimacy of EMU".[73]

The purpose of the citations above is to show the contestation between the national identity and the common European identity that lead to the understanding of where the utmost power and legitimacy should reside. Despite the mainstream discourse of national sovereignty, some elements are positioned towards the federalist sentiments. This is a complicated issue that raises questions of the role of the nation-state in the global political reality, and that is exactly what the subject of contestation is in the debate that is being introduced above.

Contestation around the definitions of democracy

Another subject of contestation in the discussion concerning Finland's EMU membership was the definition of democracy. Ordoliberalism, as introduced earlier in this paper, promotes economic constitutionalism, which separates economic policymaking from the political process. The ordoliberal thinking also guided the formation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In the parliamentary discussion of the Finnish EMU membership, the National Coalition Party was the one that most vocally supported the European economic constitutionalism. For instance, Financial Minister Niinistö discussed the rational underpinnings of the SGP and concluded: "For this reason, Finland has supported the Stability and Growth Pact. The irresponsible actions of any country should not affect the stability of the community".[74] In his statement, Niinistö leaned on the explanatory power of economics as a source of rational decisions that can provide the guidelines to prosperity. Also, the representative Ilkka Kanerva from National Coalition Party sought to

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[73] Ibid., 2001.

[74] Ibid., 1985.

legitimize the importance of the EMU in this manner: "EMU increases competition which will always benefit the wallet of consumers".[75] Kanerva referred to the ordoliberal notion of competitiveness that is at the very heart of the market liberalism that was guiding the formation of the EMU in the Maastricht treaty.

However, the ordoliberal discourse, with its focus on the benefits of market competition, budget discipline of the SPG and the independence of the ECB was also challenged due to its moral underpinnings and the damage that it causes to collectivist democratic notions of equality and liberty. It is interesting to note that the main parties who brought forth this argument were Social Democrats and the Left Alliance, two parties who both were part of the executive cabinet and voted for the EMU-membership. The SPG was the subject of concern of the Social Democrat Erkki Tuomioja:

"The Stability and Growth Pact's technical application may create problems during the times of recession but even during those moments the problem is not the monetary union as such, but the decisions and rules that are used in that particular moment".[76]

Similarly, Tuija Brax of the Green League referred to the future challenges that a tight fiscal frame posed to the public welfare policies:

"EMU's influence on the Nordic welfare state needs to be researched. The tight frame of the public economy will create problems for the welfare states during times of crisis and that will mainly affect the security and wellbeing of those who are already in a difficult position".[77]

In their statements, Tuomioja and Brax raised their concerns considering the implications of the SGP for collectivist democratic notions of equality. They pointed out the possible pitfalls

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[75] Ibid., 1995.

[76] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1693.

[77] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1997 3, p. 2005.

that may lead to a situation where an economic doctrine dictates to what extent people in lower-income brackets need to fall back on social welfare. The EMU membership also raised concerns considering the collectivist democratic notion of liberty. As collectivist democracy emphasizes the importance of deliberation, the independence of the central bank from the democratic decision-making process is a model of governance that is unsuitable for collectivist democratic values. This was another concern of representative Brax:

> It would have been better if the democratic structures of the EU would have been fixed before rushing to the economic and monetary union. However, that will not take place in the current EMU. . . The EMU will be planned in a sense that has no democratic oversight for its monetary policy . . . and for some people this will suit them perfectly, since monetary policy will be finally released from the burden of elections and voting.[78]

There are two identifiable discourses on the contestation of democracy, the ordoliberal one that follows the ordoliberal logic that is also established in the Maastricht treaty. The ordoliberal economic governance and central bank's independence are very hard to combine with the principles of collectivist democracy. Ordoliberalism is rather compatible with the notions of individualist democracy. The second discourse follows democratic collectivist principles. It is interesting to note that the main parties that were questioning the ordoliberal model of governance were the Social Democrats and the Green League which both were part of the executive cabinet and in the end decided to vote in favor of the EMU-membership. The explanation for the contradictory behavior can be found in the contestation over future expectations.

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[78] Ibid., 2004.

Control of future expectations

The future is always veiled by uncertainty. The understanding of the past, the experience of the present and the expectations of the future are cornerstones of the modern thinking.[79] Thus, in human understanding, past, present, and future are interlinked and create the foundation of people's world views. In the public sphere, where political actors seek to argue for the importance of their future visions, political actors are also referring to their understanding of historical development. Hence, the contestation around political issues is also contestation over future expectations, where political actors seek to dominate the public understanding of the coming future and its development.

In the case of the EMU membership in Finland in the late '90s, expectations of the future turned out to be crucial for the legitimacy discourses. The members of the Centre Party saw the future, as being too uncertain on the one hand, considering the economic development, and on the other, certain that further economic integration would make the EU a federal state. Mauri Pekkarinen from the Centre Party stated: " . . . how quickly the common currency will lead to federalism and does Finland want to move along on that track".[80] Pekkarinen's statement reflects the functionalist understanding of European integration.

On their part, the National Coalition Party strongly leaned towards the dominant narrative of European integration as a teleological development that would inevitably lead to peace and prosperity by democracy through the market economy. Representative Kimmo Sasi claimed that:

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[79] Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past - On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 1-5.

[80] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1997 3, p. 1993.

"Today we can say that the EU and the western leaders in the name of democracy and human rights have brought us peace over 50 years . . . the common currency is not only about economic pros but also brings peace to the continent".[81]

Similarly, Sasi's college Ilkka Kanerva referred to the leading role of Europe in the development of humankind and noted that Europe needs to unite to continue its course and Finland should be part of that unification.[82]

However, as already mentioned, the left-wing parties also supported the EMU membership of Finland, despite its predicted implications for collectivist democratic values. In the legitimacy discourses of these parties, this was explained through future expectations that sought to frame the EMU as a social-democratic project. The politicians argued that future decisions needed to be made by following the principles of the social-democratic doctrines that helped the EU to create a large community that could protect the European welfare model despite the pressure of the economic globalization. This is something that can be interpreted into the statement of the Social Democratic Party representative Johannes Koskinen:

"The Social Democrats are not going into an EMU that would put the welfare state into jeopardy. Vice Versa, we are going to EMU for the sake that the larger community of states may establish a large coalition that can strengthen the welfare of our citizens".[83]

There is a minor element of teleology in the discourse of the left-wing parties also. They repeatedly note that the development and integration of Europe is inevitable. The inevitability stems from the understanding of globalization as liberalization, where the small states have little possibility to react to the developments of the global economy. However, the argument of the left-

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[81] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1703.

[82] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1997 3, p. 1994.

[83] The Parliament of Finland, Transcript of Minutes, PTK 1998 2, p. 1696.

wing politicians seemed to be that the course of global development can be controlled through a larger community.

Legitimation strategies

Drawing back on the legitimation strategies, which were introduced in the previous chapter, we can detect three strategies that were used. Authorization was used as a legitimacy strategy by the National Coalition Party, as the member of the party refers repeatedly to the Maastricht treaty as the European constitution. In addition, the National Coalition Party's discourse also follows the legitimation strategy of rationalization, as it refers to the economic "laws" that need to be followed in order to make sensible policies.

Another powerful discourse that we have identified is the collectivist democratic one. The collectivist democratic legitimacy discourse employs moral evaluation as a legitimation strategy, as it refers to the moral norms that are derived from the collectivist democratic thinking. he collectivist democratic discourse, promoted by the left-wing politicians, challenged the legitimacy of the EMU membership.

What is common to both discourses above is mythopoesis as a strategy of legitimation. Both discourses rely on the story of economic globalization that has no alternatives, and which inevitably will alter societies. The point of identifying these strategies is that it helps us to highlight the points of contestation where these different legitimacy beliefs collide. What we have seen so far in the case of the Finnish EMU membership and its legitimacy is that there was a real contestation over the moral underpinnings of the structure of the EMU. However, we can also see that the story of the European integration and economic globalization brought these beliefs together and can be identified as the catalyst that legitimized the Finnish EMU membership in these discourses.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the legitimacy of the common currency Euro. This discussion has included three stages. First, legitimacy was discussed as a theoretical concept. Legitimacy was defined as a social phenomenon that is constructed through ideas, norms, and political myths. Second, the various ideas, norms, and myths that have led to the European economic governance were reviewed. Third, the theoretical framework was applied to the case study of the legitimacy of EMU membership of Finland. What was concluded from this debate is that there were serious disagreements over the moral underpinnings of the EMU's ordoliberal design. However, a teleological understanding of history and the narrative of 'globalization as liberalization' was the common factor that drove the legitimacy discourses of the EMU membership of Finland. Thus, globalization was viewed as a factor that trumped the ethical considerations in the process of legitimation.

The result of this case study reflects the grand narrative of our time where the economic liberalism has been the dominant paradigm that has defined the understanding of policymaking and historical development since the early 1990s. However, it is important to analyze these debates that have taken place during the turning points of history, in order to understand what kind of trade-ins have been made in the situations that finally led us to the present. From the viewpoint of today, it is easy to claim that the left-wing politicians sold their collectivist moral fundaments on fragile hopes of future developments**.** This maybe reflects the extent to what decision-makers still consider the nation-state as a proper vehicle for governance. Furthermore, it demands a conceptualization of legitimacy that allows the analysis to move beyond national borders and find answers to global challenges.

As the Euro enters its third decade, the same issues that were the subject of contestation in the Parliament of Finland in the late '90s, are seeing a strong return to the European discussions over the future of the continent. The Euro did survive its existential challenge during the Euro

crisis. However, in the current situation where the traditional monetary policy is no longer is enough, and the next recession lurks behind the corner, there is a strong demand for European economic governance to reinvent itself.

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Damnatio Memoriae – The Contested Memory of Antonio Bajamonti in Split

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Abstract

The nation-building political situation of the 19th century caused a tense situation in today's Croatia which was then divided into smaller provinces - Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. From 1835 the Croatian national revival movement took place in Croatia and Slavonia until it was interrupted by Bach's absolutism in 1848. The two united entities, Croatia and Slavonia, wanted Dalmatia to become a part of the union but things were different in Dalmatia. In the first half of the 19th century, under the threat of multiple occupiers, people of Dalmatia created a special national ideology that was territorially defined. In that way Dalmatia opposed the request for unification. Such political atmosphere continued in the second half of the 19th century which was marked by fierce political conflicts in Dalmatia. The conflicts mostly erupted between the People's Party, that wanted the unification of Dalmatia and Croatia, and the Autonomous Party, that saw Dalmatia as an autonomous entity. In the period from 1860 until 1880 the mayor of Split was the leader of the Autonomous Party Antonio Bajamonti. Bajamonti's politics and intentions were directed into the prosperity of Split. At the time Split was an underdeveloped town and it can be stated that Bajamonti's policies, such as his urbanization plans, did much for its future development. However, Bajamonti is a historical figure that is almost forgotten in today's Split. Why is that so? That is not an easy question to answer and a few aspects need to be analyzed. The nature of the politics of the Autonomous Party and of Bajamonti is going to be examined while

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taking into consideration the research of Croatian scholars on the topic. A special emphasis is going to be placed on Bajamonti's urbanization plans for Split. Later historical events are going to be analyzed as well, especially the Italian occupation of Dalmatia in the Second World War, in order to illustrate the positive and transformative role that Bajamonti's actions played in the subsequent development of Split.

Introduction

From a political perspective, the second half of the 19th century was a turbulent period in Dalmatia. That situation was the outcome of the processes that started with the beginning of the 19th century. The 19th century was generally marked with dynamic and violent events that followed the French Revolution and the formation of nation-states. After the Napoleonic wars today's Croatia was under the authority of the Austrian Empire but it was divided in two parts - Croatia with Slavonia and Dalmatia.[1] This was because the infrastructure, such as roads and train lines, that was connecting the two parts was underdeveloped. Alongside that, the two regions had significantly different historical paths. Throughout history Croatia and Slavonia were under the dominant influence of the Germanic culture while Dalmatia was mostly influenced by Venice and other cities of the Apennine peninsula.[2] Those facts led the politics of those two regions in different directions, especially in terms of national identity and nation-state formation.

The period between 1835 and 1848 was the time of the Croatian national revival movement which took place in Croatia and Slavonia. The Croatian revivalists advocated the unity of Croats

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[1] Mirko Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi' dalmatinskih Talijana" [Identity "breaks" of Dalmatian Italians], *Politička misao: časopis za politologiju* 44 (2007): 122.

[2] Duško Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti i Split* [Ante Bajamonti and Split] (Split: Slobodna Dalmacija, 2007), 55.

through their historical, cultural and religious oneness and worked on the standardization of the Croatian language.[3] In 1848 Croatian revivalists were devoted to incorporating Dalmatia into the territory of Croatia. Dalmatians strongly rejected that request by emphasizing cultural dissimilarities between Dalmatia and Croatia.[4] The Croatian national revival movement was repressed in 1848 under Bach's absolutism. The years 1848 and 1849 were the time of Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy and Baron Alexander von Bach played a significant role in the politics of the Empire during and after the Revolution.[5] From 1848 he was the Minister of Justice and from 1849 until 1859 the Minister of the Interior.[6] Beginning with 1848, and explicitly between 1852 and 1859, Bach pursued a repressive policy of centralization and control in the Empire that affected the nationalist movements.[7] Again in 1860 representatives of Croatia and Slavonia asked for the unification with Dalmatia but the Dalmatian representative declined.[8] The possibility of the unification of Croatia and Dalmatia was brought to an end after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 that established the dual monarchy.[9] Croatia fell under the administration of the Kingdom of Hungary, while Dalmatia was administered by the Austrian half of the Empire. Politically, Croatia and Dalmatia were divided until 1882 when the People's Party won the municipal elections

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[3] Josip Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX. stoljeću* [The Dalmatian Autonomous Movement in the 19th Century] (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2002), 69.

[4] Ibid., 75.

[5] Pieter Judson, *Povijest Habsburškog Carstva* [The Habsburg Empire: A New History] (Zagreb: Sandorf, 2016), 193-194.

[6] Ibid., 259.

[7] Ibid., 259-262.

[8] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 124.

[9] Ibid., 126.

in the city of Split.[10] But why did the political representatives of Dalmatian refuse the idea of unification with Croatia for so many decades?

The answer lies in the national identification of the people of Dalmatia which affected the political life of Dalmatia in the second half of the 19th century. Đinđić claims that after the French occupation and under the threat of Italian irredentists Dalmatians created a proto-national community.[11] That means that in the first half of the 19th century Dalmatia didn't follow the tendency of nation-state formation but created a community that consisted of various ethnic groups and which was territorially and not nationally defined. The Dalmatian proto-national community gathered Slavic (Croatian) and Italian ethnic groups which made it difficult to establish a unique ethnic identity. Instead, the community identified itself along territorial divisions. During the period of Croatian national revival movement the Dalmatian representatives advocated the Slavo-Dalmatic national ideology that claimed the Slavic origins of the inhabitants of Dalmatia but also emphasized the strong influence of Italian culture and language.[12] The Slavo-Dalmatic ideology was fueled with the vision of an autonomous Dalmatia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The voice of the People's Party became more prominent in Dalmatia around 1860. Its main goal was the unification of Croatia and Dalmatia. That was also the time when the Autonomous Party was formed. It advocated the self-administration of Dalmatia within the Empire. Those two parties were the main ones in Dalmatia during the other half of the 19th century, but there were also irredentist groups that wanted Dalmatia to be united with Italy (which was also going through the process of unification) and conservative groups that were loyal to the Austrian Empire.[13] The

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[10] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 218.

[11] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 122.

[12] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 68-72.

[13] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 123-125.

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political conflicts between the Autonomous Party and the People's Party were most evident in Split which was led by the mayor and leader of the Autonomous Party Antonio Bajamonti in the period between 1860 and 1880.

It can be argued that three men had the biggest impact on the development of Split up until the 20th century. The first one is the Roman emperor Diocletian who built the palace that became the foundation of the later city. The second one is the French general Auguste Marmont who initiated the transformation of the medieval town of Split into a modern city by removing its medieval and baroque fortifications and building avenues. The third man was the mayor Bajamonti. Bajamonti's goal was to improve the economic prosperity of Split by implementing an urbanization plan for the city. Today, the emperor Diocletian and the general Marmont are well known and praised in Split but the figure of Antonio Bajamonti is almost erased from the collective memory of the city.[14] Why is that so? Before we go into that, some other questions need to be answered first. What was Bajamonti's politics about? Is the consignment of Bajamonti to oblivion in Split connected exclusively with his political viewpoint?

There are a few Croatian scholars that have done research on the topic of the Autonomous Party in Dalmatian and the importance of Antonio Bajamonti for Split. Josip Vrandečić in his book *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX. stoljeću (The Dalmatian Autonomous Movement in the 19th Century)* made a great contribution to the understanding of the activity of the Autonomous Party in Dalmatia as well as to the understanding of the political situation in 19th century Croatia. Grga Novak is also an author who cast a light on the historical situation of Dalmatia and especially of the city of Split. The most important person who fought to prevent the complete erasure of Bajamonti from the history of Split is surely Duško Kečkemet. Among others, Slavko Muljačić

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[14] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 321.

and Stanko Piplović have done much to highlight the important role that Bajamonti played in the history of Split.

Antonio Bajamonti

Antonio Bajamonti was born in Split on September 18th, 1822. By the time he was born the Bajamonti family had lived for generations in Split.[15] It is believed that the Bajamontis were a noble family, originating from Spain, who were sent to Sicily in the 12th century by the Spanish king Alfonso VII. The direct ancestors of Antonio Bajamonti are first recorded in Split in the year 1704. Antonio Bajamonti spent his childhood in his family home in the south walls of the Diocletian's palace. His home, which is located in today's Alešijeva street, was marked by a memorial plaque which noted Bajamonti as a mayor of great merit.[16] The plaque had been taken off in 1901 and is now located in the Split City Museum. Bajamonti finished his primary and secondary education in Split where his teacher was Francesco Carrara.[17] Carrara was an important person of the Dalmatian Romanticism movement. Romanticism was the period when Dalmatian historians started to discuss the nature of the people of Dalmatian. One of the most popular books on the subject was Carrara's monograph on Dalmatia where he stated that Dalmatia is populated by the Dalmatian nation which consists of Slavs who live in the hinterlands, and Italo-Dalmatians

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[15] Ibid., 31.

[16] Ibid., 33.

[17] Angela Tamborra, "Baiamonti, Antonio," in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 5 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1963), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/antonio-baiamonti_(Dizionario-Biografico)/.

who live in urban areas.[18] It can be stated that this kind of upbringing had a powerful influence on Bajamonti's later political views.

It was common for young Dalmatian noblemen to study in Padua and so did Antonio Bajamonti.[19] There he acquired an interest in politics. In Padua Bajamonti was introduced to the Risorgimento movement that was inspired by the idea of a united Italy. He was especially inspired by the revolutionist Giuseppe Mazzini who advocated liberal nationalism and resistance to the administration of the Austrian Empire, in which he saw Dalmatia as a key factor in its breakup.[20] The fascination with the Risorgimento movement and the ideology of Mazzini served as the foundations of Bajamonti's political practice later in life. In 1849 Bajamonti gained a doctorate in medicine and returned to his hometown where he married Luigia Crussevich.[21] Bajamonti practiced medicine until 1851 when he left the profession because of health problems.[22] The family didn't have financial issues because Luigia was a rich heiress and Bajamonti inherited a great fortune from his aunt Elena Cippico.[23] This fact is going to be crucial in Bajamonti's construction projects. After 1851 Bajamonti focused on his political career. In the first few years of his career he opposed the politics of the Empire.[24] Because of that he was arrested a few times. However, his political past did not prevent him from winning the municipal elections in 1860.

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[18] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 67.

[19] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 38.

[20] Tamborra, "Baiamonti, Antonio."

[21] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 42.

[22] Tamborra, "Baiamonti, Antonio."

[23] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 39, 42.

[24] Ibid., 40.

Bajamonti's Politics

The inauguration of Antonio Bajamonti took place in Split in January 1860. Inspired by his teacher Carrara, the Risorgimento movement and the revolutionist Mazzini, Bajamonti represented the autonomous ideology in Dalmatia and was the leader of the Autonomous Party. The key difference between the Autonomous Party and the People's Party in defining the national identity was the former's inspiration with the Italian Risorgimento.[25] The idea of nation building in Croatia was thought of as the process of accentuating the differences of the differences between the Croatian identity and other national identities of the Empire. On the other hand, in Dalmatia, the defining of the national identity was an assimilation process that was supposed to homogenize various ethnic groups (Slavs and Italians) into one nation-state.

It is important to highlight that the Autonomous Party was not homogeneous in their political views, especially regarding the way of defining the special Dalmatian nationality.[26] There were members of the Autonomous Party that emphasized the Slavic origins of the people of Dalmatia while others emphasized the connection of the people of Dalmatian and the Italian culture. Bajamonti was the representative of the faction that focused on the Italian heritage of Dalmatia. At the beginning of his mandate Bajamonti's politics were liberal and democratic. His standpoint was that Dalmatians are a special ethnic group that is unrelated to the Italian ethnicity but he also pointed out that Dalmatians were heavily influenced by the Italian culture throughout history.[27] During the time of Bach's absolutism, Bajamonti was under constant supervision because of his beliefs that Dalmatia has strong ties with the Italian culture.[28] It was only later in Bajamonti's

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[25] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 70.

[26] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 126.

[27] Ibid., 124.

[28] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 90.

political career that he started to represent and defend the Italian minority in Dalmatia. Moreover, Vrandečić states that Bajamonti's politics, especially his construction projects, served as a transitional scheme to his actual plan. The author believes that Bajamonti was expecting Garibaldi's troops to land and occupy the shores of Dalmatia.[29]

On the other hand, Bajamonti's politics were clear in relation to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the idea of unification with Croatia. Bajamonti strongly opposed the repressive politics of the Empire and advocated the freedom of speech and cultural expression.[30] The Empire did not sympathize with Bajamonti's beliefs and stances as well. This is evident in Bajamonti's plan of developing the traffic connections of Split. He had a plan of connecting Belgrade with Split by railway and Split with Pescara by a boat line.[31] That would have been the fastest and shortest connection from Eastern Europe to Italy. But the Imperial Council [32] declined that plan because the Austrian Empire was developing the port of Trieste and the Kingdom of Hungary made most of the trade through the port of Rijeka.[33] Bajamonti also opposed the idea of unification with Croatia. In his speeches he always emphasized the historical, cultural and geographical differences between Dalmatia and Croatia.[34] Moreover, Bajamonti accepted the idea of the Slavic origins of the Dalmatian people but he strongly opposed the idea of the identification with the Croatian nation,

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[29] Ibid., 91.

[30] Ibid., 111.

[31] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 97.

[32] The legislature of the Austrian Empire from 1867 until 1918. It was a bicameral body consisting of the House of Lords and the House of Deputies.

[33] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 111.

[34] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 54-56.

as can be seen in his famous saying „*Slavi anche domani, Croati giammai*" („We'll be Slavs tomorrow too, but never Croats").[35]

Although Bajamonti was implementing politics which only benefited the urban elite, who mostly identified as Italians and Italo-Dalmatians, he also wanted to impress Slavic and Slavo-Dalmatic peasants who were living in the suburbs.[36] In order to do that, he tried to hold speeches in Croatian, the language spoken by the suburban population, but he thought that the language was still unstandardized and hard to use.[37] Another way in which he tried to impress his contemporaries was by initiating grand construction projects and urbanization plans. The historian Vrandečić argues that through these activities Bajamonti gained the respect of most of the citizens of Split, even his political opponents.[38] Bajamonti was determined to transform Split into a modern European city and was finding alternative ways to achieve this, because the Austrian Empire was not interested in financing Bajamonti's projects.[39] Projects were often sponsored by Bajamonti himself and sometimes financed by donations from citizens. In 1865 Bajamonti founded a joint-stock company *Associazione Dalmatica* to finance his projects.[40] Bajamonti was carrying out non-transparent business practices. Some projects were financed from combined private and public resources, the financial reports did not match the company's nor city's real financial situation and

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[35] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 122.

[36] Ibid., 111.

[37] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 43.

[38] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 91, 112.

[39] Ibid., 111-112.

[40] Ibid., 112.

projects were carried out without the permission of City Council.[41] Soon the People's Party started calling Bajamonti out.

Financial irregularities in the municipality and the popularization of the People's Party among the peasants were the first act of Bajamonti's political defeat.[42] From 1875 Bajamonti started to publish the newspaper *L'Avvenire* where he encouraged the formation of a pure Italian political party.[43] The empire wasn't pleased with Bajamonti's political views and in 1879 he lost his position in the Imperial Council.[44] Finally, in 1882 Bajamonti lost the municipal elections to the People's Party.[45] As a result of that more and more people started to identify as Croats which contributed to the abandonment of the idea of the Dalmatian national identity.[46] After his political defeat Bajamonti started to defend the Italian minority and its interests in Dalmatia and from 1884 to 1887 in the newspaper *La Difesa* he was publishing articles for this purpose.[47] In 1886 he founded the *La Societa Politica Dalmata*, a political party that gathered the Italian national minority in Dalmatia in order to represent their interests.[48] Despite this Bajamonti never again had a significant impact on the political life of Dalmatia. He passed away impoverished in Split on January 13, 1891.[49]

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[41] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 281-282.

[42] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 213-219.

[43] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 127.

[44] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 214.

[45] Ibid., 219.

[46] Ibid., 228.

[47] Tamborra, "Baiamonti, Antonio."

[48] Đinđić, "Identitetski 'lomovi'," 129.

[49] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 314.

In the turbulent period of the 19th century it is hard to draw straight lines between ideologies and ideas of national identities. One thing that is sure is Bajamonti's political stance toward the Austrian administration and the unification of Croatia and Dalmatia. He often expressed his belief in the Slavic origins of the Dalmatian people, but he did not see them as Croats. On the other hand, it would be wrong to argue that Bajamonti's political plan was to incorporate Dalmatia to Italy. During his mandate as the mayor of Split he advocated the politics of Dalmatian autonomy. It was only at the end of the 1870's, when he started to lose his political power, that he decided to declare himself as an Italian in a new situation where the People's Party started to gain on importance and more people started to identify as Croats.[50] During his mayoral mandate Bajamonti defended the idea of the Dalmatian national identity with its Slavic roots and its Italian cultural tradition but he strongly opposed the idea of the identification with the Croatian nation. As the People's Party won the elections and the Croatian national identity started to prevail in Dalmatia, declaring himself as an Italian was Bajamonti's way to live in the new context of the Croatian Dalmatia. It was probably the act of defending the Italian identity at the end of his political career that caused the misinterpretations of his views, first by his political opponents and later by the fascists.

The Urbanization of Split under Bajamonti

Although the exact nature of Bajamonti's politics is still under discussion, there is no doubt that he was a key person in the development of Split. At the beginning of Bajamonti's term, Split was an underdeveloped city at the edge of the Austrian Empire. Bajamonti saw the potential of Split and directed his plans into transforming it up to the level of other developed European cities.

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[50] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 228.

He was committed to finishing the process that the French general Auguste Marmont started.[51] The attitude of the Austrian Empire toward Bajamonti's plans has already been discussed, as well as the way Bajamonti financed his grand projects. Bajamonti presented himself as a committed investor for communal projects even before he became the mayor.

The first building with which Bajamonti left his mark in the cityscape of the city of Split was the palace that is now called the Bajamonti-Dešković palace. It was constructed in 1854 at the western end of Split's waterfront.[52] Kečkemet states that the palace is the most important residential building of the 19th century in Dalmatia. The name of the architect is unknown but due to the Neo-Renaissance style and form it can be assumed that an Italian architect was commissioned.[53] The building has an inner courtyard, closed off by four wings and only the eastern facade is decorated which is a very common form for Italian, especially Venetian, Renaissance *palazzo*.[54] Inside, the building was divided into private and public spaces. Bajamonti's apartment was furnished with fine furniture and busts of famous Italian poets like Dante, Petrarch and Tasso.[55] But the most important feature of the apartment are the ceiling fresco paintings that were commissioned by the painter Antonio Zuccaro from Trieste.[56] The paintings show Roman deities and poets, allegories and landscapes.

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[51] Stanko Piplović, "Splitske Prokurative" [Split's Prokurative], *Kulturna baština* 41 (2015): 245-246.

[52] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 166.

[53] Ibid., 166.

[54] Ibid., 166.

[55] Ibid., 167.

[56] Branko Matulić, "Restauracija stropnog oslika u salonu prvog kata palače Bajamonti-Dešković" [Restoration of the ceiling painting in the central salon of the first floor of the Bajamonti-Dešković Palace], *Kulturna baština* 34 (2007): 256-259.

The most important building in the cultural sense whose construction was initiated by Bajamonti was the theatre. The building was completed within only five months in 1859. It was important because it was the first time since the ancient theatre in Salona was built that Split had a permanent space for performances.[57] This was the first project that was actualized on the former Marmont's park which was built during the time of general Marmont's administration in Dalmatia.[58] The building was designed by the Venetian architect Giovanni Battista Meduna in the Neo-Renaissance style.[59] The ceiling above the auditorium was painted in the fresco technique by Antonio Zuccaro.[60] The paintings were complex showing the history of the „fatherland" Dalmatia and busts of prominent Dalmatians.

At the first City Council meeting on June 6, 1862 mayor Bajamonti brought to attention the need for creating a building regulation plan for Split.[61] By that time Split had no construction guidelines which resulted in narrow streets, dangerous buildings and poor hygiene conditions. The regulation plan was developed by the engineer Francesco Locati and the conservator Vicko Andrić, but was destroyed in a fire after the capitulation of Italy in 1943.[62] It is believed that the regulation plan provided for widening of the streets, construction of new buildings in the Historicist style and new roads to improve Split's traffic connections. Bajamonti's proposal for developing a regulation

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[57] Grga Novak, *Povijest Splita: Knjiga treća, od 1797. godine do 1882. godine* [History of Split: Third Book, from 1797 to 1882] (Split: Matica hrvatska, 1965) 448-450.

[58] Ana Šverko, *Grad (ni)je kuća : o dijalogu između novog i starog Splita : urbanistička predigra* [A City is(not) a house: a dialogue between the new and the old Split: urban design prelude] (Zagreb: UPI-2M plus, 2016) 93-94.

[59] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 211.

[60] Ibid., 217.

[61] Slavko Muljačić, "Regulacijski plan Splita Francesca Locatija iz godine 1862" [The Split regulation plan from 1862 by Francesco Locati], *Kulturna baština* 37 (2011): 174.

[62] Ibid., 174-175

plan is the best indicator of his will to improve the conditions and position of Split, something similar that Napoleon III initiated with Haussmann's renovation of Paris.

In 1864 Bajamonti initiated new construction work on the terrain of the former Marmont's park. The theatre has been already done and Bajamonti had a plan of creating a big public square in front of it. The new structures were also designed by Giovanni Battista Meduna in the Neo-Renaissance style.[63] Meduna's project consisted of two long wings that opened to the sea on the south and flanked the theatre building on the north. The western wing was completed between 1864 and 1865 and the construction of the eastern structure began only in 1908 and was completed in 1928, long after Bajamonti's death.[64] The two structures are practically the same except the eastern wing lacks relief decoration. The structures are opened by arcades on the lower level and the upper level consists of a series of apartments whose facades are decorated with biforas. The inspiration for the appearance and the purpose of these structures were the Procuratie Nuove in Venice and that is why they are called Prokurative in Split.[65]

Bajamonti also persevered in finishing the construction work on the city's water supply system. The ancient water system built for the palace of the emperor Diocletian was demolished in the 7th century due to the invasion of Avars.[66] From then on, the water supply of Split depended on cisterns and wells. The conservator Vicko Andrić started his research and plans of reconstruction of the ancient water system in 1845.[67] The reconstruction plan was very expensive,

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[63] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 259.

[64] Piplović, "Splitske Prokurative," 249.

[65] Ibid., 248-249.

[66] Stanko Piplović, "100 godina splitskog vodovoda" [100 years of Split's water supply system], *Kulturna baština* 11-12 (1981): 112.

[67] Slavko Muljačić, "Prošlostoljetni Split kroz djelovanje Vicka Andrića" [19th century Split through the work of Vicko Andrić], *Kulturna baština* 24-25 (1994): 221.

and the municipality did not have enough money to start such a project. In 1877 Bajamonti decided to take the cost of the restoration on himself and on March 14, 1880 fresh water flowed into Split for the first time in over a millennium.[68] To celebrate that special occasion Bajamonti decided to install approximately thirty water and drinking fountains all over the city.[69]

One of the most decorated water fountains was placed in front of Bajamonti's palace at the end of the waterfront. It was commissioned from the sculptor Luigi Ceccon from Padua and was financed by donations from citizens.[70] The fountain was delivered to Split in September 1880 but the opening ceremony was held in 1888 because of the new political situation in Split where the People's Party slowed Bajamonti's construction work.[71] As the People's Party took over the City Council in 1882 they brought a lawsuit against Bajamonti questioning the ownership over the fountain and the nature of its financing.[72] The litigations were settled in 1888 and the fountain was put into function.[73] The imagery of the fountain was complex, just as the ceiling frescos of the Teatro Bajamonti. The fountain had multiple levels and was decorated with sculptures showing mythological creatures and allegories. A half-nude male figure was placed on the top. The figure was leaning on a consular baton with his right hand and with his left hand he was showing toward

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[68] Piplović, "100 godina," 115.

[69] Ibid., 115.

[70] Slavko Muljačić, "Novi i zaboravljeni podaci o gradnji i rušenju Monumentalne česme na splitskoj obali" [New and forgotten informations on the construction and demolition of the Monumental Fountain on Split's waterfront], *Kulturna baština* 22-23 (1993): 103-104, 110.

[71] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 192-193.

[72] Ibid., 188-190.

[73] Ibid., 190.

the north-east. The arm raising toward east has been interpreted as Bajamonti's ambition to connect Split and Belgrade to increase the economic importance of the city.[74]

The urbanization of Split during the mayoral mandate of Antonio Bajamonti had a clear political background. Bajamonti encouraged numerous projects in order to gain respect and admiration of the citizens, especially his political opponents. But that was not the only reason. By looking at the achievements it is evident that Bajamonti commissioned mostly Italian masters to carry out the projects. It can be discussed what Bajamonti's real intentions were with his construction projects. They can be viewed as a way of preserving the continuity of the Italian culture in autonomous Dalmatia, which was the official political stance of the Autonomous Party. On the other hand, Vrandečić saw Bajamonti's construction projects as a substitute for a revolution, as a political *intermezzo*, while Bajamonti waited for the Italian troops to land in Dalmatia.[75] Although Bajamonti's real intentions are disputable, it is unquestionable that the construction projects initiated by Bajamonti modernized the city of Split to a great degree.

Damnatio memoriae

In 1880 the municipal government of Split was dissolved due to continuous and fierce conflicts between the Autonomous Party and the People's Party.[76] Bajamonti has been called out by the members of the People's Party mostly because of his financial frauds. The work done by Bajamonti was disputed even before he lost the elections in 1882. From the 1880's onward, it can be argued that the figure Bajamonti was progressively being erased from the memory of Split, as

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[74] Ibid., 183.

[75] Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret*, 91.

[76] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 302.

if he was punished with a *damnatio memoriae* as some Roman emperors were in antiquity. On May 15, 1881 a fire broke out in the Teatro Bajamonti.[77] It is believed that Bajamonti's political opponents set the theatre on fire because it often served as a place for political meetings and propaganda events held by the Autonomous Party.[78] However, Bajamonti showed the will to repair the building as soon as possible. But the political situation changed and Bajamonti didn't have so much power in the city as he used to. In 1888 the members of the ruling People's Party decided to build a completely new Croatian national theatre which was smaller and more modest than the previous.[79]

The building of the former Teatro Bajamonti served a variety of purposes after the fire destroyed most of the inner construction of the building. It served as a warehouse for bricks, later on as a summer theatre and in the interwar period it became the Vitturi palace.[80] The social and political atmosphere in Split changed completely during the Italian occupation from May 1941 until September 1943.[81] Bajamonti's achievements were given different connotations in this new political situation. Although Bajamonti advocated the autonomy of Dalmatia and the Dalmatian national identification during his mayoral mandate, irredentist groups and fascist always considered him as „one of them", as a person who wanted to see Dalmatia as an integral part of Italy.[82] That and the Italian style of Bajmonti's achievements were the reasons why fascist took these buildings

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[77] Piplović, "Splitske Prokurative," 251.

[78] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 230.

[79] Ibid., 241.

[80] Piplović, "Splitske Prokurative," 254, 267.

[81] Aleksandar Jakir, "Split od travnja 1941. do rujna 1943. godine: mjesto fašističke represije i antifašističkog otpora" [Split from April 1941 to September 1943: A Site of Fascist Repression and Anti-fascist Resistance], in *Split i Vladan Desnica 1918. – 1945.: umjetničko stvaralaštvo između kulture i politike,* ed. Drago Roksandić et al. (Zagreb: FF-press - Filozofski fakultet u Splitu, 2016), 326.

[82] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 194.

as their headquarters during the time of occupation. During the Italian administration in Split the former Teatro Bajamonti became the Casa Littoria, the headquarters of the Fascist Party, and the western wing of Prokurative became the base for national fascist associations.[83] The same happened with the fountain in front of Bajamonti's palace. During the occupation the raised hand of the male figure at the top of the fountain began to be interpreted as a fascist salute, the consular baton was interpreted as a fascio and an Italian flag was hissed on the fountain.[84] After the capitulation of Italy in 1943 the socialists were committed to remove all symbols of the fascist terror in Dalmatia.[85] One of those symbols was the fountain in front of Bajamonti's palace. The fountain was a symbol of Split until the Italian occupation after which it became a symbol of fascism in the city. That was why people wanted it removed. The fountain was demolished in 1947 during an action that was supposed to remove ruins left behind after the Allied bombing even though the fountain was intact.[86]

After the capitulation of Italy on September 11, 1943 the city of Split was overtaken by Yugoslav Partisans and two weeks later the German military units entered the city after which civilian services of the Independent State of Croatia were established.[87] The city was a target of Allied air strikes from October 21, 1943 until October 21, 1944.[88] The bombing destroyed about a quarter of the city including most of the drinking fountains that were set up after the reconstruction

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[83] Marin Pelaić, *Split za vrijeme talijanske okupacije (1941.-1943.)* [Split during the Italian occupation (1941-1943)] (Split: Udruga antifašista i antifašističkih boraca grada Splita, 2016),18-19.

[84] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 194.

[85] Ibid., 194-195.

[86] Ibid., 195.

[87] Marica Karakaš Obradov, "Saveznički zračni napadi na Split i okolicu i djelovanje Narodne zaštite u Splitu tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata" [Allied air strikes on Split and its surroundings and the activities of the National Defense in Split during World War II], *Historijski zbornik* 61 (2008): 324.

[88] Ibid., 325-337.

of the ancient water system.[89] During the period of air strikes the structures of Prokurative served as headquarters of the services that took care of the safety of the city's residents.[90] Furthermore, during the time of socialism in Croatia Bajamonti's palace went through a lot of changes. In that period the palace was repurposed into several apartments and housed several offices.[91] Such use of the spaces caused the modification of the original plan which led to the destruction of the ceiling and floor decorations.

Bajamonti's achievements went through a lot of different interpretations. From the 1880's the People's Party was determined to diminish Bajamonti's significance in the city of Split. But the most damage was caused during the Italian administration in Dalmatia. The fascists took over lots of buildings that were built under Bajamonti because they saw Antonio Bajamonti as a person who fought for Italian interests in Dalmatia and also due to the recognizable Italian style of the buildings.[92] Also, during the occupation, in the process of Italianization, schools were teaching children that Dalmatia has always been an Italian province and that it always fought the „barbarism of Slavs".[93] In the process of fascist propaganda Bajamonti surely became a significant person for the legitimation of the Italian authorities in Dalmatia as he opposed the idea of unification with Croatia and defended the Italian minority in Dalmatia at the end of his political career. From the period of Italian occupation most of Bajamonti's achievements began to be associated with the fascist ideology and symbolism which caused his figure and his buildings to fall into oblivion in the following decades.

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[89] Piplović, "100 godina," 116.

[90] Karakaš Obradov, "Saveznički zračni napadi," 343.

[91] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 176.

[92] Ibid., 193-194.

[93] Jakir, "Split od travnja," 338.

Bajamonti in Today's Collective Memory

Today, it is questionable how much Bajamonti is recognized as a key person for the city of Split. Usually streets and squares are named after the most significant figures of the city or the country. But in Split there is no mention of the name Antonio Bajamonti. Along the western wall of the Diocletian's palace there is a Bajamontijeva street but that one is dedicated to Antonio's uncle Julije. On the other hand, several Italian cities - like Rome, Milan, Padua and Trieste have squares and streets named after Antonio Bajamonti. That is probably the best indicator of the contrasting memory of Bajamonti in Italy and in Split. However, there are some renovation initiatives on buildings that were built under Bajamonti. But these initiatives are not intended to show the importance of Bajamonti for Split, but to increase tourism for Split.

One example of that is the initiative to rebuild the fountain that was demolished in 1947. After it was demolished the fountain was forgotten until 1979 when a cardboard copy was placed on the original location for the purpose of filming the series Velo misto.[94] After 1979 the fountain again became the symbol of the city and many believe that it should be rebuilt. Kečkemet claims that the aesthetic aspect of the fountain is the only reason why citizens want it to be rebuilt and not the historical and political aspects. Furthermore, Kečkemet considers this initiative superficial and questions the possibility of reconstruction in the context of the current modernistic waterfront.[95] Of the other thirty fountains, only a few are left in the city. Most of them are in an extremely poor condition while only one fountain located in the Pazar area, which is a large outdoor market in Split, was recently restored. Also, the Bajamonti-Dešković palace is still in a bad condition mostly

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[94] Kečkemet, *Ante Bajamonti*, 196.

[95] Ibid., 196-198.

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due to unresolved property issues. The tenants that moved into the palace in the socialist period did not shy away from doing extensive works in their apartments.[96] The new structures in the palace make it difficult to restore the ceiling frescos and the inlaid parquet in the former Bajamonti's apartment.[97]

The former Teatro Bajamonti and Prokurative have been preserved the best. After the Casa Littoria the theatre soon became a cinema, and today there is the cafe Bajamonti on the first floor and the upper floors are the spaces on the Youth Theatre. The cafe Bajamonti is the only memento of the existence of Antonio Bajamonti in the city of Split. The Prokurative structures are preserved as well but they do not have the significance that they used to have. Ana Šverko states that today the arcade structures are an empty scenery while the upper apartments are mostly intended for tourists.[98]

By analyzing the condition of Bajamonti's construction achievements and legacy it becomes clear that his figure is almost forgotten in Split. This started with the People's Party denying his achievements in his own lifetime. But the most damage for his reputation in Split was caused in the period of Italian occupation of Dalmatian in the Second World War. In the process of Italianization Bajamonti's politics and merits for the city began to be associated with fascism and that kind of interpretation remained in the following decades. While there are initiatives for the preservation of Bajamonti's buildings they are mostly driven by the need of widening the touristic offer of Split and not by the will to return the figure of Bajamonti from oblivion.

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[96] Matulić, "Restauracija stropnog oslika," 256-259.

[97] Ibid., 256-259.

[98] Šverko, *Grad (ni)je kuća*, 95.

Conclusion

The 19th century was a period that was marked by the process of the formation of nation-states. While in north Croatia there was an obvious will to unite the people in one nation and in one country, in the region of Dalmatia the situation was not so clear. The second half of the 19th century was a turbulent period in Dalmatia because of political conflicts. The conflicts were most evident in the period between 1860 and 1880 when the leader of the Autonomous Party Antonio Bajamonti was the mayor of Split. Bajamonti strongly opposed the politics of the Austrian Empire and the idea of unification with Croatia which was advocated by the People's Party. Bajamonti's attitude toward the future of Dalmatian and its relation to Italy is something that is still discussed by Croatian scholars. As a member of the Autonomous Party Bajamonti would have been expected to defend the autonomy of Dalmatia and its proto-nation that consisted of several ethnic groups. But the party was not homogeneous in its political views.

Bajamonti represented the Italian faction of the Autonomous Party which accepted the Slavic origins of Dalmatians but emphasized the strong influence of the Italian culture in Dalmatia. Most importantly, even though he was appreciative of the Italian culture, Bajamonti advocated the autonomy of Dalmatia. His urbanization plan for Split is proof that he was trying to increase the importance of Split as a financial centre and transport hub and his respect for the Italian culture can be seen in the Neo-Renaissance style of the buildings. Also, in the imagery of some of the buildings and monuments that were initiated by Bajamonti it can be seen that he glorified the "fatherland" of Dalmatia. However, as his power and the power of the Autonomous Party started to fade at the end of the 1870's, Bajamonti started to defend the interests of the Italian minority in the new context of Dalmatia where more and more people started to identify as Croats. At the end of his political career Bajamonti started to be attacked for his political views and his work in the City Council by the members of the People's Party. After winning the elections in 1882 the People's Party was committed to deny Bajamonti's importance for the city of Split.

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The political attacks by the People's Party were executed with the intention to reduce the power and significance of Antonio Bajamonti in Split. But the period of the Italian occupation of Dalmatia in the Second World War was the time that Bajamonti's figure and achievements started to be linked with the fascist ideology and symbolism. The fascists took Bajamonti's buildings and monuments as the headquarters of their institutions due to their Italian style. Furthermore, they considered Antonio Bajamonti a person who fought for the Italian interests in Dalmatia in the second half of the 19th century. That kind of interpretation of Bajamonti's politics and intentions remained even after the capitulation of Italy in 1943. Some of the monuments that were associated with fascism were destroyed and the figure of Bajamonti fell into oblivion. Today Antonio Bajamonti is almost forgotten in Split. No street nor square bears his name and most of the splendid buildings and construction projects that he raised in the city are in a bad condition. Although there are some initiatives to restore these valuable 19th century monuments they are mostly preoccupied with the aesthetic and touristic aspect and not the will to show Bajamonti as one of the key people for the development of Split.

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Illegal Migrations from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia to the United States from 1918 to 1941

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Abstract

The paper discusses illegal migration from the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia to the United States from the perspective of migrants in the context of international migration during the interwar period. The introduction of the quota system in the 1920's resulted in the beginning of massive illegal migration from Europe, which included the Kingdom of SCS. The paper identifies the main actors of the so-called 'migration industry' and shows the ways of illegal border crossings, the consequences of deportation and the motives of illegal migrants.

Introduction[1]

Migration history of the South Slavs is relatively well covered in historiography. Several historians have devoted their scientific research partly or almost entirely on this topic. Nevertheless, there is room for further research. This applies primarily to new theoretical and

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[1] The article was originally written for the course "Anthropology of migration" in the academic year of 2018/19 with the help of Dr. Marijeta Rajković Iveta at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb. Under her guidance the article was later improved.

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methodological approaches, but also to the exploration of hitherto poorly or completely unexplored topics. One such topic is addressed in this paper - illegal migration from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia to the United States during the interwar period. The aim of the paper is to show from "below" i.e. from the perspective of illegal migrants, the motives, intentions and ways of illegal border crossings in the wider social and political context. Given that certain acts were considered illegal only in the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia, but not in the United States, and vice versa, the term illegal in this paper includes acts that were considered illegal in at least one of these countries. The work covers the entire Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia, but due to the specific circumstances that caused the largest number of (illegal) migrants to come from present-day Slovenia and Croatia, the focus is de facto on these areas. The literature on the subject is scarce. Historiography relatively often uses *Narodna statistika*[2] [*National Statistics*] of Josip Lakatoš, which stated that one third of Croatian emigrants had illegally emigrated before the year of 1912.[3] We need to take a critical approach to this assessment because it stems from the then available data that we can never fully rely on. In addition, it is important to emphasize that Lakatoš' estimates[4] cannot be valid for the Kingdom of SCS as it was in a different legislative, political and economic position than the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia to which the estimates relate.[5]

This work relies on texts by Vesna Đikanović. Her 2007 article "Америка упркос свему: Илегално усељавање у САД 1919-1941" [America, despite Everything: Illegal Immigration into the USA 1919–1941] and part of her monograph *Iseljavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države:*

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[2] For example, Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State Since the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 41.

[3] Josip Lakatoš, *Narodna statistika* [National Statistics] (Zagreb: self-published, 1914), 64.

[4] Lakatoš' estimates relate to the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia between 1899 and 1912.

[5] Lakatoš, *Narodna statistika*, 64.

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jugoslovensko iskustvo [*Emigration to the United States: The Yugoslav Experience*] from 2012, focus on illegal migration from interwar Yugoslavia. The US perspective was given by Mae N. Ngai in her 2005 monograph, "Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America." Periodicals were used, mainly the *Iseljenik* [*Emigrant*] and the *Novi iseljenik* [*New Emigrant*] (the official gazette of the *Zagreb Emigrant Organization* and the *Union of Emigrant Organizations*). An archival fond entitled the *Iseljenički komesarijat* [*Emigration Commissariat*] was used from the Croatian State Archives. The paper uses data and information provided by family members of illegal migrants.[6] Given that they are second, third, or even fourth generation, these sources are rather short and need to be critically assessed. In addition to that, various testimonies were used, which were originally given to state officials during the interwar period by people who had first-hand experience in illegal migration.

Migrations of the South Slavs from the 1880's to 1914

The massive migration waves that swept north and west of Europe in the first half of the 19th century, spread to almost the entire continent by the beginning of the following century. With the gradual expansion of the so-called 'emigration wave', mass emigration also became present in the territories that would later form the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[7] The motives for emigration were different and specific for each South Slavic region, or even town, village. Nevertheless, there were

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[6] Josip Humjan, "Illegal emigration from Croatia to US from 1921 to 1941," Facebook, December 16, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/groups/croatianheritageandgenealogy/permalink/2243940422507824/?app=fbl.

[7] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 84.

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several economic and political factors that were common almost everywhere.[8] One of the main reasons was certainly the agrarian problem, namely agrarian overpopulation[9] and outdated tillage methods. Another important reason was the lack of industrialization.[10] A developed industry would have been capable of absorbing much of the surplus labor force of the rural areas. However, it has never developed sufficiently, and part of the unemployed population turned to alternative solutions, including emigration.[11] Emigrant letters and visits to the 'old country' were also important factors. Through them, potential emigrants receive important information, and if they choose to emigrate, those connections could help them cover the costly transatlantic tickets, accommodation, employment etc.[12] Apart from the above, other less important, but not negligible factors that contributed to emigration were greater political freedom,[13] avoidance of military service,[14] adventure, etc.[15]

Due to different economic and political circumstances, mass exodus did not hit all South Slavic regions at the same time and in the same proportions. Due to their maritime tradition, the islands and coastal regions of Istria, Croatia Littoral, Dalmatia and Montenegro were the first to be

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[8] Gerald Gilbert Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961), 6.

[9] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 61.

[10] Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, 11.

[11] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 56.

[12] Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, 18. and Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 27-28.

[13] Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, 8.

[14] Jure Prpić, *Hrvati u Americi: (njihova povijest and doprinos Americi and Hrvatskoj)* [The Croatian Immigrants in America]. Trans. Ksenija Horvat (Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika, 1997), 87.

[15] Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, 22-24.

affected by mass emigration.[16] According to Ivica Nejašmić, this happened in Dalmatia as early as the 1860's.[17] By the end of the 19th century, the whole of Slovenia and the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia were affected by the same phenomenon.[18] Emigration was also favored by the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had few legal restrictions on emigration. Such a *laissez-faire* approach stems from the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian authorities to reduce political pressure in the country by facilitating mass emigration.[19] The territory of the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Serbia, for various reasons (emigration policy, poor communication networks, etc),[20] were also affected by mass emigration, but to a much lesser extent. At the time of the creation of the Kingdom of SCS, the western and coastal regions of the new state numbered several hundred thousand emigrants and the rest of the state only tens of thousands.[21] Although they were part of the same state after 1918, the areas that made up the pre-war Kingdom of Serbia and Bosnia still had a disproportionately lower proportion of emigrants than the rest of the state. This difference persisted throughout the interwar period.[22]

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[16] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 53.

[17] Ivica Nejašmić, "Iseljavanje iz Hrvatske u evropske and prekomorske zemlje od sredine 19. stoljeća do 1981. godine – pokušaj kvantifikacije" [Emigration from Croatia to Overseas and European Countries from the Middle of the 19th Century to 1981 – an Attempt at Quantification], *Migracijske and etničke teme* [Migration and Ethnic Themes] 4 (1990): 514.

[18] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 44.

[19] Aleksandar Miletić, *Journey under Surveillance. The Overseas Emigration Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Global Context* (Belgrade: Institute for the recent history of Serbia = Institut za noviju povijest Srbije (INIS), 2009), 86-87.

[20] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 150-151. and Miletić, *Journey under Surveillance*, 87-90.

[21] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 44-50.

[22] For further information consult HDA, f. 1071, box 599 and box 600. The archival material consists statements on emigration statistics from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia in the years between 1921-1939.

American Nativism and the *Johnson-Reed Act*

On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States received millions of immigrants, which became a growing political and social challenge. One part of the public was aware of the need for immigrants, while another negatively perceived an increasing number of foreigners and sought restrictions. According to Roger Daniels, we can distinguish three main stages of American nativism.[23] The first appeared in the first half of the 19th century and was directed against Catholics, who then made up most immigrants. The second phase was the anti-Asiatic phase, which emerged in the 1870's and was dominant anti-immigration sentiment until 1882 when an almost complete ban on Chinese immigration was implemented. The third phase began in the 1880's and was directed against immigrants in general ("anti-all"). Although animosity towards European immigrants existed, nativist movements failed to impose immigration bans on them.[24] Only during and shortly after the end of the First World War did the nativists manage to impose significant restrictions on immigration from Europe. These were the first major restrictions that would mark the next decades of US targeted migrations.

The periodization of international migration[25] by Thomas Hammar illustrates the importance of the restrictions made. The periodization is divided into four stages. The first run from the 1860s until the outbreak of World War I. Controls and restrictions on movement between

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[23] Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigrations and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 265.

[24] Ibid, 265.

[25] International migrations in the 19th and first half of the 20th century were mostly migrations related to the US.

Europe, the US and Australia were then at a minimum and migration was free. The second phase lasted until the end of World War II and was marked by the introduction of restrictions in the US and globally. The third phase was again marked by great freedom of movement, which was abolished in the first half of the 1970s when rigorous controls and restrictions were reintroduced. To summarize, the periodization shows us the following phases: Open Doors (1860-1914), Closed Doors (1914-1945), Open Doors (1945-1974), Closed Doors (1974-1980).[26]

There were multiple reasons for adopting restrictive laws in the US. One was the rise of American nationalism during the war. Its primary objective was the German immigrant community, but over time, animosity began to be directed towards immigrants in general. Another reason was that by the 1920's, the US economy no longer needed large numbers of new immigrants for its growth. The last key reason was that the international system during the interwar period was marked by territorial integrity of nation-states which consequently raised borders, which, among other things, limited migrations.[27]

The beginning of the second phase coincided chronologically with the outbreak of World War I, however, the world conflict significantly limited migration for only four years. Restrictive laws in the United States in 1917, 1921, and in 1924 and the Great Depression of the 1930's limited migration throughout the interwar period. The point of making the restrictions was not only to reduce the total number of immigrants, but also to 'filter' them. Immigrants from Western and

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[26] Introducing the 5th phase of international migrations was taken into consideration later. For more information: Göran Rystad, "Immigration History and the Future of International Migration," *The International Migration Review* 4 (1992): 1170-1172. and Thomas Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens, and Citizens in a World of International Migration* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), 42-45.

[27] Mae N. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 19.

Northern Europe were viewed as 'higher quality' than those from the East and South.[28] Accordingly, the latter should have accounted for a significantly lower proportion of European immigrants than the first group. This was to be achieved by law (1917) which required that an immigrant to be admitted in the United States had to be literate.[29] As it soon turned out that the literacy level of Europeans whose share was supposed to be at a minimum, was higher than it was expected, so further restrictive laws were enacted. In 1921, a quota system was introduced to determine the maximum annual number of immigrants from a certain country. The annual quota for each country accounted for 3% of the total number of immigrants from that country according to the 1910 U.S. Census.[30] Owing to the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, the quotas were further reduced and were now calculated on the basis of the 1890 census and accounted for 2% of the immigrant population enumerated. Although all countries were treated equally, the law was *de facto* discriminatory.[31] By the 1880's, European immigrants to the United States came largely from the west and north of Europe, but since then the proportion of immigrants from the south and east of the continent had begun to increase significantly.

From the mid-1890s, undesirable immigrants became the majority, and by the time of the outbreak of World War I they were by far the largest immigrant group.[32] In certain years, immigrants from the east and south of the continent accounted for over 80% of all European

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[28] Ibid, 21.

[29] Ibid, 19.

[30] That was a problem because some European countries did not exist prior to 1918.; Ibid, 21-22.

[31] Ibid, 21-22.

[32] Maldwyn Allen Jones, *American Immigration* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 153-154.

immigrants.[33] Under the 1924 law, the proportion of those undesirable immigrants was reduced to only 15%, a significant decrease from the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war.[34] It is important to note that there were so-called non-quota immigrants, which term included close relatives of an immigrant (most often his wife and children). There were no restrictions on them. In this way, family reunification was encouraged, which positively affected their integration.[35] Because part of the potential immigrants, despite the bans, still intended to enter the US, they had to 'bypass' the US immigration regulations, i.e. they had to enter the country illegally.[36]

The United States had experience with illegal immigrants since 1882 when the Chinese were banned from entering the country. Later, bans were passed on for most Asians, which reduced the number of immigrants from those countries but condemned the rest to illegal entry into the US.[37] Illegal border crossings took place across land borders with Canada and Mexico that were largely uncontrolled. Upon arrival at one of the transit countries, migrants could rely on well-organized smuggling networks. It is noted that some of the Chinese migrants in Mexico received US dollars, Chinese-English dictionaries, Chinese newspapers published in the US, maps of the

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[33] Ibid, 153-154.

[34] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 21.

[35] Ibid, 61.

[36] Claudia Sadowski-Smith, "Unskilled Labor Migration and the Illegality Spiral: Chinese, European, and Mexican Indocumentados in the United States, 1882-2007," *American Quarterly* 3 (2008): 789.

[37] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 18.

US rail network and the like before leaving for the US.[38] Illegal border crossings had often been

linked to other smuggling routes such as opium routes.[39]

By the mid 1920's, the illegal entry of Chinese from Canada and Mexico had been

significantly reduced by various measures, including diplomatic pressures and better organization

of the US Immigration Service.[40] Illegal migration prior to the adoption of quota restrictions is

relevant as the acquired *know-how* was used to (re)activate smuggling routes after 1921. This time,

illegal migration was linked to the smuggling of alcohol[41] that was assumed by the Immigration

Bureau in 1927 as the only more profitable type of 'good' for smuggling than illegal immigrants.[42]

In addition to Canada and Mexico, the Europeans also used Cuba as their immediate transit country.

In 1924, some 85,000 immigrants went there. Some estimates say that 60,000 of them were

planning to enter the United States illegally.[43] It is almost certain that the most important smuggling

route went through Mexico, while the Canadian-US border was second in importance. In the early

1930's, the number of direct illegal crossings declined, but there was an increase in stay-in the

country longer than allowed. That type of stay in the US was also considered illegal. A portion of

immigrants have decided to exploit loopholes in U.S. immigration law. Relatively often,

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[38] Erika Lee, "Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion along the U.S. Borders with Canada and Mexico, 1882-1924," *The Journal of American History* 1 (2002): 60.

[39] Lee, "Enforcing the Borders," 57.

[40] Ibid ,76-78 and 80-84.

[41] Lisa Lindquist-Dorr, "Bootlegging Aliens: Unsanctioned Immigration and the Underground Economy of Smuggling from Cuba during Prohibition," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 1 (2014): 55.

[42] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 62.

[43] Lindquist-Dorr, "Bootlegging Aliens," 54.

immigrants went to Canada and stayed there for five years, after which they could enter the US as non-quota immigrants.[44]

The US policy of suppressing illegal immigration focused on safeguarding the external borders as well as on controlling the interior in search of those who have already entered the country.[45] The resources for these measures were never fully secured, which meant that at least some of those who tried to enter the country illegally succeeded.[46] From the perspective of illegal immigrants, this was no great consolation as they knew that they could still be caught and deported at any time. In addition, since they were illegally in the US, they were exposed to worse working conditions.[47] For European illegal immigrants, there were circumstances that worked in their favor. During the interwar period, Mexicans and Chinese were perceived as the most dangerous immigrant groups by the American public.[48] For European illegal immigrants this meant that if they didn't stand out, there was a good chance that they would not raise suspicion. In addition, at least part of the public realized that illegal immigrants were their neighbors, colleagues at work, upstanding citizens, etc. which made them question social condemnation against these people.[49] Social norms were also questioned because of the quota system itself, which made boundaries between legal and illegal *de facto* abstract. According to Mae Ngai, if we denote the maximum number of immigrants from one country as N, then $N + 1$ denotes an illegal immigrant. For

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[44] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 66-67.

[45] Ibid, 56.

[46] Ibid, 63.

[47] Ibid, 58.

[48] Daniel Tichenor, "The Political Dynamics of Unauthorized Immigration: Conflict, Change, and Agency in Time," *Polity* 3 (2015): 288. and Sadowski-Smith, "Unskilled Labor Migration," 779.

[49] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 63.

legislators, '+*1*' immigrants are illegal solely by the order in which they tried to enter the country. On the other hand, at least for a part of the US society, it was unclear what the crucial moral difference between *N* and *N + 1* immigrants was.[50]

Smuggling networks in the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia

One of the countries where the annual number of emigrants was significantly reduced was the Kingdom of SCS. Initially, the limit for this country was 6,426 and later only 617 emigrants annually, well below the number of interested potential emigrants.[51] In 1923, as many as 12,000 applications for emigration to the United States were rejected, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the overall applications.[52] A situation where there is a tendency for mass emigration, which at the same time is largely limited, opens space for smugglers. Illegal immigrants from the Kingdom of SCS came to the US like most others - through Mexico, Canada and Cuba.[53] According to the Yugoslav Consul in New York, eighty percent of Yugoslav illegal immigrants from the jurisdiction of that consulate were deported due to their entry from the aforementioned three countries.[54] In addition to the US and transit countries, smuggling networks also operated in the Kingdom of SCS. There were several types of such networks. The first was part of the shipping agencies that sold transatlantic tickets to emigrants. Such companies were supervised by the Yugoslav authorities,

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[50] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 61.

[51] Vesna Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему: Илегално усељавање у САД 1919-1941" [America, despite Everything: Illegal Immigration into the USA 1919–1941], *Tokovi istorije* [Currents of History] 4 (2007): 138. and Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, 51.

[52] "Naše iseljeničko pitanje," [Our Emigration Problem], *Iseljenik* [Emigrant], March 1, 1925. And Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 131.

[53] Đikanović "Америка упркос свему," 139; Sometimes emigrants would not arrive there directly but via third countries like France and Belgium, Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему," 140.

[54] Vesna Đikanović, *Iseljavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države: jugoslovensko iskustvo 1918-1941* [Emigration to the United States: The Yugoslav Experience] (Belgrade: INS, 2012), 255.

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but since surveillance had never been fully effective, there was room for illegal activity.[55] Agents and subagents of such shipping agencies often persuaded potential emigrants to legally emigrate.

According to Yugoslav law, any kind of persuasion to emigrate was forbidden and therefore this kind of activities were illegal (even though the act of emigrating itself was legal).[56] It should be noted that shipping companies were rarely accused of smuggling emigrants to the United States.[57] The most notorious case occurred in 1926. At the time, several British companies, affiliated to a conglomerate called the "Yugoslav Express Agency", were accused of trying to smuggle several hundred expats from Vojvodina to the United States. Many their passengers were deported by US authorities as soon as they arrived on Ellis Island. It is unclear whether this was a deliberate attempt of smuggling or a conglomerate mistake. It could be a mistake since smuggling routes did not go through Ellis Island. The tiny island was the main entry point for most immigrants and therefore very strictly controlled, what the shipping companies certainly knew. On the other hand, there are factors that make it impossible to ignore the possibility of deliberate smuggling. The reason for their arrival was the (Catholic) Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, there were Orthodox Christians among the travelers, some did not have the money to return, and two women upon their arrival married immediately. Whether it was a mistake, or a deliberate attempt of smuggling is a question that is unlikely to have a final answer. The conglomerate had never been

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[55] Darija Hofgräff, "Hrvati u svjetlu politike prema iseljeništvu 1920.-1939" [Croats in light of emigration policy, 1920 – 1939] (PhD diss., University of Zadar 2018), 73-74; And HDA, f. 1071, b. 548, "Izvještaj o Radu Iseljeničkog Komesarijata u Zagrebu u g. 1926/1927" [Report on the Work of Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb in year 1926/1927], 10.

[56] HDA, f. 1071, b. 572, "8979," 1-2.

[57] Đikanović, *Iseljavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države,* 243-270; Đikanović "Америка упркос свему," *passim.*

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formally charged.[58] Another type of smuggling network developed outside of the work of the shipping companies.[59] These were groups that persuaded potential emigrants to go to the United States illegally. Sometimes they were based outside the Kingdom.[60]

Unfortunately, due to the lack of historiographic research and historical sources, we have little information on them. The cases that became public show that they were often people who were part of the state apparatus and had access to, or could have influenced, the process of issuing all sorts of permits necessary for emigration (e.g. passports). This was possible because people employed by the Yugoslav emigration service were often negligent and prone to corruption.[61] One such network included a police sergeant, while a former county executive and a few court clerks were suspected of being part of such a network.[62] There were also networks that were not part of the state apparatus and did not cooperate with the state officials. One such consisted of Josip Grubić and Ivan Prigled from Kupčina near Jastrebarsko, who told potential emigrants that they would transfer them to the United States via Cuba for 2,000 Yugoslav dinars (YUM). They were ambushed by the Yugoslav police authorities and arrested. They confessed and said, "... that they were forced to make these frauds because they were engaged in politics and became impoverished and indebted. Since they could not find another way out of this state, they decided to fraud people

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[58] Joe Rendulić, "Slučaj sa Jugoslovenskim putnicima u Newyorku" [The Case of Yugoslav Passengers in New York], *Iseljenik,* July 15, 1926; "Švercovanje u Ameriku (U.S.A.)" [Smuggling to America (U.S.A.)], *Iseljenik*, August 17, 1926; Đikanović "Америка упркос свему," 150.

[59] There is a possibility that certain individuals were part of more than one such network.

[60] Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему," 140.

[61] Đikanović, *Iseljavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države*, 181-192; Miletić, *Journey under Surveillance*, 123-131.

[62] Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему," 146.

for money by encouraging them to go illegally to America".[63] Probably the most famous group was caught in 1929. As the Yugoslav authorities tried to suppress illegal emigration, they made sure that the case was covered by the media to serve as a warning to anyone who tried to take part in illegal smuggling in any way. The following were convicted: Švob Dragutin, Radman Luka, Puhek Lovro, Juran Marin, Aleksa Radović, and Alfred Ružić. In 1922 and 1923, Švob Dragutin was appointed as a clerk in the local administration where he dealt with the issuing of passports. He filled 30 bianco travel documents and gave them from stamping to Ilija Radić (who was not caught), for which they both received a bribe. Puhek, Radman and Juran, encouraged potential emigrants (mostly peasants) to emigrate to the United States illegally for a price of 280 USD. They worked in collusion with Švob and Radić. They obtained their documents and escorted the emigrants to Ljubljana, where they were all arrested. In 1923, Ružić, Puhek, Radman, Juran and Radović illegally procured passports.

On at least one occasion they told people that they could smuggle them into the US illegally, but that they would first have to go to France, then to Canada and then to the United States. The passports they acquired were only valid as far as France. About 20 people were deceived on that occasion alone. In 1928, Puhek told 17 people that he could arrange their leave to Canada and get them a job there. He took 200 USD from each and did not fulfill any of his promises. The penalties they received were extremely large: Švob received four months in prison; Radović three years in prison; Radman four years in prison, and Puhek, Juran and Ružić five years in prison. This group frauded around 60 people for approximately one million dinars. It seems that there were several people at the top who were leading everything, while others in rural areas persuaded potential

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[63] "Protiv verbovanja iseljenika" [Against Recruitment of Emigrants], *Novi iseljenik* [New Emigrant], March 2, 1929.

emigrants to leave.[64] The last type of smuggling did not rely on a *per se* smuggling network. Relatives and friends of potential emigrants could be used to enter the United States illegally.[65] Finally, some emigrants decided to cross the border completely independently, which was extremely risky.[66] A large number of people relied on multiple types of networks. They used ones that they estimated to be safe and cheap enough. Because illegal entry often consisted of several stages, in some cases it was possible to select a different type of smuggler for each of them.

Yugoslav authorities issued frequent warnings about the dangers of smuggling in the United States. Given that the confidence in government institutions was low, warning methods had to be innovative.[67] The Zagreb based Emigrant Commissariat sent detailed cases of arrested and deported emigrants, who were caught trying to enter the US illegally, on a monthly basis to newspapers to serve as a warning to anyone who was considering doing the same.[68] In addition, Catholic and Orthodox priests voluntarily participated in the outreach by warning the public about the dangers of illegal immigration. Given that the number of attempts at illegal border crossings was at a worryingly high level, the Consul of the Kingdom of SCS in New York became involved in the campaign to combat it. He presented in detail the cases of captured immigrants from the Kingdom of SCS. One of them was Marko Skurić, who in 1924 travelled to Mexico via Argentina. From there he tried to enter the US illegally but was arrested at the border by the US officials. Yugoslav

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[64] Convicts' age and occupation are: Švob Dragutin, 46 years old, clerk from Zagreb; Radman Luka, 51 years old, plowman from Levkušje; Puhek Lovro, 45 years old, from Bratina; Juran Marin, 46 years old, plowman from Pisarovina; Aleksa Radović, 54 years old, journalist from Belgrade and Alfred Ružić, 42 years old, merchant from Zagreb; "Oštra kazna varatelja" [Severe Punishment for Fraudsters], *Novi iseljenik,* December 12, 1929.

[65] Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 27.

[66] Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему," 141.

[67] HDA, f. 1071, b. 548, "Izvještaj o Radu Iseljeničkog Komesarijata u Zagrebu u g. 1926/1927.," 84.

[68] Ibid, 14.

authorities lobbied for him and managed to arrange his return to Argentina, but Skurić at that point didn't have enough money for that trip. After serving prison time he was deported. It was noted that "had he not paid so much in Mexico to the smuggler, he could have returned to Argentina easily without having spent half a year in prison."[69] Similar was the case of Rade Ribić, who came to the US in 1906 and returned to his homeland in 1920. Soon he wanted to go back to the US, but the quota was filled so instead he went to Canada. Since he could find a job there "one morning, between June 10 and 15, he crossed the bridge [to the US], but was returned by the immigration officer. On the evening of the same day, when he noticed that there were many people on the bridge, he tried to cross again. No one stopped him this time". Although he did cross the border and found a job he was later caught and deported.[70] Another case was Maksim Vučinić. Unlike most emigrants he was a part of an illegal migration network as a smuggler. He was caught. Despite serving in both the US Army during the First World War and later in the US Navy, he was deported.[71]

The already mentioned attempt to cross the border illegally under the pretext of going to the Eucharistic Congress was also presented. Some of those who tried to enter on this occasion were: "Jakob S. [who] knows neither to read nor to write, and because of this he was once denied entry. While initially declaring that he had come to the congress, it turned out that he had no idea about the congress, so he said he would like to visit his relatives." Another case was "a woman who came without luggage, with two dollars in her pocket, and was desperate because relatives in silk dresses did not greet her at the pier," also "K.S. first stated before the immigration inspector that

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[69] "Švercovanje u Ameriku (U.S.A.)," *Iseljenik*, August 17, 1926.

[70] Ibid, August 17, 1926.

[71] Ibid, August 17, 1926.

she had come to Congress. She said later that she had come to look for her husband, who promised to send her 20 USD a month, but did not do so. When she heard that she can't enter the United States, she asked our representatives here - to deport her husband with her. Of course, it is not possible to arrange such a thing."[72] The consequences were serious for illegal immigrants if they were caught. Some were directly deported, while others first had to serve prison time. The worst consequences came only after returning to Yugoslavia. Because the trip to the US was expensive, many emigrants sold their land or borrowed money (land often guaranteeing repayment). The problem was all the greater because the land was often the most valuable property of emigrants and their main source of income. In addition, it was considered shameful to return from 'America' without money, especially if the person had not even been able to enter the country.[73]

Motives for illegal emigration

Potential illegal immigrants were aware of the consequences of getting caught. They knew they could lose all the land or money they got by selling their lands. The news of the arrests could have been received indirectly through newspapers, priests and the like, or perhaps directly from people who had been deported. Risks were high, meaning that motives had to be strong. They were different for each emigrant, but there are a few common ones. Economic motives certainly played an important role. According to one of the economic theories of migration, the neoclassical theory (push-pull), potential emigrants from economically underdeveloped countries are planning to move to more economically developed countries. Emigrating for them is a rational decision that they

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[72] Ibid, August 17, 1926.

[73] Ђикановић, "Америка упркос свему," 143.

view as an investment. Costs, risks and potential profits are taken into account, after which a
decision is made to leave or remain.[74] One of the factors affecting potential emigrants is the real
wages. Artur Benko Grado, a statistician, economist and expert on Yugoslav migration, calculated
the amount of real wages in Yugoslavia and the countries to which the largest number of emigrants
from that country went.[75] His calculation refers to 1929 and gives us the following information:

Country	Real wage relative to Yugoslavia in %
Australia	+ 84,95
Canada	+ 47,96
New Zealand	+ 35,4
South Africa	+ 24,27
USA	+ 23,34
Netherlands	+ 22,37
France	+ 7,89
Brazil	- 1,34
Uruguay	- 7,53
Belgium	- 7,56
Germany	- 9,59
Argentina	- 22,94
Chile	- 38,35

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[74] Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 21-23.

[75] Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević, "Artur Benko Grado Bojnički kao evidentičar migracionih and masovnih
gospodarsko-socijalnih kretanja u Hrvatskoj u prvoj polovici 20. stoljeća" [Artur Benko Grado Bojnički,
Chronicler and Statistician of Migrations and Mass Socio-Economic Events in Early 20th Century Croatia],
Podravina: časopis za multidisciplinarna istraživanja [Podravina: journal for interdisciplinary research] 22
(2012): 112.

Paraguay	- 56,85

As many as six countries have significantly higher real wages than Yugoslavia, which was a strong motive for (illegal) emigration.[76] In the US, wages were almost a quarter higher, but as many as four countries had even higher wages. The question is why Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa did not have much trouble dealing with illegal immigrants while the US did?[77] The answer lies in the fact that neoclassical theory, as well as any other theories that primarily relies on any types of economic paradigm, cannot fully explain migrations. According to these theories, migrants do not go to countries with worse economic conditions. There are seven countries on Benko's list that had lower real wages than Yugoslavia, which should have meant that no one emigrated there. However, according to official Yugoslav statistics, almost two-fifths of all emigrants went to these countries. To Australia, the country with the highest real wages, only one in 200 Yugoslav emigrants went, while Argentina, that had lower wages, almost every fifth emigrant chose as its destination.[78]

Although wage levels were certainly a factor in the decision-making process of emigrants, there were other important ones. One of them is described by the Migration system theory. It refers to the connections between at least two countries where a flow of migrants exists. There are three levels of such connections. Macro level refers to the institutional factors such as interstate relations, laws, practices, and the like in the context of migrations. Micro level refers to migrant social

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[76] Artur Benko Grado, "Indeks migracije and komparativna migraciona statistika realnih nadnica" [Migration index and comparative migration statistics of real wages], *Indeks: tromjesečna revija na hrvatskom, franceskom, engleskom and njemačkom jeziku* [Index: quarterly review in Croatian, French, English and German], September 1930.

[77] Đikanović, *Iseljavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države*, 243-270; Đikanović, "Америка упркос свему," *passim.*

[78] Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 131-132.

networks. These include letters and visits of family members and friends. Meso level is the so-called 'Migrant industry'. That includes all factors (individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, etc.) that participate as any type of intermediary in the migration process. These are various agents, subagents, attorneys, smugglers, and the like who can assist but also exploit migrants.

It is important to note that in the context of illegal migration, they encourage migration because they benefit directly from them. In this case, exploitation of migrants may be more frequent.[79] All three levels existed between Yugoslavia and the US. Macro level in terms of unequal development and meso level in the form of the work of steamship agents and smugglers. The micro level stimulus that encouraged emigration was the strongest from the United States, as that country hosted by far the highest number of Yugoslav emigrants. It is estimated that 600,000 emigrants from Yugoslavia lived there, representing 80% of all emigrants from that country.[80] In addition, among a portion of the population, the United States had a reputation as the most prosperous country for immigration. Geographic location also facilitated smuggling. In some other developed countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, almost the only way to enter was through ports that were always strictly and easily controlled. Ways of entering the US were more numerous than just through its ports.

Finally, illegal immigrants who successfully entered the United States could encourage others who were thinking of doing the same. One of them sailed as a sailor on a Yugoslav ship called *Sreća* [*Happines*] to New York. The crew numbered 35 members. Ten of them left the ship and entered the country illegally.[81] Another case of successful evasion of US immigration laws is

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[79] Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 27-30.

[80] Miletić, *Journey under Surveillance*, 98-99.

[81] Joe Misurac, December 19, 2018, 02:57, comment on Josip Humjan, "Illegal emigration."

from 1939 when one of the Navy sailors left his ship in New Orleans. That person stayed in the US and did not see his wife and children that he left in Yugoslavia until 1950.[82]

An extreme example is Ivan Perković, who illegally entered the United States in the late 1920's and avoided contact with the Croatian community in fear of deportation. He introduced himself under the name John Barisi. He did not contact his wife and children he had in the 'old country' until before his death in the 1980's. By then, he already had a wife of Jewish descent, who also did not know about his true identity.[83] The exact number of illegal immigrants can never be determined. The US immigration authorities did not have any reliable estimates of their numbers, location, or the intensity of crossings.[84] Very loose estimates indicate an annual influx of 40,000 to 175,000 illegal immigrants in the years immediately following the introduction of the quota system.[85] The number of illegal immigrants from the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia also cannot be determined. The conservative estimate is that there were hundreds of them. However, considering the high number of people interested in emigrating, it is possible that tens of thousands of emigrants have tried to enter the United States illegally.

Conclusion

In the early 19th century, politically and poor residents of various countries began to perceive the newly formed United States as a country that offered them opportunities they did not have at home. Tens of millions of people crossed the oceans in search of a better life, among which

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[82] Victor Grgas, December 16, 2018, 18:42, comment on Josip Humjan, "Illegal emigration."

[83] Ivica Marušić, December 16, 2018, 20:17, comment on Josip Humjan, "Illegal emigration."

[84] Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 61.

[85] Sadowski-Smith, "Unskilled Labor Migration and the Illegality Spiral," 789.

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the inhabitants of the European and Asian continents were the most numerous. Over time, economically, politically and racially based pressures in the promised land resulted in the closure of borders. Legislative measures have sought to prohibit migration, one of the most natural phenomena in human society. This could only be partially accomplished as state institutions did not have the resources to stop mass migration in the short term. The triumph of nativism pushed migration flows from the sphere of legality to illegality, which meant that migrants had to leave the safety of migrant networks and deliver themselves into the smugglers' hands at least partially. Since, the road to 'El Dorado' has been longer, harder and more dangerous. Much of the migrant flow has been relocated from Ellis Island to various transit countries where there were no US officials and strict control. They were replaced by the 'migrant industry', which promised border crossing to anyone who was willing to pay.

Despite the problems, the risk of deportation, shame and complete impoverishment, many migrants still opted for the precarious act of smuggling. Economic prosperity and migrant networks were, for some, powerful enough to encourage people to take that voyage. Illegal migration is one of the main features of international migrations during the interwar period. They arose as a result of conflicts of interest between states that sought to close their borders and migrants, who sought to cross them. The two sides were able to match each other, which meant that neither could take an absolute victory over the other. The consequence of such conflict was the emergence of illegal migration - a phenomenon which consequences were felt primarily by migrants themselves.

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The Second Amendment: Militia and Bearing Arms as Civic Duties in the Early American Republic

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Abstract

The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the legal and political thinking that resulted in the passing of the Second Amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution. The research is organized chronologically. It proceeds from colonial era precedents to first attempts at securing the rights and duties of the early citizens of the republic. It then continues by examining the heady debate surrounding the drafting and passing of the Constitution, and finally traces the Amendment's legislative route through the 1ˢᵗ U.S. Congress. Source material consists of relevant political documents of the era, such as colonial charters, state constitutions, the Federalist Papers, Anti-Federalist writings etc. The research findings support the hypothesis that both competing modern interpretation models of the Second Amendment, the collective rights model and the individual rights model, are relatively hard to reconcile with historical evidence. A proposed model of understanding the Amendment through civic rights and duties is more suited to the thinking of the founders of the American Republic. It is hard to offer a concise answer on the research question of what particular right or rights the U.S. Congress intended to protect by passing the Second Amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights. This is because the Amendment was a result of political compromise, and therefore an attempt to appease several differentiating viewpoints. The right to keep and bear arms was part of the civic right to serve in the militia, which

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had a function crucial to national defense, as well as an instrument of safeguard against the tyranny

of government, be that federal or local variety.

Introduction

"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."[1] This is the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights that was added to the United States Constitution in 1791. Although the Bill of Rights was passed only after a bitter debate between the two leading political factions of the time, known as Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the Second Amendment was a mere sideshow of the whole ordeal.

As gun related deaths in the U.S. have increased, even as overall crime levels have decreased, and firearm regulation in general has become a cultural and political hot-button issue, the legal meaning of the Second Amendment has become more embattled.[2] To generalize a complicated issue, two opposing camps of debate have emerged, the gun-control advocates, who favor the so-called collective rights model of interpretation of the Amendment, and the gun right advocates, who favor the so-called individual rights model. In a landmark case in 2008, *District of Columbia v. Heller*, the U.S. Supreme Court made a 5-4 decision in favor of the individual rights model of interpretation. This decision was viewed as a shift in contrast to the court's previous interpretation and followed a "revisionist" trend in the academic discourse concerning the issue.[3]

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[1] "The Bill of Rights: A Transcription," America's Founding Documents, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript.

[2] John Gramlich, "What the Data Says about Gun Deaths in the U.S.," *Pew Research Center*, August 16, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/what-the-data-says-about-gun-deaths-in-the-u-s/.

[3] David Yassky, "The Second Amendment: Structure, History and Constitutional Change," *Michigan Law Review* 99, no. 3 (2000): 589-591.

The debate, however, has been largely portrayed in binary terms, as debates about the meaning of the past often tend to be. Yet, as historian Saul Cornell has pointed out, neither of the two leading theories are quite satisfactory to a keen student of history.[4] The exact meaning of the Second Amendment has often puzzled scholars, so much so, that few have ventured to investigate it until fairly recently.[5] Therefore, we should not be surprised that posterity has interpreted the Second Amendment often without giving its rich history the emphasis it deserves. Mark V. Tushnet, who has provided an excellent comparison on how historical arguments have been used by the opposing contemporary camps to further their respective political agendas, has also scolded academics for engaging in this partisan debate by cherry-picking arguments from the historical data to support either of these interpretation models.[6] Cornell, an expert on the subject, has tried to establish a third model of understanding the amendment, a model more in line with the historical understanding of the Second Amendment. It is Cornell's view that the Amendment was originally neither an individual nor a collective right to keep and bear arms, but rather a civic right for citizens to fulfill their duty in the militia.[7]

Keeping all of the above in mind, I have posed the following question to my research: *What particular right or rights did the U.S. Congress intend to protect by passing the Second Amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights?* With more than 200 years having passed since James Madison presented the first draft of the Second Amendment to the Congress, it is reasonable to say that knowing something about its history is not only beneficial, but essential to anyone wishing to have

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[4] Saul Cornell. *A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.

[5] Sanford Levinson, "The Embarrassing Second Amendment," *Yale Law Journal* 99, no. 3 (1989): 639-640.

[6] Mark V. Tushnet, *Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can't End the Battle over Guns* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), xv-xvi, 25.

[7] Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 2.

a thorough understanding of the Amendment. Therefore, I am attempting to establish an introduction to the legal and political thinking in the early American republic that produced the Second Amendment. We will have a brief look at the historical precedents of the Amendment, move on to the ideological and practical background of the issues involved, and peek behind the curtains of the 1st U.S. Congress, where James Madison presented the Bill of Rights to his colleagues in 1789.

Militia and Bearing Arms before the Independence

The preamble of the Second Amendment is about "a well-regulated" militia. This part of the Amendment, however, has become problematic to interpret in a modern society, because the militia institution was largely replaced by the U.S. National Guard in the turn of the 20th century.

In colonial times, the militia had a very meaningful and important role to play in society. The colonial subjects were still British at heart, and as such, they were keenly aware of the fact that they held the same rights and duties as any subject of the crown. According to historian Bernard Schwartz the colonists were from the beginning of their colonial life "endowed with the two essentials of the English Constitution: a representative legislative assembly and recognition of the rights of Englishmen."[8]

The Colonial Charters were the first documents to establish these essentials. Already in 1606, the First Charter of Virginia states how "all and every the Persons being our Subjects... , shall have and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all

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[8] Bernard Schwartz, ed., *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 1:49-50. In accessing colonial and early republic documents, I have relied heavily on Schwartz's brilliant book, which offers a large selection of relevant material with useful commentary by the author.

Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of England."[9] The colonies were also granted an astonishing amount of self-governance, which laid effective foundations for the later republicanism of the United States. Specific statutes for organizing militias or bearing arms do not appear in these charters. British common law tradition, another legal construction that the colonists brought with them from England, however, did support these ideas.[10]

Well before American Independence, the North American colonists had already formed militias to provide security for themselves.[11] This was natural, because regular British troops were not always available or wanted. To the colonists the militia was not just a military force, but "it also provided the only means to protect communities from civil unrest."[12] In essence, it functioned as a police force when needed. These militias were most often drawn from local men and rarely served outside their home region and typically included white males from the age of sixteen up to sixty years.[13]

To fulfill their civic duty in the militia, the colonists naturally needed weapons. The English Bill of Rights from 1689 guaranteed a right to these, with some caveats. "...the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law; that the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law."[14] The preceding segment about standing armies is relevant here,

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[9] Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights*, 59-60.

[10] Michael Waldman, *The Second Amendment: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), pt. 1, ch. 2, section 1.

[11] Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 1, section 2.

[12] Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 3.

[13] Stephen P. Halbrook, *That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right,* rev.ed. (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2014), 64, 73, and 187.

[14] Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights*, 43.

because it relates to a debate that was to become prominent in the early American republic; the debate on whether to entrust the national defense to militia or a regular army. The colonists, essentially, decided to choose the former approach.

As the advent of the revolution drew nearer, the colonists started to give more and more thought to organizing a military defense. In 1772, two years after the Boston Massacre, a document known as "The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights" was produced in Massachusetts. Among the natural rights of the colonists, it listed: "First, a Right to Life; Secondly to Liberty; thirdly to Property; together with the Right to support and defend them in the best manner they can."[15]

The colonists were becoming increasingly concerned about what they viewed as continuous usurpations of their rights. The British had quartered an increasing number of regular soldiers in Massachusetts, which had become the hotbed of American insurgency. Suddenly there was a tangible fear among the colonists of being stripped of their weapons. Militias, which previously had been "occasions for friends and neighbors to come together to drill and celebrate", attained a much more serious role.[16] The militia was also well suited to the idea of civic republicanism (or civic humanism) that cherished civic virtue and civil society above all, and was one of the leading principles of the early Republic.[17] Permanent armies were an antithesis, the favorite tool of the tyrannical European monarchs, and therefore better avoided, especially during times of peace.

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[15] Ibid., 200. According to Schwartz, this document was largely drafted by Massachusetts statesman Samuel Adams. Adams was also a vocal advocate for individual right to possess arms. See: Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 14-15.

[16] Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 12-13.

[17] Tushnet, *Out of Range*, 11.

Militia and Bearing Arms before the Constitution

American independence brought with it the arduous task of constructing a functioning framework of society for the new nation. The American Constitution was still some years away, but The Articles of Confederation, which preceded it, as well as the respective state constitutions, already featured attempts to protect the rights that were later included in the Second Amendment.

Many of the state constitutions contained either a separate bill of rights or provisions protecting a wide range of individual and collective rights in the constitutions themselves.[18] Statutes warning against standing armies were common, as were statutes placing military forces under local civilian control.[19] Again, while these statutes are not mentioned in the Second Amendment, they are closely related to the broader discourse concerning security and defense of the United States. In written texts they also often appeared right after or before the statutes concerning militias and bearing arms.

New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland all articulate regulations for militia, but do not mention anything specifically about arms.[20] The subject of arms does come up in several state constitutions, however. Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), article number 13, states, "That a well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free State."[21] Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire all discussed bearing or keeping arms in some detail.[22] It is notable that the context was in most cases related to either militia, defense of the state in general, or people religiously

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[18] Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights*, 256.

[19] A fine example of this would be the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776. In Ibid., 266.

[20] Ibid., 259, 278, 282.

[21] Ibid., 235.

[22] Ibid., 266, 287, 297, 312, 324, 342, 377-378.

scrupulous of bearing arms, such as Quakers.[23] Only Pennsylvania and Vermont explicitly guaranteed an individual right to bear arms outside the civic duty of common defense. Vermont Declaration of Rights (1777), article XV, declares "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State." This is a verbatim repetition of the article XIII from Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights.[24]

The Articles of Confederation provides an interesting take about arming and defense. Article VI, section 4 states: "...nor shall anybody of forces be kept up, by any State, in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States, in congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage."[25] Here again the subject of arming citizens is discussed in the context of militia, and indeed the men serving in the militias were to be provided arms and ammunition by their home state. This of course does not mean that these men were not allowed to own their own individual weapons, only that The Articles of Confederation, de facto constitution of 1781 to 1789, did not provide specific guarantees towards such right.

The Articles proved to be a short-lived experiment. For reasons too complex and numerous to address here in any meaningful detail, the political leaders of the Republic decided to assemble a Constitutional Convention in 1787. This produced one of the most enduring and influential legal documents of human history, the current Constitution of the United States, which replaced the

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[23]A fine example of this would be the New Hampshire Declaration of Rights. In Ibid., 377.

[24] Ibid., 266, 324.

[25] "Transcript of Articles of Confederation (1777), ourdocuments. gov, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=3&page=transcript.

Articles of Confederation. The Constitution as we know it, however, was not yet complete. A bitter political debate for and against the new Constitution between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists preceded its ratification. The most concrete compromise between the viewpoints was the suggestion to amend the Constitution with a bill of rights.

As the state legislatures pondered the ratification of the new constitution, the debate moved from private to the public sphere. The goal of the Federalist faction was to influence the public as well as the legislatures to pass the Constitution. The Anti-Federalists wanted to stop this at first, and later, after the Constitution was ratified, turned their attention towards amending it.

Militia and Bearing Arms in the Fight for the Constitution

The task to organize an efficient and trustworthy defense for the new republic was made much harder by the fact that the new American nation was comprised of several quasi-independent states that all cherished their sovereignty. Concerns of personal rights and liberties were also to be considered. The colonists had felt betrayed by the British monarchy and wanted to explore all the possible avenues to guard against similar betrayal from their own government(s). Their aspiration was to have armed forces that were dependable but could not be turned against their own citizens. The Second Amendment was to be a part of the means to this end.

The Federalist faction, arguing for the swift ratification of the Constitution, rallied behind Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, who under the pseudonym of Publius, authored *The Federalist Papers,* a collection of essays that posterity has elevated among the most studied and revered documents of American history. The essays were published between 1787 and 1788 in New York newspapers.

The Anti-Federalist writings, authored by several persons under various pseudonyms, did not achieve the same level of canonization as their counterparts, but are nevertheless among the most

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important Founding Era documents. The fact that the Anti-Federalists ultimately succeeded in their demand to amend the Constitution is a testament to their historical importance.

A close reading of the essential essays for and against the Constitution provides some fruitful insight into the debate that finally resulted in the formation of constitutional amendments. Before examining them more closely, however, it is prudent to see what the Constitution itself had to say about the topics related to the Second Amendment.

Article I, section 8, authorizes the federal government "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," and "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions", and "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."[26]

Clearly the powers granted to the federal government in this respect were much more specifically enunciated than in the Articles of Confederation. It left relatively little room for the states in the matter, or at least that is what many critics of the Constitution claimed. As the following will adequately show, the exchange between the two opposing camps concerning these powers was fierce.

Standing army, an institution that was described as "grand engine of oppression" by a leading Anti-Federalist, could now be used as a tool to enforce the collection of taxes.[27] His fellow Anti-

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[26] "The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription," America's Founding Documents, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript.

[27] Murray Dry and Herbert J. Storing, eds., *The Anti-Federalist: An Abridgement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 20.

Federalist, The Federal Farmer concurs: "...a military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point - despotic government."[28]

As we have seen, some state constitutions did provide statutes limiting the use of standing armies, or warning against them. The Anti-Federalists wished a similar statute would be attached to the Federal Constitution as well. Alexander Hamilton, however, in "Federalist #24," argues against his opponents. He describes at some length the geopolitical situation of the United States to justify the need for a standing army. He also remarks that the power of raising these armies is "lodged in the *Legislature*, not in the *Executive*" and that "this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people, periodically elected." So the fact that the people of the United States had the power to periodically elect their representatives, who in turn held the power to raise the army, in Hamilton's opinion, made sure that the Congress would find it hard to oppress its citizens.[29] The ability to vote the legislators out of office was to be the ultimate safeguard against government tyranny.

Another idea that the Anti-Federalists absolutely hated was the idea of a select militia, an elite militia that could at times be placed under the control of the federal government. The Federal Farmer writes that this select militia, formed most likely by "young and ardent part of the community, possessed of but little or no property" will "answer all the purpose of an army" and leave the rest of the population defenseless against them. He also reiterates the fear that this (or any other military force under government control) could be used "to enforce an execution of federal laws". This enforcement in the Farmer's view is best left to the sheriffs.[30]

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[28] Dry and Storing, *The Anti-Federalist*, 43.

[29] "The people" refers to that part of the population that had access to citizenship and voting rights.

[30] Dry and Storing, *The Anti-Federalist*, 51-52.

As one might expect, Alexander Hamilton, was far from pleased with this proposition. In "Federalist #29" he answers The Federal Farmer directly. "By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government."[31] A bit later, Hamilton continues: "There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; ...or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?"[32]

Shays' Rebellion during the Revolutionary War had shown that armed local militias could rise up in arms against state or federal government, should they feel injustice in the hands of it. To many Anti-Federalists, the right to insurrection was a safeguard of tyranny, but to Federalists like Hamilton it was a serious threat. They preferred the military forces of the nation to be under the control of the federal government.

As Hamilton puts it in "Federalist #29", the citizens would need to undergo regular military exercise to attain a degree of skill that he describes as "the character of a well-regulated militia," and that this would be a "real grievance" and a "serious public inconvenience" to the people.[33] This paragraph offers crucial insight into what the Second Amendment meant with the preamble of "a well-regulated Militia".

The Anti-Federalists, however, could not bring themselves to trust any sort of centralized military force. This positioned them at clear opposition with the Constitution, which intended for

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[31] In "Federalist #29," Hamilton repeats Farmer's words "young and ardent," clearly referring to his opponent's previously published text. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, *The Federalist*, ed. B.F. Wright (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), 228.

[32] Hamilton, Jay and Madison, *The Federalist*, 229-230.

[33] Ibid., 228.

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the nation to have both a (limited) standing army, strong enough to defend the garrisons and forts of the country, as well as centrally commanded militia to repel invasions or act against inner disturbances.

Both factions also had their say about arms in general. As we have concluded, many legal scholars argue that the English common law recognized a right to have arms for one's self-defense.[34] James Madison, in "Federalist #46", mentions the Americans possessing an advantage of being armed over "almost every other nation".[35] Another Federalist, Noah Webster observed "The Supreme Power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the body of the people are armed."[36]

Reading *The Federalist Papers*, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the authors intended to secure the right to keep arms constitutionally. Americans certainly did and should possess arms in their view, but it would seem that at least Hamilton was satisfied with whatever protection the state constitutions and common law provided. A quote from "Federalist #84" by Hamilton illustrates this thinking: "bill of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary..., but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?"[37] No specific amendments were needed in Hamilton's view, because they could be misconstrued or misused, and the federal government did not have powers to infringe upon the rights that the Anti-Federalists wanted to constitutionally protect. Hamilton was certain that the

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[34] See footnote 10, also: Halbrook, *That Every Man Be Armed*, 15-16 & 36.

[35] Hamilton, Jay and Madison, *The Federalist*, 335.

[36] Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 47.

[37] Hamilton, Jay and Madison, *The Federalist*, 535.

state constitutions provided ample protection for the rights of their respective inhabitants. One can debate endlessly whether he was right or wrong, but he appears to have foreseen with some clarity the troubles that future generations were to have when interpreting the Bill of Rights.

The Federal Farmer, who most constitutional academics distinguish as the most eloquent of the Anti-Federalists, offers a view with more individualistic tinge in his letter XVIII, while issuing a warning against centrally commanded militia. "These corps, not much unlike regular troops, will ever produce an inattention to the general militia; and the consequence has ever been, and always must be, that the substantial men, having families and property, will generally be without arms, without knowing the use of them, and defenceless; whereas, to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them."[38]

Another interesting Anti-Federalist voice in this discourse is the "Address and Reasons for Dissent", published in *Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser* in December 1787. Pennsylvania had ratified the federal Constitution with the final vote standing as 46-23, but the Anti-Federalist camp wanted to make public its dissent in the address. The writer/writers proposed a declaration of rights to be added to the Constitution. Statute No. #7 is of particular interest to us: "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals."[39]

In this proposal, which was not adopted, but was nevertheless influential, the individual right to bear arms for several different reasons was retained, but also the potential public danger of such

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[38] "Letters from the Federal Farmer to The Republican XVIII," Lee Family Digital Archive, Papers of the Lee Family, https://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/essays/fedfarmer/18.html.

[39] Dry and Storing, *The Anti-Federalist*, 207-208.

right was considered. Sadly, the final adopted form of the Second Amendment is nowhere near as plain-spoken. It is also noteworthy that while individuals were to retain their right to bear arms in this proposal, the state was still charged with the duty of arming the militia, thus ensuring that the weapons used by the militia were military grade instead of weapons used for recreational purposes.

To summarize the discourse between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists as it pertains to the Second Amendment; there clearly was some political will for ensuring an individual right to keep arms among the Anti-Federalists, but the issue was a minor one during this period, a "subplot" of the much more pressing issue of organizing the military matters of the country. The Federalists, meanwhile, most likely did not resist an individual right in any way but did not see the need for a specific constitutional right either.

The opposition, however, did eventually manage to convince at least one of them. By 1789, when the 1st U.S. Congress assembled, James Madison, one of the authors of *The Federalist Papers*, presented the first draft of the Second Amendment (among several other amendments) to his colleagues in the House of Representatives. Madison's change of heart is an interesting story in and of itself, but for the purpose of this article, it is sufficient to say that he tried to reconcile the differences between the opposing political factions for the benefit of the country at large.

Second Amendment in the First U.S. Congress

As we finally turn our attention towards the congressional debates concerning the Second Amendment, we once again discover that the discourse revolved around several intersecting issues. Militia and the right to keep and bear arms were wrapped together in a manner that might seem perplexing to our contemporary eyes. Serving as a contextual backdrop to this debate were bitter disagreements over different types of military forces and the power to control them, as well as

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concerns of how to factor in the religiously scrupulous citizens, all bound together with the nearly pathological fear of tyranny that is perhaps the key emotion that drove the founding era politics.

On the 8th of June 1789, keeping his promise to his constituents, Madison presented the constitutional amendments to the House of Representatives.[40] The proposal that would become the Second Amendment was originally recorded to the Congressional annals in the following form: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person."[41]

The reception that Madison received was rather unenthusiastic. Although the amendments were not dismissed out of hand, several representatives felt that the timing was not right for the Congress to consider amending a constitution that had only recently been ratified.[42] Madison's proposition was referred to a Committee of the whole, and the assembly would return to the matter on a later date.

On July 21, Madison implored his colleagues to take the amendments into further consideration.[43] A select committee consisting of one member from each state was appointed to report on the matter.[44] On the 13th of August, the select committee reported back, and again, some members were less than enthusiastic to act. Theodore Sedgwick from Massachusetts thought this as "a very improper time to enter upon the consideration of a subject which would undoubtedly

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[40] House of Representatives, "Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st sess.," *A Century of Lawmaking for A New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, 440-441, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=0%20.

[41] House of Representatives, "Annals of Congress," 451.

[42] Ibid., 464-466.

[43] Ibid., 685-686.

[44] Ibid., 690-691.

consume many days; and when they had so much other and more important business requiring immediate attention." Madison obviously did not think that the time was improper. He dryly responded that "the House had already gone through with subjects of a less interesting nature."[45]

The House of Representatives then began its deliberations on the subject, and the whole process lasted for several days. On the 17th of August, the proposal had been changed into the following form: "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms."[46] The amendment was now close to its final wording, although it still contained a clause concerning conscientious objectors. The clause concerning the right to keep and bear arms had been repositioned after the militia clause. According to Saul Cornell this is consequential, because "preambles, the introductory clauses of statutes, were commonly understood by eighteenth-century lawyers to hold the key to the 'design and meaning' of a law."[47] Whatever the reasons for this repositioning may be, they must have been important enough for the congressmen to take such action in the first place. It does however point towards the fact that the right to keep and bear arms was intricately connected with civic duties of forming militias and militia service in general.

Another small modification made at this time was replacing the word "country" with "state". This also alters the understanding of the Amendment somewhat significantly as it nudges it towards protecting states' rights instead of the country at large.

Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts commented on the proposal in Congress. "This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the mal-administration of the

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[45] Ibid., 731.

[46] Ibid., 777.

[47] Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia*, 60.

government." This view was not contested among his colleagues. Gerry then turned his attention to the clause concerning the "religiously scrupulous." He feared that if the federal government could determine any group of people as religiously scrupulous, they could use this clause as a pretext to "prevent them from bearing arms" and thus, he concludes that "under this provision, together with their other powers, the Congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as to make a standing army necessary."[48]

A research that concerns itself with the original understanding of the Second Amendment could not hope for a more revealing witness in history than Mr. Gerry. Here is an influential contemporary voice from the 18th century expressing his understanding on the subject. Gerry interprets the purpose of the proposed amendment to be securing "the people against the mal-administration of the government." The clause concerning the religiously scrupulous could possibly compromise this purpose in Gerry's opinion, because it could stop citizens from forming militias by disarming them. This concern harkens back to the fear of tyranny that was constantly on the mind of the Framers, Anti-Federalists especially. The militia was to be the great shield of liberty that would protect the Americans from government encroachment and weapons were needed for that institution to function properly.[49]

After a few minor changes to the amendments, the House of Representatives sent them to the Senate on the 24th of August 1789. Unfortunately, for us, unlike the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate did not keep a public record of its deliberations until much later, only a brief journal recording the general proceedings. On 4th of September that year, the Senate passed a motion to adopt the (then) fifth article of the amendments. On the same date, it rejected a motion to add a

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[48] House of Representatives, "Annals of Congress," 778.

[49] Mr. Gerry's fears are later echoed by Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania. House of Representatives, Ibid, 796.

clause warning against the keeping of standing armies during the time of peace. The wording now stood as follows: "a well regulated militia, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."[50]

On the 9th of September, the Senate, for a final time, returned on the subject. A motion to add words "for the common defense" after the words "bear arms" was rejected.[51] One can only wonder what sort of effect these words would have had to the historical interpretations of the amendment, had the motion been adopted. It certainly would have added a more collective tinge to our understanding of the Second Amendment. Only change to the form presented in the previous paragraph that was adopted, was omitting the word "best" that stood in front of the words "security of a free state".

After the Congress had approved the final list of the amendments, following the constitutional rules of amending itself, the Bill of Rights was now sent forth to the state legislatures.

After another long process, the Bill of Rights finally became of the law of the land on 15 December 1791. Ten of the twelve amendments proposed by the Congress were approved and ratified. The Second Amendment now stood in its final form.

Conclusion

We have traced the legal and political history of the ideas that influenced Madison and his compatriots to frame the Second Amendment from early British colonials all the way to the passing of the Bill of Rights. Right to form militias, right to keep and bear arms, treatment of conscientious

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[50] United States Senate, "Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, volume 1," *A Century of Lawmaking for A New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, 71, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsj&fileName=001/llsj001.db&recNum=0&itemLink=r?ammem/.

[51] Ibid., 77.

objectors, and organizing the defense of the American nation were all on the framers' agenda, as we have seen. We have also seen that the particular words chosen on the Amendment echoed many similar statutes and proposals presented in other documents. In that respect, the words chosen by the 1st Congress were hardly anything new or exciting.

We have established that "a well regulated Militia" was something that was formed by the white male population of the country between the ages of 16-60, approximately. It was to be a well-armed and well-exercised force. The Constitution already provided the federal government with the means to use this militia force against insurrections and invasions, as well as the right to organize, arm and discipline it. The Anti-Federalists were unsatisfied with the large control that the federal government had over the militia. The Second Amendment, essentially, was designed to return some of that control back to the states. The fear of government tyranny was a pervasive concern of the Anti-Federalists, and they saw the militia as the most important safeguard against this. Individual citizens could never stand against government oppression, but a militia could. For that safeguard to function properly, the militias needed weapons, and therefore the government, state or federal, was not to infringe upon the right of the people to keep arms and bear them in the service of the militia.

These essentially are the rights that the Framers intended for the Second Amendment to protect; the rights of the people to keep and bear arms, so they could fulfill their civic duty (and right) to serve in the local militia, that was to provide security and protection for the state and the country, but also to act as the ultimate safeguard against tyranny of the federal government, or other states for that matter. This is as concise an answer as we can come to, which is not to say that it is very concise at all. The Second Amendment does reflect the fact that the framers had to resolve very complicated issues with relatively little consensus on the details.

The contemporary understanding of the Second Amendment is problematic, largely because its history has been forgotten, and the society has undergone a significant change.

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Sometime in the late 19th century or early 20th century, the United States forgot its fear for a standing army. Today it has one of the largest, and arguably the strongest permanent military force in the world. State guards, the National Guard, and police forces both statewide and local have taken over the role that the militia played in the 18th and 19th century. This leaves the American jurisprudence with the difficult task of reconciling the Second Amendment with a contemporary society that relies on fundamentally different institutions to provide for its security. It also leaves the Second Amendment vulnerable to repeated reimagining, not only by legal scholars, but also by political forces. These, of course, are things that a historian cannot change. All that is left for him or her to do is to inform people of the historical implication of things, which could and perhaps should provide useful context in the unenviable task of trying to forge a better society.

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Bye, bye Belgium? Anti-Belgian Flemish Nationalism in the 1930s

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Abstract

Within the Flemish national movement and the public opinion there is still a lot of debate on when the Flemish national movement became anti-Belgian and, thus, separatist. For some, the First World War was the tipping point. Others use the Second World War as a starting point for this trend.[1] In this article, I will investigate whether or not the rhetoric used in the campaign for the termination of the Franco-Belgian military accord (1936) by the Flemish Veterans' Association (Vlaamse Oud-Strijders (VOS)) was anti-Belgian. However, this study will not provide a satisfactory solution to the discussion mentioned above. What it can exclude or confirm, however, is whether the Flemish Veterans' Association used a rather anti-Belgian or radical Flemish National rhetoric regarding this issue. This research aims to expose that rhetoric by means of an analysis of cartoons that were used on the front page of the magazine of VOS, entitled De Vos, in the period prior to the major planned demonstration against the military accord. Part of this research will be quantitative; the findings of this quantitative analysis will then be converted into a qualitative analysis. The hypothesis of this research is that the Flemish Veterans' association would already have been using an anti-Belgian rhetoric to a certain extent. However, that rhetoric

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[1] Wouter Verschelden, "Hoe de langetermijnstrategie van de N-VA van Vlamingen 'betere Belgen' maakt" [How the New Flemish Alliance long-term strategy makes Flemish people 'better Belgians'], *Newsmonkey*, September 25, 2017, https://newsmonkey.be/hoe-de-langetermijnstrategie-van-de-n-va-van-vlamingen-betere-belgen-maakt/.; Carl Devos, "Zonder onafhankelijkheid geen confederalisme" [Without independence, no confederacy], *Knack*, January 06, 2013, https://www.knack.be/nieuws/zonder-onafhankelijkheid-geen-confederalisme/article-opinion-82706.html?cookie_check=1561755709.

would not have been strongly influenced yet by the cartoons used and their possible interpretations. I also predict that they will portray Belgium as the emphasized victim rather than Flanders, and that France will be the big culprit in the whole story. In this way, it would have been possible to make their actions against the Franco-Belgian military accord as broad as possible, without allowing the separatist sentiment to play a decisive role. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to explicate the primary sources. First and foremost, it is essential to determine which elements appear in the cartoons analyzed in this study, and especially whether these elements have a rather Flemish national, anti-Belgian, pro-Belgian or anti-French undertone. This analysis will also determine whether any of those elements are recurrent. It is also interesting to investigate the interrelationships between these elements, which may reveal possible discrepancies between them. The research will also try to uncover the possible reasons for this. The analysis examines whether the cartoons are clarified by means of an attached text and the possible tendencies to be observed, as well as the sentiment and how it evolves. The research will also examine which roles are assumed within the drawings (Flanders, presented as a young lion cub chained to something that represents France and Belgium, for example). This research will also examine whether these roles change over time. An attempt will be made to explain any perceptible trends in order to determine whether the cartoons become grimmer or whether the elements change over time.

Introduction

For Belgium, the First World War was the catalyst for a great deal of change in the structures of the country. For example, universal voting rights for men were introduced in 1918, for women it was not until 1948 that they were able to make their voices heard directly in the Belgian democratic process. The First World War brought many changes on a diplomatic level as well. The imposed neutrality of Belgium, for example, which had been established when the

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country became independent, ceased to exist. The Belgian government thus concluded a military accord with France in 1920; the famous Franco-Belgian military accord.

The accord did not immediately satisfy the Flemish national movement. Indeed, the alliance of the Flemish Veterans' Association (VOS), with its anti-militarist character, was a great opponent of this accord.[2] In the first half of 1935, the association set up a major action against the accord. The Flemish policymakers were first made aware of this, which encouraged them to force the Belgian government to terminate this accord.[3] We can immediately distinguish the two main arguments as to why VOS would oppose the Franco-Belgian military accord. Their theory and fear that Belgium would lose part of its sovereignty to France as a result of this accord and that the Dutch language, the dominant language in the northern part of Belgium, would also disappear into the background was a cause for severe anguish to them. Their anti-military character also played a very important role in their criticism of the military accord of 1920. Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 - and later also as Head of State in 1934 - brought many countries in Europe to a high state of readiness. Hitler was extremely critical of the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty and wanted to terminate it as soon as possible, as we can clearly see in the 25-point program that the NSDAP drew up on 24 February 1920.[4] Across the European continent, people feared a new war and VOS realized that Belgium could be dragged into the conflict should a new war between France and Germany arise, in which case, Flemish blood would unnecessarily be spilled, similarly to what

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[2] Front page, De Vos, 17:43, 27.10.1935.

[3] Guido Provoost, "Het Frans-Belgisch Militair Akkoord Van 7 September 1920 En Zijn Invloed Op De Belgische Buitenlandse, Militaire En Binnenlandse Politiek (1920-1937)" [The Franco-Belgian Military Accord of September 7, 1920 and its influence on Belgian Foreign, Military and Domestic Politics (1920-1937)] (PhD diss., Universiteit Gent, 1975), 1:53.

[4] *Das 25-Punkte-Programm der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei* [The 25-Point Program of the National Socialist German Worker's Party] (München: Eher-Verlag, 1920).

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happened in "The Great War". VOS was therefore the most important actor in this narrative, which is why their perspective will play a significant role in this research.

Flemish Veterans' association: a history

Unofficially, Dr. Verduyn founded VOS or the Flemish Veterans' Association in 1917. The foundation became official under his chairmanship in 1919.[5] They were the Flemish variant of the *Nationale Strijdersbond* or NSB (National Veterans' Association). As already touched upon in the previous paragraph, they had three pillars on which they relied in order to develop their activities: the defense of the Flemish national cause, antimilitarism, and the defense of the veterans' interests. The aim of VOS was to be outside and above all politics.[6] Initially, membership of the association was reserved for veterans, which included both officers and soldiers. Exceptions were memberships for widows, orphans and parents of First World War veterans who had been killed in action. VOS wanted to broaden the scope of its activities in order to broaden public support and since many of the ex-combatants of the First World War had a much shorter life expectancy due to the terrible physical conditions in which they had served, VOS also wanted to increase the number of members allowed.[7] This operation, decided by The National Congress on October 30, 1921, would allow former soldiers who had not participated in an armed conflict, to join the association.[8] The nuance

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[5] Guido Provoost, *De Vossen: 60 Jaar Verbond Van Vlaamse Oudstrijders, 1919-1979* [De Vossen: 60 years Flemish Veteran'sVeterans' Association, 1919-1979] (Brussel: VOS, 1979), 14.

[6] Wouter Van Geert, "Het Verbond der Vlaamsche Oud-Strijders (1919-1945): stoffelijke belangen, Vlaams-nationalisme, antimilitarisme en collaboratie" [The Flemish Veteran'sVeterans' Association (1919-1945): material interests, Flemish nationalism and collaboration] (Thesis, Universiteit Gent, 2006), 14.

[7] Van Geert, "Het Verbond der Vlaamsche Oud-Strijders (1919-1945)" [The Flemish Veteran'sVeterans' Association (1919-1945)], 16.

[8] Ibid., 15.

that needs to be specified is that they did not immediately become members of VOS, but of a new organization called the *Bond van Vlaamse Oud-Soldaten*, BVOS (association of Flemish Old Soldiers). Both associations had largely the same program and worked very closely together: members even had the option to meet together despite the different membership cards and separate badges.[9] The Flemish Veterans' Association achieved its goal to increase the number of members and already in 1923, BVOS chapters reported a significant growth.[10] Not every attempt to increase the number of members was successful, however. This is reflected in the establishment of the VVOS in 1925, an organization for the spouses of ex-combatants or ex-soldiers. They were not previously included in the exceptions as the widows of the fallen and others (cf. supra). Up until 1932, only 21 municipalities had established a chapter of the women's union of VOS, and after 1932 VOS halted extensive attempts to set up such chapters. The Central Administration stated that the initiative should come from the women themselves and could not be artificially imposed.[11] According to Van Geert, the establishment of the youth departments of VOS in 1926 was not a general success either. This is supported by the fact that JVOS is almost never mentioned in the membership magazine. Initially, the members of JVOS were between 14 and 18 years old, later they broadened the age limit from 12 to 20 years of age, which suggests that JVOS had difficulties setting up fully-fledged departments. Finally, VOS set up an association for deportees: the VZAB, which will be founded in 1930. Membership opened at the National Congress in 1928, to every person who could be mobilized. This completed the broadening of VOS. To conclude, VOS had become a sort of hodgepodge of successful and less successful initiatives to expand their membership base and increase the depth of the association. They set up various associations,

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[9] Ibid., 16.

[10] Ibid., 17.

[11] Ibid., 17-18.

ranging from music and theatre associations to savings companies and bookshops. However, some were successful while others were not. For example, the list of members of the Flemish artists Old Soldiers (VKOS) would remain empty apart from the name of the founder.[12]

Becoming anti-Belgian?

Within the Flemish movement and public opinion, there is still an on-going discussion about when the Flemish movement became anti-Belgian. For some, it is before, for others during or after the First World War, and still others claim it happened at a totally different time, for example in the run-up to the Second World War.[13] This research aims to investigate whether or not the rhetoric used in the campaign for the withdrawal of the Franco-Belgian military accord in 1936 by the Flemish Veterans' Association (VOS) in their member magazine was anti-Belgian. However, this study will not provide a satisfactory solution to the discussion mentioned above. What it can exclude or confirm, however, is whether the Flemish Veterans' Association used anti-Belgian or radical Flemish National rhetoric on this issue. This research aims to expose that rhetoric through the analysis of cartoons that were used on the front page of the weekly member magazine of VOS, entitled De Vos, in the period prior to the major planned demonstration against the military accord. Part of this research will be quantitative; the findings of this quantitative analysis will then be converted into a qualitative analysis. The hypothesis of this research is that the Flemish Veterans already used an anti-Belgian rhetoric to a certain extent. However, this would not have been heavily present in the used cartoons or in any interpretation yet. I also predict that they will portray Belgium

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[12] Ibid., 19.

[13] Verschelden, "Hoe de langetermijnstrategie van de N-VA van Vlamingen 'betere Belgen' maakt" [How the New Flemish Alliance long-term strategy makes Flemish people 'better Belgians'].; Devos, "Zonder onafhankelijkheid geen confederalisme" [Without independence, no confederacy].

as a victim rather than Flanders and that France will be the main culprit in the whole story. That way, it will be possible to broaden their action against this military accord. In order to test this hypothesis, it is necessary to analyze and interpret the sources. First, it is essential to determine which elements appear in the cartoons and whether these elements have a rather Flemish national, anti-Belgian, pro-Belgian or anti-French character. We will use this analysis to determine whether the elements are recurrent and whether the interrelationships between these elements have any discrepancies. The research will also try to uncover the rationality of this. The analysis examines whether the cartoons are clarified by means of an attached text, and examines the possible trend as well as the evolution of sentiment. The test will also examine which roles are assumed within the drawings (Flanders, presented as a young lion cub chained to something that France and Belgium represent for example). The research will also examine whether these roles change over time. An attempt will be made to explain any perceptible trends in order to determine whether the cartoons become grimmer or whether the elements change over time.

What sources were used?

The realization of this research was not pure guesswork. First and foremost, this research established a chronological demarcation, starting with the first issue of De Vos in 1935, up until the last edition of the members magazine in 1936. The reason this demarcation is used is because it is more logical to search for cartoons about the actions against the accord in the years leading up to its termination. Guido Provoost's doctoral dissertation from 1975 also states that the most interesting period to cover this theme is from the year 1935 onwards, as VOS was setting up a major action on the subject in that year.[14] Searching the weekly issues of De Vos, all cartoons that

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[14] Provoost, "Het Frans-Belgisch militair akkoord" [The Franco-Belgian Military Accord], 1:53.

(partially) deal with the termination of the Franco-Belgian military accord were collected in order to investigate these cartoons more closely. Sampling is not applied in order to draw certain conclusions from the figures obtained in this investigation. The rather limited population within the study, which concerns thirty cartoons on the front page, also perfectly allows this. This guarantees the completeness of the research on the one hand and prevents possible errors that could occur when certain cartoons are omitted on the other hand. Concerning the actual research, the working method is as follows: in the analyzed drawings, the research sought on the one hand, Flemish-national elements such as the Ijzertoren in Diksmuide, and on the other hand, Belgian elements both pro and contra, and anti-French elements. The analysis was also based on why the cartoon was published, for example, as a demonstration or just to convince people. Then it was also logical to see what role VOS assigns itself within the cartoons. Do they see themselves as the saviors of Flanders or do they adopt a more nuanced attitude? Finally, the experiment examines whether other groups play a role in the cartoons. For example, it examines whether the army command or the bourgeoisie are critically scrutinized. The figures obtained in this way are converted into graphs and analyses in order to determine possible trends. By using this method, it became possible to answer every subquestion of the research.

What is exhibited?

In drawings and cartoons you can undoubtedly distinguish many different elements. It is therefore important in the context of this research to discern them in order to determine whether they carry a certain symbolism or expression of nationalism. It is important to note that the research only included the most striking elements here and that it cannot be ruled out that there were several more to be found. The graph below shows the most striking categories. There are about twenty elements that cannot be found in the graph due to their miniscule quantity and the insignificance

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of the possible conclusions. However, it is possible that some of the twenty elements that are not included in this graph are used in the other graphs (cf. infra) because they may contain the symbolism that meets the established criteria from the introduction. An example of this is the usage of the typical Marianne figure which is included in the anti-French section of the paper but excluded in this general analysis.

The first relevant element was the use of children in the cartoons. We see that this is reflected in three cartoons. The role of the children depicted can be very different. Sometimes they are perceived as the main victims of the military accord and its consequences, which is the case in two of the three cartoons.[15] In other cases, it is more apparent that the children, and in particular their future, are the main target of the opposition to the Franco-Belgian military accord. Next, the chains are discussed. VOS sees the resistance against the "blood accord" as a liberation from the chains of both Belgium and France.[16] Thirdly, there is a share of the elements earmarked for the representation of death, which occurs in five cases. This can also be done in various ways. For example, death may be depicted as a direct consequence of the military accord, but it may also be a result of a different decision of the Belgian government, such as the decrees of secretary Devèze.[17] When death is near, the tombstones are not far away either. They occur in as many cases as the element death, but not necessarily in the same cartoons. It is often seen that VOS uses the *heldenhuldezerken*, typical Flemish nationalist tombstones, which originated during the First World War.[18] In addition, the draughtsman of VOS also uses a soldier five times in his drawings.

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[15] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:28, 12.7.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:42, 20.10.1935.

[16] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18.2, 12.1.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:6, 9.2.1936.

[17] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:19, 10.5.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:20, 17.5.1936.

[18] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935.

These soldiers, who can be both French and Belgian, also take on very different roles. For example, the soldiers are sometimes depicted as instigators of evil, but also as ordinary people present in the background, as in the cartoon about the Decrees of Denunciation of Devèze.[19] What is striking is that if one wants to put the army in a bad light, one will not or seldom reach for an ordinary soldier as *pars pro toto* but always use a person in officers uniform.[20] This can of course be explained by the composition of VOS' membership, which consisted mainly of Flemish Dutch-speaking soldiers and not of French-speaking officers, the generic composition of the Belgian army.[21] The fact that women also had their place in VOS soon became clear in the opening up of membership to certain women (cf. supra). As a result, women, after the children, could not be lacking in the campaign either. A woman is depicted five times. She often stands side by side with a male figure, which leads us to believe that VOS attached a great deal of importance to the family and the role of the domestic relationship.[22] The woman was sometimes depicted alone, in the context of pointing out the man's "duty" to take care of his wife and child(ren) and to secure their future, which according to VOS is not possible within the Franco-Belgian military accord.[23] Of course, the depiction of the military accord itself was also an essential part of the cartoons. The accord was depicted six times, again in diverse formats and degrees of importance. Campaigning was apparently also very important for VOS. The depiction of a demonstration is the same as that of the accord (both depicted six times). This of course fits in with their culture of acting against something, which we

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[19] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:39, 29.9.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:22, 2.6.1935.

[20] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:22, 2.6.1935.

[21] Tim Trachet, "Mythes over de Eerste Wereldoorlog: Vlaamse soldaten de dood in omdat ze geen Frans kenden" [World War I myths: Flemish soldiers killed because they did not know French], *VrtNWS*, November 10, 2014, https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2014/11/10/vlaamse_soldatendedoodinomdatzegeenfranskenden-1-2111732/.

[22] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:27, 7.7.1935.

[23] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:43, 27.10.1935.

also see with the big demonstration against the Franco-Belgian military accord.[24] Subsequently, the analysis also notes that VOS does not seem to be so inclined towards the upper class. The bourgeoisie is depicted seven times and depicted badly in all cases. For example, they sometimes hand over the weapons to the war machine themselves or they try to undermine the actions of VOS.[25] The importance of symbolism and suchlike for VOS will become clear in the rest of the research, but the frequent usage of flags struck us in the analysis of the elements. Seven times a flag was observed in the cartoons. Further on in the research, we will examine what these flags contained and whether they could be combined within certain elements. The observation of the war material was the penultimate element that was observed. This 'heavy artillery' is always used in a negative context to reinforce the message of VOS.[26] The rationale the artist recurrently uses is not entirely illogical, since the memory of the roar of artillery surely evoked traumatic memories among the population and certainly among the veterans of the First World War. Finally, we discuss "the man", the most observed element by far in this research. We see this element 22 times in the cartoons. This is not entirely inconsistent since VOS was mainly focused on men. It was much easier for men to become a member of VOS than for women (cfr. supra).

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[24] Provoost, "Het Frans-Belgisch militair akkoord" [The Franco-Belgian Military Accord], 1:53.

[25] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:22, 2.6.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:39, 29.9.1935.

[26] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:36, 8.9.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:20, 17.5.1936.

What general elements do we distinguish?

Element	Value
Child	3
Chain	4
Death	5
Tombstone	5
Soldier	5
Woman	5
Treaty	6
Demonstration	6
Bourgeoisie	7
Flag	7
War material	8
Man	22

Flemish national elements

Within the analyzed cartoons of De Vos there are certainly Flemish national elements to be distinguished. In total, the research distinguished nineteen of those elements in fifteen different cartoons. For example, we see that the association eagerly uses the Flemish lion to reinforce their message. The lion can be found on the flags as well as on the clothing of the characters in the cartoon or even as a character in itself, but this was a one-time occurrence.[27] This is the most commonly used Flemish national symbol in the drawings: in nine of the nineteen Flemish national elements we see the Flemish lion returning as a symbol, which is more than 47%.[28] Furthermore, we see that the cartoonist regularly goes back to the recent past, namely the First World War. For

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[27] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:7, 17.2.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:22, 31.5.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:27, 7.7.1935.

[28] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:7, 17.2.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:27, 7.7.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:28, 14.7.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:48, 1.12.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:1, 5.1.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:2, 12.1.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:22, 31.5.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:27, 5.7.1936.

example, the typical Flemish national heldenhuldezerken are used, as well as the Ijzertoren, with or without an alternative inscription such as: "Here's our blood, when do we get our rights?"[29] These commemorations of the First World War can be found in three of the nineteen drawings, which account for more than 15% of the total number of Flemish national symbolism. The Battle of the Golden Spurs is also a preferred subject in the cartoons. The cartoonist of De Vos, for instance, goes back to the mythical past of Flanders in which the Flemish peasant army triumphed over the French knights near Courtrai in 1302.[30] This simplistic, nationalistic and mythical vision is annulled in contemporary academic literature but still has a decent following within the Flemish national movement.[31] The use of *nationalgeschichte* is not foreign to the artist. It is an attempt by VOS to legitimize their struggle against France and Belgium and for Flemish independence and self-determination by making readers think that this is the same struggle. At one point, he eagerly used figures and events such as Jacob van Artevelde and the Peasants' War to reinforce the struggle of VOS against what they called the "blood accord " between France and Belgium.[32] This *nationalgeschichte* occurs in five of the nineteen cartoons. This accounts for about a quarter of the total number of cartoons. Finally, we come to the last category, which is also the smallest, which only occurs two out of nineteen times, or just ten percent. This category consists of cartoons that use slogans or inscriptions. These sentences are crucial for the form of the cartoon, as they give the

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[29] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935.

[30] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:28, 14.7.1935.

[31] Véronique Lambert, "De Guldensporenslag van fait-divers tot ankerpunt van de Vlaamse identiteit (1302-1838). De natievormende functionaliteit van historiografische mythen" [The Battle of the Golden Spurs from fait divers to the anchor point of the Flemish identity (1302-1838). The nationforming functionality of historiographical myths], *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* [Contributions and Communications on the history of the Netherlands] 115, no. 3 (2000): 390.

[32] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:27, (7.7.1935).

cartoons their clarity or give an interpretation. The other elements contained therein are often not clear enough to fully convey the point. The inscriptions therefore serve the purpose of clarity.

What Flemish nationalistic elements can we distinguish?

Belgian elements

When it comes to Belgian elements, not much could be found. In the analysis of the cartoons, only five anti-Belgian elements could be found, and we encountered no elements that had a pro-Belgian appearance. The draughtsman of VOS depicts Belgium badly, he does so in two of the five cases in a military context where Belgium is very clearly portrayed as an officer. It is striking that when Belgium is depicted in this way, France is always present in the same form, but with a typical French uniform instead of a Belgian one, of course.[33] It is also noteworthy that when VOS uses anti-Belgian elements, Flanders is always on the verge of dying or already dying. For

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[33] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:36, 8.9.1935; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:20, 17.5.1936.

example, the Belgian government ensures that Flanders is drowned by, among other things, the 'blood accord' and language legislation, or that Belgium and France squeeze Flanders to death when the Franco-Belgian military accord is concluded.[34] This is a rather remarkable conclusion. VOS shows itself to be quite radicalized and very anti-Belgian. It is striking that VOS does not consistently portray Belgium as a perpetrator, nor as a victim. What the analysis shows is that Belgium is very often illustrated along with France. We can therefore assume that VOS is beginning to see France and Belgium as a whole, concerning its fight against the Franco-Belgian military accord, as VOS believes that the Flemish sovereignty is being affected.[35] The hypothesis (cfr. supra) was therefore incorrect and will be further dissected in the conclusion.

Anti-French elements

The lack of Belgian elements is compensated by the large presence of anti-French elements. In nineteen of the thirty-one cartoons anti-French elements can be distinguished. In total, twenty-one such elements are present in the cartoons. France is depicted in the drawings as a war-mongering country four times. For example, in a particular cartoon, three guns with the French slogan "liberté, egalité et fraternité" are used.[36] This kind of cartoon is of course part of VOS's fear that Belgium will be dragged into a war between France and Germany by means of this accord. Another example can be seen in the issue of De Vos of 20 October 1935. In this cartoon, France is represented by the typical Marianne figure who imposes a gun to a Flemish man, but he refuses to

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[34] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:12, 20.3.1936; Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:48, 1.12.1936.

[35] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935.

[36] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935.

use the weapon, because France did not help Flanders after the war. The text accompanying the cartoon is: "No bread... ...No blood!"[37] Furthermore, VOS depicts France twice as the ruler of Belgium and Flanders. A frequently used slogan used by the editors of VOS is "Los van Frankrijk!" (Away from France!) or "Geen Vlaamsch bloed voor Frankrijk!" (No Flemish blood for France!). This theme can be found in the cartoon of 12 July 1936, for example. In this drawing we see a Marianne figure and a Gallic rooster again, two typically French symbols, and they stamp children with the initials RF (République française) with a laurel wreath around it. The text that accompanies it states: "Flemish serfdom." It can therefore be said that in this cartoon, VOS sees France as an oppressor. The cartoonist of VOS is also not afraid to go a step further in demonizing France. For example, in three of the twenty-one anti-French elements France murders Flanders, with the help of Belgium in some cases. There is a cartoon depicting France as a soldier with Flanders being represented by a man who is tied up in front of the barrel as the soldier is about to execute him.[38] Another example is France and Belgium locked in a handshake that is squeezing Flanders to death.[39] The first cartoon in my sample that kicks off the campaign against the Franco-Belgian military accord also contains an anti-French element that cannot be placed in any of the other categories and therefore constitutes a category in itself. This cartoon published on the 17th of February 1935, depicts a demonstration with all kinds of anti-French and anti-Belgian slogans on banners. For example, they call for amnesty for the Flemish collaborators of the First World War, they use the slogan "no Flemish blood for France" and they also protest the Franco-Belgian military accord. The cartoon is rather touting: it has the purpose of getting one to join the resistance. The last category is the "Away from France" category. In these cartoons, the prevailing theme is the

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[37] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:42, 20.10.1935.

[38] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:36, 8.9.1935.

[39] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 18:12, 20.3.1936.

slogan that is used for the general resistance against the accord. This category is by far the largest with eleven of the twenty-one elements, which accounts for just over 50%. So how does this slogan express itself? This slogan can be used as a caption for a cartoon. An example of this usage is seen in the cartoon of the 28th of April 1935.[40] In this cartoon, a man with a Flemish lion on his clothing is loosening a chain that ties him to a doghouse, with the inscription: "Franco-Belgian blood accord". Here we can take the cartoon quite literally in the sense that Flanders wants to effectively break away from France and Belgium. Another example can be found in the issue of De Vos of 16 February 1936. Here two men are sounding the bell, with one of them carrying the VOS sign. The sound that comes out of the bell is: "Away from France!"

It is striking that the Flemish national elements or inspired cartoons are often only depicted without any non-Flemish elements. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that, in the drawings in which only Flemish national elements are present, the intention is to depict Flanders

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[40] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:17, 28.4.1935.

as a strong and healthy country that does not need any other ruler. On the other hand, we do see that when other elements are used, Flemish national elements are always present to offer a counterbalance, with one exception.[41]

The campaign against the military accord

In the next section we will discuss a series of figures that are needed to show a complete overview of the VOS campaign to terminate the Franco-Belgian military accord. At first, it seemed interesting to examine to what extent VOS is making the military accord come to the fore in their cartoons or whether they are giving it a secondary degree of importance.


It is noticeable that in almost three quarters of the cases, the military accord comes to the fore. This is not entirely illogical, since the period we are investigating revolves around the actions of VOS with regard to the termination of the "blood accord". Moreover, it seemed relevant to

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[41] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:22, 2.6.1935.

examine how VOS sees itself within the opposition to the Franco-Belgian military accord. We did this through the cartoons by checking to what extent VOS itself is explicitly represented. On the one hand, this can be done, for example, by putting the VOS logo on clothing or including flags from VOS or one of its side associations, such as the BVOS.

The graph shows that VOS is not entirely reluctant to depict itself as a major player in the battle for the termination of what they consider to be the "blood accord."[42] In 43% of the cases, VOS sees itself as the only (36%) or partial (7%) actor against this accord. In 58% of the cases, it is not explicitly stated whether VOS sees itself as an important actor. Finally, we also examined the reason for the publication of the cartoon used. What was the ratio decidendi?

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[42] Cartoon on the front page, De Vos, 17:28, 14.7.1935.

■ Demonstration ■ Persuasion ■ Law

3%

32%

65%

In the cartoons, three rationes decidendi can be distinguished for the publication of the cartoons. In 3% of the cases it concerns the denunciation or the introduction of a new law. In this case, it is about the introduction of the "decrees of denunciation" of the liberal minister of defense Albert Devèze in the Van Zeeland I administration. 65% of the cartoons revolve around convincing people of their points of view. One third of the cartoons call for a demonstration. It mostly concerns the participation in the large national demonstration on the 22nd March 1936 or a call for mobilization of the Yser Pilgrimage of 1935.

The use of certain elements most likely has a reason. Therefore, we will highlight the most used element of each category and try to explain why it was used. Among the general elements, the most common element is "the man." As already touched upon in the section on the general elements, it is not entirely illogical to focus more on the male sex in the cartoons because we believe that there were a lot more male members than female members. This is borne out by the failure of

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the VVOS.[43] In the history of the creation of VOS there is also a lot of focus on the man as he fought on the Western front and thus has a kind of heroic aura over him. In the case of the Flemish national elements, we see that the Flemish lion is used nine times, making it, not entirely surprising, the most common element. This accounts for 47% of all the Flemish national elements used. In terms of percentages, we can compare this element with the use of the category "Away from France", which accounts for 52%. The fact that the Flemish lion was frequently used is no surprise since VOS is an openly Flemish nationalist association. My research therefore deals with the extent to which VOS has a rather maximalist or a minimalist program. The fact that they make use of the "Away from France" slogan quite often is not surprising either. As already touched upon several times, this fits in perfectly with the rather maximalist program that they use and that they think that Flemish sovereignty is being damaged by the Franco-Belgian military accord. How can we prove that they are pursuing a maximalist program towards Belgium? We do this by combining the data into a whole. We see that Flanders often sheds its chains. It is also the case that France is always depicted in a negative way and that Belgium is hardly mentioned unless it is negative.

Clarification

The cartoons are clarified relatively often. In 22 out of 31 cases, the cartoon is accompanied by a longer text or a few short sentences. This can be explained on the one hand by the fact that the cartoons are often used as a secondary means of expressing a view on a larger article. The short texts that are included could possibly be used to clarify the cartoon, which at the time is a primary means of conveying information, without a large accompanying article. There is no general

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[43] Van Geert, "Het Verbond der Vlaamsche Oud-Strijders (1919-1945)" [The Flemish Veteran'sVeterans' Association (1919-1945)], 17-18.

tendency to interpret the cartoon. The theme is continuously updated around the theme "Away from France". For example, they will link it to the Battle of the Golden Spurs or to the Yser Pilgrimage or the great demonstration (cf. above). Ten of the cartoons with a given interpretation are clarified by means of a small text added to the cartoon and a larger article on the front page. Five of the drawings are explained by an article and the rest of the cartoons, seven to be precise, only get a short caption. However, there is no clear sentiment that dominates the cartoons. Both those cartoons in which Flanders is depicted positively are about as common as those in which it is depicted negatively. VOS is portrayed both combative as well as weak. This is a striking contradiction; however, it does fit in with the goal they are trying to achieve. If they show themselves weaker towards the outside world or if they show that they are kept under control by Belgium, it will be much easier to convince public opinion of the need for an independent Flanders that can decide its own sovereignty. If they also show themselves to be strong, for example, in the recruitment for a demonstration, they show the possible attendees that the people who are demonstrating are very strong and will have a good life.

Tendencies

In this part of the research it will be investigated to what extent trends can be observed in the cartoons of VOS. To what extent they are consistent in content and whether a link can be made with a certain atmosphere within society. Unfortunately, there were no real trends to be seen. What we see is that VOS updates their protests time and again to keep them relevant. For example, in the run-up to the Flemish holiday, 11 July, VOS will go back to the Battle of the Golden Spurs, and in the run-up to the Yser Pilgrimage, the Ijzertoren will of course also be used. So, in terms of the elements used, we have not detected any trends. The cartoons change style and content too often to discover any real trends. Even with the clarifications of the cartoons it is not clear whether they

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consistently clarified certain cartoons or not. There is no recurring pattern visible in order to establish a tendency. Furthermore, in the nature of the clarification it is not possible to see a pattern either and the sentiment does not really change over time: we see that sentiment changes so often that it becomes difficult to define a certain trend or pattern. There is a certain pattern to be found in the cause of the publication of the cartoon, however: we do see that in the run-up to a demonstration, an organization is more likely to try to convince people to mobilize and then, after the demonstration, try to convince them again to not let the momentum created during a demonstration go to waste. In terms of whether VOS is present in the cartoons or whether the problem of the Franco-Belgian military accord comes to the fore, no patterns or tendencies can be distinguished since the cartoons more or less consistently portray VOS in a certain way and that the military accord also systematically comes to the fore, with the aforementioned use of themes when approaching certain dates.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we see that the Flemish national elements take on a highly versatile role. We also see that, with certain exceptions, these elements often appear in the cartoons. In this sense, we see a kind of constant, apart from the exceptions mentioned. As already touched upon, the most used elements are the flag, the war material and, very clearly, the man. The flag is used within Flemish national symbolism, so we can be sure that the flags represented are the Flemish nationalist flag, i.e. the Flemish lion without red claws, which is now often linked to the radical separatist Flemish movement. The nuance that needs to be made is that the membership magazine of VOS was printed in black and white, so it is not entirely certain that the draughtsman had the choice to incorporate the nuance that those red claws are. Of course, the war material was also widely used,

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in the negative sense. This can of course be explained by the anti-militaristic character of VOS.[44] The role of the men within VOS has also been explained many times before. To put it simply, it is about the fact that VOS is focused on men and it is therefore logical that they play a central role in the association. Of the elements from the above-mentioned part, nineteen of the cartoons have a clear Flemish-national character. All these elements were reduced to four different categories, of which the Flemish lion was the most extensive. This character can apply to the Flemish flag as well as to the display of the Flemish lion on the clothing of certain characters, for example. Belgium is very absent from the elements and, if Belgium is present at all, is always depicted negatively. France, on the other hand, is present *en masse* and is also depicted mainly negatively. In the cartoons, the slogan "Away from France" is mainly used as a tool to demonize France. The cartoons are also clarified *en masse* by means of an article or an attached text. The idea can also be reversed, of course, to state that the cartoons rather summarize and clarify the article. The sentiment that dominates the cartoons has a distinct duality: VOS presents Flanders as a weak victim of the Franco-Belgian military accord, as well as very militant in its fight against the accord. Real tendencies could not be established, with one exception. The cause of the publication of the cartoon is very often in preparation for an action. For example, in the run-up to a demonstration, we see that VOS wants to provide clear information. Closer to the demonstration they use the cartoons to convince people to come and to hold on to the momentum after the action in order to achieve their goal by convincing the public. This means that part of the original hypothesis was wrong. We stated that VOS would rather see Belgium as a victim, but, if they use it at all, they will rather see Belgium as an accomplice of France. What is true, however, is that France was effectively the big culprit in the whole story. The introduction raised the issue of clarity about whether the Flemish movement

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[44] Front page, De Vos, 17:43, 27.10.1935.

was radicalized at that point, through the analysis of cartoons as a primary source. In my opinion, based on the research carried out, VOS was clearly radicalized and wished to split Belgium to retain its sovereignty vis-à-vis France.

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Monument and Anti-monument in Budapest: Forgetting to Remember the Holocaust?

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Abstract

This article explores the current condition of Holocaust collective memory through one monument and its anti-monument in Budapest, Hungary. The analysis of mnemonic actors from transnational, national and local levels will reveal the current conflict of agency surrounding the politics of remembrance at this given time. It will demonstrate how activist memory entrepreneurs engage in diverse artistic and social forms of Holocaust commemoration that ultimately counters the inertia or complacency of state actors and often their preferred discourse of amnesia. However, the pedagogic impact on the general public is not guaranteed. The best way to overcome this is through a constant re-negotiation of memorials through interruptive anti-monuments.

Introduction

'Holocaust memorials are seismographs of historical consciousness.'[1]

The debate surrounding the commemoration of the Holocaust through memorials is a contentious one. Whilst some see the construction of these places of memory as an integral part of our moral

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[1] Heidemarie Uhl, "From the Periphery to the Center of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in Vienna," *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust* 30, no.3 (2016): 221.

duty to memorialize the victims, others recognize the danger that once we 'assign monumental form to memory, we have to some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember.'[2] Critics of Holocaust commemoration have also begun to question our moral duty to remember. One vocal advocate on this topic has been the historian David Rieff, who argues that 'a decent measure of communal forgetting is the sine qua non of a peaceful and decent society'.[3] With Holocaust collective memory, we have entered a stage coined by Marianne Hirsch as the postmemory stage. This refers to the 'relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right.[4] Hirsch proceeds to stress that at stake here is 'an evolving theoretical discussion about the workings of trauma, memory, and intergenerational acts of transfer' including the 'the ethics and the aesthetics of remembrance in the aftermath of catastrophe.'[5] Analyzing one disputed monument in Budapest, will highlight the consciousness of this universalized discourse of the Holocaust in a localized context and what implications this politicization of commemoration has for its public remembrance of the victims.

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[2] James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 5.

[3] David Rieff, *Against Remembrance* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1997), 3.

[4] Marianne Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," *Poetics Today* 29, no.1 (2008): 104.

[5] Ibid.

Collective Memory

The concept of memory originated within the discipline of psychology, namely by Freud, relating to what, how, and when an individual remembers.[6] However, Maurice Halbwachs identified that society has a huge influence on shaping individual memory. This led to the emergence of the term 'collective memory' which refers to the media, social practices and institutions that enable people to share memories.[7] Jan Assmann extends this concept, looking deeper at the materiality, seeing this cultural memory as a 'body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose cultivation serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image.'[8] Assmann also goes on to say that 'cultural memory works by reconstructing … it always relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation.'[9] It is this notion that will be pertinent to this research as a memorial is a repository of collective memory. Often, monuments are used by political elites to privilege a certain narrative over another which enables them to further solidify their current authority in the present.[10] This argument was fundamentally founded by the historian Pierre Nora, who coined the concept 'lieux de mémoire' which is a locality founded upon a conscious 'will to remember.'[11] Nora goes on to argue that these deliberate sites of memory often become a synonym for national identity and are often vulnerable to 'manipulation

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[6] Anindya Raychaudhuri, *The Spanish Civil War: Exhuming a Buried Past* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013), 92-3.

[7] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory,* trans. Lewis Coser (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992).

[8] Jan Assmann, and John Czaplicka, "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity," *New German Critique* 65 (1995): 132.

[9] Ibid, 130.

[10] Federico Bellentani, and Mario Panico, "The Meanings of Monuments and Memorials: Toward a Semiotic Approach," *Punctum* 2, no. 1 (2016): 28.

[11] Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire," *Representations* 26 (1989): 19.

and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived' when deemed necessary.[12]

Commemoration of the Holocaust

The term *monument* often conjures up imagery of the nineteenth-century heroic and figurative statues which commemorate 'triumphs, victories and conquests.'[13] However, the global events of the twentieth century, in particular, the Holocaust, caused a fundamental shift in the way the past is commemorated. However, it should not be underestimated how difficult reaching international recognition was for the victims. The Holocaust did not reach global recognition until the Eichmann trials of the 1960s, which was the first time survivors were given a public voice as they recounted their experience.[14] Later, the Holocaust entered popular culture in Europe with the television release of the miniseries Holocaust in Western Germany and Austria. This broadcast has been recognized to have stimulated 'and raised public awareness regarding the Jewish experience of persecution' coinciding with a memory boom in the 1980s.[15]

The universalized remembrance of the Holocaust that we recognize today was formed after the Cold War. Berber Bevernage affirms the ideological link between 'dominant retrospective politics and liberal-democratic post-histoire triumphalism' through his research of post-1989 historical commissions. Many saw the emergence of liberal democracy as the ultimate 'stage of history in political or moral terms—certainly as an ideal—and that all transitions away from

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[12] Pierre Nora, *Les Lieux de mémoire* [Places of Memory] (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 8.

[13] Arthur Danto, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial," *The Nation*, August 1985, 152.

[14] Christine Berberich, "Introduction: The Holocaust in Contemporary Culture," *Holocaust Studies* 1 (2019): 3.

[15] Heidemarie Uhl, "From the Periphery to the Center of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in Vienna," *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust* 30 (2016): 231.

authoritarianism therefore would or should, logically, be transitions toward this type of democracy.'[16] As a consequence, official Holocaust remembrance days were established in an effort to build a common identity on moral duty within transnational institutions such as the European Union. Notable efforts included the establishment of the day of Holocaust commemoration in 1995 and the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research in 2000. The conference in particular united politicians, survivors, scholars, and museum professionals from 46 countries within Europe, Israel, and the United States to create the guidelines for the intercultural construction of Holocaust memory on institutional and political levels.[17] Additionally, on the 27th of January 2005, the European Parliament declared the day of the liberation of Auschwitz as a European wide day of commemoration, passing a resolution against antisemitism in conjunction, recognizing an inherent link between the two. Concurrently, this was shadowed by Kofi Annan who in the same month commemorated Holocaust Remembrance Day in the United Nations, ensuring a globalized discourse of its remembrance.[18]

With these transnational efforts to ensure the longevity of Holocaust commemoration, it would be assumed that the representation of the Holocaust was secured. However, the universal representation of the Holocaust through a memorial is far from consistent. Each memorial is subject to mnemonic politics during its construction to how its treated in the present day. A recent rise in populist politics in Europe has seen a paradigmatic shift in the way that the Holocaust is discussed, with some questioning the necessity to continue to memorialize such a traumatic past. In particular, conflicts concerning the integration of Holocaust commemoration into nation states were apparent

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[16] Berber Bevernage, "The Past is Evil/ Evil is past: On Retrospective Politics, Philosophy of History, and Temporal Manichaeism," *History and Theory* 54 (2015): 347.

[17] "Stockholm Declaration," International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, accessed October 02, 2020, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/stockholm-declaration.

[18] Berberich, "Introduction," 3.

with the assimilation of former-communist member states to the European Union. These states felt that their traumatic communist past also required transnational recognition. Mónika Kovács has defined this conflict as 'competitive victimhood' which 'often manifests itself in symmetric group conflicts' when two parties compete for visibility against each other, 'thus trying to minimize the crimes against the other group and justify the "legitimacy" of their aggression.'[19] To try to combat this phenomena, the European Parliament designated August 23 as a 'Day of European Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism'. Within this declaration the European Union stated that 'the influence and significance of the Soviet order and occupation on and for citizens of the post-Communist States are little known in Europe', and ergo called for '"Active European Remembrance", intended to prevent any repetition of the crimes of Nazism and Stalinism.'[20]

However, Heidemarie Uhl questions whether this is 'a phenomenon that will only help legitimize the historical claims of those groups and parties that are not at all interested in commemorating the victims of the Nazi regime, and are even dismissive of their sufferings?'[21] This danger was also recognized by Mónika Kovács who stated that when competitive victimhood occurs in asymmetric group conflicts, 'the refusal to recognize the victimhood of a group which suffered genocide, transferring the blame to a third party, and the resulting palliation of the perpetrators cause the secondary traumatization of victims and their descendants.'[22] As recognized

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[19] Mónika Kovács, "Global and Local Holocaust Remembrance," in *The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later,* eds. Randolph Braham and András Kovács (New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 237.

[20] "Declaration of the European Parliament on the Proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism," European Parliament, September 23, 2008, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+QT+H-2009 0083+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

[21] Heidemarie Uhl and Sandra Forrester, "Conflicting Cultures of Memory in Europe: New Borders between East and West?," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 3, no.3 (2009): 69-70.

[22] Mónika Kovács, "Global and Local Holocaust Remembrance," 237.

by Pirker, et al. this asymmetric conflict has also occurred in Western Europe where as a result of 'the actual loss of some national sovereignty in the process of integration and a feared loss of national identity' have now became central rallying issues for populist 'actors defending national memory cultures.'[23]

This article will show that in Hungary, the Holocaust has been re-written to suit a nationalist view of the past, where the nation is victimized rather than accepting any culpability for crimes committed against its Jewish victims.[24] This paper will focus on the '*A német megszállás áldozatainak emlékműve*' (*Monument to the Victims of the German Occupation*) which was built in 2014 and the creation of an anti-monument, the '*eleven emlékmű*' (*Living Memorial*), which has stood in front of the former, and which attests to the efforts of grassroots memory entrepreneurs to renegotiate the state-led landscape of Holocaust amnesia in Budapest. Therefore, in agreement with the above-mentioned quote from Heidemarie Uhl, I will examine the memorial in question from its preconception, construction and to its current use to discern the current historical consciousness of the Holocaust in the public sphere in Hungary.[25] A fragile consciousness which is in a constant negotiation between international agents, state figures and grass-roots activists.

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[23] Peter Pirker, Johannes Kramer and Mathias Lichtenwagner, "Transnational Memory Spaces in the Making: World War II and Holocaust Remembrance in Vienna," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 32 (2019): 442.

[24] Andrea Pető, "'Bitter Experiences' Reconsidered: Paradigm Change in Holocaust Memorialisation," *Heinrich Böll Foundation*, June 28, 2019, https://www.boell.de/en/2019/06/28/bitter-experiences-reconsidered-paradigm-change-holocaust-memorialisation.

[25] Uhl, "From the Periphery to the Center of Memory," 221.

Methodology

This article will begin by examining the state-level memorial committee that was put in place to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust in 2014. Analyzing a monument in Budapest was deemed important because a capital's mnemonic landscape is an important feature of cultural policy, as it highlights its self-representation on local, national, and global levels. The analysis of the monument uses sources from the decision making and construction processes such as official state press releases and media reports from 2014. This will divulge the motivations of the various stakeholders involved in the memory project.

To establish how far we can contend that the *Monument to the Victims of the German Occupation* and its anti-monument acts as a seismograph of historical consciousness, the discussion will be framed through a multi-directional level. James Young's research on Holocaust memorials in Germany, Poland, Israel and the USA was an integral contribution to this field and set the foundations for the aesthetic analysis of these repositories of collective memory. However, what was lacking from this research was the afterlife of these memorials. How do the civilians interact with these memorials after inauguration? Jenny Wüstenberg, whose main research interest focuses on civil society and its interaction with memory, has argued that academics often neglect the contribution of grass-roots organizations in driving 'the process of confronting the past' which lead to 'efforts at democratization and reconciliation to foreign policy making.'[26] This article will endeavor to demonstrate the multi-level contentions between a state and its civilians in the public memorialization process of the Holocaust.

Subsequently, the grass-roots reactions to the monument will establish the connection between the macro and the micro levels and demonstrate how far contemporary politics, in

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[26] Jenny Wüstenberg, *Civil Society and Memory in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2017), 4.

particular the current governmental 'illiberal' rhetoric, affects the framework in which the Holocaust is publicly memorialized. Research into the micro-level reactions was conducted by using first-hand interviews with members of the memory activist groups who protest the monument. The interviews were of semi-structured format and the interviewees were selected by the process of snowballing, which begun through contacting Professor Andrea Pető of the Central European University in Budapest. These English-language interviews give a unique insight into the formation of a grass-roots memorial group competing against the state-led re-interpretation of the Holocaust. Their origins, motivations, goals and methods within the social and political context will all be analyzed in this article. The interviews were conducted in Budapest in May 2019 and focus on the group's origins in 2014 to the present. The interviews also revealed the social dynamics within the activist group with disagreements causing a three-way split in the group that was originally called *eleven emlékmű*. Henceforth, as all three groups interact with the physical anti-monument, the latter will be referred to as the *Living Memorial,* whereas the Hungarian name *eleven emlékmű* will refer to the activist group that still exist under this denomination.

Hungary and the Holocaust

The discussion of the Holocaust in Hungary is still a contentious debate, especially surrounding the subject of responsibility. At the end of the First World War, Hungary lost two thirds of its territory because of the Treaty of Trianon. During the first two tumultuous post-war years, Hungary experienced two regimes collapse until Admiral Miklós Horthy took over with a conservative nationalist government. From then on, antisemitic laws were passed limiting the

relative freedom the Jewish people once had in Hungary.[27] The irredentist Horthy and his government 'flirted' with Nazism and joined the German-Italian Axis in June 1941, seeing the alliance as a means to regain lost territory.[28] After the battle of Stalingrad, trust between the axis powers fell apart when it was discovered that Horthy tried to sign a treaty with the allies culminating in the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. Horthy managed to remain in office by appointing Döme Sztójay as prime minister who in turn legalized the fascist Arrow Cross party. From then on, persecution of Hungary's Jews and Romani escalated with Eichmann's arrival to manage their deportations along with Hungarians carrying out sporadic murder.[29] What is not disputed is the occurrence of the fastest deportation of Jewish citizens seen throughout Europe, with 400,000 people deported from Hungary to death camps such as Auschwitz between March and May 1944.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the initial commemorative approach of the state was one of erasure. Similar to other European countries under communism, rather than a focus of the Jewish specificity of the Holocaust, these monuments commemorated the victims of fascism and stressed the great role of the 'Soviet liberators.'[30] It was not until 1981 that the first comprehensive account of the Holocaust in Hungary was published by the historian Randolph L.

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[27] Kati Vörös, "The 'Jewish Question': Hungarian Sociology and the Normalization of Antisemitism," *Patterns of Prejudice* 44 (2010): 157.

[28] Éva Kovács, "Overcoming History through Trauma: The Hungarian Historikerstreit," *European Review* 24 (2016): 526.

[29] Domonkos Sik, "Memory Transmission and Political Socialization in Post-Socialist Hungary," *The Sociological Review* 63 (2015): 56.

[30] Gábor Gyáni, "Hungarian Memory of the Holocaust in Hungary," in *The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later,* ed. Randolph Braham and András Kovács (New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 216.

Braham, and even this was only published in the United States.[31] The fall of the communist regime in 1989 brought with it a freedom to research for academics, which began the intense and often politicized debates surrounding the Jewish Holocaust and Hungary's responsibility which is still disputed today.[32]

At the turn of the century, in 2001, the Hungarian government passed the Memorial Day for the Hungarian Victims of the Holocaust. This was to be held on the 16th April annually which marked the day in 1944 of when the first ghettos were established in Hungary (in the Transcarpathian region).[33] Moreover, the Holocaust Memorial Centre was opened in Budapest in 2005. Opened a year after Hungary joined the European Union, this signified Hungary's adhering to the globalized moral standard, of accepting its responsibility for past crimes. Although not overtly required, this was seen as a 'symbolic and pragmatic gesture' in order to join the EU, which many Central European countries also adhered to.[34] For Mónika Kovács, this construction suggested that Hungary would follow the 'remembrance that was already institutionalized in Western Europe and the United States' as it recognized Hungary's culpability in the Holocaust.[35]

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[31] László Csősz, "Holocaust Research and Infrastructure in Hungary," *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust* 31 (2017): 146.

[32] Ibid., 147.

[33] Government of Hungary, Commemoration on the Memorial Day for the Hungarian Victims of the Holocaust, Holocaust Memorial Year 2014, April 16, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20160317193741/http://holocaustmemorialyear2014.gov.hu/commemoration-on-the-memorial-day-for-the-hungarian-victims-of-the-holocaust.

[34] Ibid., 232.

[35] Mónika Kovács, "Global and Local Holocaust Remembrance," in *The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later,* ed. Randolph. Braham and András Kovács (New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 231.

Orbán's Hungary

However, in recent years the political rhetoric towards the commemoration of the Holocaust has been inconsistent. The Hungarian academic Andrea Pető argues that contradictory messages from different levels of politics in Hungary are commonplace. In her most recent article, Pető states that this 'double performance' is the 'modus operandi of the illiberal polypore state.'[36] Current governmental rhetoric proclaims that Hungarian autonomy is endangered by a threatening European Union. In recent years, Hungary was one of the worst-hit EU nations after the economic crisis of 2008.[37] On the back of this, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz Party was re-elected in 2010 with a two-thirds majority and has since moved further to the right. Orbán has shocked Europe with his advocacy of 'illiberal democracy' and his party's deeply troubling authoritarian laws which seek to regulate the media and freedom of religion. During the European migrant crisis in 2015, Hungary erected a border fence along its border with Serbia to keep refugees and migrants out, revealing an increasingly xenophobic, populist stance that has also gained traction throughout Europe. It is within this environment that Jobbik, an extreme right party, known for their antisemitic, anti-Roma rhetoric grew in popularity and gained 16.7% of the vote in the 2010 election.[38] Although Orbán vowed to not tolerate such rhetoric, arguably it is evident that his party, Fidesz, have been capitalizing on Jobbik's exploitation of memory 'of a once great and powerful Hungary for Hungarians to consolidate its political power.'[39] Nicole Lugosi, an academic who specializes in comparative politics, researched on the nature of Populist Radical Right parties in Central Eastern

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[36] Pető, "'Bitter Experiences'."

[37] Amy Sodaro, *Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past Violence* (London: Rutgers University Press, 2018), 53.

[38] Erik Thorstensen, "The Places of Memory in a Square of Monuments: Conceptions of Past, Freedom and History at Szabadság Tér," *E-Journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association* 5 (2012): 22.

[39] Sodaro, *Exhibiting Atrocity*, 65.

Europe. She surmises that populism and nationalism have always been a feature of Hungary's post-communist governments. As a result, contested narratives of the past, and historical legacies often underpin these rhetorical strategies.[40]

This is substantiated by the new Hungarian constitution that was formulated in 2011 by Orbán's government. It declares in the preamble that, 'We date the restoration of our country's self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990.'[41] Ingrained in the Hungarian national narrative, the twentieth century is remembered as a period when Hungary lost their autonomy as a nation. The state of Hungary ergo the people of Hungary were innocent victims who under the 'national socialist and the communist dictatorship' were led to a 'state of moral decay.'[42] This statement is problematic two-fold. One, by conflating the Second World War with that of the communist era coalesces the experience of the victims from each respective era which contributes to Kovács finding of competitive victimhood. Secondly, asymmetric victimhood is advocated as it also externalizes the responsibility and homogenizes the persecutory experience of the Jewish and Romani victims with that of the wartime experience of Hungarian civilians. As a result, the trauma of Jewish and Romani victims of the Second World War is perpetuated.

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[40] Nicole Lugosi, "Radical Right Framing of Social Policy in Hungary: Between Nationalism and Populism," *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 34 (2018): 210-233.

[41] Government of Hungary, *The Fundamental Law of Hungary* [Constitution of Hungary], April 25, 2011, 3. https://web.archive.org/web/20140221180827/http://www.kormany.hu/download/a/1c/11000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf.

[42] Ibid.

The construction of a monument

How this state narrative of the twentieth century is represented in the mnemonic landscape will now be analyzed. The official 70th memorial year of the Holocaust was first announced at the end of 2012, by a government declaration which established a Hungarian Holocaust memorial committee with the purpose 'of mourning and remembrance, and to increase awareness of the tragic events of 1944.'[43] The memorial committee was to be headed by the then State Secretary in charge of the Prime Minister's Office János Lázár and would include various other Hungarian ministries. The press release also requested the leaders from various Hungarian Jewish organizations such as the Jewish Heritage of Hungary Public Endowment (MAZSÖK), the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ), the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH), the Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Community of Hungary, the Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association (MAZSIKE) and the National Association of Former Labor Battalion Conscripts (MUSZOE). The announcement also called upon the ambassador of Israel to Hungary and the ambassador of the United States to Hungary to participate in the work of the Memorial committee.[44] It should be noted that Romani representatives were not included demonstrating the current historical consciousness of what the Holocaust represents in Hungary. Overall, this announcement gave an impression that the plans and coordination of the memorial year of the Holocaust in Hungary would be one that was inclusive and diverse to the extent of remembering the Jewish victims by requesting the collaboration from a diverse range of governmental and international stakeholders.

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[43] Government of Hungary, "The Government Is to Establish the Hungarian Holocaust 2014 Memorial Committee," *Holocaust Memorial Year 2014*, December 20, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20140521081037/http://holocaustmemorialyear2014.gov.hu/the-government-is-to-establish-the-hungarian-holocaust-2014-memorial-committee.

[44] Ibid.

However, on the 31st of December 2013 there was a government decree stating that there would be a memorial dedicated to the German occupation which caused great criticism and served to contradict the initial statements of responsibility by the current Hungarian government.[45] It classified the new monument as one of importance concerning the national economy which meant that construction could start without obtaining an official expert statement of a landscape committee and the construction company could be commissioned without a common bid.[46] It was also justified that due to the short deadline, the artist was directly appointed by the minister responsible for the implementation of the project.[47] The restricted approach of the government of Hungary heavily contrasted to various international open design competitions that have since taken place in other European countries such as Germany for the memorial to the murdered Jews in Europe erected in 2005 and more recently, the Aspang Railway Memorial in Vienna erected in 2017. Rather than welcoming pluralistic suggestions for the new *lieu de mémoire*, the government of Hungary controlled the entire process for their new monument.

The monument consists of two main figures (seen in figure 1). The first is a black eagle carrying a ring, bearing the year '1944' which represents Nazi Germany. The second figure is the Archangel Gabriel which symbolizes Hungary. The Archangel has its hands outstretched trying to hold a falling orb. Without even reading the inscription, it is evident what message this monument is designed to convey aesthetically. The two figures are representative of nations where the aggressive eagle of Germany is taking away Hungary's national sovereignty from a rather passive looking Archangel. With the year 1944 inscribed on to the ring we can infer that this is about the

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[45] "2056/2013. (XII. 31.)," *Magyar Közlöny* [Hungarian Gazette] 225 (2013).

[46] Interview with Peter Berczi, May 2019.

[47] Ágnes Erőss, "In Memory of Victims: Monument and Counter-monument in Liberty Square, Budapest," *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 65 (2016): 241.

Nazi Germany occupation of Hungary which began in March 1944. From a design perspective, the figurative sculptures are rather archaic. As identified by James E. Young, since the latter half of the twentieth century contemporary artists and architects have created abstract counter-monuments that both encapsulated the 'necessity of memory and their incapacity to recall events they never experienced directly'.[48] In stark comparison, the aesthetic choice of the *monument to the victims of the German occupation* results in a much more didactic approach in dissipating the narrative of Hungary as a victim. For the spectator, the monument's iconography is homiletic instead of allowing the spectator to reach their own interpretation.

To further proliferate the intended message, the inscription etched in Hungarian on to the tympanum states that this is a '*A német megszállás áldozatainak emlékműve*' (Monument Dedicated to the Victims of the German Occupation). This inscription is repeated in four other languages (German, English, Hebrew, and Russian) along the side of the memorial declaring in English for example, 'In memory of the victims.' Having the multilingual declaration signifies that the government of Hungary wishes for their preferred interpretation of the German occupation to be transnational. The multilingual message is elusive as it does not explain who exactly are the victims which leads us to denote that this monument portrays the whole nation of Hungary as a homogeneous innocent victim of the Nazi occupation.

Placed on the south end of Liberty Square, this public space is already a contentious symbol of Hungary's twentieth century. The first monuments to be placed on the square were in the 1920s which were irredentist statues symbolizing Hungary's four corners that were lost as a result of the Treaty of Trianon. These monuments were kept throughout the Horthy era as they were perceived

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[48] James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 27.

as an important part of Hungarian canon.[49] After the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet Army, they decided to demolish these monuments and replace them with a monument called the 'Soviet Union's liberation of Budapest' which remains intact to this day.[50] Placed in direct opposition to this monument is a statue of the former United States president, Ronald Reagan, who was seen by many as the president who liberated Eastern Europe from the USSR.[51] The public square thus reflects the politics of public space to convey the 'spatial mnemonics of different regimes'.[52] Therefore, placing this new monument of victimization in physical opposition to the Soviet War memorial meant that it was designed to offset the former but also to supplement the constitutional narrative that the twentieth century was one of immense suffering for the Hungarian state. The fact that all these monuments which represent regime changes appear on a square named Liberty only serves to emphasize this irony even more.

As soon as the design plans were revealed, criticism was rife both in Hungary and worldwide. It was with the announcement of this monument that the cohesion of the memorial committee group disintegrated with the withdrawal of MAZSIHISZ in February 2014.[53] It also resulted in a heated Hungarian historian debate between the likes of Krisztián Ungváry, László Karsai, Mária Schmidt and Mária M. Kovács.[54] The historian Randolph Braham was so outraged by the news of this new monument and its 'denigrating' nature. Braham wrote an open letter to the

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[49] Erik Thorstensen, "The Places of Memory in a Square of Monuments," 5.

[50] Ibid., 15.

[51] Ágnes Erőss, "In Memory of Victims," 237.

[52] Ibid., 239.

[53] Andrea Pető, "'Hungary 70': Non-remembering the Holocaust in Hungary," *Culture and History Digital Journal* 3, no.2 (2014): e016.

[54] Henriet Kovács, and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner, "Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014," *Politics in Central Europe* 11 (2015): 53.

leaders of the Holocaust Memorial Centre in Hungary in January 2014 and also returned his medals and resigned from the Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary.[55] As purported by many Hungarian academics at the time, it was apparent that the Jewish and Romani victims of the Holocaust in Hungary were marginalized to suit contemporary political values. There were those, such as Mária Schmidt, director of the House of Terror, who advocated the government's interpretation that the deportation of Hungary's Jewish population only occurred after the German occupation in March 1944. Whereas there are those that correctly point out that ghettos and deportations existed before this date. As highlighted by Henriet Kovács, before 1944, three further anti-Semitic laws had been passed, Hungarians as well as Hungarian troops had murdered Jews, and tens of thousands of male Jews were conscripted for dangerous Munkaszolgálat (labour service).[56] In response, the Hungarian government released a statement quoting the preamble of the constitution.[57] They argued that 'it was in the spirit of the above declaration that the government decided to hold a Memorial Year to mark the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust and to erect a monument to the tragic occupation of Hungary by the Germans.'[58] That 'through these measures, the government is paying tribute to all Hungarian victims.'[59] Now ingrained in fundamental law, this discourse was used to defend their decision to erect a monument that memorializes *all* victims

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[55] Randolph Braham, "Hungary: The Assault on the Historical Memory of the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later,* ed. Randolph Braham and András Kovács (New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 299.

[56] Kovács, and Mindler-Steiner, "Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History," 53.

[57] Government of Hungary, Prime Minister's Office, "The Government Information Centre's Reaction to the Statement by Federation of Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz)," Website of the Hungarian Government, January 2, 2014, http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/the-government-information-centre-s-reaction-to-the-statement-by-federation-of-jewish-communities-mazsihisz.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

of the German occupation, anchoring the collective memory of the Holocaust to suit the contemporary Hungarian political rhetoric.

The construction of an anti-monument

The most pronounced reaction to this monument was the creation of a grass-roots anti-monument called *eleven emlékmű* (*The Living Memorial*) (see figure 2), which has now become an unofficial, permanent fixture in front of the original monument. The latter is situated right in front of a road that leads into an underground car park. This placement creates a physical distance between the spectator and the monument and often with passing traffic, even obstructing the view. In contrast, the *Living Memorial* is placed right in front of the road which allows the spectator to fully engage with the latter.

When examining the anti-monument, there are posters attached written in fifteen different languages to inform as many international visitors as possible of the activists' mission. A prevalent theme of the poster is linking the falsification of history to the current political trajectory. It argues that the construction of the monument was a concession to the 'far right… the Jobbik party'. Rather than the government's approach to history, the protestors 'call on the government not to monopolize social memory, nor to rewrite history; but to initiate a dialogue with society for carefully exploring the past, in order to facilitate the honest reckoning with old crimes and processing the lessons learned.' The poster ends with the statement that these responsible citizens will not leave the square until the monument has been removed, signaling a return to liberty.[60] The memorial also consists of a line of personal items such as letters and photos and personal

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[60] Eleven emlékmű*, "*Civilians Protest Against Monument." See Appendix.

belongings which are referred to as a 'Living Memorial of Remembrance.'[61] Included is also a

donation box which is emptied every day by the activists. As the members work for the group on

a volunteer basis, they rely on these donations to help maintain the memorial, such as printing costs

for replacing the information sheets and any damaged objects. By inviting the public to contribute

and engage, the anti-monument exudes a symbiotic relationship, whereby the witness and their

reaction to it are crucial to the upkeep of such a monument. The *living* aspect of the memorial is

also apparent in the requirement of physical 'daily routines' such as 'watering and nurturing the

plants or lighting candles' which activist Gábor Sebő saw as his primary role to metaphorically

'keep the memory alive.'[62] The *Living Memorial* is very much an interruptive memorial and this

element of individuality directly contrasts with the static didactic narrative that the monument

eludes.

The anti-monument was created soon after the government of Hungary passed the decree

for a monument on Liberty square, on the 31st of December 2013. Gábor Sebő, one of the original

members of the *eleven emlékmű,* said that already from the 2nd of January 2014, locals would

gather on the square to protest against this monument.[63] These founding members found each other

through word of mouth and social media platforms such as Facebook. Initially, it was the group's

main objective to prevent the planned monument from being erected. The first official protest by

the newly formed group *eleven emlékmű* was on 23rd of March 2014. This date was a conscious

decision in order to disrupt Orbán's election campaign just before the national elections of 6th

April.[64] For the first protest, people were invited to participate in a flash mob. This was to take

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[61] Interview with Gábor Sebő, May 2019.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Interview with Gábor Sebő, May 2019.

[64] Interview with András Lukács, May 2019.

place on the proposed site of the memorial on Liberty Square and people were invited to place personal objects that symbolized their family heritage. Lukács recalled that people were also invited to bring candles and pebbles relating to the Jewish tradition of commemoration to enable as many people as possible to contribute to the *Living Memorial*.[65] Placing these memorial objects subverted the didactic intention of the proposed monument. A speaker was also invited to the event, who was from a conservative background. The protest group deemed this as an important addition to their program to show that this protest was 'not just coming from the left' in order to appeal to Hungarians from varying political leanings.[66] The *eleven emlékmű* activists also invited national media reporters to document and spread awareness as much as possible. Members also filmed and published two versions, an hour long documentary style that appeared on social media platforms and also a two-minute summary which was sent to national media outlets to raise publicity.[67] As Assmann noted, it is clear that the grass-roots memorial group wished to anchor their cause with the contemporary situation in order to make their cause as relevant as possible.

Nevertheless, the national election was won by Orbán and construction began immediately after, on the 8th of April 2014.[68] To counter this, the protest methods used by *eleven emlékmű* were dependent on the physical environment of the area. When construction first began, the activists would dismantle every afternoon the construction barriers that were put up every day around the proposed memorial site. What the activists found remarkable was that each time the laborers would remove the objects they would keep the objects safe in cardboard boxes for the group rather than

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[65] Interview with András Lukács, May 2019.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Humanplatform, "'Eleven emlékmű' a Szabadság téren - a 2014. március 23-i flashmob," April 03, 2014, video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WoVFJjquLUk.

[68] Interview with Peter Berczi, May 2019.

throw them away. For the activists interviewed this showed that there was an element of respect given to these symbolic objects even by those who were instructed to remove them. Eventually, as a result of the chaos, the construction area became a protected area. Barriers were erected that were impossible to dismantle by hand. Hence, this led to the formation of human chains around the proposed site. Despite these efforts, the construction continued, and the monument was finished in July 2014. The original objective of the activist group - to prevent the construction of the monument - had arguably failed.

When discussing this failure with founding member András Lukács, he retrospectively reflected that their aim to prevent the statue 'was more or less, not realistic, but a correct aim.'[69] His reasoning is because the Hungarian government was directly involved in the monument project, so it would have be an embarrassment for the government to change their mind in the face of protests. A limitation of this retrospective interview is that it is difficult to assess whether at the time Lukács and other members ever believed their original objective was achievable. Realistic or not, members that were interviewed for this research stated that a significant amount of the original members left once the construction was completed, as they saw this as a sign of defeat.

However, there are two 'victories' that the members emphasized in their interviews. The first is the widely held belief that the initial title of the monument was simply *the memorial of the German occupation*.[70] The addition of the Hungarian text on the tympanum which specifically refers to the victims of the German occupation was seen as a consequence of the *eleven emlékmű* protests.[71] More importantly, the interviewees often mentioned in their interviews that the

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[69] Interview with András Lukács, May 2019.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

monument has never been inaugurated which according to Lukács, all statues should have.[72] For

Sebő, this lack of an official opening ceremony for the monument also means that it will never

become 'an official place of memory.'[73] Given the fact that the monument was classified as a place

of national importance by the official government decree, this is deemed as an achievement by the

activist group as the government have never been able to officially recognize its existence. For the

Hungarian government, the monument was forced to become a 'forgotten' *lieu de mémoire*.

With the construction of the memorial completed, this meant that if the *eleven emlékmű*

group was to continue, then their raison d'être had to be adapted. It was decided that the *Living*

Memorial would need to be maintained if the *monument to the victims of the German occupation*

stood. The group also decided to organize round table discussions that would take place as close

as to the monument as possible which begun on 17th of April 2014.[74] These discussion roundtables

have become an integral part of the *Living Memorial*'s identity, symbolized by the two white chairs

in the centre of the anti-monument which also feature on their logo. These have been placed here

to connote that the *Living Memorial* is a place of open discussion and debate, juxtaposing the

homiletic monument. These white chairs also signify the daily discussions and speeches that the

group forthwith organize in this location where they discuss politics, history, and social issues.[75]

As previously mentioned disagreements in regards to discussion topics led to a split in the group

which led to a creation of a partner group called Szabadság Színpad (*The Freedom Stage*).

Although separate, the groups have coordinated their respective discussion groups so that the

Freedom Stage would be on Liberty Square on Monday, Wednesday, Friday while *eleven emlékmű*

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Interview with Gábor Sebő, May 2019.

[74] Interview with Peter Berczi, May 2019.

[75] Ibid.

would be present on Tuesday and Thursday. Significantly, every discussion of *eleven emlékmű* is either audio or video recorded and uploaded on to the group's own private archival database online in order to document their own history of protest.

An important finding of these interviews was discovering how the group utilized the digital public sphere to publicize and curate a counter memory. One of the earliest results of the group was the creation of a Facebook group titled the 'Holocaust and my family'.[76] The subsequent stories that survivors and second generation victims collated in this digital space about their connection to the Holocaust led to a publication in Hungarian and English, with two live events also organized for the contributors to publicly share their story. These events were also joined by the *eleven emlékmű* group as well. This process of collecting memories of trauma is a consequence identified by Mónika Kovács who argues that the provocation of competitive victimhood causes secondary traumatization of victims and their descendants.[77] When the past is not confronted accurately, the trauma of the victims in the repressed group becomes a central part to the activist group's identity. In this case, it has become part of the group's objective to document these memories that were hitherto not recorded. This process of archiving their own activities solidifies the activist group's own history and existence while also preserving the everyday history of Hungarian Jewish survivors which hitherto had not been documented. The creation of digital communities which cultivate their own Holocaust remembrance both in the physical and digital space has been an interesting development to the hitherto centralized commemorative practices. It supports the observation made by Wulf Kansteiner, who recognizes the decentralized movement to preserve

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Mónika Kovács, "Global and Local Holocaust Remembrance," 237.

and interact with Holocaust history.[78] Such utilization of social media platforms and digital archives increases the accessibility and knowledge flow which allows a greater number of people to engage with Holocaust commemoration.[79]

Moreover, the *eleven emlékmű* demographic is comprised of members with different motivations who all felt the need to contest this problematic *lieu de mémoire*. The members interviewed as part of this research wanted to emphasize that not all members were of Jewish heritage. Some locals joined out of genuine outrage and in solidarity for their fellow Jewish citizens and in opposition to the Hungarian government's attempt to re-write history. This is reiterated on the information posters on the anti-monument which describes the members as 'survivors, their descendants, and sympathizing citizens.' Some members were also not from an activist background either, with some stating that they were even surprised at themselves for joining.[80] Being part of this grass-roots memorial group also led members like Peter Berczi to explore their own heritage resulting in the discovery that he was a second generation survivor which also occurred to many other members.[81] Overall, the group identified themselves as 'responsible citizens of Hungary and Europe.'[82] This was a sentiment expressed by Sebő personally in his interview as he stated that for him, 'the larger Hungary is the European Union with no borders'[83] Here, this gives a valuable insight into the way a grass-roots memory group defines its identity; the protest group see their

[78] Wulf Kansteiner, "Transnational Holocaust Memory, Digital Culture and the End of Reception Studies," in *The Twentieth Century in European Memory: Transcultural Mediation and Reception*, eds. Tea Sindbæk Andersen and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 335.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Interview with Peter Berczi, May 2019.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Gábor Sebő, May 2019.

Living Memorial as transnational, representative of European values and adhering to international remembrance standards.

However, membership numbers of the *Living Memorial* have also declined. This highlights the fragility of activist groups who work on a volunteer basis and rely heavily upon individuals to continue its work. It was revealed in the interviews that the main demographic of the activist group is that of retirement age with no active youth interest to continue their efforts.[84] It could be surmised that this age demographic who run this particular activist group is part of the same generation that became active during the memory boom of the 1980s. Now, contemporary youth interest is minimal. This may pertain to Jenny Wüstenberg's observation that 'Holocaust memory making is no longer the primary domain of the left or of civil society.' Now institutionalized by transnational institutions, activist enthusiasm has declined since the 1980s as its perceived that Holocaust memory 'has moved in to the marine of the mainstream.'[85] However, despite this shift to the so-called 'mainstream' Holocaust history is still very much vulnerable to manipulation. This concern was echoed by Andrea Pető in a recent article. She remarked that Holocaust researchers have questioned 'what have we done wrong' as it appears 'ignorance about the Holocaust has never been greater'.[86] That despite the work of academics and memory entrepreneurs alike, the wider public is disengaged with remembering the Holocaust.

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[84] Interview with Peter Berczi, May 2019.

[85] Jenny Wüstenberg, "Civil Society," 71.

[86] Pető, "Bitter Experiences."

Transnational connections, national contentions

Notwithstanding, it was revealed that grass-root memory networks are endeavoring to combat this. In September 2018 it was announced that the *Living Memorial* would receive funding to create an exhibition of their living objects in partnership with the European Commission. This is part of a larger transnational project organized by Castrum Peregrini called the Heritage Contact Zone. Based in Amsterdam, Castrum Peregrini meaning 'the fortress of the pilgrim', derived from a Second World War safe house owned by Gisèle van Waterschoot van der Gracht. This house has now become a cultural centre, 'a living archive' which explores the 'relationship between cultural- or collective memory and individual identity.'[87] The European Commission as part of their program 'Support to European Cooperation Projects 2018' granted Castrum Peregrini funding to realize a two year project called Heritage Contact Zones with six other partners across Europe.[88] The Heritage Contact Zone project mission describes itself as a presentation of contested heritage. It argues that only by recognition of these marginalized aspects of history and by actively engaging with those citizens that still suffer exclusion 'Europe will be able to transgress its impasse and move forward towards more unity.'[89] As part of this, the *Living Memorial* have been invited to create an exhibition collating all of the personal objects that have contributed to their anti-monument.[90] Thereby, local heritage projects can now bypass the usual state sponsors to continue and seek support and network with other grass-roots projects transnationally. This inclusive way of presenting such contested heritage illustrates how the notion of competitive victimhood can be

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[87] "About," Castrum Peregrini, captured March 04, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160309061806/http://castrumperegrini.org/about

[88] "The Project," Heritage Contact Zone, accessed May 22, 2019, http://heritagecontactzone.com/theproject/.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Interview with András Lukács, May 2019.

overcome as this project enables minority victim voices to be heard and remembered transnationally.

While the erection of the monument caused international outrage and fury amongst the Jewish community on a national level many support the idea that Hungarians were just as much victims as the Hungarian Jews and Romani. This national victimization discourse is to be further confirmed by the newly planned monuments by the government. The next planned memorial is a resurrection of an old memorial created in 1934 to commemorate the victims of the Red Terror during the short-lived Hungarian-soviet Republic of 1919.[91] The second is planned for the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 2020. For Gábor Gyáni, this so-called 'Trianon Syndrome', competes in Hungarian national discourse with the trauma of the Holocaust, with the former often taking precedence over the latter.[92] This very concept of a collective nation as an 'exclusive sacrificial community' is apparent in the *monument to the victims of the German occupation* where Holocaust victim trauma is negated for a mutual absolutizing of national trauma.

To date, five years after the erection of the former monument, both still stand. The majority win for Orbán's re-election in April 2018 would suggest that there is support for Orbán's political rhetoric ergo his national victimization discourse. Just a few meters to the left of the *Living Memorial* stands a church ran by a far-right supporting pastor. Inside the steps of the church there is a bust of Miklós Horthy who stands garnered with wreaths and Hungarian flags, including flags of former territories of Hungary. It was revealed in the interviews that on occasions verbal confrontations have occurred between the congregation of the church and the *Living Memorial*

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[91] Eva Balogh, "In Place of Imre Nagy, a Memorial for the Victims of Red Terror," *The Hungarian Spectrum* (blog), December 30, 2018, http://hungarianspectrum.org/2018/12/30/in-place-of-imre-nagy-a-memorial-for-the-victims-of-red-terror/.

[92] Gábor Gyáni, "Hungarian Memory of the Holocaust in Hungary," 230.

group.[93] Physical damage to the *Living Memorial* has also occurred on a number of occasions with the most recent and worse occasion in June 2019 when someone removed the whole line of posters and photos that had been cultivated since 2014. This signifies the divergence in interactions with memorials which are far from uniform and cannot be controlled.

Conclusion

The '*monument dedicated to the victims of German occupation*', through its archaic design represents a conflated vision of victimhood, providing no 'practice of self-criticism' and exempting the state from responsibility from further 'necessary public discussion and memory work.'[94] By purporting a narrative of national victimization, the monument 'underpins their new ideas about Hungarian history.'[95] By not addressing Hungary's complicity, the monument serves as a physical manifestation of the Hungarian state's discourse of victimization and its emphasis on state sovereignty over an appropriate memorial for the Jewish and Romani victims of the Holocaust. This monument is part of the larger asymmetric competitive victimhood occurring in Hungary's mnemonic landscape and resonates with numerous examples of minority groups who experience state violence who then struggle to bring the state perpetrator to accept culpability regardless of transnational efforts to universalize its remembrance.

Consequently, this led to a grass-roots movement to erect an anti-monument; one that allows for a multiplicity of interpretations and one that it is living and invites contribution and discussion. While the former monument's design was too brash and had an obvious conflicting

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[93] Interview with Gábor Sebő, May 2019.

[94] Ágnes Erőss, "In Memory of Victims," 252.

[95] Interview with András Lukács, May 2019.

historical narrative, an anti-monument was produced to renegotiate this. The research conducted on *eleven emlékmű* illustrates the importance of grass-root memory activists who challenge state amnesia. It has also highlighted the emergence of how the digital space can be utilized to create a virtual archive of memory and a platform of support for various commemorative projects. The physical interaction between the state monument and the grass-roots anti-monument supports Federico Bellentani and Mario Panico's argument that once erected, 'monuments become social properties and users can reinterpret them in ways that are different or contrary to the intentions of the designers.'[96] Here, the former monument's intention has been re-negotiated and this *lieu de mémoire* has now become a protest space against Hungary's failure to erect an appropriate memorial to the Jewish and Romani victims. The anti-monument itself has also taken on a wider significance as this space is now recognized as a location to discuss contemporary politics showing how even interruptive anti-monuments can take on new meanings themselves. This attests to the living aspect of the anti-monument which encourages active and constant engagement from the spectator. Rather than repressing, trauma can only be overcome if society allows for reconciliation and justice for past atrocities. Commemorating the victims in public spaces is one way of starting this reconciliation with the past. The *Living Memorial*'s recent connection with other European commemorative projects and funding demonstrates how European grass-roots memorial movements can seek support from transnational institutions, bypassing their respective state altogether to bring about this reconciliation. By maintaining these spaces of dialogue both physically and virtually, the commemoration of the Holocaust is ensured to not go into oblivion.

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[96] Bellentani and Panico, "The Meanings of Monuments and Memorials: Toward a Semiotic Approach," *Punctum* 2, no.1 (2016): 28.

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
Appendix

Photographs

Figure 1. Author's own. Closer view of the the Living Memorial, Budapest, (photo taken April 2018)

Figure 2. Author's own. Front view of the monument showing the two white chairs of *The Living Memorial* Budapest (photo taken April 2018)

Civilians Protest Against Monument Falsifying History

Eleven emlékmű, Civilians Protest Against Monument Falsifying History, text of the poster displayed on the Living

Memorial. Provided by Gábor Sebő.

"This monument was ordered by the government of Hungary (or, to be more exact, by Premier Viktor Orbán of almost unlimited power) and erected stealthily, following numerous delays, under the cover of the night dawning on July 20 this year.

At the edge of the sidewalk across from the monument you can see memorial pebbles, personal items, photographs, books and documents. They have been brought here uninvited in recent months by citizens outraged by the falsification of history manifested in the monument erected peremptorily, without having consulted either cityscape professionals or the community.

In the official wording, the sculptural ensemble commemorates Hungary's German occupation on March 19, 1944. As a result of the scandal following the publication of the design, the text has been changed to „the victims of the occupation". The central figure of the composition is Archangel Gabriel impersonating the innocent Hungary, dropping (actually, it looks like offering) the country's orb, while the German imperial eagle is preparing to strike. Thus does the work subserviently reflect the populist and authoritarian ruling political party's new constitution, forced upon the population again without any consultation, suggesting that the state of Hungary bears no responsibility for the genocide following the German occupation, including the deportation of nearly half a million Hungarian citizens (mostly Jews but also gypsies, gays and dissidents) to Nazi extermination camps.

This monument is a lie serving a political intention.

Hungary was a faithful ally of Hitler's Germany during WW2, being the first in 1940 to join the Axis powers. On March 19, 1944, the arriving German troops were received with bouquets rather than bullets. That occupation left the state administration untouched and the administration, in turn, enthusiastically and very effectively organized and executed the mass deportations, surpassing even German expectations.

Hungary was the first in Europe, back in 1920, to pass an anti-Semitic law followed by a row of similar, increasingly heavy-handed laws stripping Hungary's Jewry of more and more rights; the state that sent to their deaths twenty thousand people unable to certify their Hungarian citizenship in; the state whose gendarmes and soldiers murdered several thousand civilians at Novi Sad in the winter of 1942-43; the state that sacrificed two hundred thousand soldiers in a senseless war, while some of its occupying units abroad committed a series of war crimes against the civilian population.

Historians of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences have unanimously condemned the message suggested by this monument, labeling it as an attempt to rewrite history.

The protesters point out that, by erecting this monument, the government is making a concession to Hungary's far right: the advocates of the nationalist, racist, xenophobic Jobbik party, while endeavoring to whitewash the memory of their admitted mentor, Admiral Miklós Horthy who governed the country on a clerical-authoritarian platform between the world wars, then led it to destruction.

The civil groups organizing the protest action, representing the sober and responsible citizens of Hungary and Europe, demand the false monument to be removed from this location. They call on the government not to monopolize social memory, nor to rewrite history; but to initiate a dialogue with society for carefully exploring the past, in order to facilitate the honest reckoning with old crimes and processing the lessons learned.

As a matter of fact, the monument is really a genuine symbol. It is the monument of the government's arrogance and the criminal steps it took. Its removal will also be symbolic, signaling that liberty has returned. The protesters have stated they will continue their protest actions and presence as long as this mendacious monument stands here."

Old Gods and the New: (Re)Invention of Athenian Cults in the Hellenistic Period

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Abstract

The history of Athens in the Hellenistic period is a turbulent one. The polis was reduced to a second- or even a third-rate power and had to deal with powerful neighboring empires. Political and economic tides affected Athenian religion and its cult practices. Depending on the current political context and their material wealth, Athenians used their religion to establish their place in a wider Hellenistic world, to promote their polis, or as a means of foreign policy either by honoring or placating kings and other mighty men and women. This paper aims to give an overview of the development of cults and cult practices in Athens roughly from the death of Alexander the Great to the Sulla's sacking of the city in 86 BC. The focus will be on the establishment of new cults and the resurgence of old ones in a new context.

Introduction

The turbulent history of the Athenian state in the Hellenistic period can be divided into roughly two parts. The first one would coincide with the majority of the third century BCE. It is characterized by a tight Macedonian grip, war, destruction, economic downfall and long-term decline. That ended in 229 BC and the next thirty years were a sort of interregnum. During that

period, Athens, supported by mighty Ptolemaic kings in Egypt, held a strongly neutral course in their foreign policy.

The proximity of Macedonia once again proved to be a problem for Athens. Hostilities broke out in 201/200 BC. This time, however, Athens was allied with the Attalids from Pergamum, Rhodes and most importantly, Rome. Since the very beginning of the 2nd century BC, Athens was a staunch ally of Rome throughout the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BC), the Syrian War (192–188 BC) and the Third Macedonian War (171–167 BC). The only exception was the First Mithridatic War (88–84 BC) where Athens was an ally of the Pontic king, which ended in disaster.

The alliance with Rome, apart from military security, had its economic benefits. After the war with Perseus, Romans gave Athens the city of Haliartos in Boiotia, and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros and most importantly, Delos. The Romans abolished custom duties on Delos and soon enough the island became a trading hub in the Aegean, especially after the destruction of Corinth (146 BC) and the establishment of Roman province of Asia (129 BC). The acquisition of the island resulted in the increased economic wealth of Athens itself.

All these things influenced the Athenian religion and cults. The internationalization of Delos and Athens, especially its port of Piraeus, syncretistic tendencies in religion inside the Hellenistic frame, powerful and influential individuals – all this had a visible effect on Attic religious practice. On the other hand, Athenians themselves tried to resurrect old traditions and festivals.[1]

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[1] To this very day the best overview of Athenian history in Hellenistic period remains Christian Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. Deborah L. Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); for the Athenian cults in classical period see: Susan Deacy, "Famous Athens, Divine Polis: The Religious System at Athens," in *A Companion to Greek Religion*, ed. Daniel Ogden, 221–235 (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007); while Emily Kearns, "The Heroes of Attica," *Bulletin Supplement* 57, (London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 1989): 139–237 contains the catalogue of Attic heroes.

Domestic cults

The Hellenistic period was a time of intensive permeation of various cults in the Mediterranean and Athens was no exception. The 3rd and 2nd centuries BC are, on the one hand, characterized by the worship of old gods and the activities of old cults, but on the other hand, new gods and new cults were introduced. Still, this dichotomy was not that sharp, since old gods could obtain new garb and new ones are often associated with their older counterparts. Athenian religious life cannot and should not be separated from festivals that have accompanied it. These festivals contained various contests, mostly athletic but also theatrical and poetic. The organization of these festivals, and especially their funding, was left to wealthy Athenians. This was a way for them to show off their wealth and to gain status and prestige in the community. The inscriptions about these *agonothetes* are clear evidence of what was expected of them, how much money they spent and what honors they could hope for.[2]

There are two periods in the history of Athenian cults in Hellenistic times. The first coincides roughly with the 3rd century BC when Athens was experiencing military defeats and economic difficulties. There are relatively few pieces of evidence of cult celebrations from that time. It seems that there were interruptions in the celebration of some festivals, such as the *Panathenaia* and the Eleusinian mysteries. The celebrations were relatively modest. The second period lasted until Sulla's conquest of Athens in March 86 BC. During that time Athens enjoyed a period of peace, stability and economic progress. Some new cults were introduced, and the old ones were celebrated with greater pomp.

The most important Athenian festival was the Panathenaic ceremony. Cult practices associated with the *Panathenaia* were followed by gymnastic, musical and equestrian

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[2] On *agonothetai* see inscriptions: *Syll.*[3] 667; *IG* II[3] 1 991, 995, 1034, 1160; *IG* II[3] 1 1022 honors the *athlothetai* who organized the Panathenaics received; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 169.

competitions.[3] At the beginning of the 3rd century BC, there were interruptions in the celebration of this festival, but the Athenians nevertheless strove to organize them regularly. There are inscriptions that testify that they were sending special envoys (*theoroi*) to invite other cities to participate. The list of winners proves that many foreigners came to compete at that festival, especially in the 2nd century BC. Besides, many Hellenistic rulers took part in the competition, although not personally, but rather through their subjects.[4] The Athenians also used these special occasions to thank their deserving citizens and *euergetes* in a festive circumstance.[5] The *Panathenaia* were celebrated even after Sulla.[6]

The Eleusinian mysteries were of great importance and renown. Because the Macedonians held Eleusis in the first half of the 3rd century BC, the mysteries were seldom celebrated. After the a war (268–262/1 BC), they were celebrated continuously. The honors – a myrtle crown, public praise and an inscribed stele – that the Athenians bestowed upon the organizers of the mysteries testify to their value.[7] The Eleusinian mysteries were very popular in the Hellenistic world. Their eschatological character and openness for all were very receptive to the Hellenistic man. The Athenians invited foreigners, among them the Hellenistic kings, to come and be initiated into the mysteries. Prominent Romans too wished to be initiated. The Athenians granted this wish to Lucius

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[3] Events on the *Panathenaia*: *IG* II³ 1 1022, ll. 9–10; girls who wove the *peplos* for goddess Athena: *IG* II² 1942, 1034+1943, 3448; *IG* II³ 1 1284; *SEG* 13:143; the festivities lasted 23–30. *hekatombaion*, see John D. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of Athenian Year*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975): 34; John D. Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 237.

[4] *IG* II³ 1 1145, 1239; *IG* II² 2313, 2314, 2316, 2317; Polyb. 28.19; George R. Edwards, "Panathenaics of Hellenistic and Roman Times," *Hesperia* 26/4 (1957): 330; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 169, 225, 238–240; Aleksandar Simić, "Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla (262/1–86 BC)" (master's thesis, University of Belgrade, 2018), 99.

[5] *IG* II³ 1 1313, l. 40; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 240.

[6] *IG* II² 1043, ed. 54; Edwards, "Panathenaics of Hellenistic and Roman Times," 322–323.

[7] IG II³ 1 915, 1164, 1188; Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of Athenian Year*, 65; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 169.

Cornelius Sulla (for the same political and safety reasons as Demetrius Poliorcetes earlier), Quintus Tullius Cicero, but rejected Marcus Licinius Crassus.[8]

From 273/2 BC the cult of *Athena Soteira* (the Savior) appears. She was always paired with *Zeus Soter*. The inscriptions testify that the priesthood of *Athena Soteira* regularly offered sacrifices and organized the festival of *Diisoteria*.[9] Some sixty years later (215/14 BC), Athenians revived yet another festival called *Aianteia*, dedicated to the hero Ajax. One of the competitions during the festival was a maritime race of the *epheboi* near the Salamis, the birthplace of the hero.[10] The Goddess Artemis was much revered in Athens, where she was praised with the attribute of *Kalliste* (The Most Beautiful). Since the second century (approx. 170 BC) a new attribute of Artemis emerges on the prytanic inscriptions, that of *Phosphoros (*The Lightbringer). Stephanie Lynn Budin thinks that this attribute of Artemis is somehow connected to Hekate, because both goddesses are iconographically connected to torch-bearing.[11]

The Athenians freed themselves from Macedonian rule in 229 BC. To commemorate this event, two leading Athenians at that time, the brothers Eurykleides and Mikion from the deme of

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[8] Plut. *Demetr.* 26, *Sull.* 16; Cic. *De Or.* III 20, 75; the official guests of the mysteries were the citizens of Miletus: *IG* II³ 1 1372, and Gonnoi: *IG* II³ 1 1145, в. *IG* II³ 1 1387; Polybius mentions (18.19) that the Athenians had sent envoys in Egypt in 168 BC to summon the royal family to participate in the mysteries; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 221, 294; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 238; Karen L. Edwards, "Captive Gods: Romans and Athenian Religion from 229 B.C. to the Age of Augustus" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1997), 71–73, 101; Antonia Tripolitis, *Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age* (Grand Falls, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 21.

[9] IG II³ 1 902, 903, 905, 953; Priests and Priestesses, 20; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 103.

[10] Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 168; Edwards, "Captive God*s"* 61.

[11] The priests of *Kalliste*: *IG* II³ 1 1028, 1339; *IG* II² 4667, 4668: *Phosphoros*: *IG* II³ 1 1324, l. 10; *IG* II³ 1 1328, l. 9; Robert Parker, *Polytheism and Society at Athens*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 400, 404; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 169; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 176; Stephanie L. Budin, *Artemis*, (London: Routledge, 2016), 65–66.

Kephysia organized the cult of *Demos* and *Kharitai*. The priesthood of that cult was a hereditary position held by their family.[12]

The material welfare of the 2nd century BC marked a new period for the Athenian religious and cult life. Athens regained control over the island of Skyros, the legendary resting place of the hero Theseus, in 166 BC. The Athenians used this occasion to revive the festival of *Theseia* in honor of one of their founding heroes. The first recorded celebration was in 161 BC and *agonothetes* (the person responsible for organization) was Nikogenes. *Theseia*, unlike some other festivals, was restricted only to Athenians, except for foreign mercenaries in Athenian employment. The *Theseia* was also an important ephebic festival, where they could show their skills. This festival had a distinct militaristic character.[13]

Another renewed festival was that of *Thargelia*, dedicated to Apollo. There are relatively few shreds of evidence for this festival in Hellenistic times, but it can be surmised that the festival included sacrifices and gymnastic contests. All the Athenian magistrates participated in the ceremony and the slaves were freed from work on the day of the festival.[14]

Pythais was a significant religious festival during which many Athenian magistrates, ephebes, equestrians and other prominent citizens – between 300 and 500 of them – would carry the first harvest from Apollo's birthplace on Delos to his residence in Delphi. This procession was renewed in 138/7 BC and the subsequent ones were held in 128/7, 106/5 and 98/7 BC. The Athenians had trouble funding the last *Pythais*, and therefore the wealthy citizens gave their own money several

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[12]*IG* II³ 1 1137, l. 39; *IG* II³ 1 1160, l. 24; *IG* II² 4676, 5029, 5047; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 180; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 160–161; Simić, "Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla," 102.

[13]IG II² 956, 957–961; Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of Athenian Year*, 70–71; Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony, 241; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 234; Parker, *Polytheism and Society in Athens*, 483–484; Donald G. Kyle, "Athletics in Ancient Athens," Mnemosyne Supplement 95 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 40.

[14]*SEG* 21:469; Simić, *"*Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla," 100.

times. The procession that should have been held in 90/89 BC was cancelled and never organized again.[15]

The guild of dionysiac artists (*technitai*) was closely connected with the reorganization of the *Pythais*. Since the beginning of the 3rd BC, they had privileges with the Delphic Amphictyony. With the renewal of the Pythian procession, the Amphictyony renewed these privileges to the Dionysiac *technitai*. However, the Athenian guild got in conflict with a similar association from Isthmos. In the end, Romans also got involved, and they backed the Athenian organization.[16]

Delos was known in Hellenistic times as an international religious centre. It owed this to the fact that it was the legendary birthplace of Apollo and Artemis. It is therefore not surprising that Apollo's priest was the most influential among the priesthood of the island. When the Athenians took over the island in 166 BC, they imported the Athenian cults, and the Delian cults were Atticized. Thus, the inscriptions from the middle of the second century BC represent a sort of gradation of island cults. Apollo, of course, was the most important, but Zeus and Athena were highly respected in three forms: *Kynthios* and *Kynthia* (named after the Delian mountain of Kynthion), *Soter* and *Soteira*, and *Poliaios* and *Polias*. Artemis had a low position on the island and in the last place was the local hero Annios.[17]

Foreign cults - Eastern and Western

Various eastern cults existed in Athens both before and during the Hellenistic era.

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[15]Cf. *Syll.*[3] 696, 697, 711; *IG* II[2] 2336; Parker, *Polytheism and Society in Athens*, 83–84; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 276.; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 245; Simić, *"Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla,"* 100–101.

[16]*Syll.*[3] 399, 692, 704, 705; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 277–278; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 239–241; Simić, *"Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla,"* 101.

[17] *ID* 2605; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 202; Edwards, "Captive Gods," 38–39.

Egyptian gods, mostly Isis and Sarapis (or Serapis), were the most popular and the most influential. Athenians knew of the god Ammon in the Classical period, and the first temple of Isis was built in Piraeus before 330 BC. Crucial for the establishment of the Egyptian gods in Athens was the political support of the first Ptolemaic kings. The Greek traveler Pausanias said that the Athenians started worshipping Sarapis under the influence of Ptolemy, but he doesn't specify which one. The coming of the god Sarapis in Athens was probably a process that lasted through the reigns of Ptolemy I through Ptolemy III since all three kings had close ties to Athens. The worshippers of Sarapis (the *Sarapiastai*) were not numerous in the beginning, but later their numbers grew since the cult was supported by the Athenian state.[18]

The goddess Isis had a brighter future. She was popular in the whole Hellenistic world, especially in ports and trading towns, where a lot of different people mixed. She first appeared in Athens and Delos as *Isis Pelagia* (of the Sea). She had her first temple dedicated to her in Piraeus a little before 333 BC, the very beginning of the Hellenistic age.[19] Later her cult grew, and she became the most respected of all Egyptian deities. On the island of Delos existed the so-called Serapeion, a temple complex dedicated to Sarapis, but containing an important shrine dedicated to Isis. Isis, Sarapis and Anubis were worshipped as a sort of trinity on Delos[20]

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[18] Paus. 1.12, 18; the priest of Ammon: *IG* II² 1282; Sterling Dow, "The Egyptian Cults in Athens," *The Harvard Theological Review* 30 no. 4 (1937): 228, 231; Julietta Steinhauer, "Cult Associations in the Post-Classical Polis," (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2012), 52–54; Kelly A. Moss, "The Development and Diffusion of the Cult of Isis in the Hellenistic Period" (master's thesis, University of Arizona, 2017), 64, 85; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 166, 210.

[19] Moss, "The Development and Diffusion of the Cult of Isis in the Hellenistic Period," 63, 64, 67; Tripolitis, *Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age*, 27.

[20] *ID* 1510; *IG* II² 2336, l. 47; Steinhauer, "Cult Associations in the Post-Classical Polis," 49–54; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 256; Moss, "The Development and Diffusion of the Cult of Isis in the Hellenistic Period," 75–76; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 28, 211; Elizabeth G. Huzar, "Roman-Egyptian Relations in Delos," *The Classical Journal* 57 no. 4 (1962): 173; Edwards, "Captive Gods," 49–50.

Merchants coming from the Levant brought their gods with them. The citizens of Berytos (modern-day Beirut) organized a *koinon* (association) centered on the temple of Poseidon. The citizens of Tyre organized themselves around the cult of their city god Melqart, who was identified with Herakles. Apart from them, a jewish community attested for on the island, where they had built a synagogue. The cult of Aphrodite Ourania was brought to Piraeus by merchants from Citium on Cyprus was thriving. The first record mentioning the Carian cult of Zeus Labraundos dates from 299/8 BC. From Syria came the goddess Athargatis with her companion Hadad. They were worshipped as Aphrodite Hagne and Zeus Hadatos.[21]

The only western cult was the cult of the goddess Roma. Clear political reasons had lain behind Roma's introduction to the Athenian pantheon. Romans became the protectors of Athens and Delos, and this was a way for Athenians to show them gratitude. The Roman cult was soon linked with domestic ones: in Athens with *Demos* and *Kharitai* and on Delos with *Demos* and *Hestia*. The accompanying festival of *Romaia* was held in Athens only once and on Delos multiple times.[22]

Individuals as an object of worship

The Hellenistic era brought with it the rise of many extremely powerful figures, most of them being Hellenistic kings. The relations of cities and kings were multifaceted and complex, and

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[21] Tyrians: *ID* 1519; Berytians: ID 1520; *IG* II² 1271; Jews: *SEG* 32:809, cf: *ID* 2328, 2330–2332; Athargatis: *ID* 2240; Steinhauer, "Cult Associations in the Post-Classical Polis," 42; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 92–93, 213, 217; Monika Trümper, "The Oldest Original Synagogue Building in the Diaspora: The Delos Synagogue Reconsidered," *Hesperia* 73 no. 4 (2004): 513–514.

[22] *Priests and Priestesses*, 22; *IG* II² 1938, 5047; *IG* II² 2336, l. 45; *ID* 1950, 2605; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 181, 275; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 249; Edwards, "Captive Gods," 91–92.

often they entered the cult sphere. It was not unusual for a certain poleis to bestow divine honors upon a king.

The first case in Athens was the worship of Alexander the Great himself. The assumption is that the Athenians had bestowed upon him divine honors, although reluctantly, because they opposed the Macedonian rule and were unwilling to worship a living person as a god. When he died, they stopped with this practice.[23]

The evidence regarding the cults of Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes, on the other hand, clearly proves that they had received divine honors in Athens. The reason was political: Demetrios had liberated Athens from the Macedonian King Kassandros in 307/6 BC and Demetrios of Phaleron, who had ruled Athens in Kassandros' name. To honor both father and son, Athenians created two new *phylai* (tribes) and named them *Antigonis* and *Demetrias*. Therefore, Antigonos and Demetrios were the eponymous heroes of two new tribes, plus they were worshipped as *Soteres* (*Saviors*), and Demetrios had another cult as *Kataibates* (The One Who Descends, another divine attribute) dedicated to him, which was worshipped at the site on which Demetrios dismounted from his horse when he returned to Athens in 304/3 BC to liberate the city once more from Kassandros.[24]

That was not a lone case. During most of the 3rd century BC, Athens was under the authority of the descendants of Antigonos, called the One-eyed. His grandson Antigonos Gonatas, received divine honors from soldiers stationed in the Attic fortress of Rhamnous, and from the city of Athens. Gonatas' son Demetrios II was the last Macedonian ruler to receive such honors from the Athenian *demos*. Athenians did not abolish the cult of the Macedonian royal Antigonid family

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[23] Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 47.

[24] *IG* II[3] 1 1029, l. 12; Diod. 20.46.2; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 60, 74–76, 80; Simić, "Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla," 101; John M. Camp, *The Archeology of Athens* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 166.

when they gained their independence in 229 BC, but they did so at the beginning of the Second Macedonian War (200 BC) when Philip V devastated Attica.[25]

In the peaceful period of 229–200 BC, Athenians introduced two new person-centered cults. The first was in honor of Diogenes, the last foreign commander of Piraeus. He led out his troops out of Piraeus peacefully and gave the port to Athenians. For that, he received Athenian citizenship as well as a festival organized in his name called *Diogeneia*.[26] In 224 BC Athens found her foreign protector in the Egyptian king Ptolemy III Euergetes (246–221 BC). Like Antigonos and Demetrios some eighty years earlier, the Egyptian king received honors in the form of a tribe (*Ptolemais*), cult with a priest, and a festival called *Ptolemaia* were established in his name. His wife and queen Berenike was honored by having one deme in the tribe *Ptolemais* named after her. The Ptolemaic festival soon became one of the most important ones in Athens, on par with *Panathenaia*, City Dionysia and Eleusinian mysteries.[27]

Wartime brought the need for new protectors and patrons. One of the main Athenian allies in the Second Macedonian War was Attalos I, the king of Pergamon. To thank him for his aid, Athenians gave him the same honors that they had given Ptolemy III, i.e. Attalos became the eponymous hero of the tribe *Attalis*, a cult with a priest and a festival was founded in his name. His

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[25] The cult of Antigonos Gonatas related to the festival of Nemesis: *I Rhamnous* 7, 17; prayers for the royal family: *IG* II³ 1 983, ll. 11–12; *IG* II³ 1 1002, ll. 24–25; *IG* II³ 1 1026, ll. 9–10; Liv. 31.44; Christian Habicht, "Divine Honors for King Antigonus Gonatas in Athens "in *Hellenistic Monarchies – Selected Papers,* ed. Christian Habicht (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2006), 286–288; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 151, 165, 167; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 144, 170–171; Homer A. Thompson, "Athens faces Adversity," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 50 no. 4 (1981): 352–354; Camp, *The Archeology of Athens*, 168, 170.

[26] *IG* II² 1011, ll. 14–15; *IG* II² 3474, 5080; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 160–161; Simić, *"*Athens in the Hellenistic period: From Antigonus Gonatas until Sulla," 102.

[27] Paus. 1.5, 17; *euergetes* were proclaimed on Ptolemaia: *IG* II³ 1 1313, l. 40; the priest of Ptolemy and Berenike: *IG* II² 4676; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 178, 182, 221; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 165; Allan C. Johnson, "The Creation of the Tribe Ptolemais at Athens" *The American Journal of Philology* 34 no. 4 (1913): 382, 383, 398; Kendrick Pritchett, "The Tribe Ptolemais," *The American Journal of Philology* 63 no. 4 (1942): 423–431; Camp, *The Archeology of Athens*, 168.

son and heir Eumenes II, known as a great benefactor of Athens, had a festival named after him (*Eumeneia*).[28]

Although the Athenians worshipped the goddess Roma, almost no Roman received divine honors. The most notable exception is Lucius Cornelius Sulla. He ravaged Athens in 86 BC and as a means of appeasing him, Athenians created a festival (*Sylleia*) and raised a statue in his honor.[29]

New Temples

This new religious sentiment that was brought about can also be seen in sacral architecture, or to put it simply: new cults demanded new temples. Although Athenians witnessed both the construction and destruction of their temples and shrines, I will focus here on that which were built, not on those which were destroyed.

Athenaeus, quoting the attidographer Phylarkhos, says that the Athenians living on the island of Lemnos erected a temple in honor of Seluekos I and his son Antiokhos when they returned the island to the Athenians.[30]

Eurykleides and Mikion, the liberators of Athens in 229 BC, erected the temple to *Demos* and *Kharitai* commemorating the liberation. Later that temple became a place where Athenians had erected the statues of their benefactors.[31] Second century BC saw one of the most ambitious temple building projects not only in Athens but in the Mediterranean. The construction of the

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[28] Liv. 31.15; Polyb. 16.25; Attalos' priest: *IG* II² 5080; Eumeneia: *IG* II² 2459; Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*, 172.

[29] Sulla's statue: *IG* II² 4103; Sylleia: *SEG* 20:110, l. 57, *SEG* 37:135, l. 2; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 311.

[30] Athen. 6.254F–255A. Attidographers were the writers of the local history of Athens.

[31] *IG* II³ 1 1137, l. 39.

temple of Olympic Zeus was started by the tyrant Peisistratos in the sixth century BC. The building had lain unfinished for several centuries. Then the Seleucid king Antiokhos IV Epiphanes (175–164 BC), another one of Athens' great benefactors, decided to have it completed. He hired Roman architect Decimus Cossutius, but even then, the temple construction was nor completed. The probable reason is the death of Antiokhos.[32]

Beside those constructions on a larger scale, numerous small temples were built and repaired. Antidoros, a priest of Artemis Kalliste, erected a stone monument near his temple. The Athenian Council of 650 (*Boule*) decided in 220/19 BC to melt all dedicated silver items in the temple of Hero Doctor and to make a statue out of them. Sarapion from Heraklea, priest of Aphrodite, had plastered the pedestals that stand in the temple and men's bathhouse from his funds.[33]

Foreign theophoric names

In the end, I will deal with a phenomenon in Hellenistic Athens which was associated with the new gods in the city pantheon. Theophoric, i.e. the names given in the honor of some god, are nothing new; they had existed in Athens much earlier. However, with the appearance of foreign gods in Athens, there are also personal names derived from the names of these gods. In order to stay within the bounds of this publication and the paper's topic, I will only mention two characteristic examples of the Egyptian deities.

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[32] *IG* II² 4099; Gran. Lic. 28.6; Vitr. *De Arch.* 7 *intro* 15, 17; Strab. 9.1.17; Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, 166; Camp, *The Archeology of Athens*, 174.

[33] Cf. *IG* II² 1364; *IG* II³ 1 1154; besides, melting of silver dedications into statue is attested in *IG* II³ 1 1220; Sarapion: *GRA* I 39.

The first example is the personal name Sarapion (Σαραπίων), derived from the name of the Egyptian god Sarapis, whose cult Athenians officially introduced around 224 BC. The earliest known case of the use of this theophoric name is the case of an unnamed priest of Asclepius from around 170 BC, whose father was named "Sarapion."[34] Assuming that the unnamed priest was then in his mid-thirties or mid-forties and that his father was in his sixties or seventies, we get ~230 BC as the possible year of Sarapion's birth. Naming children after the Egyptian god Sarapis should be seen in the context of close contact between the Athenians and the royal family in Alexandria. Sarapion as a name is much more common towards the end of the 2nd century BC. One of the wealthiest and most respected Athenians from ~100 BC, the hoplite general and the *epimeletes* (manager) of Delos, was named Sarapion.[35]

Another well-known example is the theophoric name of Ammonios (Ἀμμώνιος). There was a rich and prominent family of Ammonioi from the deme Pambotadai in Athens, which was associated with the temple of Apollo on Delos during the 2nd century BC. The oldest recorded member of this family was Ammonios (I) whose sons Ammonios (II) and Sarapion were epigraphically mentioned on Delos: Ammonios as a priest and gymnasiarch, and Sarapion as a contributor to the temples of the Egyptian deities. Ammonios (IV) is mentioned often in epigraphic finds. He was a priest of Apollo on Delos and as such appears on the famous list of prominent Athenians who gave money to organize the last *Pythais* in 98/7 BC. Also, because of his piety, he received the honors from Delphi in 102/1 BC, which he had visited before, during the Pythian

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[34] *IG* II³ 1 1386, l. 9; Dow, "The Egyptian Cults in Athens," 216 claims that from the second half of the second century BC there is an increasing number of theophoric names related to Sarapis.

[35] *IG* II² 2336, ll. 55, 136–137, 168–169, 201–210; *IG* II² 1034+1943, l. 58; there's and inscription *IRhamnous* 56 from the end of the 3rd century BC mentioning the mercenary commander in Rhamnous who was named Sarapion, but it's not certain whether he was an Athenian citizen; other examples are: *IG:* II² 1039, l. 22; *IG* II² 1944, l. 25; *IG* II² 1961, l. 45. See also *PA* 12557–12566. Searching the name Sarapion in the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, Database *Attica* (http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/lgpn_search.cgi accessed 25.6. 2019.) gives 47 results in total.

Games. Also, the residents of the island of Tenos honored him, and from the inscription, he was the *theoros* (the holy envoy) for the Delian festivities.[36]

Conclusion

The Hellenistic period brought many changes into religious life all around the Mediterranean. Athens was not isolated from this. Tendencies to create something new, to syncretize foreign and domestic are probably attested best in the cultic and religious sphere of life. Strong political motives were often behind these Hellenistic innovations.

In Athens, these innovations are evident in the worship of the Egyptian deities Isis and Sarapis. They were brought to Athens by Egyptian merchants, but they became very popular when the court in Alexandria became the official protector of Athens. The same tendency can later be seen with the goddess Roma.

The divine honors bestowed upon certain individuals had an almost exclusively political dimension. When the Macedonian royal houses ruled over Athens, the Athenians deified Alexander the Great, Demetrios Poliorketes or Antigonos Gonatas. When the Athenians needed protection from the Macedonians, they gave divine honors to the Ptolemaic and Attalid kings. And, when Lucius Cornelius Sulla conquered Athens, he received divine honors as well.

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[36] Ammonios (I): *ID* 1416 B II, ll. 72, 88; *ID* 1442 A, l. 25; *ID* 1452 A, l. 40; *ID* 2589, l. 17; Ammonios (II): *ID* 1416 B II, l. 88, *ID* 2589, l. 17; Sarapion, son of Ammonios: *ID* 1442 A, l. 25; *ID* 1452 A, l. 40; Ammonios (IV): *IG* XII 5 837, *ID* 1656. *IG* II² 2336, ll. 41–42 (=*SEG* 22:218, ll. 37–38); *FD* III 1 228; beside this, Ammonios is the name of hoplite general in 103/2. BC: *SEG* 22:218, l. 7; two ephebes: *IG* II² 1039, l. 23, *IG* II³ 1 1313, l. 152; the name can be found also on the inscriptions: *IG* II² 2317, ed. 48; *IG* II² 4870, 5322, 6760; searching the name Ἀμμώνιος on *Lexicon of Greek Personal* Names, Database *Attica* (http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/lgpn_search.cgi accessed 25.6. 2019.) gives 52 results. Cf. also *PA* 717–726.

Economic reasons, too, lay behind the introduction of new gods and cults in Athens and Delos. Various merchants, bankers, visitors, adventurers etc., were visiting great the harbors of Piraeus and Delos and brought with them their native cults. So did the merchants from Tyre who organized themselves around the temple of their city god Melqart. In this new environment, their god was identified with his Greek counterpart Herakles and worshipped as such. The popularity of foreign gods can be seen in personal names as well. Large numbers of Sarapions and Ammonioses are clear evidence of the popularity of those Egyptian deities.

The other, very important tendency is the re-establishment of old festivals. The Athenians revived the festivals of *Theseia, Aianteia*, *Pythais*, and the *Panathenaia* was celebrated with greater pomp. Still, there were innovations. The cult of Zeus *Soter* and Athena *Soteira*, established at the beginning of 3rd century BC, became one of the city's most important cults. Artemis gained a new attribute, that of *Phosphoros*. The same *Panathenaia* gained more and more international character. Athenians had summoned many foreigners, especially the Hellenistic kings to take part in their festival. Then, they used this international audience of the *Panathenaia* (as well as the Eleusinian mysteries, City Dionysia and *Ptolemaia*) to proclaim their *euergetes,* as often they were foreigners, and often they were kings. This was an opportunity for the Athenians to show themselves to the Hellenistic world and to promote their city.

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The Matrix of Radical Hindu Nationalism and the Synthetization of Indian History

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Abstract

India is highly divided across the economic, religious, and ethnic spheres; a state defined by an overwhelming diversity and the subsequent socioeconomic fragmentation. Since the late twentieth century, the discourse of 'Two Indias' has developed significantly, as well as shifting its foci from the socioeconomic severance to that driven by religious conflict. While the various forms of discrimination within India are not necessarily connected, oft minority groups of any distinction are inherently in a weaker economic position and prey to the frenzy of communal violence. India is a system framed around elitist aspiration, but it is built upon the bones of a split population-- those blessed with being born into an esteemed family, and those sentenced to a life of striving for the bare minimum. Indian nationalism is thus structured not around a specific aspect of the ethnic demographic, but rather around the aspirations of a techno-managerial elite to achieve economic 'greatness' which, as thus, is defined as state integration into the global framework. Indian History, a complex tapestry woven by strands that differ in dialect, ethnicity, and religion, has undergone a synthetization, in which the various narratives are morphed into a succinct metanarrative which, while digestible, undermines the significance of diversity in the identity of India, thus allowing for the delegitimation of minority groups. This is especially significant in the context of the pardons that occurred in March of this year, of the criminals responsible for the Samjhauta Express blast of 2007. With the reelection of Narendra Modi as India's Prime Minister, the political and social

system of India is steered by a majority that no longer believes in a democracy built upon diversity. Democracy is currently amid being redefined in the Indian context, and, as this shift follows the same trend as other populist remodels of political systems, an interdisciplinary analysis is especially significant. It is in in this context that I will be analyzing how the synthetization of Indian History has allowed for a prominent Radical Hindu narrative, fueled by nationalism, to emerge and proliferate through Narendra Modi's speeches.

Introduction

Although it is tempting to describe the global sphere in terms of contrasting black and white, often the stereotypes of heroes and villains are less accurate than theatrical, and the obscurity of an immeasurable diversity of belief systems and interpretations further mars any potential clarity. A nascent actor upon these stages is Populism, an ideological system based on the prioritization of a specific group of people within the nation-state that often benefits the leader of the state himself.[1] The contemporary socio-political sphere is defined by overwhelming Populism, with the four most populous democracies led by Populist leaders: Narendra Modi in India, Donald Trump in the United States, Joko Widodo in Indonesia, and Deodoro de Fonseca in Brazil. Populism is highly contested and vilified in the context of popular neoliberalism as it fundamentally relies on the villainization of a contrasting ethnic, religious, or social group. Despite the prevalence of popular disavowal of Populism as a political ideology and as a movement, it has exhibited rampant success in societies plagued by disillusionment, fragmentation, and diversity. As the most populous democracy (nine hundred million voters) in the world, India acts as an apotheotic example of this

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[1] I use the masculine denotation here as Populism is built on an ideological system that takes advantage of groups that can be (mis)represented as inferior, usually involving some kind of overt sexism. Thus, leaders of Populist states are nearly always male.

trend. With a political group in power (the Bharatiya Janata Party) that is driven by a far-right proto-military group (the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), analyzing how this group attains legitimacy within a society as diverse, disillusioned, and divided as India is necessary when observing the nature of the widespread populism movement. I intend to analyze how the populist synthetization of Indian History serves the purpose of Hindu Nationalism as represented by the pattern of the history of Hindu Nationalism within the context of the RSS.

The approach of this study will be to first analyze the historical and ideological roots of Hindu Nationalism with a focus on its popularization and vilification during the era of Mohandas Gandhi and Vinayak Savarkar, that is, the mid-twentieth century. The following section is dedicated to the identification of an Indian national consciousness and how it has morphed in the past century, specifically in the context of the massive economic changes and colonialist perspective that have played a significant role in the development of the 'idea' of India. Through the observation of this nationalist consciousness, it will be possible to establish the intent behind Hindu Nationalism and its main driving force within the Indian socio-political sphere, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The ideology of the BJP and the RSS is reliant upon the ability of the governing system to construct narratives of Indian History and identity, and the remaining sections will elaborate the functioning of these narratives, the role they play in the nationalist movements permeating the public sphere, and the crises that emerge on the coattails of this ethnic nationalism.

It is important to define the use of the term 'matrix' as it is one of those oft-abused constructions that leaves the audience with a far-dramaticized understanding of whatever it is used in reference to. However, in the context of Radical Hindu Nationalism and the massive changes it has brought to the practical, socio-political, and ideological sphere of India, 'matrix' is a concerningly fitting description. Coming from the Latin term *matr-, mater* meaning a female animal used for breeding or the parent plant, matrix defines "something within or from which

something else originates or takes form." A matrix refers to the natural material in which something is embedded, the origins, processes, and outcome as one cohesive unit. Radical Hindu Nationalism acts as a matrix for contemporary Indian conceptions of the past and themselves. As will be presented below, the BJP and RSS are responsible for synthesizing Indian History into a single indeterminable strand. Thus, the ideology that fuels this movement is the birthplace of majoritarian contemporary Indian identity (although this identity is multifaceted) birthing repulsion towards all identities antonymous to its own and strengthening the boundaries of national consciousness.

The principal resources utilized for this analysis are built on two contrasting foundations: the first culled from sources that are written by and for internal circulation of the RSS/BJP which includes excerpts from their website, memoirs written by members (including Vinayak Savarkar), and the speeches of Narendra Modi, and the second consisting of secondary sources written by reflective scholars, such as sociologists, economists, historians, political scientists, journalists, and the like. There is no single source more significant than the others as it is the cohesive network of information that provides the plexus for the evidence presented here. However, the theoretical basis for the research framework is provided by the seminal works of sociologists Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson concerning Nationalism, the concept of the public sphere by Jürgen Habermas, and the theory of hegemony by Antonio Gramsci. These are the theoretical narratives chosen to fit the Indian context as this article is not an exploration of the role of South Asian identity in the creation of nationalism, but an elaboration of how the BJP and RSS have a particular and nuanced ideology that echoes the most blatant forms of past nationalism and which rotates along similar axes of demographic disparity and economic, social, or political inequality, regardless of the nature of the society in which it emerges. These themes are fundamental to the development of nationalism and constitute the specific context which shapes how that nationalism is vocalized and mobilized within society. Thus, the theoretical models are valid despite the disparity in context, as the contextual aspects are dealt with by most Indian sources. While these scholars are overwhelmingly

Western men, it is their theory that is valuable to the Indian condition that I analyze here rather than the historical context in which they emerged. Thus, adeptly supplemented by content from various Indian and South Asian perspectives, these theorists provide the models relevant to the Indian context. Additionally, while these scholars were Western in education, they had a profound interest in non-western societies. Anderson, Gellner, Gramsci, and Habermas all analyzed non-western examples to which they could apply their theory.[2] Hindu Nationalist narratives can be made more legible and comprehensible when they are fitted with these theoretical frameworks.

Savarkar's India

The world is well-acquainted with the tale of Mohandas Gandhi, the values he strove to proliferate, and the social democracy that came into India on the coattails of his assassination. However, in conjunction with the tolerance and coexistence that monopolized the socio-political narrative in India during the period of decolonization, there was another significant ideology that claimed a large support base. Following the martyrdom of Gandhi during the movement for Indian independence in the late 1940s, the secular pluralism propagated by Gandhi became sanctified as his legacy while any oppositional ideology was quickly vilified and denoted as a taboo topic.

Vinayak Savarkar was a significant individual in the Hindu nationalist movement, spearheading the movement throughout the early to mid-twentieth century (1909-1949). He is credited with the popularization of the term *hindutva* (Hinduness), an identity built upon the

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[2] The list of areas in which these scholars conducted anthropological research is not especially relevant to the argument being made here. However, Ernest Gellner, the primary scholar on nationalism theory, conducted research in societies driven by Islamic fundamentalism and wrote extensively on the role of religion in non-western societies and how that impacts nationalism. See Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992).

inherent intertwining of 'Indianness' with the religious (or at least, spiritual) identity of Hinduism.[3]

Savarkar was highly unsupportive of the Indian National Congress, essentially believing that it pandered to the social democratic values of the West at large and to Britain in particular. However, the narratives Savarkar espoused were less about consistent loyalty to an ideology and more about aligning with whatever movements were necessary to proliferate his priorities—an India defined not by its tolerance of diversity but by the inherent and heavy presence of the Hindu spiritual and social canon.[4] While Savarkar's motivations and general presence within the political scene of India are generally considered antithetical to the typical development of decolonized societies, the potential of his influence has not been analyzed fully, as it was considered a topic of taboo to discuss him (for instance, members of Congress were forbidden to participate in public functions honoring him). Thus, the prevalence and significance of his message were stunted, and Indian society developed built on foundations of tolerance and diversity, while the population which empathized with Savarkar marinated in their discontent.[5]

This discontent stoked the fire through which Hindu Nationalism proliferated in the late twentieth century, additionally fueled by the imposed suppression of Hindu populist and anti-Muslim sentiment. Savarkar's ideology was ostracized as he was, so any portion of the population that shared his discontent was silenced in accordance with the reconfiguration of norms within the

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[3] *Hindutva* was originally coined by Bengali researcher and *bhadralok* ("man of letters") Chandranath Basu, in 1892. See Makaran R. Paranjape, "Hindutva before Savarkar: Chandranath Basu's Contribution," *hindupost.in*, January 11, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190513044206/https://www.hindupost.in/hindutva-before-savarkar-chandranath-basus-contribution/

[4] During the global mobilization effort, Savarkar supported the British war effort in India by propagating the military training of Hindus, declaring "Hinduize all politics and militarize Hindudom." See Gyanendra Pandey, *Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 127.

[5] Lauren Frayer, "The Powerful Group Shaping the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India," *NPR.com*, May 03, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/05/03/706808616/the-powerful-group-shaping-the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india?t=1562129133922.

Indian public sphere.[6] While these grievances were not allowed to be aired publicly, the discontent circulated within closed social subgroups, long-standing organizations, and populist institutions. An apotheotic example of the aforementioned organization is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a volunteer organization formed as a disciplined cadre in response to rioting between Hindus and Muslims in 1925 and built upon the desire to create a more cohesively Hindu nation.[7] Due to the suppressed nature of right-wing discontent, a significant portion of the Indian population was allowed to marinate in their disillusionment, mulling in a concentrated dose of distrust, dislike, and dissatisfaction. This invariably led, as it does within dissatisfied communities, to the widespread desire for definitive change and the willingness to make previously unconsidered moral compromises in the service of an impactful societal shift.[8]

India is a unique microcosm for a wider trend in the global political sphere—a shift from moderate social liberalism to (in some cases extreme) right-wing populism built upon a narrative of re-establishing a dominant national identity. However, the Indian majority, while preaching secular pluralism and the liberal democracy that is thematically associated with the western world by the Indian public sphere, is still firmly entrenched in a premodern system of discrimination against those who can participate in their democracy. Unless the division that is distinctly prevalent within the caste system is undone and the discrimination that is built into the fiber of the Indian

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[6] In this context, the concept of the public sphere aligns with the theory of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas, that is, the creation of dialogue between various parties and their affiliations, and the consequential emergence of a public that has access to a wide variety of information and is capable of critiquing and commenting on it. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,* trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

[7] Abdul Gafoor and Abdul Majeed Noorani, *The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labor* (New Delhi: Left Word Books, 2000), 5-15.

[8] As outlined in the theory of American Sociologist James C. Davies, when the economic, social, and political realities of a population do not align or directly correlate with their expectations, radical unrest (revolutions) are the subjective response. When represented via graph, this trend manifests as a curved upside-down 'J,' thus known as the 'J-curve.' See James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (1962): 5-19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089714.

identity dismantled, until there is horizontal social mobility and the defining distinctions between individuals become malleable and soft, India will always be at risk of backsliding into ethnic conflict in search of a nation, "one wedded not to femininity and nonviolence, but to masculinity and violence, not to Truth but to Victory."[9] While these are not the sole solutions to the complex socio-political conflict happening within India, they are a necessary step in pursuit of a more cosmopolitan and tolerant society, one that is merited by the nature of the globalized world India finds itself immersed in.

The Idea of India

Indian national consciousness in the nineteenth century drew from the romantic-orientalist style of nationalist historiography that was crafted by upper-class Hindus who had both access to the means of publication as well as a reliable, European-style education. This Hindi intelligentsia glorified an 'ancient' pre-Muslim India, one rooted in the era predating what many communal nationalists considered a foreign-imposed dark age during the Mughal Empire. Hinduism promotes tolerance and accommodation as its character, which thus allows the development of a composite Indian culture leading directly to the secular Indian nationalism that is propounded by the congressional system. Congressional leaders religiously brokered Hindu-Muslim pact(s) built on 'unity in diversity,' echoing the slogans that have defined neoliberal democracies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This 'soft' Hindu secularism provided the grounds on which the Congress was susceptible to the delusion of the historicism of its national roots and led to the creation of an inherently hegemonic dynamic. Hindu social and political leaders oft have majoritarian priorities, *sic* politicized claims of the necessary path to a 'better India' is one that is

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[9] Gyanendra Pandey, *Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 128.

misguided by preconceptions and biases that undermine the non-Hindu minorities under the banner of Hindu communalism.[10]

Hindu communalism began within the Hindu fold along the lower castes (such as the Dalits). The contempt and prejudice from the upper caste of Hindus, which was previously directed towards the lower castes, has since expanded in scope to include other communities with whom the elites had previously shared power without issues. Thus, the unique chauvinism of the Indian elite has devolved into a highly selective conceptual organism (comprising approximately 15% of the population) that simultaneously dehumanizes the Dalits, the 'tribal' groups, the lower castes of Hindus, the 'backward' classes as identified by the Mandal commission, as well as religious minorities (Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians).[11] Corruption flourishes in the margins, free to evolve and adapt to circumstances unobserved. India is a book made up, in the words of journalist Lauren Frayer, "entirely of margins."[12]

The Indian economic scene is defined by the ever-broadening rift between the classes, and society is constantly plagued by the institutionalized normalcy of overwhelming inequality. This inequality is put into relief when the expectations of a society as a whole are raised, especially in the context of a developing techno-economic state that rapidly transitioned from underdeveloped to highly developed in the span of a decade. This economic equality is nearly ironic, as the BJP's

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[10] Ibid., 130-155.

[11] The Mandal Commission, also known as the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission (SEBC), was instituted by the Janata Party (now known as the Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1979 with the mandate to "identify the socially or educationally backward classes" of India. See Marc Galanter, "'Who are the Other Backward Classes?' An Introduction to a Constitutional Puzzle," *Economic and Political Weekly* 13, no. 43/44 (Oct. 1978): 1812-1828. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4367065?origin=JSTOR-pdf.

[12] Lauren Frayer, "The Powerful Group Shaping the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India," *NPR.com* (accessed 03/07/2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/03/706808616/the-powerful-group-shaping-the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india?t=1562129133922.

narratives have a distinct tone of economic nationalism in which a ruling system bases policy decisions on the nationalization and internalization of the economy to fuel nationalist interests.[13]

The inequality in India is nearly severe enough to fragment the ethnic majority into infinitesimal variations. The stark contrasts in the quality of life between different classes and locations instils an intense diversity in the quotidian habits and priorities of the population. Discrimination in India is multipolar, the axes on which societal norms rotate can be ethnic, religious, or economic in nature, and each of these foci creates a visible rift within a rapidly de-homogenized population. Due to the broad nature of the discriminatory lenses and the inconsistency of governmental response, ethnic conflicts within India have extremified both in terms of physical violence and spatial scope. The government of Narendra Modi facilitates the festering of these conflicts, and the narratives presented by Modi (and, by extension, the BJP) are successful in their contribution to the propagation of hostile nationalist sentiment due in part to the longstanding metaphor of 'Mother India.'

Theoretical and Ideological Basis of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

A nation-state that is defined by such a significant economic divide finds justification for these differences in the spiritual sphere and thus the spiritual and physical realms are oft intertwined.[14] This can be observed in the pre-eminence of Hinduism in the national consciousness of India, present in political narratives, within the identity of a household, and a determinant force

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[13] Economic nationalism does not refer to a nationally-focused economic system, but rather Nationalism that is fueled by perceptions and misperceptions about the economic state, and the role it plays in the development of identity. See Salim Lakha, "From Swadeshi to Globalization: The Bharatiya Janata Party's Shifting Economic Agenda," in *Hindu Nationalism and Governance,* eds. John McGuire and Ian Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 106-108.

[14] Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

in the social standing of families. The lack of material wealth for a majority of the population drives a narrative of anti-materialism, one that is heralded by ashram-members, yogis following the practice rooted in Indian spiritualism, and by the citizens themselves.[15] Thus, regardless of the radical nature of discontent, India's identity is profoundly rooted in its spirituality, in its religion, and in the role these factors indubitably play within the socio-political sphere. The RSS is representative of the mass disillusionment with secular pluralism that has swept through India in the decades since Gandhi's death, claiming a membership of 6,75,600 which increases every day.[16] While the RSS defines itself as a social rather than a political organization, it has aligned itself with Hindu nationalism and is often associated with movements of both violent and nonviolent nature. The mission of the RSS is to popularize notions of an India that is inherently Hindu rather than divided between the various religious/ethnic minorities. Since the propagators of Hindu nationalism do not differentiate between religious identity as Hindu and ethnic identity as Indian, they automatically consider Muslim or non-Hindu inhabitants of India as an ethnic 'other.' The RSS refers to India as Hindustan (the Persian name for the Indian subcontinent), and while this does not typically refer to a religious affiliation, it nonetheless refers to the Hindu majority of the Indian population. On the official RSS website, their official mission statement is declared as follows:

The Hindu culture is the life-breath of Hindusthan. It is therefore clear that if Hindusthan is to be protected, we should first nourish the Hindu culture. If the Hindu culture perishes in

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[15] Edward Luce, a journalist observing the socioeconomic climate of India, stated "In India the sacred and the profane always seem to be linked." See Edward Luce, *In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India* (London: Doubleday, 2007), 5.

[16] The number of individuals that are a part of the RSS rapidly increases every day. Within a four-hour time window, the number of participants increased by over 200. While this could be doctored by the organization, the online program by which one joins the RSS makes this implausible, especially as a viewer can observe both the name and region of new members. See "Join RSS," rss.org, accessed July 02, 2019, http://rss.org/.

Hindusthan itself, and if the Hindu society ceases to exist, it will hardly be appropriate to refer to the mere geographical entity that remains as Hindusthan. Mere geographical lumps do not make a nation. The entire society should be in such a vigilant and organized condition that no one would dare to cast an evil eye on any of our points of honor.

Strength, it should be remembered, comes only through organization. It is therefore the duty of every Hindu to do his best to consolidate the Hindu society. The Sangh is just carrying out this supreme task. The present fate of the country cannot be changed unless lakhs of young men dedicate their entire lifetime for that cause. To mold the minds of our youth towards that end is the supreme aim of the Sangh.[17]

While bombastic, this mission statement is quite concise when one considers the scale of Indian ethnic, religious, and dialectic diversity and the associated implausibility of emergence of an ethnically homogenous nation from a highly fractured state. India claims the largest democracy with at least 900 million eligible voters, but those voters differ significantly across economic, ethnic, and religious distinctions and are further fragmented by their placement within the caste system. India is a unique example of nationalism as, despite their apparent incongruity, there is a sense of unity, especially among the Hindu community which prides itself on tolerance and respect, generally considered to be core Hindu values. It is because of these seemingly inherent values that advocates of Hindu nationalism believe that they are best suited to lead India politically, morally, and socially.

This mission statement outlines the prevalent role of Hinduism in Indian identity for the RSS since, more than a mere geographical entity, India is something built upon and fueled by the "life-breath" of Hinduism. Echoing neoliberal social activism, the mission statement brandishes

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[17] "Vision and Mission," rss.org, accessed July 02, 2019, http://rss.org//Encyc/2012/10/22/rss-vision-and-mission.html.

the sword of organization and the necessity of any movement to be organized in order to achieve even the slightest measure of success. This organization is achieved through the militarization and centralization of support among the Indian youth who are expected to dedicate their "entire lifetime" for the propounding of the goals of the institution.

It is important to highlight the role of Hinduism in the RSS as a cultural construct. Many of the RSS members do not regard Hinduism as a religion but as a defining aspect of Indian cultural and political identity. It is not out of religious fervor that they define Hinduism as superior to the other religious/ethnic identities within India, but rather out of a deep-seated belief that they as Hindus are culturally and ethnically superior to those that surround them. It is this same belief that leads some to believe that Hindus are the best suited to facilitating an environment of 'tolerance' as their belief system is built on a system of basic respect for all living things. However, this narrative has been militarized by the RSS and the BJP, both of which are built upon an unstable superiority complex which provides the justification necessary to villainize minorities.

Hindu nationalism is imbued with a desire for a masculine identity. As part of a nation that is pictorially self-defined as 'Mother India,' radical Hindu nationalists consider themselves to be the safeguards of the sanctity of her cultural and ethnic identity.[18] A necessary aspect of the radical Hindu argument is that the men of India have become effeminate through the inherently 'weak' nature of secular liberalism and 'soft' Hindu nationalism. This narrative is another face of the multifaceted ideological basis of radical Hindu ideology. Hindu activist and scholar M.S. Golwalkar stated in 1966 that "[n]o one can hope to survive with its young men given over to sensuality and effeminacy […] the world understands nothing but the language of strength."[19] Such

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[18] Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

[19] M.S. Golwalkar, *A Bunch of Thoughts* (Mangalore: Sharada Press, 1966), https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.489044/page/n5.

a perspective believes that strength is solely achievable through the masculinization of a populist ideology.

Thus, despite the potential of Hindu ideology to act as a conduit for tolerance in India, the RSS as the proto-militarized arm of the BJP, a right-wing conservative party that also claims the world's largest primary membership, often utilizes this argument as a justification for actions that are divisive and discriminatory. The superiority of the Hindu majority is reinforced in the minds of RSS 'ordinaries' through daily paramilitary training, drills, and *shakhas,* which are celebrations of five thousand years of Hindu history based upon traditional Vedic texts. The RSS is built upon this narrative of imbuing Hindu identity with an inherent historical significance, one constructed upon centuries of legitimate Hindu presence tracing back to the Vedic Age (1500-500 BCE) and emphasized during the Mughal Empire. The ideology of the RSS is built on the synthetization of Indian history, the creation of a single strand from innumerable social nuances.[20] This synthetization serves to bind together the Hindu demographic under an ideological umbrella that disregards economic and political differences, instead building solely upon an ethnoreligious identity. A society distinctly aware of the role of colonialism in the shaping of their identity and reputation, India is bound together by a common desire to be defined autonomously from the role they served in an imperial/colonial system. This is accomplished via two main pathways, one of which is socioeconomically rewriting the Indian reputation through the technological revolution of the 1980s and 1990s, while the other is reclaiming a 'glorious' and uniquely Indian history.[21]

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[20] Lauren Frayer, "The Powerful Group Shaping the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India," *NPR.com*, May 03, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/05/03/706808616/the-powerful-group-shaping-the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india?t=1562129133922.

[21] Ibid.

Nationalist Appropriation of History

The appropriation of their own history is a defining aspect of Indian politics, one that has been effective since Jawaharlal Nehru became the first Prime Minister of India. Through the belief in a combination of developmental promises, 'soft' Hindu secularism, and the desire for Indian national unity, there was the establishment of a congressional delusion that Indian nationalism had deep historical roots and this resulted in a strong and dynamic hegemony.[22] This develops based on the theory of Czech historian Miroslav Hroch, who claimed that the creation of the concept of the nation and the development of nationalist sentiment is conducted through a three-step process: a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the majority of the group; a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.[23] [24]

According to the Czech scholar Ernest Gellner, regarded as one of the foremost experts on the development of Nationalism, a vital aspect of Nationalism's ability to develop is social mobility, that is, the ability of an individual to improve their social standing based on a meritocratic system. Without this social mobility, a population is not capable of achieving universal high culture

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[22] Achin Vanaik, "India's Two Hegemonies," *New Left Review* 112 (July 2018): 32. https://newleftreview.org/issues/II112/articles/achin-vanaik-india-s-two-hegemonies.

[23] Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movements to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe," *New Left Review* 198 (March/April 1993): 70-99. https://newleftreview.org/issues/I198/articles/miroslav-hroch-from-national-movement-to-the-fully-formed-nation.pdf.

[24] The attitude of members of the RSS towards a distinctly Hindu memory of history is best outlined by Ratan Sharda, an RSS ideologue who stated, "see, we have forgotten our history. We have forgotten the great deeds our people have done." See Lauren Frayer, "The Powerful Group Shaping the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India," *NPR.com*, May 03, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/05/03/706808616/the-powerful-group-shaping-the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india?t=1562129133922.

which is a vital building block upon which nationalist sentiment is constructed.[25] The social

mobility that is necessary for conceptions of nationalism to develop is only prevalent for the upper

castes; the rural communities and minority groups within India do not have access to the education,

connections, or influence necessary to achieve a position of power. Thus, the upper crust of Hindu

society is the only socioeconomic group that has access to the universal high culture and social

mobility that is necessary for sentiments of nationalism. This, paired with the chauvinist aggression

directed towards all minority groups, results in a precariously balanced cycle of abusive authority

that continuously undermines India's identity as a democracy.

Although Gellner states that the "national and political unit should be congruent," the sheer

diversity and heterogeneity of India disallows the development of nationalist sentiment in the

traditional sense.[26] Democracy within India is deeply rooted in the ability of sharply differentiated

communities to coexist with the conception of 'togetherness' that is foundational to the Indian

ethos. India's rapid modernization of the late twentieth century following the period of

decolonization led to the adoption of the social organization necessary for the development of a

nation-state.[27] This is a difficult distinction for India since, in addition to economic disparities, the

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[25] The role of universal high culture according to Gellner is outlined in the following passage: "The basic deception and self-deception practised by nationalism is this: nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves." See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Blackwell, Oxford University Press, 1983), 57.

[26] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.

[27] In the typical sense, 'nation-state' is a far more precise concept than 'country' since a country does not require a predominant ethnic group, i.e. an *ethnie*. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism,* 2nd ed (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).

population itself can almost be regarded as multinational owing to the depth of diversity between various ethnic and religious groups.

The extreme diversity of India causes the innate complexity of Indian history, a tumultuous web of immeasurable threads characterized by the arachnid threat of ethnic nationalism lurking somewhere in its shadows. The ability to define and cope with this threat is achievable only in the acknowledgement and acceptance of a history that has been consistently neglected. Legitimized Indian history is a fable, an ancient Eden despoiled by Muslims and Europeans, an airbrushed colonial past, a chronic blame-game that leaves the contemporary reader sure of only one thing—India is but an idyll that has been exploited by the people within her boundaries. This false strand of history has been wholly internalized by the majority of the Indian population, a decisive struggle against the contradictory evidence, from the oral ballads of dispossession that have been woven through the generations to the Hindu liturgical buildings that creak with the weight of time and secrets.[28] History is something tangible within India, it is part and parcel of the daily interactions that the population has with their context: with the prominence of the Vedic texts, with the intrinsic interaction with the temples that surround them. K.S. Komireddi, analyzing the role of this synthetization of Indian history in the contemporary political sphere, observed that:

Such well-intentioned sanitization of the past was never, in the long run, going to be able to withstand the awakening of people to their history or sustain an inclusive nationalism […] Had India been honest about its past—about the atrocities that were perpetrated and the heritage that was ravaged—it might have desiccated the appeal of Hindu supremacism. It might have reconciled

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[28] Komireddi, *Malevolent Republic*, 46-48.

Indians to their harrowing past, provoked a mature detachment from it and denied Hindu nationalists the opportunity to weaponize history.[29]

The roots of reasoning of this sanitization lie in the nature of nationalist narratives that are cultivated to proliferate and justify violence, a technique of outstanding longevity, but one that is especially relevant in the context of Narendra Modi who, guilty of a pogrom of Muslims in his state only a decade before, fully intended to instigate epic social upheaval (and was surely elected for this purpose by a desperate population).[30]

The Nature of Violent Nationalist Narratives

Nationalist sentiment far predates nationalist movements, *id est,* radical violence oft geared towards a specific ethnic minority. For the purpose of personal 'moral' justification as well as in keeping with the rules of social engagement (even within a society that is rapidly hurtling towards conflict and the subsequent upending of sociocultural norms), a nationalist movement has a pre-established ideological system. This ideological framework provides the basis on which any violent movement builds its narrative, constructs the foundation on which it conducts its aggression.

In a society overwhelmed by white noise (of very little, if any, intellectual and social significance), the social theory of Gustave Le Bon, rather than being a rarity, has become problematically difficult to escape.[31] Nationalist sentiment within India today is one that strives for

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Sanjoy Majumder, "Narendra Modi 'allowed' Gujarat 2002 anti-Muslim riots," *BBC.com,* April 22, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13170914.

[31] Twentieth-century sociologist and philosopher, Gustave Le Bon, popularised the concept of 'mob mentality,' in that in any social context, the simplicity of a message is what allows it to be easily proliferated and propagated by much of a population. The content of the message is not nearly as significant to its social absorption as the simplicity of that content. Gustav Le Bon applied this theoretical framework to the rise of National Socialism in the Weimar Republic, but it is especially applicable for any society undergoing a dramatic shift in the social

a Hindu hegemony, and the current Indian government exploits such sentiments to make grand majoritarian promises built on the necessity of removal of Muslim Indians from the public sphere.

Hegemonic Crises

Hegemonic crises are manifestations of organic crises in which the majoritarian population ceases to be susceptible to the narratives of national leaders and begins to abandon traditional parties and belief systems in pursuit of grand social reform. These crises are often instigated by the failure of the ruling class in their attempts to accomplish a large socioeconomic task, one that inherently requires the sacrifice and consent of the population. Regardless of the length of the crises, the inability of any social organism to admit defeat or inefficacy ultimately leads to the utilization of historical mysticism and elaborate nationalist campaigns in a desperate attempt to appeal to nationalist sentiment. This establishes an insecure social context within which the old ruling class may be prompted to seek 'salvation' via the extermination of the oppositional elite and the accompanying support. This can be seen specifically in the current Indian context[32] whereby Narendra Modi is figured as a 'divine leader' who strives to fuel the fire of Hindu Nationalism through the consistent undermining of the legitimacy of the Muslim Indian population, one that claims the largest demographic behind Hinduism.[33] The contemporary intra-Hindu public sphere

narrative (often facilitated and spearheaded by Nationalism). See Gustav Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Cosimo, 2006 [1895]).

[32] This process is observed by the journalist K.S. Komireddi in his first-hand account where he notes: "Castigating Nehru was now a national pastime. Votes were being cast across India to elect a new government, and people complained, wherever I went, that Nehru had destroyed the country. An age was ending, and the aggrieved voice of a suppressed nation within a nation whose existence we, asserting our claim on India by reciting Iqbal, were oblivious to was closing in on us." See K.S. Komireddi, *Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India,* (New Delhi: Thomson Press Ltd, 2019), xv.

[33] Thomas R. Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (June 1975): 364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2708933.

is reliant on this vilification of the Muslim minority which acts as the necessary 'Other' that legitimizes the radical nature of nationalist Hindu narratives. By dehumanizing the dichotomous identity of Islam as antithetical to Hinduism, the BJP and RSS, with Modi as their mouthpiece, facilitate the popular narratives of hegemonic crises in tandem with the solutions to those same crises. This is accomplished through the simplification of Indian history, synthesizing what is a highly complex and fragmented history of incredible diversity into a single cohesive narrative that pits Hindu ideology against that of Islamic identity. The body of intellectuals within India have been militarized on behalf of this synthetization; historiographers motivated by ideals of improvement, fueled by a secular Congress, have done irreparable harm to Indian history by blurring it in pursuit of a false clarification.[34] Modi is a manifestation of contemporary Indian discontent, a signifier of a deeply-rooted dissatisfaction that has institutionalized the victimization of Indian morality and authenticity, conceptual spheres that have been sacrificed in favor of a blissful ignorance.[35] There is no filter to tame the unleashing of radical nationalism. It has been systemically dismembered by a parade of comprehensively incompetent leaders, all of whom were far too focused on measurable economic and pragmatic improvements rather than the far more significant sociocultural (and intangible) sphere. The ability of the Indian nation to heal and reform itself has been continuously undermined by the prostration of the moral universe at the feet of the greatest deity of a desperate people—the promise of radical change.

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[34] Komireddi, *Malevolent Republic*, 45.

[35] "Modi was the hand grenade hurled by all those who had been sneered at, stamped upon, marginalized, subjected to cultural condescension and objectified for anthropological amusement by the preening cast of English-speaking elites fostered by India's venal secular establishment. The mood in Delhi was euphoric as he took the oath of office. People victimized by Old India saw him as one of their own: for some, an agent of their hopes; for others, an embodiment of their rage." See Komireddi, *Malevolent Republic*, 76.

Conclusion

Within the highly complex societal framework of contemporary India, radical Hindu Nationalism has emerged as a prominent ideology and movement, culminating in the re-election of Narendra Modi as the fourteenth Prime Minister in May 2019. The BJP and the RSS have created a cohesive hegemony not only within Indian society (through the consistent undermining and delegitimization of minorities as 'Indian') but throughout Indian history as well. This has been accomplished through the morphing of decidedly diverse narratives of history into a single cohesive strand with the foci of a retrotopian perspective of a glorious past that was untouched by Islam, the prerequisite of Hinduism within Indian identity (with emphasis placed on Hindutva as the 'true' conceptualization of the primary organizing principle for the Indian nation), the necessity of the masculinization of the nation, and the simultaneous vilification of femininity. Although this synthetization of Indian History fits within a variety of theoretical frameworks, the specific focus on nationalism makes the twentieth-century scholars Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, and Miroslav Hroch, together with their theories outlining the significance of history, cohesiveness, and ethnic identity for the development of pervasive and prevailing nationalism, particularly fruitful choices for this study. The election of Narendra Modi is a culmination of societal crises, ones driven by the desperation, isolation, and strife of the rapid economic growth and Congress-driven fragmentation of the last century. The disillusionment with the secular pluralism of Gandhi, paired with the restriction of societal commentary to critique this ideology, reached its tipping point in the manifestation of social frustration that has led to Modi's empowerment. It is the vast varieties of perspective, inherent in any society as ethnically and economically fragmented as India, that act as her most able deliverers. Social growth that impacts the entirety, rather than just the majority, of society will deliver the homogenization that is so desperately desired—a people bound not by ethnicity, religion, or socioeconomic class, but by the desire to build something better for themselves through cooperation and respect.

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Electrified Sex and Gender: A Short History[1]

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Abstract

This article will examine the different developments of descriptions concerning sex and gender in German medical educational books from 1800 until 1860 based on theories of electricity. Separation of both female and male sex and gender is seen as developing out of a complementary model referred to until the end of the 18th century. Furthermore, the conception of each sex as well as gender changed over time. While the male sex and gender changed from a complementary sex concept to the divine half of humanity, the female sex and gender, as the other half, was reduced to a sexual organ, the uterus. During this increasing differentiation, the male sex and gender were equally reduced to the testis. Therefore, both sexes and genders experienced the same kind of development, but at a different time. While the conceptual reduction of the female sex and gender took place, female reproduction was identified as the prime aim of female existence. The starting points of this focus on reproduction were attraction and repulsion, so written in medical educational books. This terminology of physical movement had its origin in the scientific development and research of both magnetism in the 13th century and electricity in the 1600s, where attraction and repulsion were discovered as underlying movements.

Introduction

This article tries to portray the development of the bourgeois self-image found in German medical educational books. The primary aim is to show which theories were able to lay the groundwork for a separation-model of civic class and to outline at which time specific theories were developed and how they could emerge into their new contextual role. As this article touches on many topics, it shall not use an historical approach to explain the importance of the historical development of research into electricity. Rather it tries to link some ideas and disciplines to which the differentiating model, developed in the medical textbooks, refers to and how they correspond to one another. Of course, there are many more influences on the development of gender, but too many to deal with in one paper. There are many subjects integrated into this article such as philosophy, history, natural sciences, and history of science. Nowadays, philosophy and the natural sciences are entirely separate fields of science. This was not as always so. It can be seen, as an example, how the term "natural philosophy" separated into the natural sciences and philosophy, and that this transformation took place during the 19th century. We should keep this process in mind, while trying to sort and assign some topics and terms to different disciplines.

The first section deals with the medical differentiation and separation of men, and then women from one another using German-language medical educational books as a source. The second section tries to retrace the concepts of attraction and repulsion to outline the development of these concepts of movement. But at the same time, it will focus more on the importance of the development of scientific research into electricity and experimentation, dealing with Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum Scientiarum* as well as with William Gilbert's *De magnete*.

For the purpose of this article, the terms sex and gender will be used interchangeably because in the period discussed there was no differentiation between the two terms. Therefore, an interpretation of the sources in this differentiating sense would not be possible, as it does not

correspond to the knowledge and conceptual understanding at that time.[2] Besides, in the German language, one can observe a linguistic problem of the noun *Geschlecht*, because it includes both sex and gender in its meaning. As a matter of fact, *Geschlecht* in German medical educational books is used as a term (*Geschlechtscharaktere*[3]), which is semantically not divisible into sex and gender, but has both the behavioral, socially constructed (as in gender) and biological (as in sex) meaning. The concept of gender was not introduced until the 1960s, when it was first used for medical research into intersexuality.[4]

Differentiation of sexes and genders as a new concept of bourgeois self-imaging

At the beginning of the 19th century, a concept of family and work life, which divided these two spheres, emerged in bourgeois society, trying to cope with social change provoked by the

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[2] Note: Gender, if necessary, will be used as term for the behavioral component of a human being, meanwhile sex will strictly refer to biological.

[3] Note: In these medical educational books "Geschlechtscharaktere" is linked to the behavioral component of a human being and divided into male and female types; for the German explanation of the term see: Karin Hausen, "'Polarisierung der „Geschlechtscharaktere': Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben," in *Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas*: *Neue Forschungen,* ed. Werner Conze, Industrielle Welt 21, (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1976), 363:

"'Geschlechtscharakter', dieser heute in Vergessenheit geratene Begriff bildete sich im 18. Jahrhundert heraus und wurde im 19. Jahrhundert allgemein dazu verwandt, die mit den physiologischen korrespondierend gedachten psychologischen Geschlechtsmerkmalen zu bezeichnen. Ihrem Anspruch nach sollten Aussagen über die 'Geschlechtscharaktere' die Natur bzw. das Wesen von Mann und Frau erfassen."

In English my translation would be as follows: "'Geschlechtscharaktere', a term, which nowadays is forgotten, emerged in the course of the 18th Century and was used to describe psychological characteristics of sex and gender, which were thought to correspond to physiologic ones. These predications claimed to determine the nature or kind of men and women."; For an English version of this text see: Karin Hausen, "Family and Role-Division. The Polarization of Sexual Stereotypes in the Nineteenth Century: An Aspect of Dissociation of Work and Family Life," in *Social History of the Family in Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Germany*, ed. Richard J. Evans and W. Robert Lee, 51-83 (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

[4] Markus Paulussen, "Gender- Was bedeutet eigentlich gender?" [What Does Gender Actually Mean?], University of Bielefeld, last modified January 16, 2012, https://www.unibielefeld.de/gendertexte/gender.html.

Enlightenment.[5] This concept of division, supposedly based on biology, differed from the former *Ein-Geschlecht-Modell* (one-sex-model), a complementary model.[6] As the Bourgeoisie tried to accentuate its social differentiation and self-image[7], the transformation took place through the conceptual change of the female sex and gender: The new system divided what had once been seen as a complete whole into two different areas.[8] The bourgeois man was to be carrier of history, progress and intellectual achievements, while women were in turn expected to complete the desired 'wholeness' of men .[9] Following this new system based on the *Geschlechtscharaktere* (sexual stereotypes), a separation of the social, political, and private areas of men and women took place. As a result, women especially needed a new function, because detached from men they were viewed as socially dangerous.[10] At first, the rights and duties of women were discussed within the field of politics. The emerging humanism provided a new context for the discussion over the role of women: the life sciences.[11] Medicine and anthropology were part of these sciences, but new independent disciplines emerged as well, such as biology, chemistry or physics. In medicine

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[5] Karin Hausen, "Der Aufsatz über die 'Geschlechtscharaktere' und seine Rezeption. Eine Spätlese nach dreißig Jahren" [The Essay on the 'Geschlechtscharaktere' and Its Reception: A Late Harvest after Thirty Years], in *Geschlechtergeschichte als Gesellschaftsgeschichte,* ed. Karin Hausen*,* Kritische Studien der Geschichtswissenschaft, 202 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 88.

[6] Thomas Laqueur, *Auf den Leib geschrieben: Die Inszenierung der Geschlechter von der Antike bis Freud*, (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 1992), 177; For an English version see: Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Fre*ud. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

[7] Katrin Schmersahl, *Medizin und Geschlecht. Zur Konstruktion der Kategorie Geschlecht im medizinischen Diskurs des 19. Jahrhunderts* [Medicine and Sex. On the Construction of the Category Sex in the Medical Discourse of the 19th Century], Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien, 36 (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1998), 42.

[8] Hausen, "Polarisierung," 377.

[9] Schmersahl, *Medizin und Geschlecht*, 37.

[10] Hausen, "Polarisierung," 372.

[11] Claudia Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter: Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen und das Weib, 1750-1850* [The Order of the Sexes. The Human Sciences and the Woman, 1750-1850] (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 1992), ix-x.

specifically, anatomy developed into a legitimating science of moral physiology, understood as embedding social assumptions in physiological processes.[12] According to Claudia Honegger, anatomy as moral physiology was very successful, because of its visibility and tangibility.[13] This means that because of the physical appearance through physiology or anatomy, theories would not rest intangibly in mind, but moreover could be imbedded in the human body and therefore appear tangible. Moral physiology was a success because the proof of its theories was demonstrated through the physical, often visible characteristics of the body, therefore its arguments appeared to be 'real' or 'tangible'.

Physiology was practiced by doctors and medical science.[14] As Ilse Jahn concludes, during the 18th century, physiology was a new field, which examined the function of the animal and plant bodies. But by the end of the 18th century, it served as a way of understanding the vital force of the human body.[15] Claudia Honegger states that because of this reason, doctors could take up the role of „priests of human nature".[16] A shift of the discussion of the *Geschlechtsdifferenzen* (differences between the sexes) towards the field of natural sciences brought a series of interactions between every-day and scientific efforts of knowledge aiming to understand the actual kind of differences[17], which are tangible differences such as physiological or anatomical appearances. In

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[12] Ibid. "An die Stelle der Moraltheologie […] schob sich als zentrale kulturelle Definitionsmacht eine durch die ´harte´Wissenschaft der vergleichenden Anatomie legitimierte Moral-physiologie."; My translation would be as follows: „Displacing moral theology, moral physiology pushed forward as the central power of defining culture, being legitimized by 'hard' sciences such as comparative anatomy."

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ilse Jahn, ed., *Geschichte der Biologie: Theorien, Methoden, Institutionen, Kurzbiographie* [History of Biology. Theories, Methods, Institutions, Short Biographies] (Berlin: Gustav Fischer, 2000), 280.

[16] Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter*, ix.

[17] Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter*, Ibid., ix-x.

this context, Thomas Laqueur describes the female body as space for discussion for a new formulation of social interaction between men and women and the natural body as an object of social discourses.[18] Through the ongoing division of "facts" (science) and "fiction" (religion), Laqueur assumes, there was an attempt to scientifically underpin the social division by means of the natural sciences.[19] Gender-associated topics could not only be found in medical discourses from the beginning, but also influenced the ongoing ones.[20] The description of the body, both female and male, should serve the newly emerging bourgeois self-image.[21] Likewise it can be seen as the making of the social differentiation and the Bourgeoisie itself.

Depiction of both female and male „Geschlechtscharaktere" in medical educational books from 1800 until 1860

Eva Labouvie describes men in the period of 1800 until 1860 as the norm of a human being, whereas women were seen as the "Other", special creatures with differing physiological characteristics.[22] A more exact observation must be added to the aforementioned thesis. At the beginning of the 19th century men were seen, at least in German medical educational books, as the norm, but more and more they were reduced to the testis and bodily function. Women experienced an analogous development, but it went on much quicker. As Labouvie further states, with the

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[18] Laqueur, *Auf den Leib geschrieben*, 172-173.

[19] Ibid., 173.

[20] Schmersahl, *Medizin und Geschlecht*, 37.

[21] Ibid., 42.

[22] Eva Labouvie, "Himmelskörper - Menschenkörper - Frauenkörper. Die Ordnung des Kosmos und die Verortung der Geschlechter in den Wissenschaften des 16.- 19. Jahrhunderts" [Heavenly Bodies - Human Bodies - Female Bodies. The Order of the Cosmos and the Localization of the Sexes in the Sciences of the 16th - 19th Century], *Historische Anthropologie* 18, no. 1 (2010):16.

replacement of the social sex by biological sex as the prime category of interpretation of the relation of the sexes to each other, the human body emerged as the foundation and place of origin for sexual difference. The body was also connected with „cultural" masculinity and femininity, even if the biological mechanisms of sexual organs had not yet been discovered.[23] These attributes shall now be chronologically listed to show the ongoing shifts of arguments and descriptions and the development of gender differences as a reduction towards categories based purely on sexual organs.

The male sex and gender in medical educational books

At the beginning of the 19th century, the importance of man was stressed by several scientists. This was done by displaying him in contrast to how supposedly women acted, looked, and functioned. Women were presented as imperfect, therefore only a man could complete them. Ernst Bartels, a German professor of anatomy, gynecology and pathology, stated in 1809 that only through male support female reproduction could reach perfection and in this sense the goal of an 'absolute product'.[24] He describes men as animalistic, fertile and active as well as the providers of the energy for fertilization[25], meaning women are dependent on the nature of man concerning the ability of reproduction. The body of man is referred to as an absolute[26], in the sense of perfection. Johann Friedrich Meckel, a German surgeon and anatomist, showed in 1816 that there are nearly no biological differences between men and women. Just the costae I et II (the first and second rib)

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[23] Labouvie, "Himmelskörper - Menschenkörper - Frauenkörper," 17.

[24] Ernst Bartels, *Physiologie der menschlichen Lebens-Thätigkeit: Ein Lehrbuch für akademische Vorlesungen* [Physiology of Human Life Activity. A Textbook for Academic Lectures] (Freyburg, 1809), 342.

[25] Ibid., 342.

[26] Bartels, *Physiologie,* Ibid., 344.

are bigger in female bodies than in males.[27] In 1835 Eduard von Siebold, a German gynecologist, saw a link between the medical and social function of men. A man must be powerful and should be able to stabilize and secure his family. At the very same time, the good of the state would remain in his hands and the order of the world would be his duty.[28] On the other hand, from an anatomical perspective, the male pelvis is stronger but more narrow than the female one.[29] Von Siebold doesn't discuss the social aspects as changeable elements. It can be concluded that they are embedded in a medical perception. Therefore, von Siebold's depiction can be described more as a fixed state, and less of a questioning and analysis of the gender and sex differences described by him. The idea of the *Geschlechtscharaktere* seems to already have achieved a state of 'factfulness', so that it appears as something fixed and non-arguable.

Johannes Müller, a German physiologist and anatomist, in his *Manual of Humane Physiology For Lectures* („Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen für Vorlesungen"), characterizes social positions in conjunction with physical descriptions. A man was seen as taller and stronger, built to withstand „äußere Eindrücke" (outer impressions), physically and morally more powerful than women, more resistant against lust and displeasure, and in general more persistent.[30] As an exception, standing in contrast to other literature, he not only presents positive features, but also negative ones. Man is also more selfish and craves power and glory.[31] The state

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[27] Johann Meckel, *Besondere Anatomie: Knochenlehre, Bänderlehre, Muskellehre* [Special Anatomy [...]], vol. 2, *Handbuch der menschlichen Anatomie* [Handbook of Human Anatomy] (Halle, 1816), 79-80.

[28] Eduard Casper Jacob von Siebold, *Abbildungen aus dem Gesammtgebiete der theoretisch-praktischen Geburtshülfe, nebst beschreibender Erklärung derselben* [Illustrations from the Whole Field of the Theoretical-Practical Midwifery, Containing Descriptive Explanations], 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1835), 1-2.

[29] Ibid., 11-12.

[30] Johannes Müller, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen: Für Vorlesungen* [Handbook of Human Physiology for Lectures], vol. 2, 3rd ed. (Coblenz, 1840), 2:623.

[31] Ibid.

would be the perfect place of action, because a man is mentally more productive and can take considered and reasoned action.[32] In a next step, Müller describes semen as a possible way of passing on genus, species and individual components, but only through the „Einwirken auf das Ei" (impact on the ovum).[33] In this way, the female body or at least the female genitals act as a container and as a passive structure, waiting to be stimulated. Even biological descriptions and ideas seemed to have been in the context of social and moral opinions. Müller linked a social aspect to a physiological process, in contrast to what it was linked or more precisely what it was not linked to before: physiological processes.

Joseph Hyrtl, an Austrian anatomist, first described the testicles as being responsible for the *Geschlechtscharakter*.[34] His example of missing sexual characteristics are castrati, who are not able to procreate. Hyrtl sees in this case a disappearance of „geschlechtliche Attribute" (sexual and social attributes)[35] and also states that the penis has the ability to increase the sexual arousal (Geschlechtsgefühl) in women.[36] This is the moment where an equality in description and depiction of men and women is reached. Both sexes are on the same level of biological importance. Both share the same fate of having been reduced to sexual organs. But in this reduction lies the possibility of equality in medical science, at least on an anatomical level.

At the end of the 18th century, men and women were viewed as parts of a complementary whole. But with the emergence and further accentuation of the bourgeois self-image, men reached

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., 2:617.

[34] Joseph Hyrtl, *Lehrbuch der Anatomie des Menschen, mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Begründung und praktische Anwendung* [Textbook of Human Anatomy, with Consideration towards Physiological Substantation and Practical Application], 5th ed. (Vienna, 1857), 554.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., 564.

the status of perfection of mankind and subsequently a status of being the most suited for public family representation, reproduction and creative capabilities, as they (with the help of semen) would implant 'humanness' and human nature into the ovum. Soon after the male sex and gender had to face a reduction as well. It too was now seen defined by its genitalia. Before this biological reduction, man was almost seen as a godlike creature, while being male now was defined by the function of anatomy.

The female sex and gender in medical educational books

Perception of female sex and gender had a different development than male sex and gender. While men were viewed as capable of reaching a godlike status, the female kind had to face a radical reduction into the role of the incomplete counterpart to the male. Females could only become complete and 'whole' through fertility, pregnancy and reproduction. This new conception of 'completeness' implied a reduction to sexual organs. Next to this development, the descriptions of completeness shifted from being linked to social explanations to physiological explanations. Other important terms for the development of female „anatomical" and „medical" attributions were passivity and the objectification of women as an „empty repository", which was expected to be filled.

Ernst Bartels in 1809 describes women as „receiving" when they get fertilized.[37] They are also not capable to provide "material" for their progeny, so they have to get the substance in order to guarantee the development of the embryo.[38] Additionally, female sexual organs are to be seen as incomplete parts to the counterpart of male completion. Only through men could female

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[37] Bartels, *Physiologie*, 342.

[38] Ibid.

reproducibility gain perfection or completion ("Vollendung") in order to provide a "complete product" ("ganze[s] Product") – the child.[39] Passivity is mentioned directly.

Bartels says through male interaction ("ergänzende Mitwirkung des Mannes") women could reproduce the "substance" ("Stoff").[40] Substance in this case is meant to refer to offspring. Besides, the author compares women with planet Earth: as being acted upon by light from the sun in a beneficial way. The man is seen as the sun and the sun is described as something divine, ("[…] das über das Irdische erhabene Göttliche"). Also, women are described as "positive" and men as "negative".[41] The anatomist tries to depict men as dependent on women, but at the same time as being above them. When Bartels describes men as animals, he refers to women as plants, because of her „vegetating abdomen."[42] Again one can see a component of passivity. Along with the comparison to plants, the language of the author changes into being biologically influenced, for example „vegetating abdomen." He eventually underlines this separation semantically by using botanical terminology.

Johann Meckel's description has been mentioned before, therefore Carl Gustav Carus' *Lehre von Schwangerschaft und Geburt* from 1824 (Doctrine of Pregnancy and Birth) will now be analyzed. Carus, a physician and natural philosopher, used similar oppositional pairs to Bartels, but his opinions are based on the concepts of attraction and repulsion. Attraction is meant by him in terms of the human body as contraction and repulsion corresponds to extension.[43] If these

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 343.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Carl Gustav Carus, *Zur Lehre von Schwangerschaft und Geburt: Physiologische, pathologische und therapeutische Abhandlungen mit besonderer Hinsicht auf vergleichende Beobachtungen an den Thieren* [On the Teachings of Pregnancy and Birth. Physiological, Pathological and Theraupeutic Treatises with Special Regard to the Comparative Observations of Animals], vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1824), 2:121-122.

movements stop, the organs will start to degenerate.[44] Carl Gustav Carus also believed that the uterus had the possibility to periodically reach a complete development through these movements („periodische Erreichung vollkommner Entwicklung"), meaning pregnancy.[45] „Periodisch" (periodically) is a movement consisting of both attraction and repulsion. Attraction (contraction) appears at the end of the pregnancy and goes hand in hand with the birth of a child. Repulsion (extension) is the underlying movement at the beginning of pregnancy until the very moment of birth, whereas degeneration is the movement described as leading back to female incompleteness.[46] Next, he states that only through pregnancy and birth women act as builders and creators, which completes them, but if there is no pregnancy or birth, women are „incomplete".[47] By linking completion to the uterus, women were now primarily reduced to their reproductive capabilities.

Eduard von Siebold views reproduction as the sole duty of women, when he writes "[der] Zweck der Frau [ist] […] ein körperlicher […]" (the purpose of the women is a physical one).[48] Motherhood, in his point of view, is the possibility for completion of the female being ("alle Wünsche der Frau sind erreicht, sobald Schwangerschaft eintritt").[49] He also reduces female sexual organs to the function of procreation ("das Weib, welches nie Mutter geworden ist, hat ihr Dasein nur halb erfüllt").[50] Female genitals were on the same level as the women themselves: reproduction as the prime and sole aim of existence. Siebold too links female genitals to physical movement: in

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[44] Ibid., 2:129.

[45] Ibid., 2:134.

[46] Carus, *Zur Lehre von Schwangerschaft und Geburt*, 2:135.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Siebold, *Geburtshülfe*, 2.

[49] Siebold, *Geburtshülfe*, Ibid., 3.

[50] Ibid.

not being pregnant there would be a resting status, while in pregnancy there is „Thätigkeit" (activity).[51] It can be argued from the sources that eleven years after Carl Gustav Carus described attraction and repulsion as the foundation for reproduction, this thesis was still common in German medical science. Due to this, the idea of both movements seems to have had a huge scientific influence. I hereby suppose that the author was influenced by the idea, because both movements were part of new theories emerging in the wake of the uprise of electrical knowledge and experiments in the 18th century. I will examine this more closely in the following section.

Johannes Müller describes in his *Physiology* (1840) that women are weaker, imaginative and more sensitive, but at the same time without creative power („schöpferische Kraft").[52] On reproductivity he states that women do not need the nervous activity („Nerventätigkeit") to produce an erection and in this sense "rhythmical" attractions cannot be found ("keine rhythmischen heftigen Zusammenziehungen erfolgen"), since attraction and repulsion were seen as phases in a rhythm.[53] In 1857 Joseph Hyrtl attaches a bigger importance to the female sex as to the male, because of menstruation and pregnancy. Menstruation, Hyrtl further explains, serves as "periodische[s] Reifen [der] Eier" (periodical maturing of the egg-cells), while pregnancy serves as a "lange anhaltende Steigerung [der] bildenden Thätigkeit" (persistent increase of developing activity).[54] Here we can see a shift of argumentation and a shift of the female role.

The development of women in German-language medical textbooks between 1800 and 1860 can be summarized as such: At first women were viewed as the weaker part (plant) of creation/mankind and as inferior to man. While men gained legitimacy, women faced a loss of

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[51] Ibid., 2-3.

[52] Müller, *Physiologie*, 2:623.

[53] Ibid., 2:643.

[54] Hyrtl, *Anatomie*, 567.

value by being referred to and reduced to their reproductive organs, functioning by movements (attraction and repulsion) and maintaining this status quo until Joseph Hyrtl ascribed a higher value to the female sex in his medical works. Hyrtl was, at least in Vienna, an influential person due to his close connections to the aristocracy and the court, but also an internationally renowned anatomist.[55] At the same time, as Hyrtl was giving the female body a new meaning, a new scientific and medical field developed and split from medical science: gynecology. Claudia Honegger states a similar development by describing a disappearance of the differentiating model, concerning differences in sex and gender, since the middle of the 19th century.[56]

Electrification of sex and gender – *A short history of the scientific concepts of magnetic and electric attraction and repulsion*

So where did Carus and the other doctors get their terminology from? This paper argues that they used terminology from the natural sciences, especially from natural philosophy ("Naturphilosophie"), what we nowadays call among other things physics and chemistry. I will now demonstrate that these doctors linked it to new emerging scientific areas, such as anatomy and/or physiology.

If we want to look at the beginning of the theories of the movements such as attraction and repulsion going hand in hand with electricity (and magnetism), it all started with Petrus Peregrinus (Pierre de Maricourt), who described magnetic attraction and repulsion in his *Letter of Peter Peregrinus of Maricourt to Sygerus de Foucaucourt, soldier, on the magnet* ("Epistola Petri

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[55] Tatjana Buklijas, "Dissection, Discipline and Urban Transformation: Anatomy at the University of Vienna, 1845-1914" (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2005), 36-38.

[56] Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter*, 113.

Peregrini de Maricourt ad Sygerum de Foucaucourt, militem, de magnetein", 1269).[57] He discovered that like poles repel and unlike poles attract each other. The theory of magnetism (alongside with electricity) was additionally developed by William Gilbert, the physician of Elizabeth I. and Jacob I. He published a book in 1600, called „De magnete". Within it, Gilbert describes some experiments with amber, called `electron´ in Greek („Graeci vocant elektron" or in English "the Greeks call it electron").[58] Amber is seen by him as an electric substance: if it is rubbed against fabric, it can attract light fabrics. Attraction is called by him electric force („Ob eamque causam […] nec magnetice, nec electrice [vim illam electricam nobis placet apellare quae ab humore provenit] quoduis corpus allicere, aut prouocare possunt […].") and is linked to attraction.[59] Ilse Jahn refers to this book as the first theory of magnetism as well as electricity[60], but I argue that it can be seen as the first work that separates electricity and magnetism[61] and, as I suppose, the first work to assume a link between electricity and attraction, seen from an electrical

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57 Petrus Peregrinus [Pierre de Maricourt], *The letter of Petrus Peregrinus on the magnet, A.D. 1269*, trans. Brother Arnold, (New York: McGraw, 1904), 6-8, https://archive.org/details/letterofpetrusp00pieriala/page/6/mode/2up/search/attraction.; Or see Petri Peregrini Maricurtensis [Pierre de Maricourt], *De magnete, seu, Rota perpetui motus, libellus [...] mulgatus*, ed. Achilles Gasser, (Augsburg, 1558), 30-32, https://archive.org/details/petriperegrinima00pier/page/n5/mode/2up.

58 William Gilbert, *De magnete, magneticisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure: Physiologia nova, plurimis et argumantis, et experimentis demonstrata* (London, 1600), 47; for an English translation see: William Gilbert, *On The Magnet, Magnetick Bodies Also, And On The Great Magnet The Earth: A New Physiology, Demonstrated By Many Arguments & Expiriments*, trans. Silvanus P. Thompson (London: Chiswick Press, 1900), Book 2, Chapter II: "The Greeks call it ἤλεκτρον," http://www.gutenberg.org/files/33810/33810-h/33810-h.htm#BII.1.

59 Ibid., "For it pleases us to call that an electrick force, which hath its origin from the humour."

60 Ilse Jahn, *Geschichte der Biologie*, 213.

61 Friedrich Steinle, "Wissen, Technik, Macht: Elektrizität im 18. Jahrhundert" [Knowledge, Technology and Power. Electricity in the 18th Century], in *Macht des Wissens: Die Entstehung der modernen Wissensgesellschaft*, ed. Richard van Dülmen and Sina Rauschenbach, (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), 516-517.

point of view. At least, William Gilbert has been referred to as the "the founder of magnetic and electrical science".[62]

In the 17th century, Isaac Newton, a famous physicist who linked body mass and force of attraction, started developing a groundbreaking theory. He described a non-materialistic force as the foundation for all movements: gravitation.[63] Gravitation is calculated from the relation between body mass and attraction, but for this topic the importance lies in the term „body mass". Thus, the term „body", for the first time, as she puts it and which reflects a venturous thesis, can be seen as linked to attraction.

As a further explanation, I would describe it as such: attraction was written into the, or at least into a body as a kind of invisible force, which can be described, as we will later see, as one initial point for theories portrayed before the and emerging in the 19th century and dealing amongst others with the origin of fertility. In the 18th century, electricity can be understood as part of these inherent forces and becomes — as far it could — independent from magnetism, because scientists developed an experimental approach[64], seen by the example of Prokop Divisch, who is examined later. Also, in the second half of the 18th century the number and social recognition of electrical experiments changed to the extent that they were given consideration as cure for diseases, which will be explained as well. The founder of the theory on experimental observation as the foundation of the natural science was, amongst others, Francis Bacon.[65] In his *Novum organum scientiarum* ("*New organon, or true directions concerning the interpretation of nature"*) he concludes that

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[62]James D. Livingston, "An Electromagnetic Personality," *Nature* 407, no. 6803 (2000): 453.

[63] Ilse Jahn, *Geschichte der Biologie*, 231-232.

[64] Heinz Otto Sibum and Jörg Meya*, Das 5. Element: Wirkungen und Deutungen der Elektrizität* [The 5th Element. Effects and Interpretations of Electricity] (Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), 117.

[65] Ilse Jahn, *Geschichte der Biologie*, 197.

experiments should be central methods to protect from misinterpretation and a naive understanding of nature.[66] The connection between Bacon's empiricism and modern philosophical empiricism was recently stressed by Claire Crignon who asks if "empiricism" is the right term to describe "the modern English philosophical tradition from Bacon to Locke"[67] and instead urges to further explore all different shades of the terms' meaning.[68]

It seems as if scientists, such as Alexander von Humboldt, were following this scientific ideal put forth by Bacon in the 18th century.[69] Before, only academic societies and courtly theater productions came in touch with electric experiments, but the fascination with electric experiments in the middle of the 18th Century[70] were requirements for the spread of this phenomenon.[71] A similar development took place at the beginning of the 18th Century, as the state of knowledge and science was more heterogeneous than uniform ("[…] der Stand von Wissen und Forschung bot auch noch zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts ein zerfasertes und uneinheitliches Bild").[72] This status quo stemmed from the lack of interest due to the ignorance of how to deal with this `mysterious

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[66] Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, ed. Andreas Tosi (Venice, 1762), 27; For an English translation see also: Francis Bacon, *The New Organon: Or True Directions Concerning the Interpretation Of Nature*, ed. Jonathan Bennett (Early Modern Texts, 2017), https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/bacon1620.pdf.

[67] Claire Crignon, "The Debate about methodus medendi during the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century in England: Modern Philosophical Readings of Classical Medical Empiricism in Bacon, Nedham, Willis and Boyle," in *Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18th Century*, ed. Claire Crignon, Carsten Zelle, and Nunzio Allocca, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 14.

[68] Ibid., 33.

[69] Ilse Jahn, *Geschichte der Biologie*, 280-281.

[70] Heinz Otto Sibum, "Experimentalists in the Republic of Letters," *Science in Context* 16, no. 1-2 (2003): 93-94.

[71] Sibum and Meya, *Das 5. Element*, 61: "Schlechte wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse und die von den elektrischen Phänomenen ausgehende Faszination waren Voraussetzungen zur Entstehung eines neuen Berufszweiges, des Elektrisiers."; My translation would be the following: "A bad economic situation and the fascination concerning electric phenomenons laid the groundwork for a new profession called ´Elektrisier´ [electritioner],"

[72] Steinle, "Wissen, Technik, Macht," 517.

force´.[73] But from 1733 onwards, the interest in electricity grew dramatically, because Charles Dufay´s work "Quatrième mémoires sur l´électricité" (The fourth memoirs on electricity) whose author had excellent contact with the *Académie royale des sciences* in Paris, was published and could not be ignored any longer. Dufay, amongst others, was at the forefront of private experimentation with electricity.[74] Electrical experiments were transformed from being performed in a private space to emerging into first courtly and then public entertainment.[75] Regions were these experiments were conducted (such as a machine for electrification[76]) were Germany, France and Bohemia. The experiments and demonstration of the instrumental domination of nature strongly improved the social standing of the experimenters. They became moral, political, as well as theological authorities, but most of them were not educated academically.[77] A person deeply involved in this new field of knowledge was Prokop Divisch, a Bohemian pastor. In the midst of the 18th Century he began treating patients with electricity.[78] Scientists started to use electricity on patients as well, such as Jean Jallabert in Halle or Johann Heinrich Winkler in Leipzig.[79] But medicine, according to Friedrich Steinle, was not the main purpose of using the electrical force. Rather he supposes that entertainment and showman industry were the "big players".[80] However, "the rising experimental research on electricity and magnetism played a key role in changing

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid., 523-524.

[75] Ibid., 525-532.

[76] Steinle, "Wissen, Technik, Macht," 526: The German term for this machine is "Elektrisiermaschine."

[77] Sibum, Meya, *Das 5. Element,* 62-63.

[78] Ibid., 117, see also Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, "The Esoteric Uses of Electricity: Theologies of Electricity From Swabian Pietism To Ariosophy," *Aries* 4, no. 1 (2004):70-71.

[79] Steinle, "Wissen, Technik, Macht," 534.

[80] Ibid.

scholarly opinion about the epistemological status of the art of experiment".[81] And this is the key point: Albeit the different fields of research (e.g. medicine or public attraction), electrical experiments per se were able to offer a new academic, experimental approach. The previously mentioned developing strains concerning the usage of electricity started with private experimenters, often situated near locations of the "knowledge industry" (e.g. the Académie royale de sciences in Paris). These experimenters built on each other's methods, took up the scientific study of electricity, and consequently were a key factor concerning the transmission of key terms, such as "attraction" and "repulsion".

At the end of the 18th century, electricity experienced a total experimental transmission to the natural and medical sciences, such as e.g. Alexander von Humboldts *Ueber die Anwendung des Galvanischen Reizmittels auf die praktische Heilkunde* [On the Application of the Galvanic [...]] (1797).[82] Humboldt's influence and importance is a perfect example of becoming a moral and political authority. Humboldt tried to understand the process of life and the vital force by experimenting with electricity.[83] Reproduction as part of the process of life became (at the beginning of the 19th Century) the prime aim for women soon after. At this point in time the shift of practitioners in the 'electric science' was complete, from private experimenters to academic scholars. Experiments were now run in an academic milieu, bypassing its former space, the court and the public field. Because of this shift from public to academic, I argue that electricity was at the beginning to some extent a public phenomenon, awakening the interest and enthusiasm amongst the public and reaching the attention of scholars, who ultimately embedded and transformed it into a scientific discourse. Furthermore, and this is the main thesis of this paper, this shift could have

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[81] Sibum, "Experimentalists in the Republic of Letters," 93.

[82] Ilse Jahn, *Geschichte der Biologie*, 280-281.

[83] Ibid.

animated physicians, anatomists, physiologists and other actors in the medical field to adopt this knowledge and place it in their new theories on sex and gender differences between men and women. Ultimately, the evidence is in the language (attraction and repulsion), found in medical educational books.

This evidence corresponds to the development of the accumulation of the German terms "Anziehung" (attraction), "Abstoßung" (repulsion) and the more general "Elektrizität" (electricity). For the purpose of a quantitative survey, the "Deutsches Textarchiv", an online tool and database for the history, the accumulation and usage of terminology found in German texts, was used.[84] All three terms (attraction, repulsion and electricity) show a similar development to some extent. At the end of the second half of the 18th century, the amount of texts using these terms starts to grow exponentially.[85] Yet it needs to be mentioned, that the database "Deutsches Textarchiv" is limited to a corpus of 4162 texts. Nevertheless, it shows the proportion between terms and literature, and this relation should be contextualized in the field of the newly developing/ separating sciences and newly emerging theories of science.

What can be summarized is that through the centuries the theories concerning electricity were developed further by separating electricity from magnetism, as Gilbert did. Following this first period, the empiric, ´baconistic´ view on experimentation influenced science, at least to the extent that the the 18th Century became the century of electrical experiments. This in turn lead to a transfer from electricity as a source of public entertainment in parts of Europe to electricity being used in the scientific field as a foundation of newly developing knowledge and discipline at the turn of the 19th Century.

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[84] Deutsches Textarchiv, accessed March 18, 2020, http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de.; As for the statistics the table of figures shows all three terms in the proportion between the accumulation of each of them and time.

[85] See appendix.

Conclusion

After the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, the bourgeoisie tried to find a new legitimation in private life as well as in public life after family compositions and dynamics changed. The concept of the private family changed from a model referring to men and women as a unit to one separating the spheres of action of both sexes. For nearly more than twenty years (1809 to ca. 1857), man was uplifted by natural scientists as an actor in public space, whereas the woman was degraded and reduced to her ability to produce and guarantee descendants, as the aforementioned sources show. But in the middle of the 19th Century, as can be observed, the dynamics changed again, and man faced the same fate women faced before: the reduction to biological function of reproductive organs. This paper argues that there is a dearth of literature on this topic, and that further research is needed. If we try to understand how the separation of the male and female sex and spheres in a primarily social and biological meaning could have taken place, following the development of the attraction and repulsion opens a possible avenue of research. Both electrical as well as magnetic movements as concepts evolved in the course of the formulations of new electrical doctrines, since William Gilbert disassociated them from magnetism in the 17th century, into the foundation of the biological and social separation of men and women. In conclusion, I argue that this evolution ultimately took place due to the rise of displays of electrical phenomena, first in private, then at court, and then as public source of entertainment and edification. This ultimately led to electricity being transformed into the object of a scientific field of research, anchored deeply in the natural sciences. In this context, electrical concepts were transferred and provided the conceptual foundation for newly developed medical and biological theses. As a result, I argue that these theses played a major role in the accentuation of the bourgeois self-image and were the reason for the separation of men and women in a social and biological sense.

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
Appendix

Figure 1: Relation between the accumulation of the term "Anziehung" (attraction) and time (in decades). Deutsches Textarchiv, accessed March 18, 2020, http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de.


Figure 2: Relation between the accumulation of the term "Abstossung" (repulsion) and time (in decades). Deutsches Textarchiv, accessed March 18, 2020, http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de.

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Figure 3: Relation between the accumulation of the term "Elektrizität" (electricity) and time (in decades). Deutsches Textarchiv, accessed March 18, 2020, http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de.

Book Reviews

Kimura, Kan. *The Burden of the Past: Problems of Historical Perception in Japan-Korea Relations*. Translated by Marie Speed. Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan Press, 2018. Paperback, €30.50, ISBN: 978-0-472-05410-7

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Kan Kimura, an expert on Korean-Japanese relations, is a professor at Kobe University. His work *The Burden of the Past: Problems of Historical Perception in Japan-Korea Relations* is a reexamination of the complex historical layers that have shaped and continue to shape the relationship between South Korea and Japan. In both countries, public historical discourse is overwhelmingly nationalist in nature. This has resulted in diverging perceptions of the past and is reflected in their respective foreign policies towards each other, as neither is willing to make concessions over the fear of public backlash. This work represents a synthesis of studies undertaken by other scholars, which were primarily case studies of individual issues of historical perception.

Kimura begins in Part I by searching for the frequency of key terms (Japan Textbooks, Comfort Women, Volunteer Labor Corps, Yakusuni, and Pro-Japanese Collaborator) in the main newspapers in Korea[1] (*Chosun ilbo*) and Japan (*Asahi shimbun*) to analyze the visibility of trends. Several adjustments were then made to the search process, such as the creation of an index to

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[1] Any mention of Korea from this point forward will automatically refer to South Korea (Republic of Korea). North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) will be specifically referred to as such.

account for factors such as increases in newspaper length over time and other variables. The author was able to find that most of these issues most prominently emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. He attributed this increase to three broad historical factors, most notably: the emergence of a generation that had neither experienced nor had a stake in the period of Japanese colonization, changing International Relations such as Japanese and American rapprochement with China and the end of the Cold War, and South Korea's own economic growth and a decreased reliance on Japan for trade. The democratization movement in South Korea also removed barriers to expression in the public sphere.

The theoretical framework introduced by Kimura to analyze how issues of historical perception emerged is in the form of a three-stage process. Firstly, an event and its significance has to be "discovered" by multiple actors. Secondly, their perceptions of this event must clash. Thirdly, the actors must invest sufficient importance in the matter, to outweigh the negative consequences that a clash would cause. According to him, issues of historical perception are rarely about the absolute importance of an event, but rather on the relative importance to the different actors. He continues to argue throughout the publication that both case studies are examples of a "rediscovery" of historical events relating to the relationship between both countries and that various politico-economic factors bring these to the foreground.

Part II focuses on the emergence and process of the first case study: the History Textbook Issue. This continues to remain one of the most critical issues between the two countries. He argues that the textbook issue first came to the forefront in 1982, with the launch of textbook screening processes in Japan after the Chinese government had lodged an official complaint about the content of a textbook. The new generation of Japan cognoscenti in South Korea saw this as an opportunity to educate the public about the content of textbooks in Japan, which led to the discovery that historical perceptions varied quite significantly between both countries. The emergence of the People's Conference and the long process to publish their revisionist *New Version of Japanese*

History textbook further complicated relations. During this time, both countries' governments were able to somewhat control discussion on the topic. They sought to do this as Cold War dynamics were still prominently active, and each viewed the other as a fellow member of the "free world" that could not afford to have such an issue harm wider relations.

The final part, Part III, is a case study on another very prominent disagreement between the two: the Comfort Women Issue. This issue came to the forefront after decades of *Gisaeng* tourism from Japan, former comfort women telling their stories publicly for the first time in the early 1990s, and the formation of private organizations such as *Chongdaehyop* who advocated for the issue to be addressed. The Japanese government had no interest in addressing issues of compensation, which it felt had all been handled under the 1965 Treaty of the Normalization of Relations and Claims Settlement Agreement. South Korea pressed for a full investigation, which led to the Kono Statement and a series of apologies by subsequent Prime Ministers. The lack of specificity and perceived insincerity of the apologies as a result of a series of "irresponsible statements" made by key officials of the Japanese government further escalated this issue. Finally, the end of the Cold War ushered in a period of populist patriotism in both countries, with the issue being approached differently by each incoming administration depending on the domestic political situation, which has not led to a de-escalation until today

The most notable merit in this publication lies in the fact that it adds volume to a field within which little formal study has been undertaken in an English language context. Since the text was originally published in Japan, it provides us with an insight into what is written for the Japanese domestic market. Despite this, with some small exceptions, the approach to this highly political issue was methodical and detached, blaming escalations in both countries for the emergence of the disputes. Both the Textbook Issue and the Comfort Women Issue were investigated in terms of their origins and political effects, and not on a moral basis or whether one side had a "right"

perception of history. The publication provides readers with a good introductory basis for the issue, as understanding the text did not require extensive knowledge of either country.

Despite all the merits, there are a few flaws to the approach. The author fails to address the popular factors raised by such issues, namely the emotive force that a history of colonization has in a country, and the personal histories intertwined with this. The publication focuses on the issues of historical perception playing out almost entirely on an abstract politico-economic level. While mentioned, the actions of private individuals, civil society organizations, and the general public, could have been more at the forefront. There was also little mention of how the advent of the internet, which provided more opportunities for citizens of both countries to communicate directly, has influenced debates on historical perception.

The methodology, at least at the start of the publication with the investigation into and the overreliance on newspapers is also slightly problematic. While searching for key term does show the frequency with which an issue is discussed, it still completely removes these terms from the context of the articles they were written in. The author also frequently mentions that over time the amount of references to Japanese imperialism in Korea increased in Japanese History textbooks, and that this was evidence for an increased awareness of the issue in Japan. Once again, it is unclear what the wider context of the referencing of these terms was, as they could have also discussed Japanese colonization in an apologetic matter for example. The frequent use of editorials as mouthpieces for public opinion is also a bit limiting, especially since newspapers in Korea were subject to government censorship until 1987.

A welcome addition to this publication would have been suggestions for a way forward with the historical perception issue. This leaves many open questions, for example: What could be some concrete steps that both governments could take towards reconciliation and joint remembrance? Could the United States play a role? Will China's growing power or a reemergence

of the North Korean threat once again put both countries into a Cold War-like situation, thereby forcing them into a working relationship? This future perspective was distinctly lacking.

What is particularly difficult about a work like this, and Kimura refers to this himself, is that it is not possible to reach a satisfactory conclusion as these issues are still very much ongoing. In fact, issues of historical perception have flared up again recently, and the Japan-Korea relationship is currently at a low point with no solution in sight any time soon.[2] Each new administration in either Japan or Korea brings along with it a novel approach on how to deal with issues of historical perception or escalate them for that matter. This opacity is affected by everything from the state of the economy to the strength of the administration's political foundation. It is precisely the continued relevance of this issue that highlights the value of a work like Kimura's which, despite some shortcomings, sheds light on the complicated origins of this conflict.

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